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Supreme Court 
APPELLATE D I V I S I O N — F I R S T DEPARTMENT. 
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
against 
GEORGE TOUCHE, J O H N B . NIVEN, 
ANDREW W . TAIT , CHARLES 
R . W H I T W O R T H , H E N R Y E . 
MENDES, FRANCIS J . CLOWES, 
VICTOR H . S T E M P F , E . H . WAG-
NER a n d C . A . H . NARLIAN, 
copartners under the firm 
name and style of Touche, 
Niven & Co., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Statement Under Rule 234 . 
The action was commenced by the personal 
service of the summons on the defendant Clowes on 
November 19, 1926, and on the defendant Narlian 
on May 31, 1927. The defendants Mendes and 
Niven appeared voluntarily on December 9, 1926. 
The amended complaint was served February 24, 
1927. The answer of defendants Niven, Mendes 
and Clowes was served March 16, 1927, and the 
answer of defendant Narlian on June 20, 1927. 
By stipulation dated November 17, 1927, the an-
swers of defendants filed were also deemed to be the 
answers of defendants Touche, Tait, Whitworth, 
Stempf and Wagner. 
1 
2 
3 
2 
Statement Under Rule 234. 
On June 22, 1927, an order was entered striking 
out the first affirmative defense upon the ground 
that it was insufficient in law, which thereafter was 
unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division 
of the First Department (see 222 App. Div. 737), 
and on April 13, 1928, was affirmed by the Court, 
of Appeals (248 N. Y. 517). 
During the trial the amended complaint was fur-
ther amended by adding a second cause of action. 
Plaintiff appeared by Hirsch, Sherman & Lim-
burg and defendants by Guggenheimer, Unter-
myer & Marshall. Thereafter Limburg, Riegelman, 
5 Hirsch & Hess were substituted as attorneys for 
plaintiff. 
The full names of the parties appear above. 
There has been no change of parties or of attorneys 
herein. 
G 
3 
Notice of Appeal to Appellate Division. 
S U P R E M E C O U R T , 
N E W YORK COUNTY. 
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
against 
GEORGE A . TOUCHE, J O H N B . 
NIVEN, ANDREW W . TAIT, 
C H A R L E S R . W H I T W O R T H , 
HENRY E . MENDES, FRANCIS J . 
CLOWES, VICTOR H . STEMPF, 
E . H . WAGNER a n d C . A . H . 
NARLIAN , copartners under the 
firm name and style of Touche, 
Niven & Co., 
Defendants. 
Sirs: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the plaintiff in the 
above entitled action hereby appeals to the Appel- 9 
late Division of the Supreme Court, First Depart-
ment, from the judgment of the Supreme Court, 
New York County, entered in the office of the Clerk 
of the County of New York on the 1st day of July, 
1929, in favor of the defendants and against the 
plaintiff, dismissing the amended complaint herein 
on the merits and awarding defendants the sum of 
$126.26 costs, and from each and every part of said 
7 
8 
4 
10 Notice of Appeal to Appellate Division. 
judgment, and also from so much of an order en-
tered in said Clerk's office on the 25th day of June, 
1929, as sets aside the verdict of the jury herein 
and directs the said judgment. 
Dated, New York; July 8th, 1929. 
LIMBURG, RIEGELMAN, HIRSCH & HESS, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, 
160 Broadway, 
Borough of Manhattan, 
New York City. 
1 1 TO 
GUGGENHEIMER, UNTERMYER & MARSHALL , Esqs., 
Attorneys for Defendants, 
120 Broadway, 
Borough of Manhattan, 
New York City. 
T O : 
THOMAS M . FARLEY , E s q . , 
Clerk of New York County. 
12 
5 
Summons. 
S U P R E M E C O U R T , 
N E W Y O R K COUNTY. 
ULTRAMARES CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
against 
GEORGE TOUCHE, J O H N B . NIVEN, 
ANDREW W . TAIT , CHARLES 
R . W H I T W O R T H , H E N R Y E . 
MENDES, FRANCIS J . CLOWES, 
VICTOR H . S T E M P F , E . H . W A G -
NER a n d C. A . H . NARLIAN, 
copartners under the firm 
name and style of Touche, 
Niven & Co., 
Defendants. 
To the above-named Defendants: 
You ARE HEREBY SUMMONED to answer the com-
plaint in this action and to serve a copy of your 
answer, or, if the complaint is not served with this 
summons, to serve a notice of appearance on the 
plaintiff's attorneys within twenty days after the 
service of this summons, exclusive of the day of 
service. In case of your failure to appear or an-
swer, judgment will be taken against you by default 
for the relief demanded in the complaint. 
Dated, November 18, 1926. 
H I R S C H , S H E R M A N & LIMBURG, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, 
Office and Post Office Address, 
160 Broadway, 
Borough of Manhattan, 
City of New York. 
13 
14 
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Amended Complaint. 
S U P R E M E C O U R T , 
N E W YORK COUNTY. 
[ S A M E T I T L E . ] 
Plaintiff complains, upon information and belief: 
I. At all times hereinafter stated, plaintiff was 
and now is a corporation organized under the laws 
of the State of New York. 
II. At all times hereinafter mentioned the de-
fendants were and now are copartners transacting 
business as accountants and auditors under the 
firm name and style of Touche, Niven & Company, 
having and maintaining offices for the regular 
transaction of business in the Borough of Manhat-
tan, City of New York. 
III. Fred Stern & Co., Inc., a corporation or-
ganized and existing under and by virtue of the 
laws of the State of New York, was, between Janu-
ary 2, 1922, and January 2, 1925, engaged in the 
City of New York, among other things, in the 
purchase and/or importation and sale of rubber, 
and in the conduct of its said business required 
extensive credit and borrowed large sums of money, 
as these defendants well knew. 
IV. On or prior to the 3rd day of January, 1924, 
the said Fred Stern & Co., Inc., employed defend-
ants, who, for hire, accepted said employment, to 
examine its books, accounts and records for the 
calendar year 1923, to audit the same, and to pre-
pare therefrom a balance sheet showing the finan-
cial condition of said Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as of 
December 31, 1923, and to certify to the correctness 
16 
17 
18 
7 
Amended Complaint. 19 
of the same over the defendants' signature, and 
they were employed and undertook to furnish to 
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., in the first instance, twenty-
four duplicate originals of said balance sheet so 
prepared by them and certified over their signa-
ture, and later about eight additional duplicate 
originals of said balance sheet so prepared by them 
and certified over their signature were furnished 
by them to said Fred Stern & Co., Inc. 
V. At the time of the acceptance by them of 
such employment, and prior to the certification of 
the balance sheet by defendants, as hereinafter 
stated, the defendants were informed, and they 
well knew, that Fred Stern & Co., Inc., intended to 
and would submit such balance sheet so prepared 
by defendants and certified by them to its creditors 
or prospective creditors as part of and in aid of 
applications for credit to be made by Fred Stern 
& Co., Inc., to said creditors or prospective cred-
itors, and the defendants well knew and intended 
and contemplated that the creditors or prospective 
creditors of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., should rely 
upon the said balance sheet as prepared by the 
defendants and so certified by them and extend 
credit to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., upon the faith 
thereof. 
2 
VI. In the months of January, February and 
March, 1924, the defendants undertook, purported 
and pretended to examine the accounts, books and 
records of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for the calendar 
year 1923, and to audit the same, and they pre-
pared and certified over their signature about 
thirty-two duplicate originals of a balance sheet 
which purported to show the financial condition of 
said Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as at December 31, 
20 
1 
Amended Complaint. 
1923, a copy of which is hereto annexed, marked 
Exhibit "A" and made a part hereof; and the de-
fendants delivered to Fred Stern & Inc., said 
thirty-two duplicate originals of said balance sheet 
to each of which they annexed their certificate and 
signed the same, copy of which certificate is here-
to annexed marked Exhibit "B" and made part 
hereof. 
VII. By said balance sheet and certificate and 
by the facts aforesaid, the defendants represented 
and intended to represent to the creditors or pro-
spective creditors of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to 
whom Fred Stern & Co., Inc., might apply for 
credit, that the defendants had made a careful ex-
amination and audit of the accounts, books and 
records of Fred Stem & Co., Inc., and that the 
balance sheet so prepared and certified by them 
represented the actual financial condition of Fred 
Stern & Co., Inc., and had been prepared by the 
defendants as a result of a careful and skillful 
audit and examination of the books, records and 
accounts of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., and that Fred 
Stern & Co., Inc., at December 31, 1923, was pos-
sessed of and owned the assets which were set 
forth as assets upon the said Exhibit "A," and had 
no liabilities other than the liabilities so set forth 
on said Exhibit "A"; and the defendants intended 
and expected that said representations would be 
relied upon by the creditors or prospective creditors 
of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to whom Fred Stern & 
Co., Inc., might apply for credit, and that such 
creditors or prospective creditors would, upon the 
faith of such representations, extend credit to Fred 
Stern & Co., Inc. 
22 
23 
24 
8 
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VIII. Said Fred Stern & Co., Inc., delivered to 
the plaintiff one of the said duplicate original bal-
ance sheets, Exhibit "A" hereto attached, together 
with the certificate of the defendants, Exhibit "B" 
hereto attached, for the purpose of inducing plain-
tiff to extend credit to said Fred Stern & Co., Inc., 
and plaintiff, believing in the correctness and ac-
curacy of said balance sheet and in the truth of 
the certificate of the defendants, and relying upon 
the same and the representations of the defendants 
aforesaid, at divers times subsequent to the receipt 
by plaintiff of said balance sheet and certificate 
and the making of such representations, extended 26 
credit and loaned to said Fred Stern & Co., Inc., 
at the City of New York, large sums of money, 
payment of which is past due and upwards of 
$500,000 of which has not been repaid, in the fol-
lowing amounts and on the following dates: 
Date Amount 
April 5, 1924 $ 5,040.00 " " " 12,880.00 " " " 25,760.00 " 
7, " 21,056.00 " " " 
15,792.00 " " " 7,728.00 " " " 9,856.00 " 
11, " 13,720.00 " " " 18,848.00 " " " 15,120.00 " 
14, " 28,000.00 " " " 
12,880.00 " " " 12,320.00 " 
22, " 10,752.00 " " " 14,560.00 " " " 29,120.00 
1 0 
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Date 
May 1, 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
6, " 
" 
" 
" 
22, " 
26, " 
27, 
June 10, 
July 
3 
" 7 
August 
1 
" 
" 
"« 6, " 
13, " 
25, " 
29, 
{September 2, " 
6, " 8 
' " 12, " 
15, " 
19, " 
26, " 
27, " 
29, 
October 3, 
7, 
20, 
24, 
27, 
28, 
Amount 
27,100.00 
12,320.00 
9,856.00 
2,912.00 
14,000,00 
9,000.00 
9,800.00 
10,750.00 
18,816.00 
60,000.00 
55,000.00 
50,000.00 
56,440.00 
38,000.00 
67,000.00 
62,000.00 
60,100.00 
58,000.00 
50,000.00 
55,600.00 
74,492.00 
30,000.00 
14,600.00 
32,000.00 
52,000.00 
50,000.00 
30,800.00 
78,000.00 
60,000.00 
6,000.00 
61,000.00 
21,000.00 
58,000.00 
139,000.00 
40,000.00 
40,000.00 
30,000.00 
28: 
29 
30 
11 
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Amount 
52,000.00 
50,000.00 
30,000.00 
82,800.00 
37,000.00 
50,000.00 
25,000.00 
25,000.00 
30,000.00 
100,000.00 
25,000.00 
40,000.00 32 
IX. The pretended examination and audit made 
by defendants was incomplete and was negligently, 
carelessly and unskillfully made and the said bal-
ance sheet (Exhibit A) hereto annexed, was neg-
ligently, carelessly and unskillfully prepared by 
defendants. The said Fred Stern & Co., Inc., did 
not, as purported to be shown by said balance sheet, 
have a net worth of more than $1,000,000 and a 
surplus of $500,000, but, on the contrary, said Fred 
Stern & Co., Inc., was grossly insolvent, did not 
own or possess the assets set forth as such assets 
on such balance sheet, and had liabilities vastly in 
excess of those shown on said balance sheet, all of 
which the defendants would or should have ascer- 33 
tained by an examination conducted with reason-
able care and skill. 
X. On or about the 21st day of January, 1925, 
said Fred Stern & Co., Inc., was adjudicated a 
bankrupt by the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York, in bankruptcy. 
Date 
November 3, " 
6, " 
12, " 
18, " 
" 19, " 
" 24, " 
25, " 
26, " 
December 1, " 
9, 
13, 
23, 
12 
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XI. Plaintiff was wholly free from any negli-
gence on its part, and solely by reason of the negli-
gence of the defendants as aforesaid, plaintiff has 
been damaged in the sum of $500,000, with inter-
est, for which, together with the costs of this action, 
plaintiff demands judgment. 
FOR A SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION, plaintiff here-
by repeats and realleges all and singular the 
allegations contained in the amended com-
plaint, and further alleges upon information 
and belief: 
35 XII. That these defendants represented that 
they had with reasonable care examined the 
accounts and records of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., 
for the year 1923, and that in their opinion 
the balance sheet (Exhibit A) gave a true and 
correct view of the financial condition of said 
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as at December 31, 
1923, and that such opinion was based upon 
and the result of an examination conducted by 
them with reasonable care. 
XIII. That these defendants at the time of 
such representations knew or should have 
known that the books and records of Fred 
Stern & Co., Inc., were falsified and inaccurate 
36 and that the balance sheet did not represent 
the true financial condition of Fred Stern & 
Co., Inc., in that as a matter of fact Fred Stern 
& Co., Inc., on December 31, 1923, was grossly 
insolvent, and that the examination by defend-
ants of the accounts and records of Fred Stern 
& Co., Inc., had not been made with reason-
able care but had been recklessly made, and 
that said alleged opinion of the defendants was 
13 
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not based upon nor the result of an examina-
tion conducted by them with reasonable care. 
XIV. That said representations were reck-
lessly and wantonly made by the defendants; 
that in truth and in fact defendants either 
knew of their falsity or made and gave such 
certificate (Exhibit B) with balance sheet at-
tached (Exhibit A) without knowledge or 
without opinion in good faith as to their truth 
or falsity; that said defendants either knew 
that the said statement (Exhibit A) did not 
give a true and correct view of the financial 
condition of said Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as at 38 
December 31, 1923, or knew that no sufficient 
examination or inquiry had been made by them 
to ascertain whether such balance sheet did 
present the true and correct view of the finan-
cial condition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as at 
December 31, 1923. 
XV. That all of said representations had 
been made by defendants and said certificates 
and balance sheet signed and delivered by 
them, with knowledge that they would be used 
by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for the purpose of 
procuring loans and securing credit on the 
faith thereof, and would be relied upon by 
those making such loans and extending such 39 
credit; that the loans made and credit extended 
by plaintiff to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., set forth 
in paragraph VIII of the amended complaint, 
were so made and extended upon the faith of 
such representations and in the belief by plain-
tiff that such representations were true. 
14 
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XVI. That by reason of the premises, plain-
tiff has been damaged in the sum of $275,000 
with interest, for which, together with the 
costs of this action, plaintiff demands judg-
ment. 
LIMBURG, RIEGELMAN, H I R S C H & HESS , 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, 
Office and P. O. Address, 
No. 160 Broadway, 
Borough of Manhattan, 
City of New York. 
(Verified for Plaintiff April 3, 1929.) 
The second cause of action was added upon trial, 
upon motion of plaintiff without objection by de-
fendant (see p. 246). 
42 
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F R E D S T E R N & C O . , I N C . 
BALANCE S H E E T DECEMBER 3 1 , 1 9 2 3 
A S S E T S 
CURRENT ASSETS : 
Cash: 
Current funds $20,927.83 
Held by banks in anticipation of 
maturity of acceptance under let-
ters of credit 185,123.86 $206,051.69 
Notes and trade acceptances re-
ceivable : 
Held by the Company $52,818.38 
Pledged as collateral to accept-
ances 155,944.53 
$208,762.91 
Trade accounts receivable and sun-
dry debtors: 4 4 
Held by the Company 1,349,280.43 
Pledged as collateral to accept-
ances 903,285.83 
$2,461,329.17 
Less reserve for doubtful ac-
counts 427,541,78 2,033,787.39 
Inventory of crude rubber pledged under trust 
receipts, etc 131,423,81 $2,371,262.89 
INVESTMENTS : 
Participating interest in syndicate 
owning plant and machinery at 
Batavia, N. Y. $181,350.43 
Participating interest in syndicate 
owning plant and machinery at 
Marion, Ohio 30,673.39 
Cost $212,023.82 
Less reserve 55,337.60 $156,686.22 
Participation certificate in class A 45 
preferred stock Bennett Day Co... 1,502.33 
Voting trust certificates, Racine 
Horseshoe Tire Corporation 4,000.00 
Pledged as collateral to acceptances: 
Ames Holden Tire & Rubber Co., 
Ltd., 7% cumulative preferred 
stock, 194 shares $7,800.00 
Howe Rubber Corp. preferred 
stock, 157 shares 6,200.00 14,000.00 176,188.55 
FURNITURE AND FIXTURES $8,683.92 
Less reserve for depreciation 8,683.92 
PREPAID CREDIT INSURANCE 3 , 2 2 0 . 4 4 
$2,550,671.88 
16 
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L I A B I L I T I E S 
CURRENT LIABILITIES : 
Secured by assets pledged per contra 
and by borrowed securities, aggre-
gating 
$1,402,278.03 : 
Dollar acceptances $868,409.45 
Sterling acceptances 493,948.45 $1,362,357.90 
UNSECURED : 
Accounts payable 117,598.72 $1,479,956.62 
47 
CAPITAL AND SURPLUS : 
Capital stock: 
Preferred, 8% cumulative redeem-
able: 
Authorized 10,000 shares of 
$100.00 each $1,000,000.00 
Whereof issued 5,000 shares . . . . $500,000.00 
Common, authorized and issued, 
100 shares of $100.00 each 10,000.00 
Paid-in surplus, after deducting $85,-
000.00 for which preferred stock 
was issued upon collection of spe-
cific accounts and notes receivable, 
in accordance with the stockhold-
ers' agreement $305,439.14 
Earned surplus, subject to provision 
for federal taxes on income for 
current year 255,276.12 
Total surplus 560,715.26 1,070,715.26 
48 
CONTINGENT LIABILITIES: 
Trade acceptances discounted $159,682.28 
Securities borrowed and pledged of a nominal 
value of about 12,500.00 
Sterling contracts (£165,000) covering purchase 
commitments 737,300.00 
Total $909,482.28 
$2,550,671.88 
17 
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TOUCHE, NIVEN & CO. 
PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 
Eighty Maiden Lane 
New York 
February 26, 1924. 
CERTIFICATE OF AUDITORS 
We have examined the accounts of Fred Stern & 
Co., Inc. for the year ended December 31, 1923, 
and hereby certify that the annexed balance sheet 
is in accordance therewith and with the informa-
tion and explanations given us. We further certify 50 
that, subject to provision for federal taxes on in-
come, the said statement, in our opinion, presents 
a true and correct view of the financial condition of 
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as at December 31, 1923. 
TOUCHE, NIVEN & CO., 
Public Accountants. 
(Verified by Louis A. Deetjen, president of 
plaintiff corporation, on February 23, 1927.) 
51 
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52 Answer of Defendants Niven, Mendes and 
Clowes. 
SUPREME COURT, 
N E W YORK COUNTY. 
[ S A M E TITLE. ] 
Defendants Niven, Mendes and Clowes, being 
three of the copartners of the firm of Touche, Niven 
& Co., answering the amended complaint herein by 
their attorneys, Guggenheimer, Untermyer & Mar-
shall : 
FIRST : Admit the allegations contained in para-
graph designated "II" of the amended complaint, 
except that they deny that C. A. H. Narlian is 
now or has been a member of said copartnership 
since the early part of 1926. 
SECOND: Deny each and every allegation con-
tained in paragraph designated "IV" of the 
amended complaint, except that they admit that on 
or prior to the 3rd day of January, 1924, Fred Stern 
& Co., Inc., employed defendants, who, for hire, 
accepted said employment to examine its accounts 
as of December 31, 1923, in so far as they deemed 
necessary for the purpose of making a balance sheet 
audit thereof and to certify to Fred Stern & Co., 
54 Inc., their opinion as to the correctness of the 
same, over defendants' signature, and to furnish 
to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., a number of duplicate 
originals of a balance sheet so to be prepared by 
them and certified over their signature. 
T H I R D : Deny each and every allegation con-
tained in paragraph designated "V" of the amended 
complaint, except that they admit knowing that 
19 
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the balance sheet so to be prepared by them might 
be submitted by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to some 
of its bankers. 
FOURTH : Deny each and every allegation con-
tained in paragraph designated "VI" of the 
amended complaint, except that they admit under-
taking to examine the accounts of Fred Stern & 
Co., Inc., and auditing the same in so far as they 
deemed necessary for the purpose of preparing a 
balance sheet audit of the accounts of Fred Stern 
& Co., Inc., as of December 31, 1923, and that they 
prepared thirty-two duplicate originals of the bal-
ance sheet, Exhibit A, annexed to the amended 
complaint, and thirty-two duplicate originals1 of 
the certificate, Exhibit B, annexed to the amended 
complaint, and delivered them to Fred Stern & Co., 
Inc. 
F I F T H : Deny each and every allegation con-
tained in paragraphs designated "VII" and "XI" 
of the amended complaint. 
S I X T H : Deny knowledge or information suffi-
cient to form a belief as to the truth of each and 
every allegation contained in paragraph designated 
"VIII" of the amended complaint. 
SEVENTH : Deny each and every allegation con-
tained in paragraph designated "IX" of the 
amended complaint, except that they deny knowl-
edge or information sufficient to form a belief as 
to the truth of the allegations that said Fred Stern 
& Co., Inc., did not have a net w o r t h of more than 
11,000,000 and a surplus of $500,000, and that said 
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., was grossly insolvent, did 
not own or possess the assets set forth as such 
56 
57 
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GO 
N I N T H : The alleged cause of action stated in 
the amended complaint did not accrue within two 
years before the commencement of this action. 
FOR A SECOND AFFIRMATIVE AND COMPLETE DE-
FENSE, THESE DEFENDANTS ALLEGE: 
T E N T H : On information and belief, plaintiff is 
a domestic business corporation incorporated and 
doing business under and by virtue of the Stock 
Corporation Law of the State of New York and 
is not a moneyed corporation or incorporated un-
der the Banking Law of the State of New York. 
E L E V E N T H : On information and belief, plaintiff, 
in lending and advancing money to Fred Stern & 
Co., Inc., and in other respects, did a banking busi-
ness within the State of New York, in contraven-
tion of the Stock Corporation Law, the General 
Corporation Law and the Banking Law of the State 
of New York, and that in making such loans and 
advances of money to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., and 
in doing a banking business in other respects plain-
tiff acted ultra vires. 
58 Answer of Defendants Niven et al. 
assets on such balance sheet, and had liabilities 
vastly in excess of those shown on said balance 
sheet. 
FOR A FIRST AFFIRMATIVE AND COMPLETE DEFENSE, 
THESE DEFENDANTS ALLEGE: 
E I G H T H : These defendants are and each of them 
is a certified public accountant holding a certifi-
cate of the Board of Regents of the State of New 
York authorizing them to practice as public ac-
countants in the State of New York. | 
This defense was 
stricken out as 
insufficient in law 
(see Statement, 
fol. ). 
21 
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WHEREFORE , these defendants demand that the 
amended complaint herein be dismissed, with costs. 
GUGGENHEIMER, UNTERMYER & MARSHALL, 
Attorneys for Defendants Niven, Mendes 
and Clowes, being three of the copart-
ners in the firm of Touche, Niven & Co., 
Office and Post Office Address, 
No. 120 Broadway, 
Borough of Manhattan, 
New York City. 
(Verified by John B. Niven on March 14, 1927.) 
Note: By stipulation (page 246) the allegations 
of the second cause of action are deemed to be 
denied. 
63 
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Answer of Defendant Narlian to Amended 
Complaint. 
S U P R E M E C O U R T , 
N E W YORK COUNTY. 
[ S A M E T I T L E . ] 
Defendant Narlian, answering the amended com-
plaint herein, by his atorneys, Guggenheimer, 
Untermyer & Marshall: 
F I R S T : Admits the allegations contained in 
paragraph designated "II" of the amended com-
plaint, except that he denies that he is now or has 
been a member of said copartnership since the 
early part of 1926. 
SECOND : Denies each and every allegation con-
tained in paragraph designated "IV" of the 
amended complaint, except that he admits that on 
or prior to the 3rd day of January, 1924, Fred 
Stern & Co., Inc., employed defendants, who, for 
hire, accepted said employment to examine its ac-
counts as of December 31, 1923, in so far as they 
deemed necessary for the purpose of making a bal-
ance sheet audit thereof and to certify to Fred Stern 
& Co., Inc., their opinion as to the correctness of 
the same, over defendants' signature, and to fur-
nish to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., a number of dupli-
cate originals of a balance sheet so to be prepared 
by them and certified over their signature. 
T H I R D : Denies each and every allegation con-
tained in paragraph designated "V" of the amended 
complaint, except that he admits knowing that the 
balance sheet so to be prepared by them might 
be submitted by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to some of 
its bankers. 
64 
65 
66 
Answer of Defendant Narlian. 
FOURTH : Denies each and every allegation con-
tained in paragraph designated "VI" of the 
amended complaint, except that he admits that de-
fendants undertook to examine the accounts of 
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., and audit the same in so far 
as they deemed necessary for the purpose of pre-
paring a balance sheet audit of the accounts of 
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as of December 31, 1923, and 
that they prepared thirty-two duplicate originals 
of the balance sheet, Exhibit A, annexed to the 
amended complaint and thirty-two duplicate orig-
inals of the certificate, Exhibit B, annexed to the 
amended complaint, and delivered them to Fred 
Stern & Co., Inc. 
F I F T H : Denies each and every allegation con-
tained in paragraph designated "VII" and "XI" 
of the amended complaint. 
S I X T H : Denies knowledge or information suffi-
cient to form a belief as to the truth of each and 
every allegation contained in paragraph designated 
"VIII" of the amended complaint. 
SEVENTH : Denies each and every allegation con-
tained in paragraph designated "IX" of the 
amended complaint, except that he denies knowl-
edge or information sufficient to form a belief as 
to the truth of the allegations that said Fred Stern 
& Co., Inc., did not have a net worth of more than 
$1,000,000 and a surplus of $500,000, and that said 
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., was grossly insolvent, did 
not own or possess the assets set forth as such 
assets on such balance sheet, and had liabilities 
vastly in excess of those shown on said balance 
sheet. 
67 
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F O R A FIRST AFFIRMATIVE AND COMPLETE DEFENSE, 
T H I S DEFENDANT ALLEGES : 
E I G H T H : Defendants Niven, Mendes and Clowes 
are and at all times referred to in the complaint 
were certified public accountants holding certifi-
cates of the Board of Regents of the State of New 
York authorizing them to practice as public ac-
countants in the State of New York, and this de-
fendant is and at air times referred to in the com-
plaint was a certified public accountant holding a 
certificate of the State of California. 
N I N T H : The alleged cause of action stated in 
the amended complaint did not accrue within two 
years before the commencement of this action. 
F O R A SECOND AFFIRMATIVE AND COMPLETE DE-
FENSE, T H I S DEFENDANT ALLEGES : 
T E N T H : On information and belief, plaintiff is 
a domestic business corporation incorporated and 
doing business under and by virtue of the Stock 
Corporation Law of the State of New York and is 
not a moneyed corporation or incorporated under 
the Banking Law of the State of New York. 
E L E V E N T H : On information and belief, plaintiff, 
in lending and advancing money to Fred Stern & 
Co., Inc., and in other respects, did a banking busi-
ness within the State of New York, in contraven-
tion of the Stock Corporation Law, the General 
Corporation Law and the Banking Law of the State 
of New York, and that in making such loans and 
advances of money to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., and 
in doing a banking business in other respects plain-
tiff acted ultra vires. 
7 1 
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WHEREFORE , this defendant demands that the 
amended complaint herein be dismissed, with costs. 
GUGGENHEIMER, UNTERMYER & MARSHALL, 
Attorneys for Defendant Narlian, 
Office and Post Office Address, 
No. 120 Broadway, 
Borough of Manhattan, 
New York City. 
(Verified June 14, 1927.) 
Stipulation as to Answers of Defendants 
Touche, Tait, Whitworth, Stempf 
and Wagner. 
SUPREME COURT, 
N E W YORK COUNTY. 
[ S A M E T I T L E . ] 
The plaintiff having announced its purpose to 
procure an attachment in this action against the 
property of the defendants or some of them, and 
the defendants deeming it desirable to avoid such 
attachment ; and for the purpose of avoiding such 
attachment the defendants Touche, Tait, Whit-
worth, Stempf and Wagner, some of the copartners 
above named, doing business under the firm name 
and style of Touche, Niven & Co., having agreed to 
appear herein by Guggenheimer, Untermyer & Mar-
shall as of the 17th day of November, 1927, 
73 
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I T IS STIPULATED AND AGREED, in consideration 
of said appearance, that the plaintiff will not dur-
ing the pendency of this action apply for such an 
attachment herein against the defendants or any 
of them. 
I T IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that the 
answers heretofore filed herein on behalf of the de-
fendant who have heretofore appeared herein shall 
be deemed the answer of the other members of the 
firm of Touche, Niven & Company except as to the 
first affirmative defense, which, as to such other 
members of the firm of Touche, Niven & Company, 
shall be deemed to read as follows: 
"1. The defendants Niven, Mendes and 
Clowes are and each of them is a certified pub-
lic accountant holding a certificate of the 
Board of Regents of the State, of New York, 
authorizing them to practice as public ac-
countants in the State of New York, and these 
defendants are and each of them is a char-
tered or certified public accountant, and the 
acts and omissions complained of are the acts 
and omissions of said Niven, Mendes and 
Clowes. 
"2. The alleged cause of action stated in 
the amended complaint did not accrue within 
two years before the commencement of this ac-
tion." 
I T IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that the 
notice of trial heretofore served herein shall stand 
and no new notice of trial need be served because 
of the appearance of said defendants Touche, Tait, 
Whitworth, Stempf and Wagner, copartners, as 
77 
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above described; and that the time of the plaintiff 
to move to strike out said first affirmative defense 
upon the ground that it is not sufficient in law be 
and the same hereby is extended to and including 
the tenth day after the entry in the office of the 
Clerk of the Appellate Division of the order of the 
Appellate Division determining the appeal now 
pending in that Court from the order made herein 
by Mr. Justice Peters dated the 22nd day of June, 
1927. 
Dated, New York, November 17, 1927. 
H I R S C H , S H E R M A N & LIMBURG, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
GUGGENHEIMER, UNTERMYER & MARSHALL, 
Attorneys for Defendants. 
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82 Extract from Clerk's Minutes. 
S U P R E M E C O U R T , 
TRIAL T E R M — P A R T 18 . 
June 27th, 1929. 
ULTRAMAREIS CORPORATION 
against 
GEORGE TOUCHE, J O H N D . NIVEN, 
ANDREW W . TAIT, CHARLES 
8 3 R . W H I T W O R T H , HENRY E . 
MENDES, FRANCIS J . CLOWES, 
VICTOR H . STEMPF, F . H . WAG-
NER a n d C. A . NARLIAN , co -
partners under the firm name 
& style of Touche, Niven & Co. 
I hereby certify that this cause was tried before 
Hon. John L. Walsh and a jury on the 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
8, 9, 10, 11 & 12 days of April, 1929. April 3, 
1929—Plaintiff moved to amend complaint. De-
cision Reserved. April 4, 1929—Motion to amend 
to include another cause of action granted. April 
8, 1929—Plaintiff Rests. Defendant moved to dis-
miss complaint. Reserved. April 9, 1929—Plain-
tiff moved for a withdrawal of a juror. Motion de-
nied. April 11, 1929—Defendant moved that plain-
tiff elect between the two causes of action. Denied. 
Defendant moved to dismiss 1st cause of action. 
Decision Reserved. Defendant moved to dismiss 
2nd cause of action. Granted. Defendant moved 
for a direction of verdict. Denied. April 12, 
1929—The jury after deliberation render a verdict 
84 
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far the plaintiff for the sum of $187,576.32. De-
fendant moved to set aside the verdict and for a 
new trial. Decision Reserved. June 14, 1929— 
Opinion. The Complaint must be dismissed. June 
25, 1929—Motion granted setting aside verdict and 
dismissing complaint. Order filed. Motion for an 
extra allowance is denied. Order filed. 
THOMAS M. FARLEY, 
Clerk. 
Order Setting Aside Verdict and Dismissing 
Complaint. 
At a Trial Term, Part 18, of the New 
York Supreme Court, held in and 
for the County of New York, at the 
County Court House therein, on the 
25th day of June, 1929. 
Present: 
H O N . J O H N L . W A L S H , 
Justice. 
[ S A M E T I T L E . ] 
The above-entitled action having regularly been 
brought on for trial at Trial Term, Part 18, of the 
Supreme Court, held in and for the County of New 
York, at the County Court House therein, on the 
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th 
days of April, 1929, before Mr. Justice Walsh, and 
a jury, and the plaintiff herein having appeared by 
Messrs. Limburg, Riegelman, Hirsch & Hess, their 
attorneys, David L. Podell and Herbert R. Lim-
burg, Esqs., of counsel, and the defendants appear-
86 
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ing by Messrs. Guggenheimer, Untermyer & Mar-
shall, their attorneys, James Marshall, Esq., of 
counsel, and the allegations and proofs of the par-
ties having been heard and considered, and the 
defendants having moved at the close of the plain-
tiff's case for a dismissal of the complaint, and de-
cision on said motion having been reserved, and 
the defendants having moved again at the close of 
the entire case for a dismissal of the complaint, 
and decision on said motion having been reserved, 
and the case having been submitted to the jury, 
and the jury having rendered a verdict for the 
plaintiff in the sum of $187,576.32, and the defend-
ants having moved to set aside the verdict, and 
decision on said motion having been reserved, and 
due deliberation on said motions having been had, 
Now, upon the pleadings and bills of particulars 
herein, and upon the minutes of the trial and all 
the proceedings heretofore had herein, and upon 
filing the opinion of the Court, on motion of Gug-
genheimer, Untermyer & Marshall, attorneys for 
the defendants, it is 
ORDERED, that the motions of the defendants to 
set aside the verdict of the jury and to dismiss the 
complaint be, and the same are hereby, granted, 
upon the law only and not upon the facts; and 
it is further 
ORDERED, that the verdict of the jury in the above-
entitled action be and the same is hereby set aside, 
upon the law only and not upon the facts, and the 
complaint herein is hereby dismissed on the merits; 
and it is further 
89 
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ORDERED, that the Clerk of this Court be and he 
is hereby directed to enter judgment for the de-
fendants dismissing the complaint on the merits, 
with costs to the defendants against the plaintiff, 
to be taxed. 
Enter, 
J. L. W. 
J. S. C. 
Judgment Appealed From. 
S U P R E M E C O U R T , 
N E W YORK COUNTY. 
[ S A M E TITLE. ] 
The above-entitled action having regularly been 
brought on for trial at Trial Term, Part 18, of the 
Supreme Court, held in and for the County of New 
York, at the County Court House therein, on the 
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th 
days of April, 1929, before Mr. Justice Walsh, and 
a jury, and the plaintiff herein having appeared by 
Messrs. Limburg, Riegelman, Hirsch & Hess, their 
attorneys, David L. Podell and Herbert R. Lim-
burg, Esqs., of counsel, and the defendants having 
appeared by Messrs. Guggenheimer, Untermyer & 
Marshall, their attorneys, James Marshall, Esq., of 
counsel, and the allegations and proofs of the par-
ties having been heard and considered, and the de-
fendants having moved at the close of the plain-
tiff's case for a dismissal of the complaint and of 
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each cause of action therein, and decision on said 
motion having been reserved, and the defendants 
having moved again at the close of the entire case 
for a dismissal of the complaint, and of each cause 
of action therein, and said motion having been 
granted as to the second cause of action, and deci-
sion on said motion having been reserved as to the 
first cause of action, and the second cause of action 
having been dismissed on the merits, and the first 
cause of action having been submitted to the jury, 
and the jury having rendered a verdict thereon for 
the plaintiff in the sum of $187,576.32, and the 
defendants having moved to set aside said verdict, 
95 
and decision on said motion having been reserved, 
and due deliberation on said motions having been 
had, and said motions having been granted upon 
the law only and not upon the facts, and an order 
having been entered herein on June 25, 1929, set-
ting aside the verdict of the jury upon the law only 
and not upon the facts, and dismissing the com-
plaint herein on the merits, with costs to the de-
fendants against the plaintiff, and the defendants 
having moved for an extra allowance of $2,000, and 
said motion having been denied, and the costs of 
the defendants having been taxed by the Clerk at 
the sum of One hundred and twenty-six 26/100 
96 Dollars ($126.26), 
Now, on motion of Guggenheimer, Untermyer & 
Marshall, attorneys for the defendants, it is 
ADJUDGED, that the amended complaint herein 
be and the same hereby is dismissed on the merits 
and that the defendants George A. Touche, John 
B. Niven, Andrew W. Tait, Charles R. Whitworth, 
Henry E. Mendes, Francis J. Clowes, Victor H. 
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Stempf, E. H. Wagner and C. A. H. Narlian, co-
partners under the firm name and style of Touch e, 
Niven & Co., recover of the plaintiff, Ultramares 
Corporation, the sum of One hundred and twenty-
six 26/100 Dollars ($126.26 ), their costs, as taxed, 
and that they have execution therefor. 
Dated, New York, July 1, 1929. 
THOMAS M. FARLEY, 
Clerk. 
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S U P R E M E C O U R T , 
N E W YORK COUNTY, 
TRIAL T E R M — P A R T X V I I I . 
[ S A M E TITLE. ] 
New York, April 1st, 1929. 
Before: 
H O N . J O H N L . W A L S H , J., 
and a Jury, 
APPEARANCES : 
LIMBURG, RIEGELMAN, HIRSCH & HESS , Esqs., At-
torneys for Plaintiff; by DAVID L . PODELL, 
Esq., and HERBERT R . LIMBURG , Esq., of Counsel. 
GUGGENHEIMER, UNTERMYER & MARSHALL , Esqs., 
Attorneys for Defendants; by J A M E S MARSHALL, 
Esq., of Counsel. 
PLAINTIFF 'S OPENING. 
(A jury was duly impaneled and sworn.) 
(Mr. Podell opened the case to the jury on be-
half of the plaintiff.) 
(Mr. Marshall opened the case to the jury on 
behalf of the defendants.) 
PLAINTIFF 'S OPENING STATEMENT TO THE J U R Y . 
Mr. Podell: If the Court please, Mr. Foreman 
and gentlemen of the jury: I think perhaps the 
most important thing that I can say to you at the 
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very outset is that we are exceedingly anxious 
that you should understand this case; and so I 
am going to make a statement in outline of what 
we intend to show, and I will ask you, gentlemen, 
to please bear with me if I go a little in detail. 
I will do it solely to enable you to follow the testi-
mony as it is presented here a little better. Of 
course, what I say is nothing; I am merely going 
to tell you what I intend to prove by witnesses 
and by documents. I would like you to understand 
me, so that you can follow those witnesses and 
documents a little better. 
There are three concerns that are going to be 
mentioned here constantly: The plaintiff, which 
is the Ultramares Corporation, that is an institu-
tion that has been doing business as a factor—if 
you know what that means. A factor is a concern 
that handles certain kinds of financial transactions, 
takes care of the finances of the transaction The 
details of their business will be fully explained to 
you. The defendant, the firm of Touche, Niven 
& Co., according to their letterhead, is a firm of 
Public Accountants with offices at 80 Maiden Lane, 
New York, apparently offices in New York, Chi-
cago, Cleveland, St. Louis, Minneapolis and Los 
Angeles; also offices in England, in London and 
Birmingham; and in Canada, Montreal, Toronto, 
Winnepeg; and in South America, several cities 
named there. It is a firm that did an extensive 
business, I assume, as Public Accountants. 
The other concern that you will hear mentioned, 
is a concern by the name of Frederick Stern & 
Company. Frederick Stern & Company were for 
some years engaged in business in this city as an 
importer and exporter particularly of rubber. 
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So you have got the three people whose names 
you are going to hear mentioned and the nature of 
their respective businesses. 
We have had—and I speak for the plaintiff, 
Ultramares Corporation—we have had very little 
business with Fred Stern & Company prior to 
April, 1924. I will ask you to keep that date in 
mind, April of 1924; also keep in mind as we go 
along, we are going to talk a good deal about what 
happened during the year 1923. 
In April of 1924, we were solicited to do business 
with this concern of Fred Stern & Company, and 
that meant that we were asked to finance them in 
certain transactions, purchases and sales of rubber 
that he was making, that he was bringing in rubber, 
buying it in the raw, bringing it in and selling it 
to others in this country, and he wanted to do 
business with us so that we would help finance 
these transactions; and as we will show you that 
involved right from the start extending credit to 
him in this financing. 
We could take and we did take at times certain 
securities for our advances, but there was always 
a period of time when we practically had no se-
curity whatsoever, and we had to trust the concern 
itself, and that you will understand a little better 
when the details of the transaction are explained 
to you. 
As an inducement to make us go into business 
transactions with Fred Stern & Company there was 
presented to us by Fred Stern & Company, its 
certified accountant's statement. We never had 
occasion to look at its books, and never did look at 
its books. All we got at that time, in substance, 
was the financial statement, signed by this respon-
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sible and reputable, as we thought, substantial firm 
of accountants. There was delivered to us a cer-
tificate. It said: 
"We have examined the accounts of Fred 
Stern & Co., Inc. for the year ended December 
31, 1923"— 
So you see the period of that year, 1923, will 
be important 
"and hereby certify that the annexed balance 
sheet is in accordance therewith and with the 
information and explanations given us. We 
further certify that, subject to provision for 
federal taxes on income, the said statement, 
in our opinion, presents a true and correct 
view of the financial condition of Fred Stern 
& Co., Inc., as at December 31, 1923." 
Signed "Touche, Niven & Co., Public Account-
ants." 
Now, if you will look at this statement, you will 
find that the statement was made in detail— 
"Capital & Surplus," they have their worth $1,070,-
715.26. 
Now, we commenced doing business with them. 
We financed several transactions. Toward the end 
of that year, and it all happened almost over night, 
Fred Stern, in fact on January 2nd, 1925, Fred 
Stern was reported to have committed suicide and 
his concern became insolvent, and we were in the 
hole, to use common parlance, to the sum of about 
two hundred to two hundred and fifty thousand 
dollars. The exact figures will be presented to you. 
The whole thing was a sort of a shock. It came 
suddenly, and we naturally began to inquire how 
it was that a concern showing a certified public 
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accountant's statement of a million dollars of assets 
over liabilities, capital and surplus, how it was 
possible it could have lost that money. It was pos-
sible it could have lost that money, yes, but we 
looked into the situation and we found, gentlemen, 
and this is what we intend to show in connection 
with this case, that this statement is false. 
Now, if there is anything in this case that I 
intend to prove beyond a question of doubt, it is 
that this statement as certified to by these account-
ants is false, that it is not false merely to a matter 
of fifty, sixty, seventy or a hundred thousand, but 
it is false to the extent of over a million, over a 
million two hundred thousand, over a million five 
hundred thousand. 
Now, that is not enough for us to make a claim 
against the accountants merely because the state-
ment is false. Naturally a man may so fake his 
books—there is a good deal of faking of books—so 
as to conceal those things even from an account-
ant, even though an accountant may work on it 
for months, it is possible he may be an honest man 
and doesn't notice it, that a million and a half of 
assets was concealed. 
I make the second proposition that I intend to 
show to you gentlemen before we close this case 
that it did not require a certified public account-
ant, it did not require an assistant certified public 
account, but that any clerk, any bookkeeper that 
used just ordinary care, could have seen from those 
books not only that they were crooked, but that they 
were false. And would have known that the largest 
items that they claim of assets that they had were 
pure fabrication. I say I will show you that any 
clerk, any bookkeeper, any accountant, if he had 
used just the ordinary care, would have seen it. In 
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other words, our claim is that for a man not to 
know that this was a perfect statement to the ex-
tent of a million dollars, he would have to shut his 
eyes deliberately to things that would just poke 
right into his eyes. Now, that is the part that I 
would like you to understand, gentlemen, and I 
am going to show you why I make that statement. 
I will ask you to remember in connection with this 
certified statement that there are no qualifications, 
no "ifs" and no "ands," no conditions. As every 
accountant will tell you who knows his business, 
this is an absolute certification without conditions, 
without "ifs" or "ands." It does not say that they 
did not know, that they did not do this or that, 
that they did not check up. Sometimes account-
ants do that. There are no "ifs" or thoughs in 
this statement, It is a certified balance audit state-
ment as and for a certain period. 
When Touche, Niven & Co. came there to pre-
pare those books we will show you that they found 
many things right at the start which would have 
convinced any man who had any brains at all, that 
not only were the books crooked but that the con-
cern was crooked. The books had not been written 
up since March. For many months they had not 
been written up, and Touche-Niven's man had to 
sit down and write up these books for them right 
at the start. 
When they were handed an inventory, the first 
checking that they did on the inventory showed 
that the inventory was padded. Mind you, they 
must have known, because they made that correc-
tion—that the inventory was padded not ten, fif-
teen, fifty or a hundred thousand, but over a quar-
ter of a million dollars. That is right at the start. 
At the beginning they are handed an inventory, 
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and an examination of that inventory with their 
checking will show you that they knew right then 
and there that this concern had attempted to de-
fraud its creditors by adding more than a quarter 
of a million dollars to its assets by way of inven-
tory, which it had no business to do; and did it 
crookedly, did it crookedly. It was not a question 
of putting a higher value on it at all. They just 
did it deliberately and with an intent to pad the 
inventory and to have a false statement; and that 
they knew right at the start. 
Now, gentlemen, I do not know how many of 
you are familiar with bookkeeping or with book-
keeping systems, but I am sure that we all under-
stand a certain little of it, and some of it from our 
own business experience, and some of it possibly 
from a little better knowledge. We all know, for 
instance, what we mean by a ledger. We may not 
be able to give an exact definition of what a ledger 
is, but we know what it is, and we have heard of 
journals and we have heard of sales books and we 
have heard of shipping records. 
Now, one of the ways that Fred Stern & Com-
pany defrauded and faked its books and falsified 
its books was by adding $706,000 worth of false 
accounts receivable. In other words, they wrote 
into their books that certain people owed them, 
Fred Stern & Company, $706,000. 
One item I am talking about in particular and 
I am going to talk about that because I am going 
to show you in connection with that how these 
men, studying these books for months, knew or 
should have known that that was false, that claim 
that $706,000 was due them from various customers, 
when, as a matter of fact, it was a pure fabrication, 
it was wholly manufactured. Customers did not 
owe them that money at all. 
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For years you will find that in the ledger, that is, 
from the year 1922 and for the year 1923, as you 
examined the ledger for every month, there is a 
summary of the sales that Stern & Company made, 
just entered as a monthly figure, the total sales; 
and there is just one entry for that month, begin-
ning with the year 1922. Beginning with the year 
1922, take January, there is an entry; February, 
there is an entry; March, there is an entry; one 
entry for each of these months until you come to 
December of 1923. In December of 1923—and this 
statement, you will bear in mind, was a balance 
sheet as of December 31st, 1923, that is the last 
month of this balance sheet—in December there ap-
peared to be two entries, one of them totalling six 
hundred and forty-four odd thousand dollars; the 
second of them, the fake one, totalling $706,000. 
Now, what does that mean? There is an entry 
in the ledger that there were $706,000 worth of 
sales made in the month of December, for which 
customers ' owed Frederick Stern & Company 
$706,000. It meant that merchandise had been 
shipped in that amount to customers, that invoices 
had been sent for those amounts to customers; it 
named customers, certain designated customers. 
Now, sometimes a house does not want an ac-
countant to write letters to all the customers and 
ascertain, "Do you owe this money?" although fre-
quently that is done; and when an accountant does 
not do that, usually in the statement he says, "This 
is to certify that is the worth, but we desire to 
state that we did not check the individual ac-
counts" ; which is a little warning to a man who 
relies on it. But that is not what we are quarrel-
ling with, mind you. 
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What we are quarrelling with, is this: A ledger, 
as you all know, is a posting book. You post into 
the ledger. You post it from what? 
From supporting books. You post it from the 
journal or you post it from a memorandum book, 
from a shipping record. 
Now, I say to you, gentlemen, at the outset that 
not only was this $706,000 entered as accounts re-
ceivable pure fake, but that there is absolutely no 
support for that item or any of those items com-
prising the $706,000 in the shipping records or in 
the journal entries. 
If those accountants had looked at that shipping 
record to check back that there were $706,000 worth 
of accounts receivable that Fred Stern & Company 
had these people owing to them, even if you did 
not want to write to these people, the Ford Motor 
Company or somebody else, whether they owed 
Fred Stern & Company that much money as is 
shown in the book, if you did not want to do that, 
although that is the proper thing, if you did not 
want to do that, the very least you should do is to 
check back in the other books and see if the other 
books support this item of $706,000, because you 
are certifying to a statement that other people are 
going to use and rely upon, and that is the very 
least, that you, as an accountant, should do. 
I am going to show you that when you begin to 
check back, to try to find supporting records for 
that item of $706,000, accounts receivable, you can-
not find any trace of it anywhere in the shipping 
records, that those goods were shipped to any-
body ; and when you look at the invoices, by look-
ing at them you can see that they are not the same 
invoices that that concern sent out. They had 
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fake invoices. By looking at them, there are seven 
different reasons why you could see just by looking 
at the invoice, that it was a fake. 
For instance, their invoices were numbered 
serially, and these invoices were not in the serial 
numbers. Secondly, the invoices did not have any 
customer's order number. Every other invoice that 
the concern ever sent out had a customer's order 
on it. These did not. 
Thirdly, it had no reference to shipping records 
on its face. It was not entered in any book called 
the debit memo book, never entered. 
Please remember, gentlemen, what I said to you 
at the beginning, that what I tell you is merely a 
statement of what I intend to show to you by wit-
nesses and by testimony. I do not want you to 
accept my statement for it any more than I ask 
you to accept Mr. Marshall's statement of the facts, 
but I am outlining this so as these figures are given 
to you and these books are referred to, you will be 
able to follow them and understand them. 
There were also fake accounts receivable for the 
month of November, aggregating about a million 
dollars, and they were similarly faked because they 
had no supporting entries, no basis. 
The second item: Every concern that does busi-
ness has two kinds of people as a rule that it deals 
with, as you know; people you buy from and you 
owe money to and people, on the other hand, whom 
you sell to and who owe you money. They are 
usually and naturally different groups. It is very 
seldom that the same man is both a seller to you 
and a buyer from you. That sometimes happens, 
but in this rubber situation it could not very well 
be, because the rubber came from abroad. It was 
bought from people all over the world, on the other 
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side, and it was sold to people on this side, usually 
to tire manufacturers who bought the raw rubber. 
So you had one class of people that the Stern & 
Company owed money to for purchases that they 
made from them, and this other group that made 
purchases from them. 
Now, would it not immediately surprise you if 
you found that a man that you were buying from, 
that normally you owe money to for merchandise 
you buy from him, is entered in the books as owing 
money to you—not a small sum of a thousand or 
two thousand, but over a hundred thousand? 
This man who owed these amounts was selling 
merchandise to Stern and to whom Stern owed 
money for that merchandise, is entered on the books 
as owing Stern $113,000. And we will show you 
that the only time that he ever is entered on the 
books as owing Stern & Company is in the months 
of November and December, this period when these 
books were faked up. 
Now, it would have been a very simple matter, 
when an accountant sees that to ask, "Did you sell 
merchandise to these people?" "No." "What is 
it?" Here is a concern that is borrowing. The 
books show they are borrowing large sums of money 
from banks, from factors, from various people, and 
they have got a note on their statement that it is 
an advance deposit; and the quickest way of verify-
ing that would be to communicate with that con-
cern, "Do you owe us, Stern & Company, $113,000?" 
United Baltic Company. They had representa-
tives in this country, and they would have found 
out a different situation altogether. What would 
they have found out? That instead of this United 
Baltic Company owing Fred Stern $113,000, Fred 
Stern & Company was indebted to the United Baltic 
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Company for $250,000, a total difference of over 
three hundred odd thousand. 
These mistakes, you know, if they are claimed 
to be mistakes on the part of a man, seem always 
to run into large figures. Notice the figures. An 
inquiry of the United Baltic Company would have 
disclosed that instead of the United Baltic Com-
pany owing Fred Stern & Company $113,000, not 
only did it not owe that, but Fred Stern & Com-
pany owed the United Baltic Company for mer-
chandise which it had received, over $250,000. 
And finally, gentlemen, I am just giving you 
certain instances of how this man made up his mil-
lion dollars. How these accountants did their busi-
ness, and what happened. We were not there. 
Something happened. They cannot say they did not 
know, because I am going to show it in writing that 
they knew, the accountants knew. I am going to 
show it. I will tell you now, by letters written 
by these accountants, Fred Stern & Company was 
so crooked in its transactions that in borrowing 
money from banks and from other people, it would 
pledge certain shipments of rubber, and sometimes 
it would take those shipments and pledge them not 
once but three or four times, first to one person and 
then to another. It had a shipment coming on. 
They wanted an advance of so much, and got it, and 
then they would go to another person and take the 
same shipment they had placed with the first bank 
or with the first person and pledge it over with 
the second and third and a fourth. I think you 
will find that some of these items were pledged five 
or six times. 
You will say to yourselves that an accountant 
working on these books could not discover that. I 
will show you something stranger than that as this 
case goes along. I will show you that they dis-
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covered some of it, that they wrote to banks, that 
they got answers, that those answers showed these 
accounts were being pledged two, three and four 
times. All they had to do was to read the answers 
they got themselves from banks, showing that these 
accounts had been pledged three or four or five 
times, and we will have those answers here, and you 
will see them for yourselves, to inquiries written by 
these accountants to check up, because they sus-
pected them. And not a word of it in this state-
ment, not a word of qualification to this statement. 
Not a suggestion to anybody who is going to rely 
on this statement as being signed by a reputable 
concern with offices in England, Canada, New York 
and Chicago, and all over the country—certified 
worth a million dollars—crooked. They should 
have known it. 
Now, gentlemen, the one thing I want to avoid 
in this case is to confuse you on anything. I am 
going to call my witnesses to show these various 
things, and then I am going to say to you men, if 
we are right, if these men knew or should have 
known—now, mind you, we do not have to show 
that there was any crookedness between Touche, 
Niven & Co. and Fred Stern; all we have to show 
is that they did not use ordinary care as account-
ants. That is our claim, that we are entitled to 
have them use reasonable and ordinary care. And, 
gentlemen, we will show you that we are out of 
pocket as a result of getting this statement. Had 
we gotten a true statement, showing them prac-
tically bankrupt, we certainly would not have ad-
vanced a dollar to them. Nobody does business 
with a bankrupt. And we would have been in, in-
stead of out of pocket, those two hundred and fifty 
odd thousand dollars by reason of this statement, 
because if the statement were a true and correct 
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one, it was bound to show that these $706,000 of 
accounts receivable were not due, that their goods 
were pledged three, four and five times, that people 
entered on the books as owing Stern & Company, 
did not owe them any money at all that Stern & 
Company owed them money. And if there had been 
a statement that this was a crooked concern, we 
did not want to do business with a crooked con-
cern, and we would not have had to advance them 
anything and we would not have done business 
with them. 
So there you are. We were advised by this certi-
fied public accountant's statement, on which we had 
a right to rely, believing they were careful and 
responsible people. We will show you, as I said, 
that the statement was false and that they should 
have known it was false, and did not use the com-
mon and ordinary care to find it so, and we shall 
ask at your hands a verdict, 
Mr. Marshall: In view of Mr. Podell's opening 
remarks, I would like to know now whether he 
makes any claim now of any fraud on the part of 
these defendants? 
Mr. Podell: I have set forth my complaint. 
That speaks for itself. 
Mr. Marshall: You have made some inuendoes 
here and I would like to have it definitely under-
stood. 
The Court: The Court will rule on that, that 
there is not any inuendo. There is no allegation, 
there is nothing of any kind or character in this 
case which indicates fraud, and when you reach 
that point for a ruling, the Court will rule accord-
ingly. 
Mr. Marshall: Thank you, your Honor. That 
is all I want to know. 
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DEFENDANTS' OPENING STATEMENT TO J U R Y . 
Mr. Marshall: Now, gentlemen, you understand, 
I hope, that the Ultramares Corporation did not 
ask us to make an audit of the books of Stern & 
Company. It was Stern who asked us to make the 
audit of their own books. Now, that is going to pre-
sent a question of law in the first place, whether 
there is any liability on our part at all, even if we 
were grossly negligent, to a third party, such as the 
Ultramares. That is a question, however, which 
happily you will not be bothered with, but the Court 
will have to decide. 
Now, the next thing I want to call to your at-
tention is that we do not guarantee the truth of 
any statement contained in a balance sheet. A pub-
lic accountant cannot possibly for the fee that he 
gets for his work become a guarantor of any cer-
tificate. The most he says is that he has examined 
the books and that in his opinion the balance sheet 
represents a true picture of those books. He is only 
certifying, in other words, to his opinion, his honest 
opinion, based upon his investigation. 
Now, there are several kinds of audits. There is 
what is known as the balance sheet audit, and what 
is known as the detailed audit. 
The balance sheet audit is what we were em-
ployed to make in this case. It consists of the 
preparation of the balance sheet of the company, an 
audit, a sufficient testing and investigation of the 
records to give us a right and fair basis for our 
opinion, that that balance sheet represents the con-
dition of the books. 
Now a detailed audit, as the name indicates, is 
something in greater detail. There the accountant 
tries to go into many more items in the books dur-
ing the course of the whole year. He does not rely 
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so much upon tests as upon investigation of par-
ticular transactions. That kind of audit is used 
more frequently when you are trying to check up 
on employees, to see whether they have been guilty 
of stealing from the company, and then you want 
to trace out each item; but in ordinary commercial 
life the form of audit that is most frequently used 
is the balance sheet audit, because the time and the 
expense of a detailed audit is out of all proportion 
to the value of such an audit, in the preparation of 
the ordinary balance sheet. 
It is found moreover in thousands and thousands 
of cases for all practical purposes the tests which 
must be made by the accountant preparing his bal-
ance sheet audit, are sufficient to determine the ac-
curacy of the report. 
Where there is the grossest kind of fraud on the 
part of the company whose books are audited, as is 
indicated in this case, where if as Mr. Podell says, 
they had such accounts receivable of over $700,000, 
failed to enter on their books liabilities, that can be 
so well faked that the best auditors in the world 
making the most careful audit, cannot possibly find 
it; but we were not in any way negligent. We shall 
show you that we spent on this audit some three 
hundred hours of work, hard work. It is not just 
taking off lists. It is very hard work, making com-
parisons between books, between documents, and 
then arranging them in proper balance sheet form 
so that they meant something. 
We put in over 300 hours of work on this audit, 
for which we got approximately $1100. 
In the course of that work we had occasion to 
check up the customers' ledgers against the sales 
invoices, the sales invoices against the lot record 
of shipments, and the lot record of shipments, re-
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versing it the other way, it runs from the lot record 
of shipments to the sales invoices and from there 
back to the customers' ledger. 
Now, it is true that we did not examine every 
single lot record, every single voucher in the course 
of the year. As I told you before, we were not hired 
to do that. That would have cost an immense 
amount of money, more than Stern was ready to 
pay. In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred it would 
have been a useless procedure. 
New, it is suggested by Mr. Podell that these 
books were way behind, that all books of the com-
pany were way behind. As a matter of fact, the 
only book, as far as I know, that had not been writ-
ten up to date was the accounts receivable account 
in the control ledger. Now, the control ledger, let 
me say, is a sort of a summary book. You have 
your summary in the general ledger, you have your 
accounts receivable ledger, which was written up to 
date. That, in their system, should again have 
been posted to the control ledger for accounts re-
ceivable in the general ledger. That was a mere 
summary. As far as their bookkeeping was con-
cerned, it might have been left out altogether. It 
was a convenient way to group all of their accounts 
receivable together by entering it in this control 
ledger. It was this posting that was behind, not 
the original entries at all. 
Now, in considering this question, I am going to 
ask you to judge these defendants in the light of 
the facts that were then known to them, that then 
appeared; not in the light of Stern's subsequent 
bankruptcy or of Stern's subsequent suicide, or of 
anything else that might be presented here; but I 
am going to ask you to look at their work, and to 
test it and see whether they did good work. Look 
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at it from the viewpoint that they may have had 
at that time. 
They had implicit trust in Stern; they had im-
plicit trust in his employees. They consulted on a 
number of these items, not one man alone, not the 
books alone, but they tested them by conversations 
with employees, with several employees in many in-
stances, so that if there was fraud in this case on 
the part of Stern, it was fraud through the whole 
organization, because any man of any importance 
in that business who was talked to by us was then 
a thief and a liar. 
Mr. Podell has been silent on one very important 
or several very important phases of this case. 
He will have to show, in order to recover here, 
not only that they were negligent, but that his 
clients relied on our balance sheet and that his 
client was guilty of no contributory negligence, 
that it was in no way negligent in relying on this 
balance sheet, if it did so rely. 
Now, we are going to show you that they did 
not rely on this balance sheet at all; they relied on 
Stern's honor just as we relied on Stern's honor. 
They relied on trust receipts covering definite speci-
fied merchandise which was given to them in every 
instance before they advanced one cent of money 
to Stern. When the merchandise covered by these 
trust receipts was sold by Stern, Stern immedi-
ately gave them the accounts receivable, the ac-
counts of the people to whom he had sold the cer-
tain specified named merchandise covered by the 
trust receipts, so in place of the merchandise they 
had the accounts receivable, the accounts of the 
people to whom the merchandise had been sold 
and they were so careful about that that they them-
selves sent these invoices to the customers with a 
notation signed by Stern, "This invoice has been 
1 5 2 
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assigned to Ultramares Corporation. Please pay 
them." Or words to that effect, signed by Stern. 
And I want to suggest to you further that the 
Ultramares Corporation, secured as they were by 
trust receipts and by accounts receivable, would 
have gone into this business with Stern, no matter 
what balance sheet they had. Even if they had no 
balance sheet, because we are going to show you, 
gentlemen, that they got for their advances to 
Stern interest and commissions at the rate of 26 
per cent, per annum, which on a secured business 
such as this is a very nice return, and you can take 
some chances on short loans when you get that re-
turn ; and I tell you further that we are going to 
show that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence, that it was negligent, because it claims 
that its losses occurred on loans made in Novem-
ber and December, 1924, almost one year after the 
date of our balance sheet, and they claim they were 
still relying on that balance sheet one year after 
the date of it. Why, in a business like the rubber 
business all kinds of things could happen in that 
time to make such a balance sheet just a perfectly 
worthless thing. 
We are going to show you further that they 
never took the trouble to inquire whether the se-
curity which they were given on these final pay-
ments, on these final advances, were actually in 
existence. They took Stern's word for the fact and 
let it go at that. They took the trust receipts and 
then woke up one morning and found out that 
Stern had defrauded them, had given them no mer-
chandise or trust receipts at all but just a blank 
piece of paper. 
And finally we are going to urge upon you that 
even if we were negligent, it was not our negligence 
that caused this loss, but Stern's fraud, the fraud 
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of Stern upon us, the fraud of Stern in presenting 
this balance sheet to the plaintiff, the fraud of 
Stern in failing to give them security as he had 
agreed to give them, failing to give them security 
as he had represented. 
This case is going to last some time, I am afraid. 
It may be that at any one time we might not be 
able to get a perspective of the whole case, but we 
ask you to be patient, and I promise you as we go 
along you will begin to see the matter as I have 
outlined. 
Mr. Podell: I wonder, your Honor, if we might 
make an effort, in view of the statements, to have 
the courage to ask whether we could not stipulate 
a number of things that neither side disputes, and 
in that way save considerable time? 
Mr. Marshall: Will you state what they are? 
Mr. Podell: I would like to identify the certifi-
cate or statement that was furnished us as being 
the statement that was prepared by Touche, Niven 
& Co., and that that is their signature. 
Mr. Marshall: I think we will have to have evi-
dence, your Honor, as to how they got it, and under 
what circumstances. 
Mr. Podell: I shall furnish that. All I am ask-
ing you now is to stipulate 
Mr. Marshall: I will stipulate this is the balance 
sheet prepared by us and the certificate, but I will 
not stipulate it ever got into their hands or how it 
got into their hands. 
Mr. Podell: I am not asking you for that. All 
I want is to identify the statement and that is 
signed by one of your partners, is it not? 
Mr. Marshall: Yes, that is signed by one of the 
partners. 
Mr. Podell: Will you mark this for identifica-
tion, please? 
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(Marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 for Identifi-
cation. ) 
Mr. Podell: And I wonder if we may agree on 
identification of the books and records of Stern & 
Company? 
Mr. Marshall: I do not think so, no. 
Mr. Podell: Mr. Djorup, will you take the 
stand? 
PLAINTIFF 'S PROOFS. 
CHRISTIAN DJORUP , a witness called on behalf of 
the plaintiff, being first duly sworn, and stating 
that he resides at 18 West 70th Street, New York 
City, testified as follows: 
Direct examination by Mr. Podell. 
Q. Mr. Djorup, what is your profession or occu-
pation? A. Public accountant; certified public ac-
countant. 
Q. And whom have you been associated with; 
what concern? A. Christian Djorup & Company. 
For how many years back, Mr. Podell. At the pres-
ent time? 
Q. During 1923 and 1924, whom were you as-
sociated with? A. McArdle, Djorup & McArdle. 
Q. And in 1925? A. McArdle, Djorup & Mc-
Ardle. 
Q. That was your firm at that time? A. Right. 
Q. And were you engaged as accountant in be-
half of the receiver in bankruptcy of Fred Stern 
& Company? A. I was first engaged by the Credi-
tors' Committee and after we formed the receiver-
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ship, then by the receiver, and afterwards by the 
trustee of Stern & Company. 
Q. And did you, pursuant to that engagement, 
visit the premises of Fred Stern & Company? A. 
I did. 
Q. And did you then and there at the time of 
such visit take possession of the books and records 
of Fred Stern & Company? A. I did. 
Q. And can you identify the books and records 
that you took possession of at that time? A. I can. 
Q. Now I show you one book and ask you 
whether that is one of the books of Fred Stern & 
Company that you took possession of? A. It is; it 
is the general ledger for the years 1921 to 1923. 
Q. 1921 to 1923? A. Right. From 1920 to 1923. 
Mr. Podell: I offer it in evidence, your 
Honor. 
Mr. Marshall: May I examine prelimi-
narily? 
The Court: Yes. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Mr. Djorup, will you open that book, please? 
You did not see this book, did you, in 1923 or 
1924? A. I saw it in 1925; January of 1925, when 
I came into the offices of Fred Stern & Company. 
Q. That was the first time you saw it? A. That 
was the first time I got into Fred Stern's office. 
Q. That was the first time you saw this book? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you say that those pages in that book 
are in the same condition as they were in January 
or February, 1924? 
Mr. Podell: They are certainly not. We 
do not claim they are. 
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Mr. Marshall: Just a minute. Make the 
objection then. 
Mr. Podell: There is no claim those 
pages in 1925 were the same as they were in 
January, 1924. 
The Court: You mean as to the subse-
quent entries that were made therein? 
Mr. Podell: Yes. 
The Court: I think Mr. Marshall's ques-
tion intended to cover evidently that thing, 
whether they were the same figures. 
Mr. Podell: It is difficult for the witness 
to answer. 
Mr. Marshall: I will withdraw the ques-
tion then and I will ask some other question 
instead. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Can you say that every figure on that book 
was there in January or February, 1924? A. No, 
for I came in in 1925. 
Q. Can you say whether any sheets had been 
removed from that book since 1924, January or 
February of that year? A. I cannot. 
Q. Can you say whether any sheets had been sub-
stituted in that book for the sheets that were in 
there in January and February, 1924? A. I can-
not say. I can prove whether they have been sub-
stituted or not or whether the sheets were in there 
or not by the statements that have been submitted 
in prior years. 
Mr. Marshall: I ask that be stricken out. 
The Court: The latter part may be 
stricken out. 
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Q. You do not of your own knowledge know 
that any item in that book was or was not there in 
January or February, 1924? A. I do. 
Q. Of your own knowledge? A. Of my own 
knowledge. 
Q. Did you see that book, Mr. Djorup? A. I 
didn't see the book. 
Q. And you say of your own knowledge? A. In-
directly, for we took off the balances of 1921, 2, 3 
and 4, for each year for the past three years, and 
they corresponded with the statements that had 
been submitted for those prior years by the same 
firm of accountants. 
Mr. Marshall: That is reasoning, your 
Honor. 
The Court: Strike it out. 
Mr. Podell: An accountant, your Honor, 
has nothing to do with books except to rea-
son about them. 
The Court: Strike it out. 
Q. This book, by the way, is a loose leaf book, is 
it not? A. It is. 
Q. That means that any one leaf can be taken 
out at any time and a new leaf be put in? A. Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: I object to the admission 
of those books on the ground that there is 
nothing to show that they are in the condi-
tion in which they were at that time. 
The Court: I will take them not as the 
authentic books. I will take them as the 
books that were presented to this accountant 
at that time. As to their authenticity, we 
may come along and take that later and find 
out as to their authenticity. It is taken sub-
ject to that connection. 
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Mr. Marshall: Your Honor is taking 
them as the books this accountant found in 
the office of Stern in 1925? 
The Court: That is all he said. We have 
no basis to assume anything else. 
Mr. Marshall: I take an exception to the 
admission of the book. 
(Book received in evidence and marked 
Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 2.) 
Q. Is there anything in that book to show the 
number of pages in the book? A. No, there is not. 
They are not numbered. 
The Court: May I suggest, Mr. Podell, 
that all of these books and these papers that 
are involved here, and which were involved 
in the matter of the bankruptcy and trustee 
in bankruptcy, be submitted to this witness, 
who I suppose was the man who made the 
examination, at least I make that assump-
tion ; collect them all here, so we will not 
have to go through them all individually, 
and let the objection be made by counsel 
for the defendant as to their introduction in 
one broad objection and we will get that 
over with quickly, instead of taking each 
book separately. 
Mr. Podell: I would do that provided 
your Honor will permit me to mark each 
book as a separate exhibit, because the rec-
ord would not be clear otherwise. 
The Court: Certainly, I see the necessity 
of that. Identify each one. 
Mr. Podell: We will take all the books 
and identify them as the books found by this 
witness in Fred Stern's office at that time. 
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The Court: In 1925? 
Mr. Podell: Yes. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Are these books that I show you here, all 
books that you found in the offices of Fred Stern 
& Company and that you took possession of on the 
1st of January, 1925? A. They are part of the 
books which I took possession of. 
Q. They are part of the books; there were other 
books? A. There are other books. 
Q. But these were all there at that time? A. 
These were all in the offices of Fred Stern & Com-
pany at that time. 
Mr. Podell: I offer them in evidence. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. As to these books, Mr. Djorup, your answer is 
the same, that you never saw them before you went 
into the office of Stern & Company in January of 
1925? A. That is correct. 
Q. So you could not say whether the books are 
the same as they were in January or February of 
1924, as of your own knowledge? A. That is right. 
Mr. Marshall: Same objection. 
The Court: Same ruling. 
Mr. Marshall: I take an exception. 
Mr. Podell: You will identify them as 
they are marked. 
(Book received in evidence and marked 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3.) 
The Witness: Carbon copies of invoices 
for the year 1923 called "Debit Memos." 
(Book received in evidence and marked 
Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 4.) 
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The Witness: That is the accounts receiv-
able ledger from January 1, 1922, to Decem-
ber 31, 1924. 
(Book received in evidence and marked 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5.) 
The Witness: That is debit memo book or 
sales record from July, 1923, to December 
31, 1924. 
(Book received in evidence and marked 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 6.) 
The Witness: That is the shipping record 
of the United Baltic Corporation. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Whose book was that; is that a Fred Stern 
book? A. Fred Stern book, showing shipments of 
the United Baltic. 
Mr. Marshall: Do not say what it shows, 
please. 
The Witness: And of L. Ruffer & Sons. 
(Book received in evidence and marked 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 7.). 
The Witness: That is the shipment or de-
livery record of outgoing shipments from 
No. 10,001 to 10,500. The dates are from 
October 5, 1923, to December 19, 1923. 
(Book received in evidence and marked 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 8.) 
The Witness: That is shipment record or 
delivery record from 10,501 to 11,000, from 
December 20, 1923, to March 5, 1924. 
(Book received in evidence and marked 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 9.) 
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The Witness : That is a ledger for notes 
and trade acceptances receivable from Janu-
ary, 1922, to 1925. 
(Book received in evidence and marked 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 10.) 
The Witness: That is the trial balance 
of accounts payable or shippers and dealers 
for the years 1923 and 1924. 
(Book received in evidence and marked 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 11.) 
The Witness: That is trial balance of ac-
counts receivable or customers for 1923 and 
1924. 
(Book received in evidence and marked 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 12.) 
The Witness: That is debit memorandum 
book or sales journal from September, 1922, 
to July, 1923. 
(Book received in evidence and marked 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 13.) 
The Witness: That is the credit memo-
randum, book or purchase journal from 
January, 1922, to January, 1925. 
(Book received in evidence and marked 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 14.) 
The Witness: That is bank and letters 
of credit ledger from January, 1923, to De-
cember 31, 1923. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Now, did you have occasion, Mr. Djorup, to 
make any comparisons of figures between state-
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ment, Exhibit 1 for Identification, and the contents 
of any of these books? Just answer yes or no. A. 
Yes. 
Mr. Podell: I ask for the production of 
all work sheets of the defendants supporting 
this statement. 
The Court: May I ask here if there was 
an examination before trial? 
Mr. Marshall: There was not. 
Mr. Podell: There was an examination 
under 21-A, your Honor, a very exhaustive 
one, where books were identified under 21-A 
by certain of the witnesses. 
Mr. Limburg: That made it quite unneces-
sary to have any further examination before 
trial. 
Mr. Marshall: I present these work 
sheets. I do not present them though as be-
ing in support of any balance sheet. They 
are the work sheets that we prepared in the 
course of our audit. Try to keep them in 
order, if possible, please. 
The Court: Mr. Podell, the witness has 
called the Court's attention to the fact that 
there are some books on the floor which are 
material, which you have forgotten to intro-
duce. 
Mr. Podell: I have not forgotten, your 
Honor. There are not only the books on 
the floor but there are other books for an-
other year which we have not marked at this 
point. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Have you ever seen these work sheets that 
are produced by the defendants? A. I have seen 
some of the work sheets. 
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Q. Copies or originals? A. Originals. 
Q. And did you have occasion to compare the 
contents of some of these work sheets with some 
of the volumes? A. I did not compare the work 
sheets, but photostat copies. 
Q. You mean photostat copies of the work 
sheets? A. Right. The originals I saw in the of-
fice of the defendants. 
Q. Of these very work sheets? A. The originals 
of some of these very work sheets. Just the ac-
counts receivable trial balance were shown to me 
in their office when I called their attention to dis-
crepancies and had rechecked the books of Fred 
Stern & Company at my request. 
Q. In making both the comparison of this state-
ment, Exhibit 1 for Identification, as you have tes-
tified, as well as the copies of work sheets produced 
by the defendants, did you find that the books 
therein referred to were the books that are marked 
in evidence? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as calling 
for a conclusion and not being the best evi-
dence; whether those are the correct books 
or not. 
Mr. Podell: We do not claim they are the 
correct books. 
Mr. Marshall: That calls for a conclu-
sion, comparing one thing to another and 
then saying it is the authentic book. 
The Court: Yes, but I will take it under 
the same ruling as originally made, that 
they be connected with these particular 
books, but as an introductory matter, for the 
purpose of proceeding with the trial, I will 
allow it at this time. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
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Mr. Podell: Your Honor, is there any 
question raised as to the identity of these 
books? 
The Court: None, but there is some ques-
tion apparently raised by questions of coun-
sel for the defendants as to the correctness 
of their present condition or as of January, 
1925. 
Mr. Podell: We are not seeking to prove, 
your Honor, the correctness of their present 
condition. 
The Court: But as of January, 1925. 
Mr. Marshall: It is a question of identity, 
your Honor. 
The Court: I appreciate that. 
Mr. Podell: And we are not seeking to 
prove anything more by the offer of these 
books in evidence. They have been marked 
in evidence and I am taking this time in the 
hope that a little discussion of this thing in 
clarification may save us a great deal of 
time. Perhaps your Honor will permit me 
to do it at this stage. 
The Court: I will. 
Mr. Podell: Will they stipulate that these 
are the books without warrantees of the en-
tries at all, that each of the entries are exact-
ly as they were? Will they stipulate that 
they are the set of books that Fred Stern 
used, the physical books that Fred Stern 
used during the years that they purport to 
be his books, and that these defendants 
worked on them? That is all. After all, 
there is only one ledger which they used, or 
two, and we want the identity of it. 
The Court: That is easily obtainable out-
side of this witness. 
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Mr. Podell: I can call a half a dozen peo-
ple who will testify to that. I have a man 
here that was in Fred Stern's employ. I am 
saying this merely to save time. 
The Court: I appreciate what you are do-
ing and how much time would be saved, but 
still I have the objection in front of me. 
Mr. Podell: That is up to counsel. Will 
you stipulate that these physically are the 
books that Fred Stern used without guaran-
teeing that those entries are the same en-
tries, or any other guaranties; but that these 
books are the same thing? 
Mr. Marshall: The covers, you mean? 
Mr. Podell: The physical books. I mean 
the covers and the pages. 
Mr. Marshall: They are loose leaf. 
Mr. Podell: They are not all loose leaf. 
Most of them are bound, and even if they 
are loose leaf, there is certain identity both 
in the cover and in the contents. 
The Court: There certainly is, but not 
from this witness, 
Mr. Podell: I want to know first whether 
they will put me to the necessity of calling 
half a dozen people that I have here to iden-
tify these books. If counsel think they can 
gain anything by it, of course that is their 
privilege, but I will do that if I must. 
Mr. Marshall: Are you finished? 
Mr. Podell: I want to know whether you 
will stipulate that. If not, I will call my 
witnesses. 
Mr. Marshall: We are in this position, 
your Honor—that after all these years we 
cannot possibly say what was in the books 
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at that time, whether any given entry or 
given sheet is as it was at that time. It is 
unfair to ask us. 
Mr. Podell: That is just what I am not 
asking you for. 
Mr. Marshall: May I proceed without in-
terruption? 
Mr. Podell: I will withdraw my request 
for a stipulation. Romberg, take the stand. 
Mr. Marshall: May I finish what I was 
going to say? 
Mr. Podell: I have withdrawn any re-
quest for any stipulation. I find now we 
waste more time by discussing it. 
The Court: The question is withdrawn. 
That ends the matter. 
(Witness excused.) 
LESLIE M. SIESS, a witness called on behalf of the 
plaintiff, being first duly sworn, and stating that he 
resides at 571 Madison Avenue, Elizabeth, New 
Jersey, testified as follows: 
Direct examination by Mr. Podell. 
Q. What is your business, Mr. Siess? A. I am 
with the New Empire Corporation as a clerk. 
Q. Were you ever connected with Touche, Niven 
& Co.? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you do accountancy for them? A. I 
worked as a junior. 
Q. You worked as a junior accountant for them? 
A. As a junior accountant. 
Q. Did you work on the books of Fred Stern & 
Company? A. Yes. 
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Q. At the premises of Fred Stern & Company? 
A. Yes. 
Q. State the time when you worked on the books 
of Fred Stern & Company? A. I imagine for 
about three weeks or more. 
Q. What three weeks? 
The Court: Identify the year, sir, if you 
can. 
The Witness: I went there in the latter 
part of the year 1923. I imagine it was three 
weeks out of the latter part of December and 
the first part of January, 1924. 
Q. What did you do, what was your first job 
there? A. I was to work for Mr. Romberg. 
Q. What were you to do working for Mr. Rom-
berg? A. Post the ledger. 
Q. Post the ledger from what date to what date? 
A. I think from April, 1923, to the end of the 
year. 
Q. You posted it up from April, 1923, to the end 
of 1923, is that right? A. Yes. 
Q. Who told you to do that? A. Mr. Romberg. 
Q. Were you taking your instructions from Mr. 
Romberg? A. Yes. 
Q;. Who told you to take your instructions from 
Mr. Romberg? A. I believe, practically, Mr. Rea. 
Q. Who was Mr. Rea? A. A manager of Touche, 
Niven & Co. 
Q. You found that their general ledger had not 
been written up for how long? A. As I say, from 
April, 1923. I imagine it was about that date. 
Q. Did you report that to Mr. Rea? A. I don't 
know as though I did or not. 
Q. Was it not an unusual condition for a general 
ledger not to have been posted up from April to 
December? 
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Mr. Marshall: Just a minute. Will you 
show he is an expert to give an opinion of 
that sort? 
The Court: I will allow it as a matter of 
course of business. 
Q. Did it strike you as unusual that the ledger 
had not been written up from April to December? 
A. Well, yes. 
Q. You did not report it to Mr. Rea, the man-
ager? A. As I said, I don't know as though I did 
or not. 
Q. You do not know whether you did or you did 
not? A. I think that was my answer before. 
Q. Can you identify your own handwriting in 
any of these books? A. I think I can. 
Q. Can you point to the book that you wrote 
in, please? Would you recognize it better by look-
ing at them? A. I guess I had better. 
Q. (Handing book to witness) What book is that 
that you are looking at ? A. This appears to be the 
general ledger. 
Q. Is it the same general ledger that you wrote 
in, or is there some doubt about that in your mind? 
A. I recognize some of my figures in here. 
Q. Is it the same book that you wrote in, yes or 
no? Can't you say that? 
Mr. Marshall: Part of it may be the same, 
part of it may not, your Honor. 
Mr. Podell: That is a very happy sugges-
tion to your witness. It had not occurred to 
him. I object to counsel 
Mr. Marshall: He is your witness now. 
Mr. Podell: Your employee, not mine. 
Mr. Marshall: He is not my employee. 
Mr. Podell: I disown him. 
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Mr. Marshall: You called him; you can-
not disown him. 
The Court: He is yours for all purposes 
here. 
Mr. Podell: Excepting I have the right to 
cross-examine as an employee of the defend-
ants. 
Mr. Marshall: He is not an employee, and 
he so testified, Mr. Podell. 
Q. Were you an employee of Touche, Niven & 
Co. at the time you were up there? 
The Court: He said he was. • 
Q. Can you answer the question that has been 
put? A. I can't identify this book in its entirety. 
Q. You cannot? A. Not in its entirety. 
Q. Do you find everything that you wrote in 
there? A. I don't know as I can find everything I 
wrote in this book. 
Q. Do you find any of your writing in there? A. 
I said so before, that I recognized some. 
Q. Will you turn to the pages that you wrote in. 
The Court: This will be a job forever and 
a day. 
Mr. Podell: I cannot help it, your Honor. 
I do not know what we are wasting a lot of 
time about. Counsel won't stipulate the 
books, so I have to prove them, that is all. 
The Witness: Do you want me to identify 
each sheet that I have figures on? 
Q. Can you identify the rubber sales account 
that you wrote up? Have you got the account? A. 
Yes, I have found it. 
Q. Is it in your handwriting? A. Not all of it. 
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Q. Where did your handwriting begin? A. 6/10. 
I am in doubt as to the 5/7. 
Q. You are in doubt about the entry made on 
5/7, which is May 7th, is that it? A. Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: 5/7, does that mean May 
7th? 
The Witness: I assume it would. 
Mr. Marshall: It may refer to something 
else. 
Mr. Podell: Will you please not tell him 
what it means or what you think it means. 
I submit he should not interrupt my ques-
tions by saying he thinks it means something 
else. 
Mr. Marshall: I am sorry. I meant to 
object to Mr. Podell's leading the witness by 
saying that meant May 7th or whatever it 
was. 
Mr. Podell: You should have taken your 
objection. 
Q. What is it? Are you in doubt now about 5/7 
being May 7th? A. I say I am in doubt as to 
whether those are my figures. 
Q. What I am asking you now is, is there any 
doubt in your mind whether 5/7 means May 7th of 
1923? A. Yes, there would be doubt. 
Q. There would be doubt as to that in your mind? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, let me see, Mr. Clerk or Assistant—is 
that what you called yourself, a clerk or assistant to 
Touche, Niven? A. Junior. 
Q. Your page begins with 1/38, does it not? 
Mr. Marshall: January 38th, yes. 
The Court: Mr. Marshall, please, do not 
interrupt again. 
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Mr. Marshall: I am sorry my sense of 
humor got the better of me, your Honor. 
Q. What do these numbers to the left indicate? 
A. I was ahead of Mr. Marshall. I happened to 
see that 1/38. That is what made me doubt. 
Q. What do the numbers to the left indicate? 
How many such separate numbers are there? A. 
One to twelve. 
Q. Do you understand that the year 1922 had 
twelve months? A. I imagine so. 
Q. So that the numbers 1 to 12 as they appear 
on the left-hand column, do they indicate the first, 
second, third, fourth month? A. I assume they 
would. 
Q. You assume that much. You know that much, 
do you not, or is it just an assumption? A. I know 
that much, if it wasn't for this figure here, this 
1/38. 
Q. We will come to that in a moment. As an 
accountant, did you ever try to find out what the 
figures are that you wrote, what they meant? A. 
I did at the time. 
Q. You knew, did you not? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, you are certain that you wrote these 
figures I am pointing to now, 6/10? A. I am al-
most certain. 
Q. Almost certain? A. Yes. 
Q. Are you Certain that you wrote 7/5? A. Yes. 
Q. You are certain about that. Can you tell us 
what the 10 or the 5 meant when you wrote it? A. 
To me now that looks like 6/10. 
Q. What does that mean? A. I would say June, 
but I don't know whether it would mean the 10th 
of June or not. 
Q. What is this account? A. Rubber sales. 
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Q. Mr. Witness, can you tell this jury what it is 
that you wrote on there after you began to write? 
A. Posted the debits and credits to the rubber sales 
account. 
Q:. You pasted the debits and the credits to the 
rubber sales account, is that right? A. Yes, 
Q. From what period to what period? A. From 
June, 1923 
Q. Up to what period now? Answer the ques-
tion? A. It is identified on this sheet as 12-8. 
Q. What year? A. 1923. 
Q. That is December 8th, 1923. Now, can you 
say to this jury that all these items that preceded— 
that appeared to have been made before you actu-
ally there at the time when you began your writ-
ing? A. Yes, 
Q. Then that account contains entries that were 
there when you started and contains also entries 
made by you up to December 8, 1923, and contains 
one entry that you are in doubt about, that is 
12/29, is that the thing? A. Yes. 
Q. You are in doubt about that one? A. Yes, 
sir. 
Q. Now, you are certain that that is the book 
that this account was in, are you not, or was it in 
some other book? A. That I couldn't tell you. 
Q. Are you certain that that is the book that 
that account was in? What would you call this 
book? A. I say that is the general ledger. 
Q. And was this account in the general ledger 
at the time you wrote on it? A. The account was 
in the general ledger. 
Q. At the time you wrote on it? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And is this the general ledger that you wrote 
in? A. That I don't remember. 
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Q. Will you look through and see if you find 
other handwriting there than yours? A. Yes, there 
is other accounts. 
Q. That you wrote in? A. Yes. 
Q. You recognize your handwriting in there? A. 
Yes. 
Q. With these other items of handwriting and 
these other accounts that were in there, can you 
not tell this jury whether this is the book that you 
wrote in at that time? A. I can say that I wrote 
in this book. 
Q. That is all that I am asking you. A. But I 
doubt as to its entirety. 
Q. Did I ask you anything about its entirety? 
A. No. 
Q. Who was it that suggested entirety to your 
mind? A. Nobody. 
Q. Have you talked over this question of your 
identifying these books with any of the lawyers or 
any of the Touche-Niven people? Have you talked 
about that before you came to court? A. Yes. 
Q. Who was it told you about entirety of the 
contents of the books when you talked to them? 
Who was it talked to you about entirety? A. I 
talked on these books before a referee some 
Q. I am talking now about any lawyers or any 
people that you spoke to before you came here to 
identify these books. 
Mr. Marshall: I think it is improper for 
him to cross-examine his own witness. 
The Court: I will allow this question. 
While not a hostile witness, he was in the 
employ of the defendant. 
The Witness: Nobody told me as to its 
entirety. 
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Q. Did anybody talk to you as to identifying 
these books as a witness here in court? 
The Court: On the subject of identifica-
tion? 
A. No. 
Q. Nobody at all? A. No. 
Q. You have not any reluctance to identifying 
the book, have you? A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you say that this is the general ledger that 
you worked on at that time? 
Mr. Marshall: I think that question has 
been asked in several different forms al-
ready. 
Mr. Podell: It has been answered in sev-
eral forms, and I would like to get a definite 
answer on that. 
Q. Is this the general ledger that you worked on 
for Fred Stern & Company, and its books? A. 
From the sheets I find my handwriting in, I would 
say yes, but not in its entirety. 
Mr. Podell: I offer the book in evidence, 
your Honor. 
Mr. Marshall: I object to the admission 
of anything excepting what the witness had 
his handwriting on. 
The Court: I will allow it. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
(Received in evidence heretofore, having 
been marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2.) 
Mr. Podell: I ask that these work sheets 
be marked for identification at the present 
time. 
221 
222 
75 
Leslie M. Siess—For Plaintiff—Direct—Cross. 229 
Mr. Marshall: Why not put them in evi-
dence? 
Mr. Podell: I will only mark them for 
identification. 
(Marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 15 for 
Identification.) 
Q. Can you identify any other books here that 
you worked on? If you cannot identify them, can 
you name them? A. No, I cannot. 
Q. Do you mean to tell this jury now, that you 
were working in the employ of Touche, Niven & Co. 
and that you did not at that time know the names 
of the books you were working on? A. No. 
Q. You do not mean that, do you? A. No. 
Q. You do know? A. Yes. 
Q. What books were you working on besides the 
general ledger? Never mind looking at those. Just 
tell me what books. 
The Court: That is a pretty hard ques-
tion. Remember this is an accountant who 
has worked in a number of places. It may 
be difficult to test his recollection, to snap 
so quickly an answer. 
Q. Do the best you can and see what you can 
remember of the type of books you examined. If 
it is going to help you to see these, I will be very 
pleased to have you look at them, if it is going to 
help you to identify the books you worked on. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. You just look at this book, Plaintiff's Exhibit 
No. 4, and tell us whether you made any entries 
in that book (handing to witness), either made 
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entries or worked on at the time you were working 
there. A. Did you want me to identify this book, 
as to what it is? 
Q. Yes. A. And if I made any entries in it? 
Q. Yes. A. And if I worked on it? 
Q. That is it. A. In answer to the first question, 
this is the accounts receivable ledger. I don't see 
any figures here that are mine, as making any 
entries, but I believe I must have worked on it. 
Q. Do you recognize it at all, after seeing it now, 
as one of the books that you had in the place at 
that time? A. It looks like one of the books they 
had up there. It has been five years and I don't 
quite remember all the books. 
Q. Did you not make any record of the books you 
were working on? A. I may have. 
Q. Where would that record be? A. Time sheet. 
Mr. Podell: I ask for the production of 
the time sheet. 
Mr. Marshall: They do not show any list, 
Mr. Podell. 
Q. What is there about the book that makes you 
say 
Mr. Marshall: Just a minute, please. 
He asked for the production of a paper and 
I want to produce it (handing paper to 
counsel). 
Q. Will you look at the time sheets that are pro-
duced here and see whether that will refresh your 
recollection so that you can identify the books that 
you worked on? A. May I answer now? 
Q. Yes. A. General ledger, accounts receivable 
book. 
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Q. Is there anything on those time sheets that 
enables you to identify the book before you as the 
accounts receivable book that you worked on at 
that time? A. No. 
Q. Do you say that that book before you is the 
book that you worked on at that time? A. It ap-
pears to be the book, because a good many rubber 
accounts are listed here, Canadian Consolidated 
Rubber, etc. 
Q. You mean you recall that from those names 
or those pages? A. No. 
Q. What do you remember about the book that 
identifies it in your mind? A. It is not identified in 
my mind. 
Q. Look through it and see if you cannot find 
some trace of your writing or your auditing or 
anything that will identify it; just look through a 
few of the pages, anyway. 
Mr. Podell: Is Mr. Towell in court? 
Mr. Towell, take the stand, please. 
Mr. Marshall: May I have the privilege of 
cross-examining this witness? 
The Court: You may cross-examine him 
now, if you wish to. 
Cross-examination by Mr. Marshall. 
Q. You said you were employed by the Empire— 
what company was it? A. New Empire Corpo-
ration. 
Q. How long have you been employed there? 
Speak up so the jury can hear you. A. Three years. 
Q. And were you discharged by Touche-Niven, 
or why did you leave them? A. I was not dis-
charged. I had a better offer. 
Q. From the New Empire people or their con-
nections? A. Yes. 
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Q. Now you say you posted a ledger. Do you 
know which ledger it was that you posted at Stern 
& Company? A. Yes, the general ledger. 
Q. That is not the accounts receivable ledger, is 
it? A. No. 
Q. Not the customers' ledger, rather? A. No. 
Q. That is the part of the general ledger which 
is a summary of the customers' ledger? A. Well, 
the general ledger is not a summary of the cus-
tomers' ledger, but there is an account in the gen-
eral ledger that would naturally have a summary, 
the accounts receivable control. 
Q. Is Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 the book that you re-
ferred to and in which you did the writing (hand-
ing to witness) ? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, I think you said that you took instruc-
tions from Romberg. On what did you take in-
structions from Romberg? A. Mr. Romberg gave 
me instructions what to do. You want to know 
what they were? 
Q. No. Was that in posting the books, was that 
in respect to posting the books? A. Yes. He in-
structed me to post the books. 
Q. Did he give you any instructions at all with 
respect to the audit of the books? A. No. 
Q. Whose instructions did you take in respect to 
auditing the books when you came to that? A. Mr. 
Towell. 
Q. And who was Mr. Towell? A. An employee 
of Touche, Niven & Co. 
Q. He was your senior was he not, the senior 
accountant? A. Yes. 
Q. And Mr. Romberg was who? A. An employee 
of Fred Stern & Company. 
Q. What were the duties of a junior accountant 
on an audit, as you understood them? A. To fol-
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low the instructions of the senior to the best of his 
ability. 
Q. And what did you do in connection with this 
audit as far as you can recollect—I will withdraw 
that and say, did you follow the instructions of the 
senior? A. Yes, I did. 
Q. On this audit? A. Yes. 
Q. And anybody else's instructions; did you fol-
low anybody else's instructions on the audit besides 
the instructions of the senior? A. No. 
Q. You said you came to Stern & Company, I be-
lieve, in December, 1923. Is that your best recol-
lection? 
The Court: Refresh it, if you can. 
Q. Will you look at your time sheets and see if 
that refreshes your recollection any on that point 
(handing to witness) ? A. Yes, it does. 
Q. When did you first come there? A. January 
28. 
Q. January 28? A. 1924. 
Q. Not in December? A. No. I am in error. 
Mr. Podell: I ask that these time sheets 
be marked in evidence, your Honor, so far 
as they relate to Fred Stern & Company. 
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, may 
we make a transcript of it, to be put in evi-
dence, because they do refer to other ac-
counts of ours. 
Mr. Podell: There is only one page, I 
think, that refers to other accounts, and I 
have no objection to that page—a transcript 
being made thereof. There is one toward the 
end. You can make a transcript of that. 
(Time sheets received in evidence and 
marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 16.) 
(Witness excused.) 
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SYDNEY TOWELL , witness called on behalf of the 
plaintiff, and being first duly sworn, and stating 
that he resides at 1950 Andrews Avenue, New York 
City, testified as follows: 
Direct examination by Mr. Podell. 
Q. Mr. Towell, what is your business or occupa-
tion? A. Public accountant. 
Q. And were you connected with Touche, Niven 
& Co. in 1923 and 1924? A. Yes. 
Q. And in what capacity? A. As a senior ac-
countant. 
Q. As a senior accountant, you say? A. Yes. 
Q. Did you have occasion to do any work on the 
books of Fred Stern? A. Yes. 
Q. All I am going to ask of you now is to tell 
the Judge , and jury, if you can, can you identify 
the books that you worked on? A. I have no recol-
lection about the books to-day. 
Q. Can you identify the books that you worked 
on for Fred Stern & Company? A. No. 
Q. Your answer is no? A. No. 
Q. Did you write in any of them? A. No. 
Q. Did you make any checks in any of them? A. 
I do not think so. 
Q. You do not think so? A. No. 
Q. How much time did you put in at the premises 
of Fred Stern & Company? A. About two weeks. 
Q. Is that all the time that you put in? A. Yes. 
Q. In connection with what did you put in those 
two weeks? A. Examination of the records in the 
preparation of a balance sheet, 
Q. You did that in two weeks? A. Yes. 
Q. What records did you examine? A. Pretty 
nearly all of the records in the office of Fred Stern. 
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Q. What did they include, what records did they 
include? A. It included their ledgers 
Q. What did your examination consist of? A. A 
balance sheet audit, 
Q. And in making that balance sheet audit, did 
you not make some marks of some kind in those 
books? A. No. 
Q. Did you. not check any of the figures? A. 
Yes, 
Q. Did you prepare work sheets from those 
figures as you saw them in the books? A. Yes. 
Q. Can you by comparison of your work sheets 
with the books presented to you, check off to see 
whether or not the entries on your work sheets were 
copied from those books; can you do that? A. If 
you have the books here I could probably check 
through most of these work sheets, as you suggest, 
Q. All right. Take the first of these work sheets. 
Take your general ledger trial balance, if you 
please. Have you got that general ledger trial bal-
ance? Have you got your work sheets covering the 
accounts receivable? A. I have the general ledger 
trial balance that you asked for. 
Q. We will pass that for the moment. Look at 
your work sheets covering accounts receivable. A. 
Yes, I have that, 
Q. Now, that contains certain conclusions and 
certain figures copied from certain books, does it 
not? A. Yes, 
Q. Look at the book before you now and make 
as many comparisons as you require in order to be 
able to answer the question whether that paper 
before you, those figures, those work sheets were 
copied from the book that is before you. Just check 
up something of the figures on the one with the 
other and see if they are taken from that book? 
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Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, I 
think he ought to put the work sheets in evi-
dence if he is going to use them as a basis 
of comparison. They are only marked for 
identification. 
Mr. Podell: I have not any objection to 
putting in evidence whatever work sheets I 
use. 
Mr. Marshall: If they go in, they ought 
to all go in, because they are part of the 
same thing. 
Mr. Podell: Does counsel want to take 
the position I am bound by the contents of 
those papers because I put them in evidence? 
And if your Honor will hold 
The Court: I have not thus held, and I 
do not propose to. 
Mr. Marshall: I have not made any such 
claim, your Honor. 
Mr. Podell: I will offer them in evidence, 
if that is what you wish. I offer them all 
in evidence, upon the understanding, or, 
rather, upon the reservation that I certainly 
do not propose to be bound by their con-
tents, being the papers and books and rec-
ords of the defendants themselves, made at 
that time. 
Mr. Marshall: He has got to be bound to 
some extent by their contents. 
The Court: That is just the point, so the 
Court stands on its original ruling. The 
application for counsel to put all these pa-
pers in evidence is denied and an exception 
given to the counsel for the defendant. 
Mr. Podell: I will put in the paper I call 
for. 
The Court: Proceed. 
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Q. Have you made those check-ups? A. No, sir. 
Q. Check as many that will satisfy you so you 
can say those items on your work sheets were really 
copied from the book before you. 
Mr. Marshall: There is the work sheet 
there now, and I think this is the time to 
mark that particular sheet. 
Mr. Podell: Yes. 
(Received in evidence and marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibit 15-A.) 
Mr. Marshall: May we have the name of 
this particular sheet? 
The Witness: It is the working papers on 
the accounts receivable of Fred Stern & 
Company in connection with the audit of 
December 31, 1923. 
Q. Are those working sheets in your handwrit-
ing? A. Part. 
Q. But you know the handwriting on the others 
are? They were all Touche-Niven men that were 
working on those? A. I am not at this time cer-
tain of Mr. Siess's handwriting, but I believe them 
to all be in his handwriting, if not in my own. 
Q. And Siess was an employee of Touche-Niven 
at that time? A. Yes, 
Q. Will you go along and check them up and see 
if you can say the book before you is the book you 
made those work sheets from? A. I didn't copy 
these down out of the ledger, you know. 
Q. That is the accounts receivable book, I think, 
that you have before you. You said you copied 
them from the accounts receivable? A. That was 
done at my direction. 
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Q. Check the one against the other and see if 
you can say it was done from the book before you. 
Just check them up so you will be satisfied, so that 
you can honestly say that that is the book. A. 
I have an account here that is the same name on 
the account, on the trial balance. I haven't yet 
followed the balance of the account into this ledger 
account, 
Q. Now, can you not check up one against the 
other, so that you can say to twelve men that this 
is the book from which these figures were taken; 
can't you do that? A. No. 
Q. You cannot do that? A. No. 
Q. Was this taken from the accounts receivable 
ledger? A. Yes. 
Q. And if a book were presented to you that 
purports to be the accounts receivable ledger, you 
could not check one against the other so you can 
say whether these figures were compiled from that 
book? Do you understand my question? A. I do. 
Q. You are sure you understand it? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, here you have—these are work sheets, 
are they not? A. Yes. 
Q. They are work sheets of what, on the subject 
of accounts receivable, are they not? A. Yes. 
Q. You know as an accountant that they must 
have been taken from some accounts receivable 
ledger; you know that, do you not? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, you have the names of the various ac-
counts, have you not? Where do you begin? Where 
is your first one? A. Akron Seamless Rubber Com-
pany. 
Q. Can you tell us whether there is an account 
by the name of Akron Seamless Rubber Company 
in that book? A. The name is in the index. 
Q. Now, will you turn to the book? A. Yes, there 
is. 
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Q. Is there any account that precedes it? A. Yes. 
Q. Which one is it ? A. The Asbestos Textile. 
Q. That is a closed account as of the date of this 
audit, is it not? A. Yes, it appears to be. 
Q. So that really the first open account in this 
accounts receivable book is the Akron Seamless 
Rubber Company; that is the first open account, 
is it not? A. That is the first open account. 
Q. Does it also appear to be the first open ac-
count on this work sheet? A. Yes. 
Q. It does, does it not? A. Yes. 
Q. Can you get any other comparisons on that 
account so you can get—what is your next item? 
Is the amount due from them stated here on your 
account? A. $69,981.75. 
Q. Do you find that precise figure on the page 
of the Akron account ? 
Mr. Marshall: I think we might save time. 
I will be ready to concede that these sheets 
show items that were on the books, if that 
will help, Mr. Podell. 
The Court: He wants to know whether 
that is the book. 
Mr. Marshall: If we can shorten it by the 
other concession. 
Mr. Podell: It has taken a long time to 
extract that little bit of a concession, but I 
think we better go through now. 
Mr. Marshall: You never asked for it. 
Mr. Podell: We had better go through 
now and prove our case. 
Mr. Marshall: If you will find a place in 
the record where you asked me to make a 
concession that the work sheets show 
Mr. Podell: I stopped asking concessions. 
I will prove them if it takes me a week. 
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Mr. Marshall: I defy him to show where 
he made such a request. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. The question is whether this first figure that 
you have here, $69,981.75, is the precise figure that 
appears on this page, $69,981.75? A. Yes. 
Q. Is there any doubt in your mind that this 
first item was taken from that page? A. The figure 
is the same. 
Q. Is there any doubt in your mind that this first 
item was taken by you from this first page? A. 
It was not taken by me. 
Q. But taken by whomever they were taken, were 
taken from this first page? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as calling 
for a conclusion. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, accountants can 
only give conclusions. 
Mr. Marshall: That is a concession I am 
awfully glad to have. 
Mr. Podell: Exception. I would like to 
be heard on that question. 
The Court: He took all of his from the 
work sheets. 
Mr. Podell: This is the work sheet I am 
talking about. 
Q. Did you examine the work sheets? A. Yes. 
Q. You did examine the work sheets at that time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. After the juniors had prepared them? A. 
Yes. 
Q. And did you examine this book yourself? A. 
The book came to my attention. I did some work 
on it. 
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Q. Did you not check off and make the compari-
son to see whether there was a correct transcript 
made? A. No. 
Q. What did you do in connection with that 
book? Did you not make the audit? A. I directed 
Mr. Siess to take off a trial balance, which he did. 
Q. You said that you examined 
Mr. Marshall: Please do not interrupt the 
witness. 
The Court: Let him answer. 
The Witness: I saw that he had taken off 
a trial balance and that his addition of that 
trial balance and his total balance agreed 
with the total as shown in the general ledger. 
Q. Is that all that you did? A. I then had him 
make a further examination of each and every ac-
count, and aged the account in order that I could 
properly take them up as to their age and their 
collectibility. I think that was all the work done 
by Mr. Siess that I myself 
Q. Mr. Siess is the young man that preceded you 
on the witness stand? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, did you personally check up on his work 
sheets to find out whether he did his work correctly? 
A. Sufficient for my purposes. Not a complete 
check right through. 
Q. Did you do it? Yes or no. Did you do it? 
A. No. 
Q. You did not do it? A. Not the whole thing. 
Q. I did not ask you about every item. Did you 
do it in the way you thought it ought to be done? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did not that involve checking up to see 
whether or not these items are correctly transcribed 
from the accounts receivable? A. No. 
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Q. Or whether the total is correct? A. Whether 
the total is correct, yes. 
Q. Which total did you check up on? A. The 
total of these sheets. 
Q. The total of each separate sheet? A. No, the 
total of the whole thing. This total (indicating). 
Q. I see. Now, then, if you as an accountant 
were asked to identify this book as the accounts 
receivable ledger, could you do it as an accountant 
by examining these work sheets and seeing whether 
these work sheets represent work sheets of figures 
taken from this book; could you do that? A. No. 
Q. You could not do it? A. No. 
Q. Not even if every item that appears on these 
work sheets is identical with every item that ap-
pears on those very accounts in this book. To you 
as an accountant, that would not be enough? A. 
I could prove it out as an accountant if I found 
a duplicate in this ledger of everything that I have 
on the sheets, I would come to the conclusion my-
self that it was the same ledger. 
Q. That it is the same book. Well, now, would 
you have to examine every one of these items on 
these sheets to say that, or could you make a check-
up? A. I don't know whether I could do it then. 
Q. You just told us that you would come to that 
conclusion if every one of these items— A. I said 
I would probably come to that conclusion. 
Q. You want to put in the word "probably"? A. 
I can't tell how it would come out. 
Q. I am not asking you how it would come out. 
I am assuming now that every item that you have 
on these yellow sheets is found in this book exactly 
the same; whether you as an accountant would say 
to the jury that those entries were taken from that 
book? Now, would you do that, could you do that? 
A. No. 
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Q. You are sure you understand my question? 
A. Yes, I understand your question. 
Q. Will you be good enough during recess 
Mr. Podell: I take it that your Honor 
wants to recess at the usual hour? 
The Court: Yes, we will take it now. 
Mr. Podell: I was going to ask the wit-
ness if he could do it in recess time, so as to 
save us time, to check off these figures and 
at least tell the jury whether the figures on 
his work sheets are contained in this book, 
referring to the accounts receivable ledger. 
(Recess until 2 o'clock P. M.) 
AFTER RECESS. 
SYDNEY TOWELL resumed. 
Direct examination (continued) by Mr. Podell. 
Q. Now, have you traced a number of these items 
that appear on the work sheets with regard to the 
accounts receivable, so you can say that they came 
out of the book that is before you? A. Yes. May 
I qualify that? 
Q. Yes. A. I have it. I can't say they came out 
of the book. I find the same items with the same 
names of account on this sheet before me, as there 
are in this ledger. 
Q. What do you call the book before you; what 
do you call it? A. It appears to me to be an ac-
counts receivable ledger. 
Q. And how would you describe the work sheet 
before you? 
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The Court: That has already been de-
scribed as the accounts receivable summary. 
Q. Accounts receivable work sheet, is that it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you can say from your experience as an 
accountant that that accounts receivable work 
sheet must have been taken from some accounts 
receivable ledger? A. Yes. 
Q. And so far as you have examined, about how 
many items have you compared? A. About a third; 
almost a half. 
Q. Almost half. Of how many, a total of about 
how many? A. About eighty accounts. 
Q. The total is eighty? A. About. 
Q. So that you must have compared forty, about? 
A. I have compared about eighty. 
Q. You have compared about eighty as to the 
names and the amounts and the items, and they 
tally? A. As to the names, and the total amount. 
Q. They tally? A. Yes. 
Q. The book that we have referred to is Plain-
tiff's Exhibit 4 in evidence. Now, have you got a 
work sheet there for accounts payable? A. Yes. 
Q. Will you look at this book I show you now 
—I see it has not been marked. 
Mr. Podell: I ask that this book be marked 
as an exhibit. 
Mr. Marshall: I think we ought to have 
some identification on that. 
Mr. Podell: Will your Honor permit me 
to ask a question from the floor? 
The Court: Yes. You are addressing 
whom now? 
Mr. Podell: Addressing Mr. Djorup. This 
book that I show you, was this also one of 
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the books that you found in the office of 
Fred Stern & Company at the time you came 
up there in January, 1925? 
Mr. Djorup: Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: May I ask, as I asked you 
before; you could not say the entries in that 
book in January or February, 1924, were 
the same, could you, of your own knowl-
edge? 
Mr. Djorup: Not of my own knowledge. 
Mr. Marshall: And you cannot say 
whether there were any other sheets in that 
loose leaf book which may have been in there 
in 1924 and may be out of there now; you 
could not say that, could you? 
Mr. Djorup: No, I couldn't. 
Mr. Podell: Since 1925 you have not taken 
any loose leaf pages out of this, have you? 
Mr. Djorup: No, I have not, 
Mr. Marshall: I would not even suggest 
that, 
Mr. Podell: At least they are in the con-
dition he found them in. 
Mr. Marshall: I assume so. That is ad-
mitted in the same way as the others, I 
take it. 
The Court: Yes, taken with the same res-
ervation. 
(Received in evidence and marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 17.) 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Now, take a half dozen items at random from 
your accounts payable work sheets. Pick them at 
random and check them as against that book, and 
see if you can tell us whether the items on your 
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accounts payable work sheet tally with the entries 
in the book, Plaintiff's Exhibit 17. How many 
items have you looked at? A. I have looked at 
about six items. 
Q. Did you pick those items at random? A. Yes. 
Q. Do you find they tally with the entries in that 
book before you, Plaintiff's Exhibt 17? A. Five of 
them do, but there is one item that 
Q. You find that they tally as to name and 
amount, is that right? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Which one is it that you are having difficulty 
with? A. There may not be any difficulty. The 
item I have difficulty with is the account of Hut-
tonbach Lazarus & Sons. The balance on my work 
sheet is a credit balance of $49.80. 
Q. How much does it appear in the books? A. 
On the ledger account, under date of January 1, 
1924, the balance carried forward is $49.80, but I 
do not find the sheet that has the December 31st 
balance. It probably is the same, of course. 
Q. Probably it is $49.80, you mean? A. Probably 
so. This is a balance carried forward, but I do 
not find the sheet from which it was carried for-
ward. Not positively. The preceding sheet would 
normally be the sheet. 
Q. That is sheet No. 2, is it not? A. Yes. 
Q. This is account No. 6, and that is account 
No. 6? A. Yes, it is the same account apparently. 
Q. And the preceding sheet, you say, should show 
—what is this item here (indicating)? A. That is 
an item $49.80. 
Q. Well, it does show it, does it not, the preced-
ing sheet? A. No. This item of $49.80 is in the 
middle of the account. The item you are pointing 
to is dated April 12th. 
Q. What is carried forward out here as a balance 
(indicating)? A. That is $49.80. 
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Q. So you have that figure. The account as you 
have it appearing three or four times in the hook, 
haven't you, as $49.80? Here again it is $49.80 
(indicating), is it not? A. That is in 1924. 
Q. Yes. Well, you made your audit in 1924, 
did you not? A. I am looking for the December 
31st, 1923, balance. I cannot find the end of the 
account. 
Q. Was there a balance struck at December 31, 
1923? A. Apparently so. 
Q. Now, let us see. The last entry here is July 
12th, is it not? A. July 11th. 
Q. July 11th, is it? A. It looks like that to 
me. 
Q. July 12th is one entry and then July 11th is 
another, and the last balance that appears under 
the column of "balance" appears to be $49.80, does 
it not? A. Yes. 
Q. That is, under the column "balance," and 
that is the last item that appears under 1923, is it 
not? This is 1923, is it not? Is that right? A. 
Yes, that is 1923. 
Q. Now, the last balance that appears under the 
column of "balance" on the sheet for 1923 is $49.80? 
Mr. Marshall: Under what date, Mr. Po-
dell, 1923? 
Mr. Podell: July 12, 1923. 
Q:. That would indicate to you, would it not, 
that between July 12, 1923, and December 1, 1923, 
there were no other transactions? A. No. 
Q. Would not that indicate it to you? A. No. 
Q. Have you got any transactions entered be-
tween July, 1923, and January 1, 1924; have you 
got any entries of it at all? A. I don't see any 
here. 
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Q. All right. Now, at least so far as these items 
are concerned, that would indicate to you there was 
no other transaction between July 12, 1923, and 
January 1, 1924? A. No, I wouldn't say that. 
Q. You would not say that? A. No. 
Q. Are there any items here which indicate that 
there were any transactions in this book between 
July 12, 1923, and December 31st, 1923, with this 
concern, Huttonbach, Lazarus & Sons? A. There 
appears to be part of the account missing from 
July 11th to December 31st. The balance is the 
same. 
Q. The balance would be the same? A. There 
may be other transactions, with that whole balance 
left open. 
Q. Both of these are on one page, on both sides 
of one page? A. There seems to be some mix-up 
of accounts. 
Q. Is there a mix-up in the books or is there a 
mix-up in your mind? Just wait a minute, please. 
Is it not true the last item on the reverse side of 
this one sheet is entered as of July 12, and the 
one before that July 12, 1923; that is true, is it not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When you reverse the process and look at 
this side of the page, it begins with January, 1924? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You would not say there is a page missing 
in between those two, would you? A. No. 
Q. At least the last balance that appears in this 
book is $49.80, is it not, under the column of "bal-
ance" for 1923? A. I don't think so. 
Q. Well, what do you read there? A. I see the 
figure carried out. 
Q. And under what figure is it carried out? A. 
Under "balance." 
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Q. And is it the last item that appears under 
that column? A. It is the last item under that 
column. 
Q. That is all I asked you, sir, 'Now, the first 
item that appears on the 1924 colmun, is how much 
of a balance, under the head of "balance"; January 
1, 1924, balance how much? A. $49.80. 
Q. Now, how much is there on your account for 
that date? A. $49.80. 
Q. Now, is there any other item that you want 
to check? 
Mr. Marshall: May I ask him about that 
item or would you rather have me wait? 
Mr. Podell: Certainly, but let me finish 
this first, 
Q. Are there any other items you want to check 
to see if they tally with the book? How many have 
you checked? 
The Court: Six. 
A. I have checked six. 
Q. And you said that you had picked them at 
random? A. Yes. 
Q. As an accountant, can you say to this jury 
that that work sheet that you have there of accounts 
payable was taken from this book for accounts 
payable? A. No. 
Q. You could not say that? A. No. 
Q. Do you know of any other book that it might 
have been taken from? A. It was taken from the 
accounts payable ledger of Fred Stern & Company. 
Q. And despite the fact that you have chosen six 
items at your own free will, and that at least as 
to the figures and accounts they appear in that very 
book, you cannot tell this jury, as an experienced 
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accountant, whether that work sheet was taken and 
made up from that book, Plaintiff's Exhibit 17? A. 
I can merely tell them that the figures that I have 
checked agree with the balances, with figures shown 
in this book. 
Q. How many accounts payable ledgers did they 
have, do you know? A. I don't remember. 
Q. Have you got any record of how many ac-
counts payable ledgers they had? A. No. 
Q. Have you got any record of the books that 
you examined? A. No. 
Q. Is there any way from your papers that you 
can tell what books you examined? Have you got 
your time sheets? A. Yes. 
Q. Will you produce them, please? 
(Produced by Mr. Marshall and handed 
to counsel.) 
Mr. Podell: Let us mark his accounts 
payable work sheets in evidence. 
(Received in evidence and marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibit 15-B.) 
Mr. Podell: I offer the entries in both 
as they relate to the Fred Stern & Company 
account. I offer them in evidence, paper 
produced by the defendants. 
Mr. Marshall: No objection. I assume 
here too, we can make transcripts. 
(Received in evidence and marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 18.) 
The Court: Let me ask you something, 
Mr. Accountant: Is that a conclusion that 
you draw based on the fact that your recol-
lection fails you as to the identity of these 
books, or is it based on the fact that you 
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never saw these books at all and worked on 
the work sheet supplied to you by your 
junior? 
The Witness: It is based on the fact that 
I cannot recollect what the books looked like 
or what they contained. I did see the books. 
The Court: Let me get that clear. In 
other words, your declination to say that 
these are the books is based on the failure 
of recollection as distinguished from the fact 
that you do not say that they are not the 
books. In other words, you fail to identify 
them because of recollection? 
The Witness: Yes. 
Q. For how many years did you work on these 
books altogether? A. One only. 
Q. Only 1923? A. Yes. 
Q. Who did the work for 1922; do you know? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. You are still with Touche, Niven & Co., are 
you not? A. Yes. 
Cross-examination by Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Mr. Towell, you are loaned out at present, 
are you not? You are not being paid by them? 
A. No, that is right, 
Mr. Podell: What does that mean? I do 
not quite follow. 
The Witness.: I have been doing some pri-
vate work for a client and have a temporary 
arrangement whereby I have not resigned 
from the staff, but I have been doing some 
private work, a tentative arrangement. 
The Court: Private work under the con-
trol of somebody else? 
289 
290 
291 
98 
292 Sydney Towell—For Plaintiff—Cross. 
Hugo W. Romberg—For Plaintiff—Direct. 
The Witness: Yes. 
The Court: In other words, not being un-
der the control as an employee of this de-
fendant company? 
The Witness: Yes. 
The Court: You are still connected with 
them in the sense that you are loaned out for 
this particular purpose? 
The Witness: Yes. 
Q. Now, this Huttonbach account, the books are 
not closed and balanced for the year there, are they? 
A. No. 
(Witness excused.) 
H U G O W . ROMBERG, a witness called on behalf 
of the plaintiff, being first duly sworn, testified as 
follows: 
Direct examination by Mr. Podell. 
Q;. Mr. Romberg, you were at one time connected 
with Fred Stern & Company? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Just tell us from what period to what period? 
A. Well, as to the years, I don't exactly recollect. 
I can refresh my memory. Can I refresh my mem-
ory? 
The Court: Refresh your memory from 
anything you have. 
The Witness: Well, when did Mr. Stern 
die? 
The Court: He died in 1925. 
The Witness: I left in March, 1924. 
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Q. You say you left— A. I left the company 
some time in March, 1924, and was with them two 
years previous to that, 
Q. So that you would say that you were with 
them from March, 1922, to March, 1924? A. From 
March, 1922, to March, 1924, yes. 
Q. About? A. Correct. 
Q. And in what capacity? A. In the capacity 
of being in charge of the books and accounts. 
Q. Did you do any of the bookkeeping yourself? 
A. Some of it. 
Q. What system or set of books did they have 
there? A. Double entry system with controlling 
ledger. 
Q. What books comprised that double entry sys-
tem? A. One of them is a general ledger, which 
has subsidiary records. 
Q. A little bit louder. First, this general ledger? 
A. Yes, which has its subsidiary records, like ac-
counts receivable, accounts payable; then some of 
those books have other subsidiary records, like sales 
sheets, sales invoices, purchase records, contract 
books and the information that goes with it, 
Q. Now, of course, you cannot be expected and 
I do not want you to misunderstand my question, 
to remember all the items that were in all these 
books. That is not what I am going to ask you 
about. Mr. Romberg, could you identify the books 
that you used during those two years? A. Yes, 
Some of the books naturally I did not handle per-
sonally. 
Q. I understand. But you supervised them? A. 
I supervised them, yes, sir. 
Q. What book is the one I show you now (hand-
ing to witness)? 
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The Court: And you are referring to what, 
Mr. Podell? 
Mr. Podell: Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. 
A. This is the general control ledger. 
Q. And from what period to what period was it 
used by Fred Stern & Company? A. From January 
1st, 1922, to January 1st, 1924. 
Q. That would cover those two years, the year 
1922 and the year 1923? A. 1922,1923, to January 
1st, 1924. 
Q. What is the book to your left, Exhibit No. 
4? A. Accounts receivable ledger. 
Q. And from what date to what date was that 
used by Fred Stern & Company? A. January 1st, 
1922, to into 1924; some items appear March 5th, 
some June, some even further than that, 
Q. When you say March 5th and some June, do 
you mean 1924? A. Right. 
Q. So that it was used for the entire year 1923, 
for the entire year 1922 and for part of 1924; that 
is correct, is it not? A. From the entries here, yes. 
Q. What is that book there to your right, Plain-
tiff's Exhibit 17? A. Accounts payable ledger. 
Q. And from what date to what date was it used 
as an accounts payable ledger by Fred Stern & Com-
pany? A. From January 1st, 1921, as far as De-
cember 30 th, 1924. 
Q. Now, I show you another book and ask you 
how would you describe that book (handing to 
witness Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5)? A. The book 
is marked "debit memo" book. 
Q. And from what date to what date was that 
used by Fred Stern & Company? A. July, 1923, to 
December, 1924. 
Q. What was the debit memo book; what was it 
used for? A. It is a summary of the invoices of 
merchandise sold. 
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Q. A summary of the invoices for merchandise 
sold and shipped, or just sold? A. Sold and 
shipped. 
Q. You do not make up your invoice until the 
shipment is made, do you? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that. I do not 
think the witness has been shown competent 
to answer that question. 
Mr. Podell: He was in charge of the book-
keeping. 
Mr. Marshall: That does not prove they 
could not make up an invoice without ship-
ping, or vice versa. 
Q. What was your practice so far as your super-
vising the bookkeeping department? Did you un-
derstand it to be that whenever a shipment was 
made an invoice was made up? A. My supervision 
of the bookkeeping department did not go over this 
book. 
Mr. Marshall: Referring to Exhibit 5. 
The Witness: As a matter of fact, many 
of the other exhibits. 
Q. You saw that book there, did you not? A. 
Yes. 
Q. I do not quite understand. I would like to 
get it clear. You mean you did not supervise the 
entries that were made in this book? A. No. I 
only seen the book once a month. 
Q. But you were the head of that bookkeeping 
department? A. Yes. 
Q. And seeing it once a month was in the 
course of your regular duties; that was part of your 
work there; that was what you were paid for? A. 
My mind was wandering a little bit, referring to 
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your question , before—"Are you head of the book-
keeping department ?" There was a gentleman 
there by the name of Mr. Eric Pam. 
Q. I call it the bookkeeping department. I do 
not care what you call it. I used that word to de-
scribe what I mean. A. I had some specific work 
to do. I did some specific work. 
Q. Yes, I know that. Now, did you not know, 
or do you not know, that your practice—did you 
ever see an invoice? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You saw a number of them, did you not? 
A. Yes, a number of them. 
Q. Saw them in the course of the performance 
of your duties? A. Yes. 
And was it not the practice in Stern & Com-
pany that the invoices were made out at the time 
when the shipment was made? A. That didn't come 
within my jurisdiction at all. 
Q. I did not ask you that. I asked you whether 
you knew it. I did not ask you whether it came 
under your jurisdiction. 
Mr. Marshall: I object. He says he can-
not answer that question because it did not 
come within his jurisdiction. 
Mr. Podell: He did not say he could not 
answer at all. 
The Court: I will allow the question. 
Q. You knew a good many things were done in 
your business that were outside of your jurisdic-
tion, did you not? Did you not know that you could 
Hot make up an invoice until you got the weights? 
A. Well, naturally. 
Q. And the weights were put right on the invoice? 
A. Correct, 
Q. And you could not very well know the weights 
until a shipment was made? 
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Mr. Marshall: I object to that as a con-
clusion. 
The Court: I will allow it. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
A. That is right. 
Q. So that you made up your invoice, and when 
you made a shipment you sent an invoice to the 
customer, did you not? A. I am answering the ques-
tion that every invoice is made out that way, 
whether it is this one or any other invoice. 
Q. There is nothing involved. That is all I am 
asking you. Now, this debit memo book that you 
see there—I just want to get the successive steps, 
Mr. Romberg, and you can help us if you will make 
sure to understand the question; the successive 
steps. You have spoken of various books you had 
there. When you got an order, I suppose some 
entry was made somewhere of the order, was it not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What book was that entered in? A. Contract 
book. 
Q. In the contract book? A. Yes. 
Q. After the order was received, then the ship-
ment had to be made pursuant to that order, is that 
right? A. Right. 
Q. Now, at the time the shipment was made there 
was a shipping record made of that shipment, was 
there not? A. I suppose so. 
Q. Well, did you not see shipping record books? 
A. No. 
Q. How would you describe these books I show 
you now (handing to witness) ? A. Those are ship-
ping record books. 
Q. They are shipping record books? A. Yes. 
Q. Just look at the dates and tell us from what 
date to what date those shipping record books were 
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used, Exhibits 7 and 8? A. This book I have in 
front of me now, numbered from 10,001 to 10,500. 
Q. And the dates are what? A. Are from Oc-
tober 5th, 1923, to December 19th, 1923. 
Mr. Limburg: That is Exhibit 7, your 
Honor. 
Q. From October, 1923, to what? A. To Decem-
ber 19th, 1923. 
Q. And the book after that? A. The book from 
10,501 to 11,000 is from December 18th, 1923, to 
March 5th, 1924. 
Q. Those two books undoubtedly cover the 
months of December, do they not, that is, between 
the two of them, 1923? A. Yes. 
Q. December, 1923? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, will you tell us, please, just what form 
that is there, just how it is done? Look at the 
form. Let us see. Is it a copy of invoice or does 
it give the weights or what does it give? A. The 
invoice is supposed to be made up from this record. 
Q. The invoice is made up from this shipping 
record? A. This shipping record. 
Mr. Marshall: He said "supposed." 
Q. That is what anybody who makes up an in-
voice would do there and did in Fred Stern's place, 
is it not—he would look at the shipping record to 
get his weights and other things, would he not? A. 
This is an office shipping record. This is not the 
actual shipping record. 
Q. What is the actual shipping record? A. That 
was done out at the pier or at the wharf or at 
the bonded warehouse. 
Q. When you speak of the office shipping record, 
you mean by that what? A. There are subsidiary 
records to this book yet. 
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Q. But this book is supposed at least to contain, 
shipping records in so far as the office could keep 
track of them, is that right? A. This book is sup-
posed to give the information to the clerk who 
makes up the invoice from this sheet. 
Q. That is right. It is a basis for the invoice? 
A. A basis for the invoice. 
Q. And, of course, every well organized office 
must be certain that its invoices are correctly made 
out—I will withdraw that. I will not press that. 
In any event, just so the jury would not have to 
look at each one of these pages, this contains the 
date of the invoice, does it not? First, it contains 
the date of the shipment, rather; is that right? A. 
Yes, that is, the date of the shipment, 
Q. The person to whom or concern to whom it is 
shipped, and the address? A. Right. 
Q. Then it has a blank line "payable to" and 
"Chemical National." That means the account was 
pledged with the Chemical National? A. Assigned 
to the Chemical National. 
Q. "Quantity twenty-five tons." That gives you 
the weight, does it not? A. Right. 
Q. "Grade standard ribbed—" A. "Smoked 
sheets," 
Q. That is rubber, is it not? A. Yes. 
Q. Standard ribbed smoked sheets of rubber? A. 
Yes. 
Q. Came from the steamship "Vastonia," is that 
right? A. Yes. And the contract date. 
Q. The date of the contract, the number of the 
contract ; the price appears there too? A. Yes. 
Q. The broker appears there? A. Yes. 
Q. And the terms "net thirty days after date in 
Boston," is that right? A. Right, 
Q. What is that (indicating) ? A "Shipped from 
the east direct," 
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Q. What does that mean? A. It went direct to 
the Hood Rubber Company. 
Q. Then it totals up the price of the total ship-
ment, which in this particular instance comes to 
115,162.21, does it not? A. Yes. 
Q. And then you have specified the weights? A. 
Gross weight, 
Q. And the tare and the net weight? A. That is 
right. 
Q. What is that item "rubber stock book 550"? 
What book does that refer to, do you know; what is 
the rubber stock book? A. I think it refers to the 
contract book. This contract. I am quite sure. 
Q. Reference is on that page both to contract 
books and also to other books there, the item may 
be entered in or should be entered in, is not that 
right? A. Yes. 
Q. In other words, this shipping record is tied 
up backward and forward with the rest of the 
books? A. With the rest of the books, yes. 
Q. Now, then, after that shipping record is made, 
is it true that copies of invoices were made up, and 
you had an invoice book for that purpose, did you 
not? A. Right, 
Q. And is the book I show you the invoice book 
of Fred Stern & Company (handing to witness), 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3? A. Yes, that is the invoice 
book. 
Q. And from what date up to what date? A. 
From January 3rd, 1923, to December 7th, 1923. 
Q. It practically covers the year 1923, is that 
right? A. Practically the year, yes. It is up to 
December 31st, 1923. 
Q. You want to correct your last answer so that 
instead of saying December 7th, 1923— A. Instead 
of December 7th, 1923, it is up to December 31st, 
1923. 
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Q. It is up to and including December 31st, 1923? 
A. Yes. 
Q. By the way, Mr. Romberg, so we will follow 
the course of these things, you have spoken now 
of the shipping record ; the order book first, then 
the shipping record that is made up— A. The 
order book I haven't seen yet, 
Q. We have not marked it yet; but the shipping 
record was the next set, and then came this invoice 
book. Now, from the invoice book was there en-
tries made in other books? A. The invoice book is 
then summarized in that debit memo book which 
you asked me about before. That analyzes it, giv-
ing the detail of the invoice number, the number of 
cases, the rubber sold, whether it is any other sale 
or any other type of sale, and then the accounts 
receivable charge, the accounts payable charge, or 
claim account charge or general ledger. In other 
words, it analyzes all the invoices. 
Q. That is one book, the debit memo book? A. 
Yes. 
Q. Would you not also have to make an entry 
when you sent an invoice into the accounts receiv-
able book of some kind? A. Yes. 
Q. What book would that entry be in? A. The 
entries are made from the invoices to the accounts 
receivable and checking the debit memo book at the 
same time. 
Q. Just so we will understand, let us take one 
thing at a time. From the invoices some entry is 
made into the accounts receivable ledger, is it? A. 
All invoices are entered into the accounts receivable 
ledger. 
Q. That is what I want to know. All invoices 
are then entered into the accounts receivable 
ledger? A. Yes. 
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Q. Is it checked also with the debit memo book? 
A. Yes, because that, which is a summary of all 
invoices, contains some invoices that are recorded 
in the accounts payable ledger, and a summary of 
the accounts receivable column is a control. So is 
the accounts payable column a control. 
Q. In so far as any such entries are entered into 
the accounts payable ledger, they relate to what 
Fred Stern owes to someone else for that shipment? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Appearing on that invoice? A. Or it happens 
to be a charge to someone. 
Q. You mean someone to whom that shipment 
has been sent? A. No. At one time I may buy 
something from one concern and sell to the same 
concern. 
Q. That happened sometimes? A. That happened 
sometimes. 
Q. That was not quite customary, was it? A. 
Oh, yes. 
Q. Did you not make most of your purchases of 
rubber from abroad? A. No. There were quite 
many purchases made right in the market here. 
Q. In the market? A. In the market. 
Q. And then you would have some people to 
whom you would sell? A. Some, people we would 
sell and buy from. 
Q. You do not mean that; you do not mean that 
every one to whom you sold you also bought from? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Every one? A. Not every one, but some. 
The Court: You mean buy the same mer-
chandise right back again? 
The Witness: That is possible too. 
The Court: In the market? 
The Witness: Yes. Just like trading, in 
speculation. 
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Q. That sometimes happen? A. Very often. 
Q. You would not call it very often? A. Pur-
chases and sales in the market are made on future 
basis. 
Q. You are speaking now of trade with dealers? 
A. Yes, in the market. 
Q. With dealers? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, as to any merchandise that was pur-
chased from abroad, I mean rubber purchased from 
abroad, it was not customary that the people from 
whom you purchased it, if they were abroad, you 
sold them? A. No. That is an exceptional case. 
That would be an exceptional case. 
Q. You mean by that that it was not customary? 
A. It was not customary. 
Q. If it happened there it would be an excep-
tional case, it would be rather an unusual case? A. 
Yes. 
Q. So that we will follow these things in their 
regular course, Mr. Romberg, you have identified 
now the invoice book and then you have spoken of 
the accounts receivable ledger, and you have iden-
tified that. Then, of course, from the accounts re-
ceivable ledger and from the accounts payable 
ledger, the items were posted or at least were 
supposed to be posted into the general ledger? A. 
Into the general ledger, the postings came from the 
summary books, like the debit memo book. 
Q. Did you have the journal there? A. Yes. At 
the end of the month there is one journal entry 
made up, and the journal entry is then posted into 
the general ledger. 
Q. And how is that journal entry made up, on a 
journal voucher? A. On a journal voucher, cor-
rect. 
Q. Will you look at these papers and tell us 
whether those are the journal vouchers for the 
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month of December (handing to witness)? Look 
them over carefully—December, 1923—that were 
used in the office of Fred Stern & Company at that 
time? I think there is one here for October too. 
A. Some for November and some for December, 
1923, and some for October, 1923. 
Q. You recognize them and identify them as 
journal vouchers that were used and made in the 
months of October, November and December, 1923, 
in the place of business of Fred Stern & Company? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Podell: I offer those in evidence. 
Mr. Marshall : May I see them? 
(Handed to counsel.) 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Whose handwriting are these vouchers in? 
A. Some of them are initialled by one of the clerks 
who made them, "E. E. A."-—same, same, same, 
same, same. This voucher has been—the detail of 
this obviously has been made up by one of the 
clerks. The cover has been made up by me. 
The Court: You recognize them as the 
vouchers used at that time? 
The Witness: Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: I would like him to look 
at every one, Judge. 
Mr. Podell: I should think that would 
be a proper subject for cross-examination. 
Mr. Marshall: I think not. 
Mr. Podell: He has examined them and 
identified them. 
The Court: I will let him answer. Look 
at them. 
The Witness : These vouchers that are in 
my hand now, marked November, 1923, the 
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upper part number is not a date, that is a 
number of the voucher, Nos. 1 to 16; they 
all have been made in the vouchers and 
offices of Fred Stern & Company. Whether 
these are in the ledger, I would have to check 
up. 
Q. Do you know whether they were made and 
in the office there in January and February, 1924? 
A. That I couldn't say. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. That was the time when these accountants 
were there? A. Yes. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Now, I show you journal voucher 12-26, and 
ask you whether that voucher was in that condition 
in January or February, 1924 (handing to wit-
ness) ? A. No. 
Mr. Podell: There are some additions, 
your Honor. I have not taken up each one 
of these vouchers separately. When I see 
each one separately, I will point out, 
Mr. Marshall: If he wants to mark them 
for identification, that is one thing. 
Mr. Podell: The accountants both of the 
defendant and us have gone over these things 
and have put marks on some of them, and 
when we offer them I will point out what we 
put on and what was originally on them. 
Mr. Marshall I do not think he can put 
them in generally. 
Mr. Podell: I am just putting them in and 
your Honor is taking them as identified doc-
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uments that were used in that month and 
nothing more than the extent of this wit-
ness testimony with regard to these Touch-
ers, that they were made out during that 
month. 
The Court: The first page he clearly iden-
tifies. 
Mr. Podell : He does not fail to identify 
these. He says there was something added, 
and what was added undoubtedly was added 
by either our accountant or their account-
ant. 
Mr, Marshall: I object to having it read, 
your Honor. 
Mr. Podell: I am not going to read it. 
The Court: I think we can control that 
as we go along, Mr. Marshall. I think I 
can control that situation as we go along, 
and eliminate that when we come to that 
proposition. 
Mr. Podell: I think so, your Honor. I 
am told that this calculation that appears 
within the red circle was not there, but the 
only thing that was there were these two 
lines, and as to that invoice that is all I 
offer. Any method counsel wants to use to 
block it out or cover it up is quite agreeable 
to me. I do not want it before the jury. It 
is just merely our work. 
Mr. Marshall: I think it will be fair to 
make a copy of the part he claims is genuine. 
Mr. Podell: I do want the original to be 
marked and be in evidence, though. I would 
like the original to be marked. Will you 
mark it subject to that correction? 
Mr. Marshall: And my objection that they 
are not properly identified. 
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The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. And, further-
more, that they are not binding on us. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Is this the October one that you say (hand-
ing to witness), and wherever you find anything 
added by anybody, point it out to us? A. October. 
Q. You say those are the journal vouchers made 
up in Fred Stern & Company's place of business 
during the month of October, 1923, is that right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. You identify them as those journal vouchers? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, look at December and go through the 
same way, if you have not done so. 
Mr. Marshall: December contains that 
journal voucher to which I referred. 
Mr. Podell: That is the one of which we 
will have a duplicate made. While he is 
doing that, Mr. Stenographer, will you be 
good enough to mark these, beginning with 
October? 
(October journal vouchers received in evi-
dence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 19.) 
Mr. Marshall: If you see any others that 
have been altered, in December, please point 
it out. 
(November journal vouchers received in 
evidence and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 20.) 
The Witness: With the exception of No. 
12-26.) 
338 
339 
114 
340 Hugo W. Romberg—For Plaintiff—Direct: 
Q. Is that the only one that is different, that has 
something added? You identify those as journal 
vouchers that were made up and entered at the 
time they are dated, in the place of business of 
Fred Stern & Company, and that is in the month 
of December, 1923? A. Without carefully going 
into them, I take them as being those vouchers. 
Q. You say they are those vouchers? A. Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: There are two documents 
included in this file, your Honor, which are 
apparently not journal vouchers at all. 
The Court: Take them out then. 
Mr. Marshall: One of them says journal 
entries, but they are not journal vouchers. 
The Witness: Some of those entries have 
naturally notations on which I don't recall. 
Q. These two documents appear on the file in 
the invoice for the month of December, 1923. I 
show them to you. You examine them closely, 
please, and tell us what they are, and what you 
know about them (handing to witness)? A. These 
are entries that have to be reversed, some of them. 
Q. No. Who made that up, do you know; who 
made up those two statements? A. That I don't 
exactly recall. 
Q. That you do not remember? A. I don't recall, 
no. 
Q. What were they used for? A. They were en-
tries made. 
Q. I cannot hear you, Mr. Romberg. A. They 
were entries made to adjustments, reverse entries 
for the following year. 
Q. And what else? A. Reverse entries for the 
following year and closing entries, some of them. 
Q. What is your best recollection about those 
papers, Mr. Romberg? A. Very hazy about these 
two papers. 
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Q. Hazy as it is, what do you remember about it? 
A. Can I see the general ledger for a minute? 
Q. Certainly (handing to witness). 
Mr. Podell: May those journal vouchers 
be marked? 
Mr. Marshall: I will note my objection 
and exception to this exhibit, as before. 
(Received in evidence and marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 21. ) 
Q. May I ask you whether it will refresh your 
recollection at all if I say that those represent the 
statement of corrections and adjustments that 
Touche-Niven's man prepared at or about the time 
of his audit; the corrections and adjustments that 
should be made. Now, look at them and satisfy 
yourself about that and if you are not sure, say so? 
A. These are entries that I received from someone 
of Touche, Niven & Co. 
Q. Do they represent what I asked you, correc-
tions, reversals and adjustments? A. Yes, on the 
accounts. 
Q. On the accounts of Fred Stern? A. Of Fred 
Stern & Company. 
Mr. Podell: Now, I would like to have 
those marked separately, the journal vouch-
ers. 
Mr. Marshall : I have no objection, your 
Honor. I would like, in that connection, if 
I might, to have three of these journal vouch-
ers independently marked also. 
The Court: You mean as separate exhib-
its? 
Mr. Marshall: Yes. 
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The Court: Do you not think you had 
better wait until you come to it? 
Mr. Marshall: All right. 
(Received in evidence and marked respec-
tively Plaintiff's Exhibits 22 and 22-A.) 
Q. Now, just as quickly as you can, I want you 
to look at these books, please. We have identified 
the more important ones, I think. I want you to 
pick up each one of them and briefly tell us what 
it is, whether it is a book that was used by Fred 
Stern & Company and what it was used for and 
from what period to what period. A. This is marked 
Exhibit 11, trial balance book, from January, first 
trial balance January 1st, 1923, to December 31st, 
1923. 
Q. That is, accounts receivable trial balance? A. 
Correct. 
Q. For the year 1923? A. These are credit 
memos. 
Q. First, on the books that were used by Fred 
Stern & Company ? A. Yes. 
Q. And give the period? A. Marked Exhibit 13, 
credit memos, summary of all returns. 
Q. A book containing entries of credit memos 
and returns? A. Yes. 
Q. From what date to what date? A. From Jan-
uary, 1922. 
Q. January, 1922? A. One entry in January, 
1925. 
Q. Up to January, 1925? A. Up to December 
31st, 1924. Exhibit marked 12, debit memos, sum-
mary of invoices and charges from December, 1922. 
Q. Summary of what? A. Invoices and charges 
from September, 1922, to July, 1923. Exhibit 
marked 6, I am not familiar with this book. 
3 4 7 
3 4 8 
117 
Hugo W. Romberg—For Plaintiff—Direct. 349 
Q. What about it? A. I am not familiar with 
this book, marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 6. 
Q. You are not familiar with it? A. No. 
Q. You mean by that that you made none of 
the entries in it? A. I made none of the entries 
and never saw it. 
Q. You never saw it? A. I never saw it. 
Q. I show you a paper, Mr. Romberg, and ask 
you whether you can recognize that paper as being 
in your handwriting (handing to witness)? A. 
That is in my handwriting. 
Q. It is? A. Yes. 
Q. See if it is not true that you made a copy of 
those entries. A. Yes. 
Q. That apears on that paper right from this 
very book that you say you never saw? 
Mr. Marshall: Is he cross-examining his 
own witness? That is very astonishing. 
The Court: He may answer. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
A. I can say right offhand I did not make it from 
this book. I may have made it from invoices, but 
not from this book. I never saw that book before. 
Q. Did you make it from this book at all? Do 
you recognize this book I show you now (handing 
to witness) ? A. Can I refresh my memory and see 
the accounts payable ledger? 
Q. Certainly. You may refresh your memory 
from anything you like to look at. If there is any 
answer that you have given that is incorrect, you 
have a perfect right to correct it. Let me interrupt 
you a second, to ask you, Mr. Romberg, whether 
this is not in your handwriting. A. No, it is 
not in my handwriting. 
Q. Are you sure about it? A. Quite sure. This 
is the same handwriting as this one is (indicat-
ing). 
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Mr. Marshall: Referring to item on page? 
Mr. Podell: On page 30. 
Mr. Marshall: Of Exhibit 6? 
Mr. Podell: Of Exhibit 6. 
Q. When you say on this record here, this is the 
same handwriting as this, it means nothing. Now, 
what do you mean? A. It is the same handwriting 
as this one here (indicating). 
Q. Which is the same handwriting as which? 
A. This one here (indicating). 
Q. The item I have shown you on page 30 of this 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 you say is the same handwrit-
ing as the item appearing on the paper that I have 
just shown you, is that right? A. Right. 
Q. Whose handwriting did you say this was, re-
ferring to the paper that I have shown you? A. I 
think this is by a man by the name of Utley. 
Q. Was Utley working for Fred Stern & Com-
pany? A. Yes, he was working for Fred Stern & 
Company. 
Q. And you recognize his handwriting in this 
book, Plaintiff's Exhibit 6, do you? A. Well, that 
is the same handwriting as this. I am not quite 
sure whether it is his handwriting, but it is one 
of the employees down there who wrote this in this 
one. 
Q. You do know this book was written up and 
kept by one of the employees of Fred Stern & Com-
pany from what date—the first invoice appears to 
be March 2nd, 1920? A. Yes. 
Q. And it continued right on to when? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to his giving sum-
maries of the books this way. 
Mr. Podell: I am just fixing the time. 
The Court: Did not already say he did 
not see that book? 
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Mr. Podell: I am asking him now, could 
he identify the handwriting in it, and he 
says he does, and that it was kept by an em-
ployee of Fred Stern & Company. He iden-
tifies the handwriting. 
The Witness : I never had a hand in the 
book myself. 
The Court: Do you recognize the hand-
writing and recognize it as a book that was 
kept and participated in the business of 
Stern during the year 1923? 
The Witness: Yes. I am sorry that was 
shown to me on the first page here, hand-
writing that is absolutely strange to me. 
Q. That is what misled you? A. That is what 
misled me entirely. 
Q. As you look through the book you can iden-
tify this handwriting? A. Yes. This handwriting 
and this handwriting and I recognize this hand-
writing (indicating). 
Mr. Marshall: Some of the handwriting 
you identify and some you do not? 
The Witness: Some I do not. 
Mr. Podell: I beg your pardon. He said 
the first part. The first part, Mr. Marshall, 
let the record show, it relates to entries made 
in 1920. This is in evidence, your Honor, 
so we can read from it. 
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: Begging your Honor's par-
don, please; in evidence for one purpose only. 
The Court: Yes; so far it has not been 
connected. 
Mr. Podell: The paper that the witness 
referred to as not recognizing the handwrit-
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ing, in fairness, I think, to the witness, it 
ought to be stated 
Mr. Marshall: That is what I am trying 
to find out. Give us the page. 
Mr. Podell: Pages 4 and 5. I think that 
represents the very first page of the book. 
There is nothing on pages 1, 2 or 3. That 
is right. Nothing on page 1, nothing on page 
2, and nothing on page 3. On page 4 is the 
first entry, and it appears to be dated March 
2nd, 1920. This witness was not then em-
ployed by Fred Stern & Company. 
The Court: I understand. What we want 
is from January 1st, 1923, to December 31st, 
1923. 
Mr. Podell: That is it. 
The Court: To identify that book and its 
entries as of that time. 
Mr. Podell: That is it. 
Q. Now, you look at this and answer the Judge's 
question and see whether you recognize the hand-
writing beginning with page 20, the first item be-
ing United Baltic Corporation? A. Yes. 
Q. And that they contain entries showing the 
year 1923. You see that? A. Right, 
Q. And you identify it as a book that was kept 
by Fred Stern & Company? A. A book that was 
kept by Fred Stern & Company. 
Q. During that period? A. During that period. 
Q. As a matter of fact, these items in 1923, as 
they are contained in this book, relate first to the 
United Baltic account, do they not, for specified 
dates? A. I wouldn't be able to say there is a 
heading here, United Baltic Corporation. 
Q. An examination of some of these items, as a 
matter of fact——-
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The Court: Let us get back to this propo-
sition. 
Mr. Podell: I do not think we need this 
now for the present. As a matter of fact, 
the handwriting or label on it is United 
Baltic Corporation invoices beginning at 
page 20, and Ruffer, page 100; that repre-
sents accounts of those two concerns. 
Mr. Marshall: The witness said he never 
handled the book. Ask him instead of lead-
ing him. 
Q. Does it represent the accounts of those two 
concerns for the periods therein indicated? A. I 
don't know. I never handled the book. I recog-
nize the handwriting, but for what purpose the 
book was used 
Q. You recognize it as a book that was used by 
Fred Stern & Company? A. Yes. 
Q. From an examination of it and from your 
experience as a bookkeeper, can you not say from 
the entries contained therein, that they relate— 
well, perhaps, the documents speak for thmselves, 
That is Plaintiff's Exhibit 6. And we will with-
hold these for the present, that is, that book. You 
go right along and identify the others and let us 
see if we cannot save as much time as possible. 
What is the next book? First, state whether it 
was a book kept by Fred Stern & Company? A. 
The book marked Exhibit 14, bank ledger, all ac-
counts with the various banks were kept from Jan-
uary 1st, 1923, to December 31st, 1923. 
Q. Now, the next? A. These are evidently rec-
ords of some trust receipts with invoices attached, 
showing a memorandum of shipments made. That 
was not kept by me. 
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The Court: Covering what period? 
The Witness: Right from September 12, 
1923, to March 26th, 1924. 
Mr. Podell: I do not think that has been 
marked, your Honor. 
Mr. Marshall: May I see it? (Handed 
to counsel.) I object on the ground it has 
not been shown that it was in this condition, 
these documents were in here at the time 
we made the audit, or that we saw these 
documents at the time we made the audit. 
The Court: You will have to reach out 
further, Mr. Podell. 
Mr. Podell: I do not know whether we 
will have to do it now. 
The Court: The others are connected. I 
think we are at a point when this should 
be 
Mr. Marshall: I do not think the others 
have been connected to us, your Honor. 
Mr. Podell: He found them there in 1925. 
The Court: You may find from him as to 
whether those were the books worked upon 
by these accountants at the time. That is 
right, they have not been connected that far 
yet. 
Q. You can answer that question, can you not? 
The books you have thus far identified were books 
that were worked upon by these accountants? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to him leading this 
witness. 
Q. Were they books that were worked upon by 
these accountants? A. Some of them. 
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Q. What do you mean by some of them? A. 
For example that one you have in your hand there. 
I haven't seen it, either. I do not think they saw 
that one, nor have I seen it. 
Q. You have not seen it? A. No. 
Q. But all these others that you have identified— 
A. No, they never saw this one. 
Mr. Marshall: That is Exhibit 6. 
Mr. Podell: And you are very happy to 
have him say that. 
Q. How do you know that? A. Because I know 
what books have been turned over to the account-
ants. 
Q. You helped Mr. Stern in some of his manipu-
lations on these books, did you not? A. I wouldn't 
exactly say that. That is one reason why I left 
previous, prior to 
Q. Won't you answer one question at a time? 
Mr. Marshall: If he is going to cross-
examine his own witness, I will object to it. 
Mr. Podell: I have a right to do this, 
your Honor. 
The Court: Yes, I think so. 
Q. Do you say now that you did not help falsify 
some of these records? A. I had knowledge of some 
of them. 
Q. Did you not make false entries yourself? A. 
Yes, there were some of them were incorrect, 
Q. And you knew them to be false? A. Exactly. 
Q. You have testified to all this in the examina-
tion in bankruptcy? A. I am repeating exactly 
what I said before. Is that correct? 
Q. Now, Mr. Romberg, just one question : You 
know that in this law suit the United Baltic ac-
3 6 8 
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count is quite an important item? A. I believe that 
was after I left. 
Q. I did not ask you what was after you left or 
before you left. Do you realize that in this very 
lawsuit the United Baltic account is a very im-
portant item? A. I don't know anything about the 
account. 
Mr. Marshall: I object. 
The Court: The objection is sustained. 
Q. Do you know that the plaintiff in this action 
has made the claim that the United Baltic account 
was falsified? 
Mr. Marshall: This does appear to me to 
be cross-examination. 
Mr. Podell: I think it is, yes. 
The Court : I think it is cross-examina-
tion, but it is not outside of the sphere. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
Q. Will you answer that? A. I don't know. 
The Court: In other words, he assumes 
the responsibility of it. 
The Witness: I don't know. 
Q. Is there any particular reason why you are 
reluctant to identify that United Baltic book? A. 
No, none whatsoever. 
Q. Is there any particular reason why you should 
be so certain that these people did not see—I mean 
Touche, Niven & Co.—did not see the United Baltic 
book? 
Mr. Marshall: I do not think, your Honor, 
when the witness makes a damaging admis-
sion, that he should be 
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Mr. Podell: Let me get this answer and 
I won't go any further. 
Mr. Marshall: I am making an objection, 
and I do not care to be interrupted. 
Mr. Podell: I did not mean to interrupt 
you. 
Mr. Marshall: I do think, when he makes 
an admission that Mr. Podell does not like, 
he should not be entitled to try to rip him 
to pieces this way. 
The Court : But an error is always sub-
ject to correction. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
The Witness : Accountants have a habit 
of marking books sometimes. That has not 
been marked. 
Q. That has not been marked? A. That has not 
been marked. 
Q. Is that what you base your conclusion on, 
that they did not see that book? A. Yes. 
Q. Because it was not marked? A. It was not 
marked. 
Q. Do you know the mark of Touche, Niven & 
Co.? A. No, I do not. 
Q. Do you know how they marked the book? A. 
There is no specific mark. They all have a certain 
type of marking. 
Q. Do you know the type of mark, what mark 
Touche, Niven & Co. used? A. They may use any 
kind of a single check mark, or double check mark. 
Q. Either a single check mark or a double check 
mark? A. Yes. 
Q. Do you find a blue pencil check mark on these 
various pages? Did you notice that, beginning with 
page 37, there are blue pencil check marks? 
3 7 4 
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The Court: I am afraid you are going 
into a sphere of cross-examination of this 
witness, Remember he is called by you to 
support your claim against these defendants. 
Mr. Podell: He is called by me, your 
Honor. I brought out what I think the 
Judge and jury should know about this wit-
ness. 
The Witness: Can I see the general ledger 
for just one more second? 
Q. In order to answer my present question? 
First, answer the question; is it not true that you 
find check marks there as to those items? A. I 
find some check marks here. 
Q. You just stated that you do not know which 
are the check marks of Touche, Niven & Co. and 
which are the check marks of any other accountant, 
is not that right? A. (No answer.) 
Q. Did you conceal that book from anybody? A. 
No. 
Q. So far as you know, did anybody conceal it 
from the accountants? A. No. 
Q. You have identified it previously as one of 
the books kept by Fred Stern & Company? A. Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: Plaintiff's Exhibit 6. 
Q. So that, so far as you know, had Touche, 
Niven & Co. sought to see it or asked for it, it was 
there available for them? A. Right. 
Q. That is correct? A. Yes. 
Q. Then, we will not take any more time with 
that. Go on and identify these other books, please. 
Just tell us what that next one is. A. Exhibit 9, 
record of notes and trade acceptances due, notes 
and trade acceptances receivable. 
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Q. That is a book that was kept by Fred Stern 
& Company? A. That was a book kept by Fred 
Stern & Company. 
Q. Will you look at the others, Mr. Romberg? 
A. They are the same. They all have been identi-
fied. 
Q. Will you look at Exhibit 10, trial balance for 
accounts payable? Just identify that and tell us 
whether that was one of the Stern books kept at 
that time? A. Exhibit 10, trial balance for ac-
counts payable from January 1st, 1923, to Decem-
ber 31st, 1924. 
Q. Now, to your knowledge, were all these books 
that you have identified in the premises of Fred 
Stern & Company at the time when these account-
ants were making their examination? A. Yes. 
Q. And that covers the period of January and 
February, 1924? A. Yes, 
Q. January and February, and we will make cer-
tain about March, too? 
Mr. Marshall: Is he asking a question or 
making a statement? 
Mr. Podell: I am asking a question. 
Mr. Marshall: I object to the form of the 
question. 
The Court: Objection sustained. The 
form is bad. 
Q. Were they there in the month of January, 
1924? A. I remember them in January, and I 
think in February, 1924. I don't remember March, 
1924. 
Q. Now, to your knowledge, these accountants 
used these very books, or did these accountants use 
these very books at the time when they made their 
audit in January and February, 1924? When I 
say these accountants, I mean the firm of Touche, 
Niven & Co. 
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Mr. Marshall: I object to that. He has 
already testified we did not see some of those 
books, that they were not turned over to us. 
The Court: There is one batch of papers 
that is not an exhibit, and then Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 6 that he said were not turned over. 
Mr. Marshall: I did not understand him 
to say that they saw all these others. 
The Court: That is what we are trying 
to find out. What is your answer? 
The Witness: They saw some of the books. 
The Court: Can you tell us what ones 
they saw, what ones were actually there 
when these accountants were doing their 
work? 
The Witness: All the books were actually 
there, but not all of them were handed to 
them for examination. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Do you mean to imply by that, that any of 
them were concealed from them? A. They were 
not concealed. 
Q. They were in the place of business? A. Yes. 
Q. If they asked for the accounts payable ledger, 
if was given to them? A. Yes. 
Q. And any books they asked for were given to 
them, were they not? A. Yes. 
Q. You were there at the time? A. I was there 
at the time. 
Q. And while you do not want to state that they 
actually examined every one of these books, you 
do say these books were in the premises and that 
they used several of them? A. Correct. 
Q. To your personal knowledge? A. To my per-
sonal knowledge. 
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Q. Now, I would like to have you tell us what 
you know as to whether—I will reframe the ques-
tion. Look at the paper I show you and tell us 
whether you cannot state that they were papers 
that were on the files and records that were made 
at the office of Fred Stern & Company, made or re-
ceived or kept in the office of Fred Stern & Com-
pany on the dates that they appear or purport to 
be dated? 
Mr. Marshall: That is a pretty compli-
cated question. 
Q. First, were they papers that were in the files 
of Fred Stern & Company? 
The Court: In January and in February 
of 1920 what? 
Mr. Podell: 1924, when this examination 
was made. 
The Witness : I think some of them ap-
pear to be dated in March, 1924. 
The Court: Exclusive of those. 
The Witness: These are papers that 
show—— 
Mr. Marshall: I object to what they show. 
The Court: Sustained. 
The Witness: I do not know whether they 
were there in 1924 or at any other time. 
Q. Do you know if they were papers that came 
from the files of Fred Stern & Company? A. From 
the handwriting that appears on the bottom of 
some of those, from notations that appear on these 
invoices and records, they were handled by Fred 
Stern & Company. 
Q. Examine them and see if you cannot identify 
them as the original invoices received by Fred Stern 
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& Company. You can use any other book that you 
like. 
Mr. Marshall: I object to trying to get in 
what these things were in the record in such 
manner. 
The Court: I appreciate it, but I am go-
ing to allow it just the same. 
Q. Original invoices received from the United 
Baltic Company by Fred Stern & Company. Do 
not guess, but study those documents. 
The Court: That may be, but this is quite 
important at this point, in the Court's esti-
mation, as to whether there was any knowl-
edge on the part of these defendants as to 
their existence. 
Mr. Podell: That is something I intend 
taking up in a subsequent part, your Honor. 
I have got to go one step at a time. 
The Court: They become a matter of rec-
ord here. That is the danger. 
Mr. Podell: I shall ask that. 
The Court: I wish you would. I wish 
you would predicate that part of the propo-
sition. 
Mr. Podell: He may not know about it. 
The Court: Then, how can we say this 
defendant knew? 
Mr. Podell: I will show that they knew. 
The Court: He says he does not know 
whether they were ever there or not. He 
recognizes handwriting on there which indi-
cates to him that they had something to do 
with the concern he was employed by, but 
outside of his knowledge of the fact that 
they were there, he knows nothing. 
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Mr. Podell: I ask him to take up any 
other book or record he chooses and tell us 
specifically whether he cannot identify those 
papers as the original invoices that were 
actually received by Fred Stern & Company 
on the date they purport to be dated, from 
the United Baltic. He may know that. It 
is called to his specific attention. 
The Court: You mean that might refresh 
his recollection as to identification? 
Mr. Podell: Yes. 
The Court: I will allow that, if he can. 
Mr. Marshall: Do we not first have to 
refresh his recollection as to whether he saw 
those things? 
The Court : Certainly. Now, he says he 
is seeking to refresh his recollection, to see 
if he can. 
Mr. Marshall: If he cannot, it is not 
competent for the second half or three-quar-
ters of Mr. Podell's question. 
Mr. Podell: I do not know what you mean 
by that. 
Q. I show you this paper (handing to witness). 
Is this paper in your handwriting? A. It is. 
Q. Look at it and see if it is not a summary of 
these papers that I have shown you. A. This rec-
ord is made out of two different things. One is 
an original invoice and one is a trust receipt. The 
original invoices do pass through my hands—they 
don't pass through my hand, but they pass through 
the office which I have charge of. I know they 
come in and are received. 
Q. I will reframe my question so it will have 
nothing to do with the trust receipt and will relate 
only to the original invoice. Does that enable you 
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to answer it a little better? A. I know this orig-
inal was never received. They are never received 
by me nor handled by me. This record has my 
original handwriting, as I recollect it now very 
clearly, because originally it was. drawn up by 
some one and made up very poorly, in very poor 
handwriting, so I volunteered to copy it for him 
and show it in a good record. I surmised it was 
a summary of an account current with the United 
Baltic Corporation, as the copy was marked 5 per 
cent, basis, and then turned it over to the person 
who was really supposed to keep it. 
Mr. Marshall: A person in Stern's em-
ploy? 
The Witness: Yes, and, as you notice, it 
is being continued from there on. 
The Court: Let us see if we get that. I 
want to get it clear now. In other words, 
this sheet which has been handed to you, 
this pencil memorandum here, has been 
drawn by you not from any authenticated 
records, but from a copy that was made by 
somebody else; because of its poor condi-
tion, you re-wrote that in this particular 
form. 
The Witness: That is correct. 
The Court: So you know nothing, as you 
say, of the authenticity of the original en-
tries made upon this sheet? 
The Witness: No. 
Mr. Podell: The sheet is not so much the 
sheet I am offering. He said something else 
that I want to ask him a specific question 
about. 
Mr. Marshall: May we mark those for 
identification? 
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The Court: Yes. 
(Marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 23 for 
Identification.) 
Q. Do you identify or can you identify those 
invoices that are before you and attached to those 
papers, as the original invoices that came to Fred 
Stern & Company on or about the times that they 
purport to be dated? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that question. 
The Court : Objection sustained for the 
reason that he said that he never saw—that 
they went through a course of business in 
that place, over which he had no control, 
and based on this copy that was handed to 
him, he made up this other sheet. He said 
he never saw the originals at any time. Did 
I understand you to say that, Mr. Romberg? 
The Witness: That is correct. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Mr. Marshall: I understood him to say 
that of the trust receipts, your Honor. 
The Court: Yes, I understood him to say 
that about the trust receipts. 
Mr. Marshall: The trust receipts, he said, 
had never been in the office. 
The Court: Let him answer. We are 
arguing at cross purposes. What do you 
say? 
Mr. Podell: If your Honor will permit 
me to ask the question just this way first: 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Did not the invoices pass through the office 
that you had charge of? 
The Court: He said they did. 
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A. The invoices, as I look at them now—as I 
would look at them at any other time, naturally 
would have passed through. I never saw it. I 
personally didn't handle them. 
Q. Who would handle them? A. They were han-
dled by three employees. 
Q. There were three employees that handled the 
invoices as they came in? A. Yes. 
Q. Who were those employees, do you remember? 
A. If I have a list showing the employees of that 
time, I may recall. I may recall the name, but I 
can't remember now. 
Q. Will you look at your list, if you want to, 
and tell us who were the clerks? We want to get 
somebody who will identify them, if we must. A. 
It wouldn't appear on any one of those books, I 
don't think. The name, the clerk's name, would 
not appear on any one of those books. 
Q. I wish you would look it over. A. There 
were two girls who handled them and a fellow by 
the name of Utley. The girls' names I can't recall 
any more. 
Q. Do you recognize the handwriting of those 
people on them? A. Yes, I recognize some of the 
handwriting. 
Q. Of the employees of Fred Stern & Company? 
A. Certain employees of Fred Stern & Company. 
Q. What are the dates of those invoices as far 
as they purport to be dated? A. This one is dated 
September 3, 1923. 
Q. When an invoice was received by Fred Stern 
& Company, was there any mark made on it, de-
noting the date of receipt? A. No date would be 
put on it. There is some notation of entries on 
the various records. Maybe those records will show 
the date. 
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Q. Will you look at those records and verify and 
tell us whether entries were made concerning 
those— A. It says contract hook—— 
Mr. Marshall: Do not read from that. 
The Court: Do not read it aloud. Read 
it to yourself. 
The Witness: It shows there are some 
entries made from this invoice. 
Q. Made in what? A. In various records. 
The Court; What we want to get to as 
quickly as possible is whether or not those 
entries will help your mind to be refreshed 
as to whether or not those records were in 
the office of Stern in January and February 
1924. Can you say whether they were or 
were not, or don't you know? 
The Witness: May I see the accounts pay-
able ledger? 
(Handed to witness.) 
Q. Will you look at Exhibit No. 6 and see 
whether that will refresh your recollection? 
The Court: That is not 6. 
Mr. Podell : Let him look at anything he 
likes first. 
Q. Mr. Romberg, will you look at Exhibit 6 and 
see if that refreshes your recollection? 
Mr. Marshall: I do not know how he can 
be asked to refresh his recollection from a 
book which he says is in the handwriting 
of some one else and which he only identi-
fied by reference 
Mr. Podell: I suggest, your Honor 
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Mr. Marshall: May I finish my sentence, 
please? By reference to this Exhibit 23 for 
Identification. 
The Court: I think he did say he knows 
nothing about the entries made in this book. 
Mr. Podell: He identified the entries as 
in the handwriting of employees, and knew 
that it was a book; he was misled, he said, 
at first by the first two pages, because it 
contained handwriting that he had never 
seen. 
The Court: That is right. 
Mr. Podell: Now, your Honor, a man can 
refresh his recollection from anything. 
The Court: I will allow the question. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
Q. Would you look at the lot number on that 
invoice; that might help you. Look at the lot 
number at the top of the page. A. Yes; I located 
the shipment. 
Q. You have located the shipment? A. Yes, 
Steamship Diomed 
Mr. Marshall: Do not read, please. 
Q. Is there anything in that book that refreshes 
your recollection so that you can say that that in-
voice was on the files of Fred Stern & Company at 
or about the time that it purports to be dated? A. 
It does not refresh my recollection. I can locate 
that invoice. 
The Court: As having been in the files 
in February and January of 1924? 
The Witness: I don't know that. I can 
locate this invoice recorded in this book. 
The Court: We are not interested in that 
at all. We are trying to find out whether or 
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not you can locate that invoice as being in 
the files of this Stern & Company in Jan-
nary and February of 1924. That book, if 
anybody looked for it, they would find it 
there. That is what we want to know. 
Would it be there for anybody to find it if 
they went to look for it? 
The Witness: I am sorry. These rec-
ords were kept by someone else. I cannot 
say whether they were there in January, 
1924, or not. They most likely were there. 
Mr. Marshall: I move to strike that out 
as a guess. 
The Court: Strike it out. That does not 
mean anything to us. If you do not know, 
say so. If you do know, say so, and if you 
say they were not there, say so. Now, which-
ever it is, say so. You know or you do not 
know. It is either one or the other. 
The Witness: I can locate any entry in 
any one of the books by looking at some 
records. I can locate any memorandum on 
any one of the books if they are recorded 
properly, from notations that are made on 
invoices. 
Q. Let me have that invoice a moment, When 
Fred Stern & Company received an invoice what 
mark did it put on the invoice, if any, to denote its 
receipt? A. This is a notation on Fred Stern 
& Company's part (indicating). This is a nota-
tion entry (indicating). This is an entry (indi-
cating). This is a number that is being given 
(indicating). This is an invoice (indicating). This 
is an invoice like that is being given and checked 
accordingly (indicating). This is the exchange 
rate at that time at 4.50 (indicating). 
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Q. Of all these marks that were made by Fred 
Stern & Company or its employees at the time of 
the receipt of the invoice, which one of them de-
notes the time of its receipt? A. None of them. 
Q. Well, which one of them denotes the time 
when it was entered in other books? A. There is 
no definite time. If the invoice is dated September 
3rd and mailed from New York most likely on 
September 5th and 6th and passed through various 
hands and entered. 
Q. Can you tell by looking at the cross refer-
ences? Take this invoice (indicating). That was 
entered in what book? A. Contract book, folio 28. 
Q. Was it entered in any other book? A. Just 
this book that I find now under the heading of that 
steamer. 
Q. The Diomed, that is the name of the steamer? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Will you turn to that book and tell us what 
date it was entered ? A. I notice there is a TR out 
here, which means trust receipt. That means the 
date of the trust receipt. It says "TR September 
12, 1923." 
Q. That invoice, from all records that you could 
inspect, was unquestionably in the file of Fred 
Stern & Company at September 12, 1923; was it 
or was it not? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to the word "un-
questionably." 
The Court: Was it or was it not? Strike 
out "unquestionably." 
Mr. Marshall; If he knows, 
The Witness: I am not the one who han-
dled this. 
Q. Who did handle it? Can you locate the per-
son who handled it? A. That I don't know. 
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Q. Try and answer my last question. You have 
not answered it yet. Assume this entry now that 
you have in that book. It was not the practice of 
Fred Stern & Company to make out a trust receipt 
without having an invoice, was it? A. The trust 
receipt is not made out by Fred Stern. 
Q. The banks would not make out a trust re-
ceipt without having an invoice, would they? A. 
On the face of it, this has been entered as of Sep-
tember 12, 1923. 
Q. That means the invoice must have been there 
at September 12, 1923? A. Yes. 
Q. No doubt about that, is there? 
Mr. Marshall: He said "must have been." 
The Court: I will allow it. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
Q. The only question in your mind is whether 
that invoice remained on the files of Fred Stern & 
Company, so that it was there in January and 
February of 1924, when these accountants were 
there? A. That is correct. 
Q. And that is something that you cannot say? 
A. I cannot say. 
Mr. Podell: We have at least got that 
much. Now, we will mark this, with your 
Honor's permission, we will mark this in-
voice in evidence simply to the extent that 
the testimony indicates it to be admissible, 
and no further. 
The Court: As of September 12, 1923. 
Mr. Podell: I offer that, and may I, to 
save time, if this witness will make the same 
identification with respect to the other in-
voices, giving us the date, the date appears 
on the face of the invoice, I shall offer all 
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of them unless counsel prefers to have me 
ask all of these questions with respect to 
each one of the invoices. 
Mr. Marshall: I will assume he is asked 
the same question with respect to every in-
voice, and I nevertheless object, that it is 
not binding on us in any way and it does 
not show that it was there when we audited 
the books, and that we saw or passed on it. 
The Court : Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
The Court: That does not say it was 
there. It is only in so far as the witness has 
testified, for the purposes of connecting it 
with this concern up to the time of its al-
leged date, and all of the other invoices simi-
larly described, and still we have the con-
nection to make with this defendant, as yet. 
Mr. Podell: All right. May I ask that 
those original invoices be marked in evi-
dence? 
(Received in evidence and marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibit 24.) 
(Whereupon, at 4.20 o'clock P. M., ad-
journment was taken until to-morrow, April 
2, 1929, at 10 o'clock A. M.) 
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New York City, 
Tuesday, April 2, 1929, 10 o'clock A. M. 
(Trial continued.) 
(Same appearances.) 
SECOND DAY. 
Mr. Podell: May we call Mr. Rea out of 
order, your Honor? 
Mr. Marshall: Could we not wait a few 
minutes for Mr. Romberg? 
The Court: Yes. 
H U G O W. ROMBERG, witness on behalf of the 
plaintiff, resumed, further testified as follows: 
Direct examination (continued) by Mr. Podell. 
Q. Now, Mr. Romberg, just these two books, just 
look at them and tell us if you recall them, and if 
they were used by Fred Stern & Company and from 
what period to what period, and what they are? 
A. I recognize by the handwriting that they have 
been used by Fred Stern & Company. This stock 
certificate is dated May 16, 1922. They all have 
the same date; common stock. And this one here 
being preferred stock, also dated May 16, 1922. 
Mr. Marshall: You mean the first entry 
is dated that? 
The Witness: Yes. The first entry is 
dated May 16, 1922. 
Q. Those are the stock certificate books of Fred 
Stern & Company? A. Fred Stern & Company, 
both common and preferred. 
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Mr. Podell: I offer them in evidence. 
Mr. Marshall: No objection. 
(Common stock book received in evidence 
and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 25; pre-
ferred stock book received in evidence and 
marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 26.) 
Q. Mr. Romberg, you have seen this certified 
statement, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 for Identification 
(handing to witness) ? A. Yes, I have seen that. 
Q. Do you remember about when it was fur-
nished to Fred Stern & Company? A. Some time 
in 1924. 
Q. About what month? A. I cannot exactly re-
call the date; from the letter here, evidently it is 
February 26, 1924. 
Q. It is dated February 26th? A. Yes. 
Q. Does that refresh your recollection at all as 
to when— A. Some time in February. 
Q. And who was it that delivered them? A. It 
was delivered to Mr. Fred Stern personally. 
Q. And who made the deliveries, who gave them 
to him? A. A messenger, in a big envelope, with 
several other statements. 
Q. How many such statements were furnished? 
A. I believe at that time they were given six. 
Q. And how many were furnished shortly after-
wards? Were there any furnished shortly after-
wards? A. I think they were furnished some time 
afterwards. Just how many, I would not be able 
to recall. 
Mr. Marshall: I will concede there were 
about thirty. 
Mr. Podell: Thirty-two. 
Mr. Marshall: Thirty-two, if you say so. 
Mr. Podell: Thirty-two copies. 
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Q. Were they all duplicate originals? A. Well, 
they were actual duplicates of the original. 
Q. Now, do you remember a conversation be-
tween you and Mr. Rea, with respect to your sign-
ing some letters? 
The Court: Who is Mr. Rea, to refresh 
my recollection? 
Mr. Podell: Mr. Rea is one of the defend-
ants' senior accountants. 
Mr. Marshall: He is the staff manager of 
Touche, Niven & Co. 
Mr. Podell: In charge of this audit. 
A. If you tell me some more about it, I may 
recall it. 
Q. I beg your pardon? A. Perhaps if you will 
tell me some more about it, I may recall the con-
versation. 
Q. Where he asked you to sign a certain letter 
with respect to liabilities, and you at first declined 
to sign it? A. Can I see the letter? 
Mr. Marshall: I move to strike out Mr. 
Podell's statement about that. 
Mr. Podell: I will show 
Mr. Marshall: Just a minute. Let us 
have his testimony. I will produce the let-
ters if you want them, but it is his recol-
lection and not your testimony we want. 
Mr. Podell: Let me have the letters. 
The Court: Strike it out, if there are the 
letters. 
Mr. Marshall: Certainly (handing letters 
to counsel). 
Q. Now, just look at these letters (handing to 
witness); and tell the Court and jury first whether 
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they help to refresh your recollection as to what 
transpired. Just answer that yes or no. A. I 
recollect these letters. 
Q. And do you also recollect what happened be-
fore you signed those letters? A. Yes. I recollect 
something that happened before I signed these let-
ters, too. 
Q. And did you then have a talk with Mr. Rea? 
A. I recollect some conversation, but just what it 
was I couldn't definitely say. 
Q. I want you to look at this paper then that I 
show you now, beginning at the top of the page 
Mr. Marshall: What page? 
Mr. Podell: 1759. 
Q. And see if that helps to refresh your recol-
lection as to what took place (handing to witness) ? 
The Court: Does that help your recol-
lection, those two pages? 
The Witness: Those do help quite a great 
deal. 
Q. Will you be good enough to tell the Judge 
and jury, please, what happened between you and 
Mr. Rea with respect to these letters? A. It hap-
pened just exactly as it is written down here. 
The Court: Tell us that. 
Mr. Marshall: Do not read it, though. 
Q. Do not read it. Just tell us what happened. 
A. I believe Mr. Rea dictated some letters in the 
office, those two letters that were shown to me 
beforehand, and asked me to sign them. It was 
stated in here that I point-blank refused to sign 
them. Not exactly in that many words, but I hesi-
tated and did not want to sign them, and asked him 
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to see Mr. Stern first. He went in to see Mr. Stern 
and came out and said Mr. Stern wanted to see me. 
I then went in and after certain things Mr. Stern 
promised to do, I signed the letter, and he also 
signed the letter himself. 
Q. Now, you say you hesitated to sign them. I 
would like to know just what you said to Mr. Rea. 
A. No reason was given at all. 
Q. Did he ask for any reason why you would 
not sign them? A. No. 
Q. He just put them before you and asked you 
to sign? A. Exactly. 
Q. And you told him you would not? A. I told 
him I would like to have Mr. Stern sign them first; 
show them to Mr. Stern first. 
Q. Did you not so testify, that you refused to 
sign them? A. Well, I refused to sign them first, 
and refused to sign them until I said, "You better 
see Mr. Stern on those letters." 
Q. You know what the substance of these letters 
is, do you not? A. I do. 
Q. Was Mr. Rea insisting that you should sign? 
A. Mr. Rea would not make the audit, or would 
not give us a certified balance sheet unless those 
letters are signed. 
Q. Now, here I want to ask you whether this is 
a correct statement of what transpired—of course, 
you gave the testimony that I am reading from, 
some time ago, did you not? A. Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: I object to his putting it 
in that way. He is trying to refresh the 
witness' recollection by reading this. I ob-
ject to having him read testimony here. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Podell: If your Honor please, your 
Honor permitted me to cross-question this 
witness before. 
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The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Podell: And where there is a decided 
difference between what he says on the wit-
ness stand now and something of importance 
here in this testimony, it seems to me I have 
a right to bring it to his attention, even if 
only to correct a mistaken statement made. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Q. Did you not testify in so many words 
Mr. Marshall: This is the same question, 
your Honor. I object. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Q. Now, will you look at the page that I show 
you now 
Mr. Marshall: What page? 
Mr. Podell: Third question and answer, 
page 1759. 
Q. And tell us if that is a correct statement? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that. 
The Court: I will allow that, 
Mr. Marshall: Can he not ask whether 
that refreshes his recollection? 
The Court: He can serve the same pur-
pose in another question. 
Q. Go ahead? A. The third question? 
Q. Yes, the third question and answer. 
The Court: Come along, Mr. Witness, 
please. 
A. The contents of the answer is absolutely cor-
rect. I do not say that I exactly said the same 
words. I cannot recall those same words. 
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Q. Well, what is the last? I did not get it. A. 
The meaning was exactly the same. I may not 
have used the same words. 
Q. Is it not correct to say that when he asked 
you to sign those letters, you refused to sign them? 
The Court: He said he did. 
A. I did. 
Mr. Podell: Now, I offer these two letters 
in evidence, your Honor. 
Mr. Marshall: No objection. 
(Letters received in evidence and marked 
respectively Plaintiff's Exhibits Nos. 27 and 
28.) 
Q. Was Mr. Rea insistent that unless you signed 
those two letters he could not give you a certified 
statement? A. Can I amplify it? 
The Court: Yes. Let us see what your 
answer is. 
A. The entire conversation both between Mr. Rea 
and myself was not on definite yes or no or re-
fusals or anything like that. My answers were just 
evasive. 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor—— 
Mr. Marshall: I insist he has got to take 
the bad with the good, your Honor. 
Mr. Podell: I am willing to take the bad 
with the good, but I am entitled to an an-
swer. 
(Question repeated as follows: "Was Mr. 
Rea insistent that unless you signed those 
two letters he could not give you a certified 
statement?") 
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The Court: That can be answered yes or 
no. Was he insistent? 
The Witness: Yes. 
Mr. Podell: Now, if your Honor would 
like to have the whole conversation, I would 
be very glad to have it. 
The Court: Yes, let us have it. 
Q. Let us have everything that took place be-
tween you and Mr. Rea with regard to these two 
letters. A. For example, as to these letters, you 
asked me whether Mr. Rea was insistent. Mr. Rea 
asked to have the letters signed. There was no 
insistence about it on the man's part, and my an-
swer to him was in such a way that it wasn't alto-
gether a refusal, but just an evasion. 
The Court: Go ahead now; what hap-
pened after that? 
The Witness: Then I asked him to go in 
to Mr. Stern and see what Mr. Stern says 
and have him sign it; and he went in to Mr. 
Stern, and Mr. Rea came out and called me 
in, to go in to Mr. Stern. I went in all 
alone, and the end of the matter was after 
certain promises Mr. Stern made, that I 
signed the letter with him right there. Then 
I came out and asked Mr. Rea to go into 
Mr. Stern's office and the letters, signed, 
were turned over to Mr. Rea. 
Q. Do I understand you correctly that you tried 
to avoid signing those letters? A. Yes. 
Q. And you so stated to Mr. Rea? 
Mr. Marshall: He did not say that, your 
Honor. That is just what he did not say. 
Mr. Podell: He said to your Honor, Mr. 
Rea insisted. He said he refused to sign. 
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Mr. Marshall: He said, not a refusal, 
The Court : We cannot see the physical 
motions of people who are transacting that 
particular thing, and language may state 
very definitely what the physical conditions 
were as of the time, so that the conversa-
tion that has been given, I think, describes 
the situation fully. 
Mr. Marshall: Evasion. 
Mr. Podell: May I have my question read, 
please? 
(Question repeated as recorded.) 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, I would like to 
ask that question. 
Q. Did you state to Mr. Rea that you preferred 
not to sign those papers? 
The Court: That is a question, and that 
is language. 
Q. Did you say that to Mr. Rea? 
The Witness: I did. 
Q. Were you present when Stern asked for the 
thirty-two copies, the number of copies of the cer-
tified statement? A. I do not recollect. I don't 
think so. I don't know. 
Q. You have no recollection of it? A. No recol-
lection. 
Q. Did any one in your presence—was there any 
talk in your presence at any time between Stern 
and any one representing Touche, Niven & Co., as 
to why they wanted so many copies? A. No. 
Q. You were not present? A. No. 
Mr. Podell: May I read the letters which 
have been marked Plaintiff's Exhibits 27 
and 28? 
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The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Podell: Both letters are dated Febru-
ary 21, 1924, and may the record show, your 
Honor, that the letters we have been ques-
tioning this witness about this morning are 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 27 and 28? 
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Podell: They are on the letterhead 
of Fred Stern & Company. They are ad-
dressed to Touche, Niven & Co., at 80 Maiden 
Lane, New York. (Reading Plaintiff's Ex-
hibit 27.) They are signed, "Fred Stern, 
President of Fred Stern, Inc., Hugo Rom-
berg, Cashier." 
Mr. Marshall: Is that Stern's signature 
on that letter? 
The Witness: Yes. 
Mr. Podell: There is no dispute about 
that. 
Mr. Marshall: I wanted to have it on the 
record. 
Mr. Podell: The record may have that. 
The next letter is dated February 21, 1924, 
addressed to Touche, Niven, on the letter-
head of Fred Stern & Company (reading 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 28 to jury). 
Mr. Marshall: And that other exhibit 
also contains the signature of Stern? 
The Witness: Yes. 
Mr. Podell: Yes. The signature of Stern 
and Romberg. 
Q. Messrs. Touche, Niven & Co. made the audit 
for Fred Stern & Company for the year 1922, also, 
did they not? A. Yes. 
Q. Did they ask you for any such letters for 
that year? A. I don't recall; I don't know. 
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Q. Do you not know that this is the first time 
that they ever asked any letters from you? A. I 
think you are right. 
Mr. Podell: You may examine. 
Cross-examination by Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Now, yesterday, Mr. Romberg, you were asked 
to identify certain books. I suppose you could 
not say at this time that those books were in pre-
cisely the same condition they were in when you 
left Stern's office, could you? A. No. 
Q. Your memory would not go to each item of 452 
those books any more? A. Not only that, but I 
left before. I left way before Fred Stern & Com-
pany continued, and they continued in business 
after I left. 
Q. But you could not say that there were no 
changes in the books that were there when you 
left since you left, could you? A. No. 
Q. Some of these books were loose-leaf books, 
were they not? A. Yes. 
Q. And you cannot say for sure, can you, that 
all leaves are there now that were in those loose-
leaf books when you were there? A. No. 
Q. And can you say for sure whether there were 
no new leaves entered in those books since you 
left? A. No, I cannot say. 
Q. Now, the accounts receivable control ledger, 
you remember that book? A. Yes. 
Q. That could be posted directly from duplicate 
invoices, could it not? A. Yes. 
Q. And it frequently was so posted, was it not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Without reference to the journal vouchers? 
A. At no time is there a reference to the journal 
vouchers. 
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Q. You say, Mr. Romberg, that you left Stern in 
March of 1924, is that correct? A. Right. 
Q. Before this period, Stern had bought rubber 
from Ultramares, had it not, from the plaintiff 
here? A. I think so. 
Q. And it had owed Ultramares money and paid 
it, had it not? 
Mr. Podell: That is objected to. There 
has been no proper foundation laid for it. 
Q. Have you any recollection of any sales or 
transactions between Stern and Ultramares prior 
to March, 1924? 
Mr. Podell: I object to it as not proper 
cross-examination. 
Mr. Marshall: I will withdraw the ques-
tion at this time. 
Q. You left Stern in March, 1924? A. Yes. 
Q. Prior to that time, had you not resigned in 
November, 1923, from Stern's employ? A. Twice. 
Q. Did you at that time tell Stern that you did 
not care to continue to make false statements for 
him? A. I did. 
Q. Did you then agree to continue in his employ 
so as not to endanger Stern's home, did you tell 
him that? A. He made certain promises. 
Q. Did you tell him that you would continue in 
his employ even though you did not want to con-
tinue to make false statements, because you did 
not want to endanger Stern's home? A. I did 
practically. 
Q. The false statements that you referred to, 
that you had been making and did not want to 
continue to make, what kind of false statements 
were those? A. I would have to refresh my mem-
ory on that. 
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Q. You cannot remember the kind of false state-
ments that you made for Stern? A. Let us 
Q. Yes or no, can you remember? A. I do not 
remember anything definite. I can remember it 
if I see the statements or the supporting entries. 
Q. Were the trial balances that you had taken 
off for Stern that way false? A. The trial balance 
sheet that Stern got personally from me always 
showed the true condition. 
Q. Did you make any false trial balances for him 
prior to 1924? A. For him personally, never. All 
changes he made personally. 
Q. Did you make any false trial balances for 
any one prior to 1924? A. Not over my signature. 
Q. Did you make any, whether you signed any 
or not, did you prepare any? A. No, not directly. 
Q. Did you prepare them indirectly or in any 
way, any false balance sheet prior to March, 1924? 
A. May I amend the answer? 
Q. Yes. A. Mr. Stern asked me to make a bal-
ance sheet, and I made it up according to the actual 
condition of the books. 
Q. When? A. Prior to December 31, 1924, some 
time in July and August, Mr. Stern made some 
changes on those and returned them to me and 
said, "Have that typed." It was typed and I saw 
that the typing was correct, and he signed them, 
and what he did with them, I do not know. 
Q. You do not know whether he made a false 
statement or not? A. Naturally, he made changes. 
Q. And those changes falsified the account? A. 
Yes. 
Q. And you knew it? 
Mr. Podell: Falsified that particular bal-
ance sheet? 
The Witness: Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: Yes. 
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Q. After you left Stern in March, 1924, you con-
tinued to do work for him? A. No. Very little. 
Q. But some? A. I was called in from time to 
time. 
Q. You had the general ledger in your possession, 
did you not? A. I was given the general, posses-
sion 
Q. Just yes or no. A. Yes. 
Q. And you had that general ledger in your pos-
session at the time that Stern committed suicide? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you make any entries in that ledger? 
A. No. 
Q. You were paid for your services up to No-
vember 29, 1924, were you not? A. No. 
Q. You were not? A. No. 
Q. You are sure of that? A. I am quite sure 
of it. 
Q. In 1924, did you prepare for Stern, or did 
you assist Stern in preparing, a false balance sheet 
of about June 30, 1924? A. No. 
Q. You are sure you did not? A. Quite sure. 
Q. You prepared no balance sheet at that time? 
A. No balance sheet for him. 
Q. Do you remember being examined in the 
Bankruptcy Court in the Fred Stern matter? A. 
I do. 
Q. Do you remember the following colloquy: 
"Q. I show you a copy of the statement and ask 
you whether you ever saw the original of it (hand-
ing it to witness)?" 
Mr. Podell: What page is that ? 
. Mr. Marshall: 43. 
Q. (Continued) "A. Oh, yes, I saw that. Q. Who 
prepared that statement ? A. Let me explain this. 
Mr. Stern wanted the figures to be prepared accord' 
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ing to his suggestions. I only did the adding of 
it, and so forth, for example, I kept some of the 
figures I had. I brought them with me. Those I 
gave to Stern, showing the changes on the back, 
if any, which were made. This is a statement he 
wanted me to make up of June 30." Do you re-
member that? A. Correctly. 
Q. That was the truth? A. That is absolutely 
the truth. 
Q. "Q. In whose handwriting is this statement 
which you show me? A. That is my handwriting. 
Q. That statement which you made out as of June 
30, 1924? A. Those are just figures, not a state-
ment, just figures. Q. Just figures? A. Yes. Q. 
And where were those figures taken from? A. No 
place. Q. No place? A. They were not taken from 
anywhere, because there was no general ledger in 
existence. Q. Are they imaginary figures? A. 
Imaginary figures based upon previous statements 
of approximately how much the figures should be." 
Do you remember that? A. Yes. 
Q. And that is true? A. Yes. 
Mr. Podell: This relates to an alleged 
statement of some kind prepared along sub-
sequent to the delivery of the statement to 
us, that is, June of 1924. I would like to 
have that statement produced. That was 
never furnished to us. 
Mr. Marshall: I am going to ask you to 
produce it. You have it. 
Mr. Podell: You are making a few reck-
less statements there. 
Mr. Marshall: It is subpoenaed. 
Mr. Podell: Does that prove that we have 
it? 
Mr. Marshall: Let us, get to that in the 
proper order. 
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Mr. Podell: Then, why do you shout that 
way in the midst of what I am showing to 
the Judge when you do not know what you 
are talking about? 
Mr. Marshall: You know what I am talk-
ing about. 
Mr. Podell: Please do not address me. 
Talk to the Judge. 
The Court: Stop. 
Mr. Podell: We have never produced that 
statement and we have never had that state-
ment. Counsel is asking a lot of questions 
about it. I do not want to clutter the record 
up with a lot of objections. We want to 
know what that statement is. 
The Court: Have you got it, Mr. Mar-
shall? 
Mr. Marshall: I have never seen it. 
Mr. Limburg: The trustee's counsel pro-
duced it in the bankruptcy examination. 
The Court: That does not say that they 
know anything about it. 
Mr. Limburg: They are asking about it. 
The Court: They are asking about it from 
a record. That is no implication that they 
have it. 
Mr. Limburg: We do not claim they have. 
Mr. Podell: It should be produced. Any-
body talking about the contents of a state-
ment should produce it. It is confusing. 
The Court: There is nothing confusing 
about that. He is directing his examina-
tion to an alleged statement of June. 
Mr. Podell: June, 1924. 
The Court: 1924? 
Mr. Podell: Yes. 
The Court: Oh. 
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Mr. Marshall: This witness stated he left 
the employ of Stern at that time. 
Mr. Podell: He left in March. 
Mr. Marshall: I want to show that he 
did not leave in March and that that was 
untrue. I want to further show that there 
was consistent conspiracy on the part of this 
man and Stern to fake books. 
Mr. Podell: We do not deny that, and I 
will stipulate it. 
Mr. Marshall: I want to bring it out in 
my own way. 
The Court: It is very material to these 
defendants whether or no under fake books 
or conspiracy of what it may have been, if 
of such a character that the ordinarily pru-
dent man would not have detected it, then 
it is a very material thing to them that there 
were figures so hidden that they would have 
followed. 
Mr. Podell: That is what we are here to 
try. I maintained to the jury in my state-
ment that those books were faked and that 
Stern faked them and that this man helped 
in it. There is no dispute about that. We 
do not have to go into statements of June, 
1924, to prove that. My contention is that 
this was so crudely and visibly done that 
these men were bound to have seen it. 
The Court: I think we are going beyond 
the relevant necessity under the concessions 
that have been made. 
Mr. Marshall: I wish to ask a few more 
questions. 
The Court: Yes, you may. Now, we have 
it openly and notoriously stated by counsel 
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for the plaintiff that these books were faked, 
conspired about and connived about, result-
ing in falsified reports. 
Mr. Podell: Certainly. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. What I read you, Mr. Romberg, was true? A. 
Absolutely correct. 
Q. Did you or did you not prepare a subsequent 
report for Stern, or participate in the preparation 
of a false report or statement as of June 30, 1924? 
Mr. Podell: I object to that. 
The Court: I will allow it. 
Mr. Podell: I respectfully except. It is 
immaterial and incompetent and after the 
event having no bearing on the issues before 
this Court. 
A. A similar question you asked me before, and 
my recollection of that answer was that I did not. 
If you read this answer that you have read to me a 
little while before, the statement when I came into 
Stern's office was prepared in his own handwrit-
ing, and there was a question only of putting it in 
the shape of a balance sheet form. In that, I did 
assist him. 
Q. You assisted him in putting that false state-
ment in the balance sheet form in your handwrit-
ing? A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know what happened to that state-
ment? A. No. 
Q. Has the trustee got it? 
Trustee's Representative: No. 
Mr. Marshall: I would like to have it 
identified a little later. 
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The Court: Do not tell me about it. I 
cannot do anything about it. 
Q. Taking from Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 21, jour-
nal vouchers 12-27, 12-28, 12-29, those represent 
corrections which Touche, Niven requested be made 
in your books on the audit as of December 31, 1923, 
do they not? A. They are not only corrections, 
but actual closing entries. 
Q. To make the corrections which they recom-
mended? A. Yes, 
Q. You made those closing entries, or Stern made 
those closing entries? A. Yes, they are closing 
entries. 
Q. I believe you said on your direct examina-
tion that not all of the records of Stern & Com-
pany were turned over to Touche, Niven, did you 
not? A. Right. 
Mr. Limburg: I do not believe he said 
that. 
Mr. Marshall: He said it just now. 
Q. United Baltic invoices, these that I have in 
my hand, part of Exhibit 24, were concealed from 
them, were they not? A. I do not know. 
Q. Do you not know as a matter of fact, that 
they were not entered on the books of Stern & Com-
pany until after Touche, Niven had completed their 
audit? A. I do not know, no. 
Q. You do not know that? A. No. 
Q. Do you say they were on the books of Stern 
& Company at the time of the audit? A. I do not 
know that, either. If I see the books, I may be able 
to tell you. 
Q. You have no recollection of that? A. No 
recollection of that. 
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Q. Is there anything that you want to refresh 
your recollection with? A. The purchase record. 
Mr. Podell: I again call the attention of 
the Court to the fact that all we called this 
witness for was just to identify books, and 
that is all. 
Mr. Marshall: This I understood was ad-
mitted in evidence. 
Mr. Podell: As a paper or book that was 
on the files of Stern & Company during that 
period, and that is all. I did not go into 
the question of contents. 
Mr. Marshall: If you make no claim that 
we saw them—— 
Mr. Podell: I make the claim that you 
certainly should have seen them if you had 
done your duty properly and you should have 
insisted on getting them. 
Mr. Marshall: You are making a speech 
to the jury. 
Mr. Podell: You asked me for a question 
and I am answering. 
Mr. Marshall: It did not require that 
answer. 
Mr. Limburg: Which book do you wish? 
The Witness: The accounts payable book 
I think will show it too. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Will you see if there is anything in that book 
that will help you to recollect whether, or not these 
vouchers were entered at the time that the audit 
was made? A. These entries were made by some 
one else, but by looking them over I might be able 
to locate them, just when the entry was made.. 
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Mr. Podell: I object to that as calling 
for the contents of a book not in evidence 
and as not proper cross-examination and in 
competent, irrelevant and immaterial. I do 
not purport to vouch for the credibility of 
this witness. 
The Court: I will allow the question. 
Mr. Podell: I except. 
Q. Can you refresh your recollection on that 
point? A. I will look through the entries. Just 
one second. According to this ledger here, this 
invoice dated September 3, 1923—— 
Q. I only asked you whether it refreshed your 
recollection? 
The Court: Do not tell us anything about 
its contents. 
A. As to what? 
Q. As to whether those invoices were entered in 
the books at the time Touche, Niven made the 
audit? 
Mr. Podell: Is that the book in particu-
lar or the books generally? 
Mr. Marshall: Whether that book re-
freshes his recollection, as to whether they 
were entered in any books. 
Mr. Podell: You are asking for the con-
tents of all the books and I make the same 
objection, and exception. 
The Court: Same ruling. 
A. It is not a question of recollecting. The en-
try is made here in 1924. 
Q. Do you remember anything about when the 
entries were made in the books respecting those 
United Baltic invoices? 
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Mr. Podell: My further objection is that 
it does not appear that he made any entries 
himself. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Podell: Exception. 
A. I did not make the entries. 
By the Court. 
Q. So that you do not know and it does not re-
fresh your recollection? A. No, it does not refresh 
my recollection. I could find the result. 
The Court: Never mind the contents. 
We do not want the contents. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. The audit that Touche, Niven were engaged 
to make was a balance sheet audit? A. Yes. 
Q. And you attended to that? A. Yes. 
Q. You knew when the audit was completed that 
it was false? A. I did. 
Q. And Mr. Stern knew it? A. Yes. 
Q. When you signed these certificates, Plaintiff's 
Exhibits 27 and 28, you knew those were false? 
A. I did. 
Q. And Mr. Stern did? A. Yes. 
Q. Do I understand that you said to Mr. Podell 
in answer to the question, "Did you say to Mr. Rea 
I prefer not to sign those papers, referring to Plain-
tiff's Exhibit 27, 'I did,' " is that your answer? A. 
Not in those exact words, but I suggested that he 
go and have Mr. Stern sign them first. 
Q. When you said in answer to Mr. Podell that 
what you said to Mr. Rea was not like a refusal, 
but an evasion and you asked him to see Mr. Stern, 
was that a correct answer? A. Right. 
4 8 5 
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Q. That was correct? A. That was correct. 
Q. There was not a blunt refusal, but an evasion? 
A. Not a blunt refusal. 
Mr. Podell: I object to that, and I move 
to strike out that statement. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Marshall: It is cross-examination. 
The Court: Sustained. I appreciate that. 
Q. I asked you whether you did not testify in 
these bankruptcy hearings that at the time you 
were requested to sign it, you signed it because it 
was brought to you unawares, these two letters or 
certificates? A. It was a surprise to me. 
Q. And that is why you signed it? A. Not ex-
actly. The signing of it was done exactly as re-
peated before. It was brought to me unawares. 
Q. But you knew what you were signing? A. 
Yes, I read it. 
Q. And you knew that those certificates stated 
that all of the liabilities were entered on the books, 
did you not? A. Right. 
Q. And you knew that was not so? A. I knew. 
Q. And you knew that there were no future con-
tracts for crude rubber that were not in the inven-
tory? A. Yes. 
Q. And you knew that that was not true? A. I 
did not keep the future contract book record and 
what has been shown of that to Touche, Niven & 
Co., I would not know. 
Q. But you signed it, anyway? A. Yes. 
The Court: What are those exhibit num-
bers? 
Mr. Marshall: 27 and 28. 
Q. Now, Mr. Romberg, you remember that you 
offered at these bankruptcy hearings to help the 
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creditors in every way that you could, do you not, 
the creditors of Stern? A. They asked me to tes-
tify and I said I would gladly tell them everything 
I knew of the conditions. 
Q. And you were told, then, by the trustee's at-
torney, "I think it is important for you to do so"; 
do you remember that? A. I do not. I do not 
definitely recall it, no. 
Q. Do you remember you were first asked 
whether you would be willing to assist the re-
ceiver's accountant in getting true facts of the sit-
uation, and to develop facts of which the receiver 
already was aware; do you remember that? 
Mr. Podell: I want to call the Court's 
notice to the fact that this is not any part 
of the cross-examination. I did not ask him 
a word about that on direct, and I still urge 
the fact that the direct examination confined 
itself exclusively for the purpose of identify-
ing the books and nothing more and nothing 
less. Your Honor excluded when I tried to 
read portions of his testimony. 
The Court: Now what? 
Mr. Podell: I want to call notice to the 
fact because I will ask your Honor to read 
certain portions of this man's testimony on 
redirect examination. 
The Court: Now what? 
Mr. Podell: I want to note on the record 
that I shall ask your Honor that, in view of 
the fact that counsel is reading a portion of 
his testimony under 21-A, I shall ask your 
Honor 
The Court: Do you object to this testi-
mony? 
Mr. Podell: Yes. 
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The Court: Then, the objection is sus-
tained. 
Mr. Podell: That is much better. 
Mr. Marshall: Can I not show that this 
witness is a biased witness? 
The Court: You may, but not under this 
cross-examination. Objection is sustained. 
Mr. Marshall: Does your Honor rule that 
I cannot show now that he agreed to help 
the trustee and has been kept out of jail for 
that reason? 
Mr. Podell: Is that a fair statement? Did 
we have anything to do with that? 
Mr. Marshall: I did not say that you did. 
Mr. Podell: Is that a proper remark to 
make in the presence of the Court and jury 
and charge that to us? 
The Court: I do not see what there is 
that is annoying you about his statements. 
I have not the slightest conception as to why 
you should be annoyed by any of his state-
ments at all, except as a matter of identifi-
cation. Objection sustained, Mr. Marshall. 
Mr. Marshall: I take an exception. That 
is all. 
Mr. Podell: For the purposes of the rec-
ord, I would like to offer in evidence the 
statement of this witness beginning with the 
top of page 1759 to 1761, so that it will ap-
pear in the record, and I would like to have 
that portion of it either read into the record 
at the proper time or marked for identifica-
tion. It is testimony of this witness as the 
same appears on pages 1759, 1760 and 1761. 
Mr. Marshall: Are you offering that in 
evidence? 
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Mr. Podell: I have offered them. May I 
renew my offer? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as incom-
petent, irrelevant and immaterial. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Podell: Exception. I would like to 
have them marked for identification, so that 
the same will appear on the minutes. 
Mr. Marshall: No objection to that. 
Mr. Podell: I take it that that objection 
and exception applies to each question and 
answer separately. 
The Court: Yes, on each of those three 
pages. 
(The testimony referred to will be found 
at the end of the record of to-day's session.) 
Redirect examination by Mr. Podell. 
Q. You have been asked about some of these ac-
counts. Do you remember an item on the rubber 
sales account entered up in January or in Decem-
ber of 1923 aggregating the sum of approximately 
$706,000? A. I have a recollection. 
Q. Is this paper in the rubber book, the rubber 
sales account? A. May I see the journal entry that 
goes with it? 
Q. Please answer my question first. A. This is 
the rubber sales account. 
Q. If you need any papers to answer my ques-
tions, I will get them for you. Do you see the last 
item appearing in this book under the heading of 
rubber sales account? A. Yes. 
Q. Do you see the date of it? A. There is no 
date, but just the months. 
Q. Will you read the item the same as it appears 
in this book, omitting this part, which I will stipu-
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late with you, Mr. Marshall, if you wish, that it 
was subsequently written. This was written later 
and this was written later. Omitting the pencil 
and give us the ink item as the same appears. 
Mr. Marshall: I take an exception to that. 
Mr. Podell: I will offer the whole of it, 
if you want it, 
Mr. Marshall: I am objecting to the entry 
being put in evidence. 
Mr. Podell: The book is in evidence. 
Mr. Marshall: For one purpose only. 
Mr. Podell: No, it was not limited in pur-
pose. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Will you tell us what that item was, begin-
ning with this last line? A. The last line reading 
on the rubber sales account 12-29, 12 indicating the 
month and 29 the number of the journal voucher, 
$3061.92, a debit entry. On the credit side appears 
an entry 
Q. Do not read the pencil. A. No. 12-28, $706,-
843.07. 
Q. Is there anything else in ink on that same 
line? A. Debit balance 
Mr. Marshall: That is not on that line. 
Q. On that same line is this there? A. I read 
that. 
Q. 12-28? A. That means the month 12 and 28 
is a number. 
Q. The number of the journal voucher? A. Yes. 
Q. For that month? A. For that month. 
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Q. Was that item in the book at the time when 
Touche, Niven were auditing these books in Jan-
uary and February of 1924. Just answer that yes 
or no. A. Yes. 
Q. Was that a false item? A. May I see the 
journal voucher? 
Q. Can you not say that to this jury without 
looking at any journal voucher or anything else, 
that that item was a pure fabrication? A. You 
want me to recollect my memory? 
Q. Yes; what is your best recollection of it? 
A. If I see the journal voucher, I can tell. 
Q. Can you not tell without looking at the jour-
nal voucher? A. No. 
Q. $706,000 is a very large quantity for one 
month's sales, is it not? A. A lot of figures have 
passed through my hands since. 
Q. I am not talking about figures, but sales for 
one month. Do you not consider that $706,000 was 
a very large quantity of sales for your business for 
one month? A. May I turn to the rubber sales ac-
count, to the page before. 
Q. Tell me first in answer to my question 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as imma-
terial. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
Q. Look at the previous item? A. 12-9, $644,-
000. 
Q. That represents $644,000 additional sales? A, 
Yes. 
Q. Taking the $644,000 of sales already entered 
in December and the next item of $706,000 of sales, 
that makes a total of $1,300,000 of sales for the 
month of December, does it not, 1923? A. Right. 
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Mr. Marshall: I object to the witness 
reading from this book or the contents of 
that book going into evidence. 
Mr. Podell: It is in evidence. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Will you please tell this jury whether in any 
one month to your knowledge that your concern 
has been in business, it ever made sales of $1,300,-
000? 
Mr. Marshall; I object to that. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Q. Will you look at the records and tell us 
whether the records show that there were sales 
anywhere near $1,300,000 in any one month? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Q. Can you by looking at this record tell us 
whether or not that $706,000 entered of sales in 
the month of December, 1923, was a pure fraud and 
falsification? A. From this entry alone, no. 
Q. What do you want to look at? A. The journal 
entry. 
Q. Is that all you want to look at? A. The in-
voice register and debit memo book. 
Mr. Marshall: The trustee presented 
some papers here and I do not like to keep 
them in my possession and they may be im-
pounded with the Clerk. 
Mr. Podell: Do not charge me with the 
responsibility of that. 
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Mr. Marshall: Oh, no. 
The Court: Sure. 
The Witness: No. 12-28 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. I want you to answer my question. My ques-
tion is whether you can state to this jury, and you 
can examine any books or papers you like, whether 
or not that item of $706,000 is a pure falsification? 
A. I answered that before. I wanted to refresh my 
memory on it. 
Q. Look at anything that you like. A. I cannot 
find any supporting entry nor voucher for that 
entry in the rubber sales account in the amount of 
$706,834.07. 
Q. And what is your conclusion from that? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to his drawing a 
conclusion from that. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
Q. What is your conclusion as to my specific 
question? What is your conclusion as to whether 
or not that $706,000 is a pure falsification? A. 
That is just exactly what it is. 
Q. It is that? A. It is that. 
Q. And the way you arrive at that is by looking 
at the debit memo book? A. Right. 
Q. The debit memo book is not a loose leaf ledger? 
Mr. Marshall: I move to strike out Mr. 
Podell's statement of how he arrived at it, 
and I object to any testimony of this witness 
of how he arrived at it. 
The Court: I will allow it, 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
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Q. This debit memo book is not a loose leaf book? 
A. No. 
Q. There are no pages missing from the debit 
memo book? A. No. 
Q. They are all consecutively numbered 28, 29, 
30 and 31? A. Yes. 
Q. You did not conceal this debit memo book 
from these accountants at any time? A. No. 
Q. Did anyone conceal them from them to your 
knowledge? A. No. 
Q. Was the book there in January and February 
of 1924? A. Yes, I believe so. 
Q. To your knowledge did they not use this debit 
memo book in making the audit? A. Yes. 
Q. Will you turn to the supporting entries or 
the place where there should be a supporting entry 
for that $706,000 item and tell us if there is any? 
A. There is no supporting entry for this. 
Mr. Marshall: I move to strike out the 
witness' answer. 
The Court: Strike it out, 
Q. Turn to the page where consecutively in the 
order of dates you have your entries in the month 
of December, 1923? A. Page 33. 
Q. Does that contain the entire record for the 
month of sales, referring to Exhibit 5? Will you 
find anywhere for the month of December in this 
supporting book, the debit memo book, any record 
of sales for $706,000? A. No. 
Mr. Podell: May I just for the purposes 
of identification mark page 33 for identifi-
cation? The book is in evidence. 
The Court: Yes. 
(The same was thereupon marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibit 5-a for Identification.) 
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Q. Have you got the journal voucher 28 that is 
referred to in that item? A. Yes. 
Q. By the way, this false item of $706,000 of 
sales, that is the very last item of sales in that 
account, is it not? A. Right, 
Q. It is the last thing that is entered? A. Right. 
Q. You know it is different in handwriting from 
the handwriting that immediately precedes it? A. 
Right, 
Q. And the handwriting that immediately pre-
cedes it was whose handwriting, the preceding ac-
counts? A. I do not recognize the handwriting. 
Q. Mr. Siess, the accountant, has testified that 
he wrote the items from 12-57 down to the end of 
December, excepting the last item? A. That is 
right. 
Q. That is not in his handwriting? A. No. 
Q. So that the handwriting, on that last item 
was different from the handwriting of the previous 
entries? A. Yes. 
Q. And it is the last item? A. Yes. 
Q. By the way, that very item refers to a journal 
voucher? A. It refers to 12-28. 
Q. And 28 meant the journal voucher? A. The 
journal voucher number. 
Q. Did you dig up the voucher No. 12-28, is 
that it? A. That is 12-28. 
Q. Does it contain other entries which are sum-
marized in the account of the rubber sales? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to this. 
The Court: Sustained. It speaks for 
itself. 
Q. Can you tell us whether there is any entry 
here contained showing rubber sales of $706,000 
as entered there in that last item? A. There is no 
entry on this voucher 12-28 in the amount of 
$706,843.07. 
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Mr. Marshall: I move to strike it out. 
Mr. Podell: That voucher is in evidence. 
Mr. Marshall: Yes, it is. 
Mr. Podell: For the purpose of account-
ing, I think they have adopted the rule that 
they will allow someone to summarize, the 
contents of a lot of papers. 
The Court: That is right. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Now, Mr. Romberg, was this paper concealed 
from the accountants at any time to your knowl-
edge? A. No. 
Q. And speaking of this paper we are speaking 
of, journal voucher, 12-28? A. Yes. 
Q. Did you ever refuse to give it to them? A. 
No. 
Q. Was it in the files of Frederick Stern & Com-
pany to your knowledge? A. Yes. 
Q. And you can say that this is the identical 
journal voucher that bore that No. 12-28 and was 
in the files in January and February, 1924? A. 
Yes. 
Q. In whose handwriting was this false entry of 
$706,000? A. That is my handwriting. 
Q. So that you know that you falsified it? A. 
I know I made the entry. 
Q. But you knew also that you were falsifying 
it? A. Yes. 
Q. And you did not falsify any items on this 
journal voucher which you specifically referred to 
in this last item? A. No. 
Q. You did not? A. No. 
Q. So that anyone comparing that item with the 
supporting journal voucher referred to in this paper 
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would have seen that it is not contained on the 
journal voucher and has no support on the journal 
voucher? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Podell: That is all. May I have that 
marked for identification? 
(The same was thereupon marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibit 21-A for Identification.) 
Recross-examination by Mr. Marshall. 
Q. This journal voucher, 12-28, Exhibit 21-A, only 
purports to cover the recommendations made by 
Touche, Niven & Co. for closing entries after their 
audit? 
Mr. Podell: I object to that as an im-
proper summary of the contents of the paper, 
and leading and suggestive in respect to it. 
The Court: I would like to have for my 
own sake and for the jury's sake 
Mr. Podell: We intended to show that by 
accountants. I assume we will call some ac-
countants. I will not press the objection. 
The Court: That is the only reason. These 
are closing entries made by Touche, Niven 
& Co. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. That is all that paper purports to be? 
Mr. Podell: What paper is that? 
Mr. Marshall: 12-28. 
A. There are some additional small changes and 
adjustments, but that is all that it really is. 
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The Court: Those are figures made by the 
accountants. 
Mr. Marshall: When we had finished aud-
iting the books, we found that certain ad-
justments had to be made to put the books 
properly in balance and we recommended 
certain closing entries, as is always done at 
the end of an audit. 
The Court: And these represent those 
closing entries? 
Mr. Marshall: Yes. 
Mr. Podell: That is what is confusing 
about it and that is why I made the objec-
tion. Your Honor is being misled. 
Mr. Marshall: I think not. 
The Court: I was a little suspicious, but 
both of you are at odds about what it was. 
Mr. Podell: There is a decided difference 
between us as to what it was. Counsel here 
is talking about some corrections. Is this 
entire paper consisting of such adjustments 
and corrections? 
Mr. Marshall: He said there were a few 
minor things that were not. 
Mr. Podell: He calls them minor things 
Redirect examination by Mr. Podell. 
Q. Will you tell us whether this entire paper 
and the entries consist of corrections and adjust-
ment? A. No. 
Q. The primary function of this journal voucher 
is to furnish the supporting paper before this entry 
is made in that book on the rubber sales account, 
is it not? A. I do not understand that question. 
Q. Is it not true that if that $706,000 item were 
a true and correct item of sales that before the 
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entry would be made in this book, there would be 
some entry showing it on this paper? 
The Court: By whom? 
Mr. Podell: By the regular bookkeeper 
in the premises. 
The Court: Is that a bookkeeping record 
of the people in the premises, this 12-28? 
The Witness: That is a bookkeeping rec-
ord by Touche, Niven & Co. 
The Court: By Touche, Niven & Co.? 
The Witness: Yes. 
The Court: The accountants? 
The Witness: Yes. 
The Court: Not by the bookkeepers of 
Stern & Company? 
The Witness: No. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Tell me, did Touche, Niven & Co. keep your 
books? A. No. During 1923 the books fell away 
behind 
Q. If the bookkeeper in the employ of Fred Stern 
& Company had done his duty, it would have been 
part of his business to keep that journal voucher 
as part of his books? A. Yes, but he did not have 
the time. 
Q. He did not write them up? A. No. 
Q. And so Touche, Niven & Co. wrote them up? 
A. They assisted in the writing of them. 
Q. So that there is no doubt now in your mind, 
at least, is there, that Touche, Niven & Co. saw 
this paper 12-28? 
The Court: That is what I am trying to 
get. 
Mr. Podell: I am trying hard to get that. 
The Court: I do not think the jury knows 
it, and I want to be sure that they know. 
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By the Court. 
Q. Is this a bookkeeping record of Stern & Com-
pany? A. Yes. 
Q. Even though it is made up by Touche, Niven 
& Co.? A. Yes. 
Mr. Podell: And your Honor should keep 
in mind why it was made up by Touche-
Niven. 
Mr. Marshall: I object to Mr. Podell sum-
marizing every time he opens his mouth. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. My last question is, there is no doubt, is there, 
in your mind, that somebody from Touche, Niven 
& Co. not only saw this paper 12-28, but wrote on 
it? A. Yes. 
Q. And wrote on it before this fake entry was 
written? A. That I do not know. 
Q. Wrote on it at the time, or before they sup-
plied that financial statement? A. Yes. 
Q. And before that financial statement 
Mr. Marshall: I object to his statement 
that we supplied a financial statement. We 
made a balance sheet audit and supplied 
copies of that, 
Mr. Podell: I will correct that. Sup-
plied thirty-two of them, so that it should 
be in the plural. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. And that entry, $706,000, the false one, cer-
tainly was made before the financial statement was 
supplied or those financial statements were sup-
plied? A. Before the completion of the statement 
by Touche, Niven & Co. 
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Mr. Podell: That is all. 
Mr. Marshall: That is all. 
(Witness excused.) 
GEORGE REA, called as a witness on behalf of the 
plaintiff, being first duly sworn, testified as fol-
lows : 
Direct examination by Mr. Podell. 
Q. Where do you reside? A. 54 Hazelwood Road, 
Bloomfield, New Jersey. 
Q. Mr. Rea, what is your business or occupation 
or profession? A. I am a public accountant, 
Q. And in 1924 whom were you associated with? 
A. With Touche, Niven & Co. 
Q. And in what capacity were you connected 
with them? A. As a staff manager. 
Q. How long have you been with them? A. At 
that time I had been with them about four years 
and a half. 
Q. Are you with them still? A. I am. 
Q. At this moment ? A. I am. 
Q. What was your connection, if any, with the 
audit of the business of Fred Stern & Company 
for the year 1923? A. I was in charge of the ex-
amination which was made by our accountants, 
Q. You saw the statement that was finally cer-
tified? A. I did. 
Q. You know the number of copies that were 
delivered to Mr. Stern? 
Mr. Marshall: We have already conceded 
that. 
Mr. Podell: I want to know from Mr. Rea 
what his knowledge was. 
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Q. Did you know that? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. There were twenty-four original copies deliv-
ered at one time, duplicate originals? A. I believe 
so. 
Q. Do you understand what the purpose and use 
of those original copies was to be? A. I believe so. 
Q. Will you tell us what was your understanding 
that he would use those statements for? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to it in that form. 
The Court: It is a short form, but it will 
do without a lot more questions. I will 
allow it. 
Mr. Marshall: It was only an objection 
to the form and I will withdraw my objec-
tion. 
A. For the purpose that any of our clients use 
their balance sheets in submission to their stock-
holders and those interested in the financial condi-
tion of the company. 
Q. I did not get the last part. You spoke of 
submission to stockholders? A. And others inter-
ested in the financial condition of the corporation 
that the books had been examined by ourselves and 
had been found to be correct. 
Q. You knew then, did you not, that among 
others that were interested in the financial condi-
tion of that corporation were the number of its 
creditors? A. I assumed that they would be. 
Q. And a number of the banks? A. Probably. 
Q. And a number of the people from whom they 
intended borrowing money or financing them? A. 
They might have been. 
Q. You knew that, did you not? A. No. 
Q. Did you not know that they intended using 
that financial statement for the purpose of arrang-
ing their finances for the coming year? A. No. 
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Q. Did you know that they intended using it for 
any question that might arise during the course 
of the next few months or the next month in financ-
ing his business? A. No. 
Q. You did not know that? A. No. 
Q. Mr. Rea, you are not attempting to favor the 
concern you are working for? A. No. 
Q. I want to read to you a question and answer 
that was asked you under 21-A, and I would like you 
to tell the jury whether it was a correct statement 
that you made at that time. Mr. Rea, when I asked 
you as to whether Mr. Stern told you the purpose 
for which he intended to use the twenty original 
copies of the audit, you asked me whether I wanted 
your understanding or impression or your knowl-
edge on the subject. That is at page 1109: "Q. 
What was your understanding? A. My under-
standing was that he would use the balance sheets 
for any purpose that might be, that might arise 
during the course of the next few months or the 
course of the next month in financing his busi-
ness." Was that a correct statement of your un-
derstanding? A. Will you read the answer again? 
Q. You want it again. Just the question or the 
answer? A. The answer. 
Q. "My understanding was that he would use 
the balance sheets for any purpose that might be, 
that might arise during the course of the next few 
months or the course of the next month in financing 
his business." Would you like to see the answer? 
A. I understand it. 
Q. Was that a correct statement of your under-
standing? A. Yes. 
Q. "And in connection with financing his busi-
ness you also had in mind the possibilty of obtain-
ing loans from banks? A. Yes." A. Yes. 
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Q. "Q. By the use of those audits? A. Yes." A. 
Yes. 
Q. Is it not also fair to assume that when a client 
asks for twenty copies of a balance sheet with your 
signature attached to the balance sheet, that he 
is going to use that in connection with seeking 
credit for his business purposes? What would be 
your answer to that question? A. Will you read 
the question? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as calling 
for a conclusion. 
The Court: Allowed. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
Q. (Last question repeated as recorded.) A. 
Not necessarily. 
Q. You made this answer and see if you want 
to change it: "That would not be an unusual pur-
pose for which it would be used." A. I do not 
see any conflict between the answers. 
Q. Never mind the conflict. Is it a correct state-
ment to say that that would not be an unusual pur-
pose for which he would use these extra state-
ments? A. It is. 
Q. Now, do you not know from your experience 
that when banks or any other creditors get these 
certified balance sheets that they rely on their con-
tents? A. They rely on them for what they pur-
port to be. 
Q. They rely on the accuracy of the statements 
certified to by a firm such as yours? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, Mr. Rea, just one question: What part 
did you personally play or rather take in the mak-
ing of this audit; just what did you do; what was 
your position in connection with it? A. I conferred 
with our office secretary as to the men who were 
available 
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Q. I am not asking you really for what you did. 
I am asking it to find out what your relative posi-
tion to the men was; what did you call yourself? 
Are you senior accountant? A. I am staff man-
ager. 
Q. And are they all under you, all the people 
that worked on this audit, were they all under you? 
A. They were. 
Q. Were you their superior? A. I was. 
Q. Had you had anything to do with the 1922 
audit of Stern's books? A. Yes. 
Q. And how long had your concern been auditing 
Stern's books? A. I think that the audit for 1923 
was the fourth audit that we had made. 
Q. The fourth one? A. The fourth one. 
Q. So that for four preceding years or three 
years, anyway, your concern had audited the Stern, 
books? A. Yes. 
Q. And had you personally had connection with 
every such audit? A. Yes. 
Q. And did you not know from that experience 
that Stern always was a heavy borrower? A. Yes. 
Q. That he always owed money to banks or fac-
tors or creditors? A. Yes. 
Mr. Podell: That is all. 
Cross-examination by Mr. Marshall. 
Q. And you knew, did you not, Mr. Rea, from 
the previous audits and from examining this bal-
ance sheet, that the bulk, the great bulk of the 
obligations of Stern were secured, did you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, what did you do, with respect to Mr. 
Towell in this audit of 1923, as staff manager? A. 
I approved of his being selected by our office secre-
tary as the man to do the audit, discussed the 
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Q. You believed him to be a man competent to 
do this kind of an audit? A. Yes, I knew he was. 
Q. And what else did you do in the course of 
the audit before the balance was finally certified? 
A. I reviewed his working papers, inquired of him 
as to the sources from which he got his informa-
tion, the character of the information he had, and 
his understanding of the work he had done and the 
records that he had seen and the working papers 
that had been prepared, and the balance sheet that 
he had drawn from them. 
Q. Did he explain to you each of the items in the 
balance sheet? 
Mr. Podell: I submit that is outside of 
the scope of his direct examination, your 
Honor. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, Mr. 
Podell asked him what he did as staff man-
ager. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Podell : I asked him specifically what 
his position was. 
The Court: You may make him your own 
witness for that purpose at this time. 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, this is not the 
time. We are in the plaintiffs' case and not 
on the defense. 
Mr. Marshall: I am going to ask him 
about three more questions. 
The Court: Let us have it over with. 
Mr. Podell: The trouble with those three 
questions is that they will necessitate my 
cross-examining this gentleman for a great 
many more questions, because that is a sub-
ject-matter of the defense. 
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The Court: That is true. It would neces-
itate a cross-examination and he should not 
have to do it now, Mr. Marshall. 
Mr. Marshall: I respectfully except. 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor's ruling relates 
solely to the order of proof, as I understand 
it? 
The Court: That is all. Not as to its 
admissibility or its inadmissibility. Of 
course, it is admissible at the proper time. 
Q. Now, Mr. Rea, did you ever hear that any-
body was going to lend money on the strength of 
this balance sheet? A. Not that I recall, no. 
Q. Did you ever hear of any agreement by any-
body to lend money if a balance sheet showed up in 
a certain way? 
Mr. Podell: I object to that. Nobody 
claims any agreement here of any kind, or 
whether he knew of any agreement. 
The Court: I will allow it, sir. 
Mr. Podell: Exception. 
A. No. 
Q. Did you ever know that anyone was going to 
lend money to Stern at that time? A. No. 
Mr. Marshall: That is all. 
Redirect examination by Mr. Podell. 
Q. Just what do you mean by that, Mr. Rea, 
in view of the previous statements? Do you mean 
to tell this jury that when these statements were 
handed over you did not know they were going to 
be used by Stern for the purpose of getting credit? 
A. No. . 
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The Court: As a fact? You mean you 
did not know as a fact in the future that 
they would be used? 
The Witness: Yes. I had no such knowl-
edge. 
Q. What was your understanding of the purpose 
he was going to take them for? A. That he would 
use our balance sheets, if he used them at all, for 
financial purposes, that he would use it as col-
lateral evidence as to his own representations to 
others he was seeking credit from as to his finan-
cial condition. 
Q. When you signed that certificate you knew 
that you were also making representations, did you 
not? A. I did not sign the certificate. 
Q. Whoever it was that signed it on behalf of 
your concern? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as calling 
for a conclusion of law. 
Mr. Podell: I will not press that. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Q. What you mean to point out is that at that 
very moment when these certificates were handed 
over to him you did not know of any specific person 
to whom he said he was going to take that par-
ticular balance sheet and get a particular credit? 
A. No. I didn't know he was going to use it at all 
for that purpose. 
Q. But you understood he was going to use it in 
securing credit, that that was the purpose that he 
was expecting to use it for in connection with the 
conduct of his business? A. No. 
Q. You did not understand that? A. No. 
Q. What did you understand? Tell us again. 
A. That he would use it as our evidence, just as 
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it purported to be, that we certified that this was 
a true balance sheet, and that he would use that 
as collateral evidence to his own representations 
as to his financial condition. 
Q. For what purpose? A. Any purpose that he 
might use in a financial way. 
Q. What do you mean by "in a financial way"? 
A. To get loans, extend loans, get credit, and pos-
sibly induce other people to put money in the busi-
ness, buy stock, and so forth. 
Recross-examination by Mr. Marshall. 
Q. You did not know he would use it; you only 
knew he might use it, is that what you mean? A. 
Yes. 
The Court: We will take a five-minute 
recess. 
(After short recess.) 
Redirect examination by Mr. Podell. 
Q. Mr. Rea, you knew that this concern, Fred. 
Stern & Company, was a closed corporation, did 
you not? A. Yes. 
Q. And how many stockholders did it have? A. 
I think just the one real stockholder, Mr. Stern. 
Recross-examination by Mr. Marshall. 
Q. How long had you known Mr. Stern, Mr. Rea? 
A. Not more than four years. I don't remember 
whether I had met him the first year or not. 
Q. And Mr. Romberg? A. About two years, I 
think. 
Q. And had you ever heard or seen anything to 
make you doubt their honesty? 
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Mr. Podell: I object to that as not proper 
cross-examination at this time. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, I 
think I can shorten it tremendously if I can 
put in these two or three questions. 
The Court: I know it, but I do not want 
to open up the door of cross-examination. 
Mr. Marshall: I take an exception, re-
spectfully, of course. 
Mr. Podell: At this time. 
The Court: Not as to its admissibility, 
but as to this time. 
Mr. Marshall: I think in view of his 
questions about Mr. Rea's knowledge of the 
use of the balance sheet, it is proper to show 
even now, at any time, that he had perfect 
faith in the integrity of Stern and Romberg 
and in this balance sheet he was going to 
put out. 
The Court: I have not any objection to 
that at all, as to what his opinion was as 
to the balance sheet. None at all. 
Mr. Marshall: That was going to be the 
third question in my order. I will put that 
now. 
Mr. Podell: He can bring that out in the 
same line of cross-examination, your Honor. 
The Court: I will allow that question at 
this time, Mr. Podell. 
Mr. Podell: Then, will your Honor per-
mit me, if this witness is not recalled, to 
permit me to recall him for the purposes of 
cross-examination ? 
The Court: Certainly. 
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By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Did you at any time doubt the truth and hon-
esty of this balance sheet and the certificate at-
tached to it? A. No. 
Q. That is Exhibit 1. 
Mr. Marshall: I have no other questions. 
Redirect examination by Mr. Podell. 
Q. Do you really mean that, Mr. Rea? Did you 
understand the question? The question is, did you 
at any time doubt the truth or falsity of this state-
ment? Do you mean your answer to stand as it 
is? A. I had reference to the time when it was 
issued. 
Q. At a particular time. You know that it is 
false, do you not? A. I do not. 
Q. You know now that it is false? A. I do not, 
Q. Have you not discovered that it is false? A. 
I understand there are questions raised as to the 
accuracy of it, sir. 
Q. Is that all you understand? A. I have no 
knowledge 
Q. Do you not know that your own employee 
marked certain accounts as purely fictitious? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that, your 
Honor. There is no basis for that statement, 
and it is not so. 
The Court: I do not know whether it is 
or not. Therefore the witness, I think, can 
say. 
Q. You do not know that certain of these ac-
counts are fictitious; you do not know that now 
even, is that your statement? A. Not of my own 
direct knowledge. 
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Q. You have not looked at the books to verify 
it? A. No. 
Q. Your employees have reported to you, have 
they not? A. They reported that certain things are 
represented to be fictitious. 
Q. Represented to be fictitious? A. Yes. 
Q. By whom? A. By people who subsequently 
examined the books. 
Q. Did you not check up on them? A. No. 
Q. Did not your employees check up on them? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you not send two of your accountants over 
to verify them? A. No. 
Q. As a matter of fact, Mr. 
The Court: The witness' answers are 
clearly based on the fact from an accounting 
standpoint, that he does not know of his own 
personal knowledge; that what he does know 
i s a matter of hearsay. Do not let us mince 
words on things that do not mean anything. 
Q. Did you not get that information from your 
own employees? A. No. 
Q. Do you know Mr. Letter and Mr. Montague? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you not send them over or did not your 
concern send them over, to your knowledge, to 
check up on these claims that were being made that 
the statement was false? A. As I remember, they 
were sent over to help Mr. Djorup check up on 
some work he was doing on the books. 
Q. And did not they come back and tell you 
that those items, certain items, were false? A. No. 
Q. Never told you that? A. No. 
Mr. Marshall: I think we have pursued 
this line of discussion far enough, your 
Honor. 
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Q. You have said that nothing had happened to 
arouse your suspicion about the concern ; is that 
your statement? A. During the course of the audit, 
yes. 
Q. Nothing happened? 
Mr. Marshall: I was not allowed to go 
into that, your Honor. 
Mr. Podell: That is exactly what he was 
asked. 
The Court: I will allow it. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
Q. Do you not know or was it not reported to you 
by the men working under you that they found the 
inventory had been falsified to the extent of over a 
quarter of a million dollars, before this statement 
was certified? A. No. They didn't report it was 
falsified. They reported that the inventory had 
been overstated and that they had made correc-
tions. 
Q. Overstated in excess of $250,000? A. Yes. 
Mr. Podell: That is all. 
Recross-examination by Mr. Marshall. 
Q. It is not unusual, is it, to find large over-
statements in inventories and books that you audit? 
A. No. 
Mr. Podell: What was the inventory, Mr. 
Rea? 
Mr. Marshall: I am examining him. All 
right, what was the inventory, Mr. Rea? 
The Witness: I don't remember the de-
tails. 
Mr. Podell : Look at your statement and 
tell us what the total inventory was, and 
then tell us the overstatement. 
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A. The inventory as we finally determined it was 
$131,000. 
Q. And they were all pledged, the whole inven-
tory? A. Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: Now, I think, your Honor, 
I am entitled to ask him, in view of Mr. 
Podell's question 
Mr. Podell: I did not invite this, your 
Honor. 
The Court: No, sir, I am not going to per-
mit it at this time. 
Mr. Marshall: I do not want to press 
your Honor as long as you come to that con-
clusion, but I think Mr. Podell has opened 
the door by his last few questions. 
The Court: The Court has ruled, and you 
may have an exception. 
Mr. Marshall: I respectfully except. 
Redirect examination by Mr. Podell. 
Q. In other words, on this question of inventory, 
on an inventory of $131,000, you found that this 
concern had overstated it by $250,000? A. What is 
the question, please? 
Q. (Question repeated as recorded.) A. Our as-
sistants found that they had overstated it. 
Q. And so reported to you? A. Yes. 
Q. And that did not arouse your suspicion about 
the integrity of a concern that does that? A. No. 
Mr. Marshall: Then I think I have a right 
to ask him about his understanding of the 
integrity of these people. 
The Court: Objection sustained, if there 
be one. 
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Mr. Podell: There is certainly one, at this 
time. 
Mr. Marshall: Mr. Podell has asked him 
about a, suspicion as to integrity. 
Mr. Podell: I did not invite this. I cau-
tioned counsel if he asked questions of the 
character he did, it would involve more 
cross-examination. 
Mr. Marshall: May I put on the record, 
then, the questions I want to ask? 
The Court: Anything you desire to put 
on the record, you may, sir. 
Mr. Marshall: Understand, there is going 
to be an objection, and you are not to an-
swer. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Have you ever seen or heard anything to make 
you question the integrity of Mr. Stern or of Mr. 
Romberg? 
Mr. Podell: That has been asked and an-
swered. 
The Court: He just wants it for the pur-
pose of the record. 
Mr. Marshall: It has not been answered. 
The Court: That has not been answered. 
It has not been allowed. 
Mr. Podell: The very first question your 
Honor did permit, you said you would not 
object to having him ask that one question. 
That is what brought out all this cross-
examination. 
The Court: But this question I did not 
allow. 
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Mr. Podell: I stand corrected. I thought 
your Honor did allow a similar question. I 
object to it at this time. 
The Court: Declined at this time. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. I will state to 
your Honor I have no further intention of 
calling Mr. Rea, 
Mr. Podell: I will call him for cross-
examination, that is all. 
(Witness excused.) 
Mr. Podell: Now, your Honor, I would 
like to read, while we are on the subject, 
from the testimony of Mr. Clowes, who is a 
partner of the defendant. He is one of the 
defendants himself. As an admission 
against interest, I would like to read a 
previous statement made by him. 
The Court: This is in the examination be-
fore trial? 
Mr. Limburg: In the examination in 
bankruptcy. 
Mr. Marshall: In the Stern bankruptcy. 
The Court: All right. 
Mr. Podell: I am reading from page 1453. 
Mr. Clowes is one of the defendants and a 
member of the firm of Touche, Niven & Co. 
"Q. You realize, of course, a man in your pro-
fession, that this audit sheet report, or rather these 
audit sheet reports, are used by a client for the 
purpose of gaining credit? A. As a general propo-
sition, yes, I know that to be a fact." 
Mr. Podell: Now, I want to read also 
from the testimony of Mendes, likewise one 
of the defendants named here, a member of 
the firm of Touche, Niven & Co.: 
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"Q. You know, do you not " 
Mr. Marshall: What page, please? 
Mr. Podell: Page 1615. 
"Q. You know, do you not, as an experienced ac-
countant and as a member of the firm of Touche, 
Niven & Co. that banks rely on reports of certified 
accountants such as your firm is in the habit of 
certifying, and extending credit to various busi-
nesses; you know that, don't you? A. I have a 
general understanding that they do." 
Mr. Marshall: I never questioned the gen-
eral understanding. It is in the pleadings. 
I do not know why he is going through all of 
this. 
Mr. Podell: Now, your Honor, is this 
necessary at this time? 
The Court: I think it is somewhat super-
fluous, Mr. Podell, because it is admitted. 
Mr. Podell: What is admitted? 
The Court: The fact that they knew gen-
erally that these reports would be used as 
financial statements to banks or to creditors 
or to stockholders or to purchasers or sellers. 
Mr. Podell: I do not think their admis-
sion in the answer, your Honor, goes quite 
that far, but I am perfectly willing to take 
that, if they so stipulate. 
The Court: I think that is the fact, is it 
not, Mr. Marshall? 
Mr. Marshall: It is right in the answer, 
your Honor. 
Mr. Podell: I beg your pardon. I will 
read what is in the answer. 
The Court: Well, if it is not, Mr. Marshall 
says he agrees with the Court now, so how 
further can we go? 
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Mr. Podell: He did not until this minute 
say that. All he admits, your Honor, in the 
answer—he does not admit what your Honor 
said he admits, as your Honor stated, un-
less he admits it now, which I am perfectly 
willing to take. All he admits in his an-
swer is they admit knowing that the balance 
sheet so to be prepared by them may be sub-
mitted by Fred Stern & Company to some 
of its bankers. That is all he admits. Now, 
I would like to have that stipulation that 
your Honor stated, and I understand Mr. 
Marshall stipulates that is so. That settles 
it. 
Now, Mr. Levy, will you take the stand, 
please? 
SAUL LEVY, a witness called on behalf of the 
plaintiff, being first duly sworn and stating his ad-
dress to be 475 Fifth Avenue, New York City, tes-
tified as follows: 
Direct examination by Mr. Podell. 
Q. Mr. Levy, what is your professional occupa-
tion? A. I am a certified public accountant. I am 
also a member of the Bar. 
Q. How long have you been practicing your pro-
fession as a certified public accountant? A. For 
the past ten years, a little over that. 
Q. And are you practicing on your own account 
or with some firm? A. On my own account, for all 
of that time. 
Q. And where are your offices? A. 475 Fifth 
Avenue, Manhattan. 
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Q. And has your practice included examining ac-
counts and presenting certified balance sheets? A. 
Yes, sir. 
Q. From time to time? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you had occasion to examine certain 
of the books and records of Fred Stern & Company? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you likewise had occasion to examine 
them in conjunction with the statement certified, 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 for Identification, certified by 
Touche, Niven & Co.? 
The Court: Have you not connected that 
yet? 
Mr. Marshall: They have not. 
Mr. Podell: I will take that up. I think 
perhaps your Honor's suggestion is quite 
correct. I will take that up and connect it 
now. 
The Court: It is before the jury and be-
ing thought about, so let us have it in evi-
dence rather than for identification. 
Mr. Podell: I will withdraw the witness 
and call Mr. Deetjen. 
(Witness withdrawn.) 
Louis A. DEETJEN , a witness called on behalf of 
the plaintiff, being first duly sworn and stating his 
address to be 159 Park Street, Montclair, New 
Jersey, testified as follows: 
Direct examination by Mr. Podell. 
Q. Mr. Deetjen, are you connected with the 
Ultramares Corporation, the plaintiff in this ac-
tion? A. I am. 
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Q. And in what capacity? A. I am the president 
of the Ultramares Corporation. 
Q. And how long have you held that office? A. 
Since the 1st of January, 1925. 
Q. And what was your office in January of 1925? 
A. In December, 1924? 
Q. Yes. A. Vice-president and treasurer. De-
cember, 1924. 
The Court: December, 1924. 
Q. December, 1924? A. Yes. 
Q. When did you become connected with the 
Ultramares Corporation for the first time? A. 
When it was founded. 
Q. Which was what year? A. In July, 1919. 
Q. And you have been with them ever since? A. 
Yes. 
Q. In one capacity or another? A. Yes. 
Q. And what was your connection with them in 
the early part of 1924? A. I was vice-president 
and treasurer. 
Q. Were you also a member of the board of direc-
tors? A. I was. 
Q. Who was the president of the concern at that 
time? A. Mr. Von Goeben. 
Q. Is he living? A. No. 
Q:. When did he die? A. Two years ago. 
Mr. Marshall: Get his full name, 
Q. What is his first name? A. Alexander. 
Q. And he was the president in the early part of 
1924? A. He was. 
Q. Who was the chairman of your board of direc-
tors at that time? A. Mr. Schlubach. 
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Q. Now, will you look at this paper to your left, 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 for Identification, examine it 
and tell us whether you have seen it before? 
Mr. Marshall: Yes or no, please. 
A. I did. 
Q. Do you recall when you first saw that docu-
ment? A. The end of March, of 1924. 
Q. And in what connection did you come to see 
it? A. I saw it when Mr. Stern handed it over to 
Mr. Von Goeben. 
Q. And after it was handed over to the presi-
dent of your company, did it then continue in the 
possession of your company? A. I didn't under-
stand that. 
Q. Did it then continue in the possession of your 
company? A. This statement, yes. 
Q. Where was it that he handed it to Mr. Von 
Goeben, where? A. Where he had it? 
Q. Where was it, where was it that it was handed 
by Mr. Stern to Mr. Von Goeben? A. In our office. 
Q. Where was your office? A. 25 South William 
Street. 
Q;. Had anyone asked for any statement, to your 
knowledge? A. Mr. Von Goeben. 
Q. And after it was furnished, was it the sub-
ject of any discussion among the managers or 
officers of the corporation? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to any 
Q. Just answer yes or no for the present. 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as not bind-
ing on us in any way. 
The Court: I will allow that. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
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Q. What is your answer? Was it the subject 
of any discussion? Was that statement the sub-
ject of any talk among the directors or among the 
managers of the company after it was delivered? 
A. It was handled by 
Mr. Marshall: Just yes or no, please. 
Q. Just answer yes or no, whether after getting 
this statement you talked about it among your-
selves? A. Yes. 
Q. That is what I want to know. Now, did you 
discuss it in connection with extending any credit 
—that is all. 
Mr. Podell: I offer that statement in evi-
dence, your Honor. 
Mr. Marshall: I object to it as not bind-
ing upon us. 
Mr. Podell: The statement referred to, 
the record shows, is Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 for 
Identification. 
The Court: I will allow it. 
Mr. Marshall: It has not been shown yet, 
your Honor, that it was given 
The Court: Emanated from you. 
Mr. Marshall: We admit it emanated 
from us, but not that it has any bearing on 
the cause of action at all. 
The Court: I will allow it. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
The Court: Your objection is based on the 
fact legally that it is not binding? 
Mr. Marshall: Yes. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: As given by Stern to them. 
How can that bind us or anybody else, what 
Stern did to them? 
The Court: I will allow it. 
5 9 6 
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Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
The Court: On the pure proposition of 
law. 
Mr. Marshall: Your Honor understands 
that is one of the basic propositions here? 
The Court: I understand. And on the 
whole, I will make certain reservations 
which will protect that issue. 
Mr. Marshall: I assume your Honor is 
not ruling finally upon that issue? 
The Court: Absolutely not. 
(Received in evidence and marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibit 1.) 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Had Mr. Stern to your knowledge been in the 
office on several occasions prior to the time when 
that statement was furnished? A. Yes. 
Q. How long before that? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to any relations 
between Stern and the witness before that, 
The Court: Sustained. I do not see its 
relevancy. 
Mr. Podell: I will not press it at this 
time. 
The Court: Any cross-examination? 
Mr. Marshall: Not at this time, your 
Honor. 
(Witness excused.) 
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HERBERT SCHLUBACH , a witness called on behalf 
of the plaintiff, being first duly sworn and stating 
his address to be 24 Prospect Avenue, Larchmont, 
New York, testified as follows: 
Direct examination by Mr. Podell. 
Q. Mr. Schlubach, what concern are you con-
nected with? A. With the Ultramares Corpora-
tion. 
Q. And in what capacity are you connected with 
it now? A. As chairman of the board. 
Q. And how long have you been connected with 
the Ultramares Corporation? A. Since September, 
1923. 
Q. What was your position with the company 
during 1923 and 1924? A. Chairman of the board. 
Q. Does that mean that you were the chief execu-
tive officer of the company? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did that involve the duties of passing upon 
credits? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Passing upon any application for credit? A. 
Yes, sir. 
Q. I wish you would describe to this jury, please, 
what is the nature of the business of the Ultramares 
Corporation; what was it rather in 1923 and 1924? 
The Court: Is Ultramares a name? 
The Witness: Ultramares Corporation. 
Mr. Limburg: It means over seas. It is 
the Latin for over seas. 
The Witness: We are doing an import 
and export business and factoring. That 
means to say that we are buying and selling 
merchandise and produce for our own ac-
count or foreign account on commission, and 
advance moneys for such purchases and on 
such produce. 
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Q. By factoring, you mean you advance moneys 
to others? A. To others. 
Q. Who do a similar business? A. Who do a 
similar business. 
Q. Prior to April or March of 1924, had your 
concern advanced any money, owed any money 
to Fred Stern & Company? A. No. 
Q. You had had some business transactions with 
them, had you not? A. Yes. 
Q. What was the character of those business 
transactions; I am speaking now of prior to March 
of 1924? A. We had sold rubber to Stern. 
Q. Was it a large sale? A. No. 
Q. What was it they averaged approximately? 
A. Oh, several thousand dollars. 
Q. How much? A. A couple of thousand dol-
lars, 
Q. Would you say that 10,000 was the maximum 
of any one transaction? A. The maximum may 
have been up to $15,000. 
Q. Fifteen? A. Fifteen. 
Q. And were they cash transactions? A. They 
were cash transactions. 
Q. And when you say they were cash transac-
tions, just what does that mean, a letter of credit or 
cash? A. No, cash. 
Q. He would pay as he got the merchandise? A. 
He would pay as he got the merchandise. 
Q. C. O. D.? A. Against the delivery of the 
merchandise. 
Q. So if I understand you correctly, and be sure 
that you state it correctly—you can use any papers 
you want to refresh your recollection—at least for 
the period of time that you were in charge of the 
credit arrangements, you can state to the Court and 
jury that prior to March of 1924 there was no 
credit extended to Mr. Stern? A. Yes. 
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Q. That is correct? A. That is correct. 
Q. And there were no loans made to him? A. 
No. 
Q. And his purchases were all on a cash basis? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Had you had any requests for credit to Mr. 
Stern prior to March, 1924? A. No. 
Q. So that had you ever looked into the question 
to determine whether he should get credit? Just 
answer yes or no. A. No. 
Mr. Marshall: Wait a moment. I object 
to that. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Marshall: I move to strike out the 
answer. 
The Court: Strike it out. 
Mr. Podell: Exception. 
Q. Was there a request for credit to Mr. Stern at 
any time in 1924? 
Mr. Marshall: Just a minute. I want to 
know whether the witness—I think the ques-
tion should be as to whether there was a 
request to this witness. 
The Court: Or if he knows of his own 
knowledge, as the chairman of the board of 
directors, it would naturally come before 
him, I suppose. 
Mr. Podell: Why, certainly. As chair-
man of the board of directors. 
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, the 
bill of particulars here says that these trans-
actions were all with Mr. Von Goeben. 
The Court: I have never seen the bill of 
particulars. Will you give me one, Mr. Lim-
burg? _ 
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Mr. Podell: There is nothing in the bill 
of particulars, your Honor 
Mr. Marshall: It has not anything to do 
with this particular question, but I just 
want to post your Honor what I am point-
ing at. If your Honor please, their bill of 
particulars specifically shows, and I will 
hand it to your Honor, that the arrange-
ments between Stern and Ultramares, that 
they claim were made, were made with Mr. 
Von Goeben. 
Mr. Podell: That does not preclude his 
having passed on them as chairman of the 
board of directors. 
The Court: I will allow the question. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
Q. Was there a request for credit to be extended 
to Mr. Stern, to your knowledge, at any time in 
1924? A. Yes. 
Q. In connection with such a request—— 
Mr. Marshall: May the same objection 
apply to that question? 
The Court: Yes, certainly, and all this 
line. 
Q. Did you ask for a financial statement? A. 
I did. 
Q. By the way 
Mr. Marshall: Just a minute. I object 
to that question as not being within the bill 
of particulars, and being contrary to the 
bill of particulars. 
The Court: What is Exhibit A and B? 
Mr. Marshall: That is the balance sheet 
and the certificate, your Honor; and as be-
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ing contrary to their claim of the case. If 
they gave us an incomplete bill of particu-
lars, it was unfair and not properly within 
the order of the Court, 
Mr. Podell: We are certainly not devi-
ating from the bill, not a dot nor a syllable. 
Will your Honor permit me to ask a pre-
liminary question of this witness? Will your 
Honor permit me to ask one preliminary 
question that will help you on this ruling? 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. In the course of your duties, Mr. Schlubach, 
would it be part of your function to pass upon all 
questions of credit? A. Yes. 
Q. To be extended to anybody? A. Yes. 
Q. Was that one of your principal duties? A. 
Yes. 
Q. So that no matter to whom the request came 
for credit, it would be referred to you, would it not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You were what is commonly called or known 
as the credit manager of this concern? A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Schlubach, if I may repeat the question, 
in connection with passing upon the credit to 
Stern, did you request that a financial statement 
be furnished? 
Mr. Marshall : Will you please say re-
quested of whom? 
Mr. Podell: I will ask him that next. 
Mr. Marshall: I object to the question 
then, until we find out. 
The Court: That is right. I think he is 
entitled to that. 
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Q. Of whom did you request the financial state-
ment? 
Mr. Marshall: That presupposes that the 
former question was allowed. 
Mr. Podell: You won't allow me to ask 
the former question. 
The Court: That is in addition to the 
former question. 
The Witness: Of Mr. Von Goeben. 
Q. Made the request of Mr. Von Goeben? A. 
Yes. 
Q. Did Mr. Von Goeben 
Mr. Marshall: I object to any conversa-
tions between this witness and Mr. Von Goe-
ben, as not binding on the defendants. 
The Court: That is on the same theory, 
you mean? 
Mr. Marshall: That is on a different 
theory. The other thing was not a conver-
sation. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Podell: This, your Honor, on the 
subject of reliance. Reliance consists of and 
deals with a frame of mind, a state of mind. 
The cases are numerous. And I am sure 
your Honor is fully familiar with them, that 
we have the right to ask a man as to what 
his state of mind was with respect to certain 
things. 
The Court: Yes. I think that is true. 
Mr. Podell: Now, in order to prove reli-
ance, of course we have to prove what he 
had before him to rely upon. All I want to 
show in connection with that very subject 
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is: Here is a man charged with a duty of 
passing on the credit and relying on some-
thing and extending credit thereon. 
The Court: I do not think conversations 
will be binding, conversations had between 
him and the president of the company. 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, supposing now 
that they sat down and discussed the matter 
of this statement among themselves and 
reached certain conclusions. I am surmis-
ing it. 
The Court: I will be very glad to have 
the conclusions. 
Mr. Podell: Just the conclusions? 
The Court: Just the conclusions, but not 
what the conversations were. In other 
words, you want to show a frame of mind? 
Mr. Podell: Yes. 
The Court: In other words, the frame of 
mind that they were in, but not based on 
conversations with this party. 
Mr. Podell: All I want to show with this 
specific question—I have already shown that 
Stern handed a financial statement to Von 
Goeben—all I want to show is that that 
financial statement delivered by Von Goeben 
to him, pursuant to a request previously 
made that a financial statement be secured, 
that is all. In other words, your Honor, the 
fact that a financial statement was furnished 
by Stern, delivered to Von Goeben. We 
want the fact that these gentlemen examined 
it, or we will have that, and relied upon it, 
as we claim. All I want to do with this 
specific question is, that when the question 
was presented to him, and it deals with the 
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very question, the vital thing, reliance, he 
said, "I want to see a financial statement." 
That is an expression of his frame of mind. 
The Court: You mean what he said to 
Von Goeben. 
Mr. Podell: To whomever he said it. He 
requested, he wanted to have a financial 
statement. In other words, in line with what 
these very people have said, they knew that 
creditors extending credit to these people 
would rely on that. 
The Court: What was the first question 
that was objected to? 
(Question repeated as follows: "Q. Mr. 
Schlubach, if I may repeat the question, in 
connection with passing upon the credit to 
Stern, did you request that a financial state-
ment be furnished?") 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that. 
Mr. Podell: It is expressive of his frame 
of mind, that is all. 
Q. Did you require a financial statement, did 
you need it, did you want it? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to it. 
Mr. Podell: It is expressive of his frame 
of mind in passing on this question. 
Mr. Marshall: Not binding on us in any 
way. 
The Court: He may answer. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
A. Yes. 
Q. After you expressed this request for a finan-
cial statement, was this financial statement, Plain-
tiff's Exhibit 1 in evidence, delivered to you? 
6 2 3 
6 2 4 
209 
Herbert Schlubach—For Plaintiff—Direct. 625 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that, unless it 
shows from whom it came. 
Mr. Podell: I will ask: 
Q. Who did it come from? A. Mr. Von Goeben. 
Q. Delivered it to you? A. Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: I object, your Honor, on. 
the ground that the question and answer 
called for conversations and transactions be-
tween employees of the Ultramares Corpora-
tion, and that they are res inter alios acta, 
and that they are not binding on these de-
fendants. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
Q. When that statement was delivered to you, 
did, you examine it in the course of your duties to 
determine whether or not to pass credit to Mr. 
Stern? A. I did. 
Mr. Marshall: May it be understood that 
this whole line is subject to the same objec-
tion and exception, because I do not want to 
interrupt the whole course of the trial? 
The Court: Yes, you may have a general 
exception. 
Q. And did you likewise discuss this statement 
among members of the board of directors of the 
corporation? A. Yes. 
Q. Whom did you discuss it with? A. With Mr. 
Van Goeben and also with Mr. Deetjen, who was 
present while we were discussing it. 
Q. And as a result of your examination of this 
statement and a discussion of this statement, did 
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you arrive at certain conclusions with respect to 
whether or not you should extend credit to Mr. 
Stern? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to this on the fur-
ther ground that it calls for a conclusion. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
Q. Just answer that yes or no. A. Yes. 
Q. Now, will you state what conclusion you came 
to with regard to the request for credit after you 
had examined this statement? 
Mr. Marshall: Same objection, your 
Honor. 
The Court: Same ruling. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
A. That we would grant him the credit that he 
had requested. 
Q. And how much did you agree to grant him? 
Mr. Marshall: Just a minute. Is this 
supposed to be a conversation with Stern 
or only with 
Mr. Podell: I am addressing myself to 
the question of reliance which deals with 
the frame of mind. I want to know what 
his frame of mind was after he examined 
The Court: Then you say that you pro-
pose to follow it out by the proof of what 
he did conclude and what he did decide re-
lying on that, that he did do that? 
Mr. Podell: Exactly. 
The Court: All right. If you want the 
fact, I will allow it. 
Mr: Marshall: Exception. 
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Q. What did you decide to do with respect to ex-
tending credit to Mr. Stern after you had examined 
this statement? A. To grant him the credit that 
he had requested. 
Q. Which was how much? A. $100,000. 
Q. Was that a line of credit for $100,000? A. 
Yes. 
Q. That was your decision at that particular 
time? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, in making that decision to extend him a 
line of credit, of $100,000, did you rely on the 
statement that was furnished you, Plaintiff's Ex-
hibit 1? 
Mr. Marshall: Same objection. 
The Court: Same ruling. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
Q. Do you understand? A. Yes. 
Q. Your answer is that you did? A. Yes. 
Q. Did you believe at that time that statement 
was a true and correct statement? A. Yes. 
Q. Had you been informed—I want you to listen 
to this, Mr. Schlubach, it is very important—have 
you been informed, had anyone told you at that 
time that Fred Stern & Company were insolvent? 
A. No. 
Q. If anyone had told you at that time that 
Fred Stern & Company were insolvent would you 
have had any business transactions with them at 
all? 
Mr. Marshall: Wait a minute. I object 
to that as calling for a conclusion, and not 
binding on us. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
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Q. What is your answer? A. Certainly not. 
Q. Now, thereafter, after making that decision, 
did you as a matter of fact actually enter upon 
transactions with Frederick Stern & Company? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that, unless he 
proves what the transactions are. 
Mr. Podell: I will. 
The Court: I will take that. 
Q. Just answer that yes or no. A. Yes. 
Mr. Podell: We will show every transac-
tion, and may I state—I think I am re-
liably informed—the other side had every 
opportunity to go over our books. 
Mr. Marshall: We have had no oppor-
tunity to go over their books, your Honor. 
Mr. Limburg: Everyone of these records. 
You did it yourself, in my office, with your 
representatives. 
Mr. Marshall: We had an examination, 
your Honor, of certain documents which we 
called for, and they produced them. There 
is no question about that. We did not go 
over your books. 
(Recess taken until 2 o'clock P. M.) 
A F T E R RECESS. 
HERBERT SCHLUBACH resumed: 
Direct examination (continued) by Mr. Podell. 
Q. Mr. Schlubach, you spoke of the line of credit, 
$100,000 you decided to let Mr. Stern have. Was 
that subsequently confirmed in writing by Mr. 
Stern, the paper I show you? A. Yes. 
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Q. And that has the signature of Mr. Stern? A. 
Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: I only have the same gen-
eral objection to this letter, that it is a 
transaction between Stern and Ultramares, 
and therefore not binding on us. 
The Court: Are you offering it in evi-
dence? 
Mr. Podell: Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: I suppose your Honor 
rules the same? 
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. I think there 
was a reply to this letter that should go in 
with it. 
(The same was received in evidence and 
marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 30, and was 
read to the jury.) 
Mr. Podell: We have another letter un-
der the same date from Stern on April 4th, 
and another letter on April 5th, and then 
comes our first answer. I will offer all of 
them together. 
Mr. Marshall: Subject to the same objec-
tion and exception? 
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: And I assume that Mr. 
Podell is not offering the pencil notations on 
this one letter. 
Mr. Podell: If you object to that, I will 
not, I think they are helpful, but I do not 
think I have the amounts and the lots and 
you may decide not to object for that, but 
for the present, so long as you are not cer-
tain, I will withdraw the pencil marks on 
the copy of the letter. 
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Mr. Marshall: If the witness will tell us 
what they are, I will have no objection. 
Mr. Podell: I will ask him later. I will 
offer the letters without the pencil marks. 
(The same were received in evidence and 
respectively marked Plaintiff's Exhibits 31, 
32 and 33.) 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 30 was read to the 
jury.) 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. May I ask you, Mr. Schlubach, something has 
been said about the rate of interest. Are these 
terms the usual factor terms to your knowledge? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as incom-
petent, irrelevant and immaterial. 
Mr. Podell: I do not think that counsel 
should have left the impression that we were 
charging usurious interest. 
Mr. Marshall: I made no such claim. 
Mr. Podell: You made the statement to 
the jury that we were charging 26 per cent, 
interest. 
Mr. Marshall: No, sir. I did not say 
there was any usury. I said it was a very 
profitable transaction for these people be-
cause what they got in addition to the 6 per 
cent. interest was commissions, which, taken 
with the interest, totalled at the rate of 26 
per cent. on the amounts loaned. 
Mr. Podell: That statement will not bear 
proof in the first place, and in the second 
place, in view of that issue being injected 
in the case 
The Court: I will allow it. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
6 4 0 
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Q. Is that the usual or less than the usual fac-
tor's commission? A. Usual and less. 
Q. As a matter of fact, what is the usual fac-
tor's commission aside from the 6 per cent, that is 
charged? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that. 
The Court: Sustained, what the usual 
one is. 
Mr. Podell: I just want to show that sub-
sequently—well, I will ask it. 
Q. These arrangements that are incorporated in 
this letter, were they subsequently modified as be-
tween Mr. Stern and your company? A. They were 
modified, yes. 
Q. Was the line of credit subsequently arranged 
to be increased or was that considered? A. No. 
Q. Were there other arrangements made for each 
transaction as it came along? A. Yes. 
Q. In making all these arrangements did you 
rely on the statement—— 
Mr. Marshall: Just a minute. Let us see 
who made the arrangements. 
Mr. Podell: The documents will show 
each of the arrangements. The arrange-
ments are in writing and they will show 
each one of them as we get along with re-
spect to each specific transaction. 
Q. In making those arrangements throughout 
the period you dealt with Stern did you rely on 
the truth of the certified accountants' statement as 
furnished? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that on the 
previous grounds and on the ground that 
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there is nothing to show that this witness 
handled the transactions at subsequent 
times at all. 
Mr. Podell: We will prove those transac-
tions. 
The Court: Allowed. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Had you known that this concern was bank-
rupt or that this concern, Fred Stern & Company, 
had falsified that statement to the extent at least 
of over $700,000 in the alleged accounts receiv-
able, would you have done any business with them 
at all? A. No. 
Mr. Marshall: Same objection. 
The Court: Same ruling, except that it 
has already been answered before. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibits Nos. 31 and 32 were 
read to the jury.) 
Mr. Marshall: Who signed that? 
Q. Do you know who signed that? A. I do not 
know. 
Mr. Marshall: I suggest 
Q. Who was the president at that time? A. Mr. 
Von Goeben. 
Mr. Marshall: Is the original in the hands 
of the trustee? We can stipulate that it 
was signed by Von Goeben. 
Mr. Podell: Very well. 
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Q. Let us clear up these pencil corrections and 
the figures that I have referred to. You find them 
on this letter, Plaintiff's Exhibit 32, and on this 
copy of letter, Plaintiff's Exhibit 31. Just the 
pencil corrections and the figures, and also on this 
copy of letter, Plaintiff's Exhibit 33. What are 
the pencil corrections of the typewritten figures? 
A. The pencil is just the sum of all these three dif-
ferent amounts that are contained here. It is just 
the addition of these three sums. 
Q. That is on Exhibit 33? A. Yes. I cannot 
explain this one. 
Q. Perhaps you can tell us which are the figures 
that we should take here, the pencil figures or the 
typewritten figures, do you know that? A. No. 
Mr. Marshall: Will you ask the witness 
if he knows in whose writing that is on 
Exhibit 32? 
The Witness: I do not know. 
Q. Who would know? A. Mr. Manning. 
Mr. Marshall: Is he here now? 
Mr. Podell: No; we will get him. 
Q. You speak in this letter of April 4 of finan-
cing approximately $100,000. value of Red Smoke 
sheets by your company; what did that consist of? 
A. It is rubber. 
Q. But what did the financing consist of? We 
advanced the money to Stern to buy rubber. 
Q. For whom to buy? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to his explaining 
the transaction. 
The Court: Do you mean the history of 
it? 
650 
651 
218 
Herbert Schlubach—For Plaintiff—-Direct. 601 
Mr. Marshall: Yes. 
The Court: I think so. There is no reason 
why we should do that. 
Mr. Marshall: We should have the origi-
nal documents. 
Mr. Podell: We will. We will give you 
all the original documents, and I think we 
have them all. 
A. We advanced Stern the money to buy rubber 
which was imported and which he bought from im-
porters or imported himself and had to pay here, 
and also rubber that he bought in some instances 
right here in New York. 
Q. As to such rubber which he was to buy and 
which was to be imported did you have any security 
until that rubber actually arrived? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as a con-
clusion of law and I think that they should 
produce the documents. 
The Court: Yes, we are now at the point 
where it is necessary that the transaction 
itself be described. 
Mr. Podell: There is reference in these 
communications to a phrase "trust receipt." 
Mr. Marshall: Let us have the trust 
receipts. 
Mr. Podell: Mr. Marshall, will you please 
be patient enough to let me finish my ques-
tion. 
Mr. Marshall: I am sorry. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. In the letter of April 5, 1924, you say "And 
we accordingly hand you herewith our check for 
$43,680." I show you a paper and ask you whether 
that is the check you gave with that letter? 
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Mr. Marshall: I object to that check alone 
unless he shows the trust receipts and the 
other documents. 
Mr. Podell: I can prove only one thing 
at a time. Give me a chance. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Podell: I offer that in evidence. 
Mr. Marshall: Objected to on the same 
ground as previously and on the additional 
ground that it is only part of the transaction. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
(The same was received in evidence and 
marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 34.) 
Mr. Podell: I am advised that my state-
ment a moment ago was not correct. There 
were a number of these transaction that were 
closed and liquidated. As to those we have 
a receipt here from Stern showing that we 
returned to him the trust receipts after 
they had been closed out. 
The Court: After the loan had been paid 
out. 
Mr. Podell: Yes; they may be in the 
hands of the trustee and we will find that 
out and if we get the originals, we will be 
glad to use them. 
The Court: You are showing a prima 
facie loan. 
Mr. Marshall: The clerk has those papers 
here. 
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Mr. Podell: Counsel wanted the trust re-
ceipts. 
Mr. Marshall: They are here I think in 
court and they were left with the court this 
morning. The trustee's file are here in court, 
Mr. Podell: If they are here we will pro-
duce them. The only function that they can 
serve us is to let your Honor and the jury 
know a typical case in one of these transac-
tions and I am willing to take the first or 
last but the trust receipts for all are in 
the same form. I offer in evidence the origi-
nal trust receipt executed by Fred Stern & 
Company on April 5, 1924, and also one ex-
ecuted on April 4, 1924, and another one 
executed on April 5, 1924. 
Mr. Marshall: Let us ask the witness 
whether those were received. 
Mr. Podell: It is stipulated that they 
were received. 
Mr. Marshall: All right. By Ultramares 
Corporation? 
Mr. Podell: Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: At the time that the check 
was given? 
Mr. Podell: I do not know. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. When would you get the trust receipts from 
them? A. Stern would send around these trust 
receipts when he required money, as a matter of 
convenience. 
Mr. Marshall: I move to strike out "as 
a matter of convenience." 
Q. What do you mean by "as a matter of con-
venience"? A. He would not be obliged to send 
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the trust receipt right at the very moment because 
the trust receipt referred to a certain lot of rubber 
that he was going to purchase or pay for with the 
money that he got from us. 
Mr. Marshall: I move to strike it out 
as not binding. 
The Court: I will allow it. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. These exhibits 
are under my same general objection and 
exception. 
The Court: Yes. 
(The same were received in evidence and 
marked respectively Plaintiff's Exhibits 35, 
36 and 37 and read to the jury.) 
Q. Mr. Schlubach, I want to ask you, this paper 
acknowledges receipt from Ultramares Corporation 
of certain merchandise, 50 tons of rubber. At the 
time when this paper was delivered to you on April 
5, did you have any 50 tons of rubber from Mr. 
Stern? A. We had given the money to buy such 
50 tons but we did not have it actually in our pos-
session that very moment. 
Q. And the reference in this paper is to the 
Steamship M. S. Dollar, pier 16, Stapleton. Can 
you state from that statement whether that par-
ticular 50 tons was to arrive by steamship? What 
I am asking is whether this was imported rubber? 
A. That was imported rubber. 
Q. Was it due to arrive by steamship at a certain 
pier? A. Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: Can you say now that it 
was due to arrive or whether it had arrived 
from that steamship? 
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The Witness: It had to arrive by that 
steamship but may have been just on the pier. 
Mr. Marshall: It may have been there 
already. 
Q. It may have been on the pier and it may not 
have been? A. It may have been and it may not 
have been. 
Q. So that there will be no misunderstanding 
about it, at the time when you gave him this check 
for $43,000. did you give him any rubber? A. Not 
the actual rubber, but the money to buy that rubber. 
Q. But you did not give him any rubber? A. No. 
Q. He did not give you any rubber? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that. 
Q. Did he give you any rubber? A. No. 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that. 
The Court: I will allow the question. 
Mr. Marshall: Your Honor will allow 
them to contradict the document? 
The Court: No, I do not think it is con-
tradictory. It is explanatory of the whole 
transaction. 
Q. Did he give you any rubber at the time he 
signed this paper or at the time you gave him the 
check? A. No. 
Mr. Marshall: That is subject to my ob-
jection that it calls for a legal conclusion. 
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
Q. As I understand you, this check which you 
gave, was a check given for him to purchase that 
rubber? A. Yes. 
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Q. Until he actually got it, you could give him no 
rubber? A. Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: Same objection. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
Q. You could not? A. No. 
Q. And could he hold any rubber in trust for 
you until he gave you that rubber? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Podell: There are a number of these 
transactions. I can go on and offer each 
one of the letters and documents. 
Mr. Marshall: I would suggest that you 
give us the number and mark them in evi-
dence as a whole. 
Mr. Podell: We will take one or two more. 
I offer in evidence the assignments of ac-
count covering the $43,000 item, which as-
signments are dated respectively April 2, 
1923—that is, the invoices are dated April 2, 
1923, one of them, and we received it per 
copy of letter attached on April 7, and the 
second invoice is dated April 8 and accord-
ing to the copy of the letter we received it 
April 10, and the third of these invoices is 
dated April 17 and according to the copy of 
the letter we received it April 21. Annexed 
to each of these papers is likewise one letter 
showing the notification to the customers of 
Stern. 
The Court: Is this for the purpose of his-
torical fact or is it one of the actual loans? 
Mr. Podell: Just historical. It is just a 
typical case. 
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Mr. Marshall: Just the general objection. 
I have no other objection because they go 
with the exhibits already in. 
(The same were received in evidence and 
marked Plaintiff's Exhibits NOS. 38, 39 and 
40.) 
Mr. Limburg: This is part of the $100,000 
and then we can stipulate that all of the 
remaining transactions were in the same 
form, and have a stipulation as to the date of 
the advances and we can furnish that. I 
have the tabulation prepared. 
Mr. Marshall: What you put in now is 
only under trust receipt No. 1. 
Mr. Limburg: 1, 2 and 3. 
Mr. Marshall: Those that you have put 
in? 
Mr. Limburg: Those that have been put 
in so far. 
Mr. Marshall: Thank you. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 38 was read to the 
jury.) 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. What are these two numbers in the upper 
right-hand corner of the invoice? 
Mr. Marshall: If you know. 
Q. Do you know what they mean? A. No, I do 
not. 
Mr. Marshall: Does H. N. Manning? 
Mr. Podell: Yes. 
Q. That closed that transaction? A. Yes. 
Q. When you got the check on this assigned ac-
count? A. Yes. 
671 
672 
225 
Herbert Schlubach—For Plaintiff—Direct. 673 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 39 was read to the 
jury.) 
Juror No. 1: There is marked here "net 
cash." Prior to the time that you extended 
the credit you claim you sold him goods for 
cash. It is marked for cash thirty days. Did 
you sell him on different terms? 
The Witness: Yes. 
Juror No. 1: What do you mean by cash 
prior? 
The Witness: Cash terms are net ten 
days. We sold him cash. 
Juror No. 1: Do you mean you sent him 
C. O. D ? 
The Witness: At the time I was with 
the company 
Juror No. 1: The $15,000 credit 
The Witness: When I was with the 
Ultramares Corporation, I entered in Sep-
tember, 1923 
Juror No. 1: Did you ship him the goods 
C. O. D. or he had to bring the check down 
to get the goods? 
Mr. Podell: You mean prior to this? 
Juror No. 1: Prior to extending the 
credit. 
Mr. Podell: The juror is asking you about 
the transactions that took place between you 
and Stern before there was any certified 
statement delivered to you. 
The Witness: When we were selling rub-
ber to Stern? 
Juror No. 1: And you said cash? 
The Witness: Yes. 
Juror No. 1: How was that cash drawn? 
Was it cash ten , days or cash C. O. D. or 
before the delivery? 
674 
675 
676 
226 
Herbert Schlubach—For Plaintiff—Direct. 
The Witness: It was cash against the de-
livery and cash ten days in one or two in-
stances. 
Mr. Podell: Supposing we get the actual 
records of that, Then you can make sure 
about how that was done. 
Bp Mr. Podell. 
Q. Are you in a position to say, for instance, 
in the entire year of 1923 before you got any state-
ment or made any arrangements to advance him 
credit, how much business did you do, what was 
the volume of business that you did with Stern? 
A. I entered the Ultramares in September, 1923, 
and I cannot say anything before that time. 
Q. As between September, 1923, and the end of 
1923, what is your best recollection? A. Small 
amounts. Just a couple of thousand dollars at the 
most. 
Q. Does this paper help you at all? This 
paper has a record of all the years, including 1924. 
Does it help you to tell the juror just what each one 
of these transactions in 1924 was before the fur-
nishing of this statement ? 
Mr. Marshall: Might I see that paper? 
Mr. Podell: Surely. 
Q. Take January or February, 1924, and give the 
dates and the amounts? A. Yes. 
Q. Give them to the juror? A. There were seven 
cases of rubber, cash. 
Q. What was the date? A. That was on the 6th 
of February, $385.77. 
Mr. Marshall: I will consent to put that 
in as a summary. 
The Witness: $385.77. 
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Q. You have a record here, February 6, seven 
cases rubber cash, $385.77. What the juror would 
like to know was whether that meant cash ten days 
or cash against delivery; is that correct? 
Juror No. 1: What length of time was it? 
The Witness: With reference to this spe-
cial invoice, I cannot say. It must have been 
cash against delivery. 
Q. Would not your books show that? 
Mr. Limburg: This is from the books and 
it states which was cash and which was ten 
days and which was against delivery. 
Mr. Marshall: You may put it in evi-
dence. 
Q. What is 6-27? A. June, twenty-seven cases 
of rubber. 
Mr. Podell: I offer this statement in evi-
dence. 
Mr. Marshall: No objection. 
(The same was received in evidence and 
marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 41.) 
Mr. Podell: That is a summary of all the 
years from 1919 to 1924, inclusive. I must 
say that the last three items appear to be 
in months subsequent to the furnishing of 
the statement, but the date appears there on 
that statement. 
Mr. Marshall: I assume that no claim is 
made of any loss on these transactions. 
The Court: Not at all. It is to instruct 
the juryman on the very important question 
of the frame of mind of the parties before 
the receipt of the alleged statement. 
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Mr. Podell: Mr. Limburg, will you be 
good enough to check up so that we will be 
sure to be correct. Does this mean cash 
against delivery? 
Mr. Limburg: Yes. 
Mr. Podell: And where you have ten days 
it means 
Juror No. 1: It is not anywheres more 
than ten days. 
Mr. Podell: That is what I will call your 
attention to, and I trust you will 
Juror No. 1: I am interested prior to the 
time they extended $100,000 credit. 
Mr. Podell: It was between February 6 
and May 1st, so that all these items above 
May 1st were prior and preceding it. Now 
you are coming to periods subsequent to the 
furnishing of the statement and you will ob-
serve that it begins with cash thirty days 
and cash sixty days. 
Juror No. 1: The first date is June 24, 
1924. 
Mr. Podell: Yes. 
Juror No. 1: And this first charge is 
made after this one. 
Mr. Podell: Yes. May transactions are 
still cash, and the amounts of the purchases 
in 1919 run from $86 up to $8,000. The 
total of them you can see for yourself is ap-
proximately eleven or twelve thousand dol-
lars for the entire year 1919. For the entire 
year 1920 there was one large purchase of 
$15,000 and all the others were $2201, and 
it would total transactions for the year 1920 
of $18,000. For the year 1921 everything 
is in cash. 
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Mr. Marshall: It speaks for itself. 
Mr. Podell: And the total transaction for 
the entire year 1921 approximately $13,000 
or $14,000. In 1922 the total transactions 
would not exceed eight or nine thousand dol-
lars. It was all cash or cash ten days. In 
1923 the total transactions did not exceed 
eleven or twelve thousand dollars, or about 
$13,000, and they were all strictly cash, 
cash against delivery. In 1924 the first 
transaction, February 6, seven cases was for 
cash, $385, and the second was May 1st, 
eleven cases of rubber for cash, $637, and 
May 14 still cash, $344, and June 24th, fifty-
six bales, amounting to $900, still cash, and 
July 27th, twenty-seven cases of rubber, the 
first time in their dealings that they ex-
tended them thirty days and then sixty days 
for the next two transactions. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. These transactions that the juror has just 
questioned you about, so that there will be no mis-
understanding, were different from these transac-
tions that we are speaking about here in these in-
voices? A. Yes. 
Q. Those transactions referred to in that exhibit 
which I have just read, Exhibit 41, were cases 
where you had sold these amounts of rubber to 
Fred Stern & Company? A. Yes. 
Q. Rubber that Ultramares had brought in? A. 
Had imported. 
Q. And he was a customer of yours in buying 
these items that I have read? A. Yes. 
Q. There was no financing of this character be-
fore the furnishing of this statement? A. No. 
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Q. And it only came along after the statement 
was furnished? A. Yes. 
Q. Where you were factoring for him? A. Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: I object to the conclusion 
that he was factoring. 
The Court: I will allow it. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
Mr. Podell: I am advised, your Honor, 
that this letter which I am about to offer 
completes the balance of $100,000 advance. 
Mr. Marshall: Same objection, same gen-
eral objection, your Honor. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
(Received in evidence and marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 42.) 
Q. I ask you whether these are the two checks 
you gave for those items of $54,432 (handing to 
witness) ? A. Yes. 
Mr. Podell: I offer those in evidence. 
Mr. Marshall: Same objection. 
The Court: Same ruling. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
(Received in evidence and marked respec-
tively Plaintiff's Exhibits 43 and 44.) 
Mr. Marshall: Now, one more detail to 
complete this transaction, the invoices that 
were actually assigned under this. 
Mr. Podell: Yes; they were not sent to 
us until later. Let us have every paper, Mr. 
Limburg. 
Mr. Marshall: If it would save time, I 
would just as soon have you stipulate there 
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were these invoices similar to No. 2 and 3, 
which were in each instance assigned and 
paid. 
Mr. Podell: Yes, but I want to show when 
we got them. 
Mr. Limburg: Here they are (producing 
papers). 
Mr. Podell: Let us mark them, so the 
transaction will be complete. 
(Received in evidence and marked respec-
tively Plaintiff's Exhibits Nos. 45 to 50, in-
clusive. ) 
Mr. Marshall: Now, may we have the 
trust receipts that were forwarded with 
those letters? Same general objection, and 
exception. 
Mr. Podell: The first one is trust receipt 
No. 4 and that is dated April 7th. 
(Received in evidence and marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 51.) 
Mr. Podell: The second is trust receipt 
No. 5. That is also dated April 7th. 
(Received in evidence and marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 52.) 
Mr. Podell: The third is trust receipt No. 
6, likewise dated April 7th. 
(Received in evidence and marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 53.) 
Mr. Podell: The fourth is trust receipt 
No. 7, likewise dated April 7th. 
(Received in evidence and marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 54.) 
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By Mr. Podell. 
Q. The trust receipts I assume are all dated on 
the respective dates when you gave the checks to 
Mr. Stern; they are all dated April 7th? A. Yes. 
By Mr. Marshall-
Q. Those are the trust receipts referred to in the 
letter from Stern asking that the money be ad-
vanced? A. Stern sent them in. 
Q. With his request for the advance of the 
money? A. With his request for the advance of 
the money. 
Mr. Podell: Now, I offer in evidence com-
munication received April 9th, and for the 
sake of clarity I may say that that concludes 
the $100,000 arrangement. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. By April 9th you had advanced a total, ac-
cording to these checks, of $98,000 odd. Did you 
then receive this letter (handing to witness) ? A. 
Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: Do you mean that he re-
ceived it? Do you mean that you received 
it personally? 
The Witness: No. That the Ultramares 
received it. 
Q. Mr. Schlubach, at that time, on the date when 
that letter was written you, had you received from 
the assigned accounts on the first transactions any 
of the money in payment of your advances of 
$98,000? 
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Mr. Marshall: Well 
Mr. Podell: The evidence is, your Honor, 
our first payment, according to these docu-
ments, came due on April 22nd, so I think 
we may assume that by April 9th, when this 
letter was written to us, we had not received 
any of the money. 
The Court: You mean under the assign-
ments, that they were not to be paid until 
that date credit was extended to, to the re-
spective purchasers? 
Mr. Podell: Yes. Our assigned accounts 
did not fall due until April 22nd, so we could 
not have received any part of that. 
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Podell: I offer it in evidence. 
Mr. Marshall: Same general objection, 
as to relations between the two parties. 
The Court: Same ruling. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
(Received in evidence and marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 55.) 
Mr. Marshall: May we have an explana-
tion what the words "Inv. by Bearer" 
means? 
Mr. Podell: Yes. 
Q. Do you know what the words "Inv. by Bearer" 
means? 
Mr. Marshall: Just read the letter and 
see if that will give you any idea what those 
letters mean. 
Mr. Podell: Do you claim it means "In-
voices by Bearer" ? I think that is what it 
means. That is a fair inference. 
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The Witness: That is what I think. I 
don't know. 
Mr. Marshall: We might agree that is 
what it means. 
Q. When was it put on, do you know anything 
about that? A. No. 
Mr. Marshall: I should judge it is Stern's 
writing. 
Mr. Podell: I do not know. We will find 
out perhaps from some other source. Now, 
I offer in evidence letters bearing date April 
10th from Stern to us and our reply of April 
11th from us to Stern. 
Mr. Marshall: The same general objec-
tion. 
The Court: Same ruling. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
(Received in evidence and respectively 
marked Plaintiff's Exhibits 56 and 57.) 
Q. When Mr. Stern made this request, as I un-
derstand it, you had already advanced $98,000 odd. 
You had received no part of it yet; is that correct, 
what I have stated? A. Yes. 
Q. And he was making a request for additional 
advances? A. Yes. 
Q. Did you then consider as the credit manager 
of the concern, whether or not you should make 
additional advances? 
Mr. Marshall: I object as to his state of 
mind, in addition to the other objection. 
The Court: I will allow it. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
A. I did. 
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Q. In considering that, did you have in mind, 
did you consider the financial statement of the 
man, as furnished to you? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that being with-
out the bill of particulars, among other 
things. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you rely upon it? A. Yes. 
Q. Did you believe it to be true? A. Yes. 
Q. And did you in reliance thereon, decide and 
actually make further advances to him? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, if you had known that the man had 
falsified his books, even as to one item of $706,000, 
or if you had known that the man was bankrupt, 
would you have had any business dealings with 
him of any kind, either on secured or unsecured 
basis? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
Q. What is your answer? A. No. 
Q. Now, are these the two checks respectively 
$47,688 and $53,200 which are referred to in this 
letter (handing to witness)? A. They are. 
Mr. Podell: I offer those. 
Mr. Marshall: Same objection and excep-
tion. 
(Received in evidence and respectively 
marked Plaintiff's Exhibits Nos. 58 and 59.) 
Mr. Podell: Those checks are dated re-
spectively April 11th and April 14th. 
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Q. Now, on the 14th of April, taking your aggre-
gate of advances together, that would come close 
to $200,000? A. Yes. 
Q. And you had received nothing on that ad-
vance as yet from him, on the assigned accounts? 
A. No. 
Q. Now, then, you have, I assume, invoices and 
trust receipts just exactly like in the first transac-
tion? A. Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: I think he had better put 
them in. 
Mr. Podell: I will mark them all in evi-
dence. 
Mr. Marshall: Just mark them. 
Mr. Podell: The dates of those invoices, 
your Honor, and the dates of the trust re-
ceipts will be tabulated so we can have them. 
And the trust receipts themselves may be 
marked by either party. If I omit to mark 
them, you may mark them. I will have no 
objection. 
Mr. Marshall: How many are you con-
sidering in under that? 
Mr. Podell: I consider every one of them 
in for that matter, excepting as to those 
which were not paid, we will take them up 
separately. 
Mr. Marshall: That is up to 104? 
Mr. Podell: Is it 104, the first one? 
Mr. Limburg: 105. 
Mr. Marshall: You concede that trust 
receipts up to 104 were all paid? 
Mr. Limburg: They were paid but we had 
to pay back. 
Mr. Marshall: I object to what they had 
to pay back. They were paid, your Honor, 
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by the people whose accounts were assigned; 
is not that right? 
Mr. Podell: You explain that to the 
Judge. 
Mr. Limburg: May it please your Honor, 
we have here and we furnished them with 
our bill of particulars, a complete detailed 
statement of every payment, every loan we 
had made up to and including January 31st, 
1925, every charge we made for interest or 
for commission, every payment we had re-
ceived, giving the date and giving the 
amount, giving the interest credits. Now, it 
is my suggestion that that will save perhaps 
a good deal of time because it covers every-
thing. Then in addition we furnished the 
statements of all amounts that we collected 
since January 31st, 1925, and likewise 
The Court: Do you credit that? 
Mr. Limburg: When that statement was 
prepared, which was the last statement ren-
dered by us to Fred Stern, of course it 
covered only up to January 1st, 1925, and 
in the meantime he had been adjudged a 
bankrupt, and therefore we furnished in our 
bill of particulars the dates and amounts of 
every dollar we have collected since and the 
details of those statements, from whom, and 
the date and all that, and likewise a state-
ment of every dollar that we paid out subse-
quent to that because 
Mr. Marshall: I object to the reason, 
your Honor. 
Mr. Limburg: We will cover that by 
testimony then. I thought we could shorten 
it. 
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The Court: You mean it will be testi-
mony going to your damage? 
Mr. Limburg: Yes, sir, I am going to 
testify to what I arranged to pay out because 
of suits brought against us. 
Mr. Marshall: That is immaterial. 
Mr. Limburg: By people who claimed that 
these accounts assigned to us, banks, had 
previously been assigned to them, that they 
were their property and that we had to ac-
count to them for the moneys we had col-
lected and which we had credited Stern. 
Mr. Marshall: That is obviously not bind-
ing upon us, your Honor. 
Mr. Limburg: Surely. If our pretended 
collection or the collection we had made 
turned out to be one that we had to account 
to some other institution for because it did 
not belong to Stern at that time, why, it was 
not any payment. 
Mr. Marshall: You did not have to ac-
count, You settled. 
Mr. Limburg: We settled very cheaply 
and we saved you $150,000 by the settlement. 
Mr. Marshall: Thanks. We would rather 
have had the chance to deny it, sir. Now, 
your Honor, I think it is highly improper 
to have brought this up in this way by this 
statement of Mr. Limburg's, and I take ex-
ception to it. 
The Court: Overruled. It is immaterial. 
We have not got it yet, so it is just a state-
ment. It does not go on the record as evi-
dence. It is just a statement for the instruc-
tion of the Court as to how far we can go and 
as to how much time we can save, I am 
querying as to the item of damage; that is 
all that is in my mind. 
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Mr. Marshall: May I ask your Honor 
then to instruct the jury to disregard the 
statement of Mr. Limburg? 
The Court: Yes, that is just a statement, 
not evidence. 
Mr. Limburg: Can we save time, your 
Honor, by putting in evidence everything of 
which they have copies in the bill of par-
ticulars that we furnished? 
The Court: I do not see any reason why 
we should not. If they are to be disputed, 
let them be disputed on cross-examination, 
as a matter that was sworn to in the bill of 
particulars. I will allow it. 
Mr. Marshall: And may we have the 
statement that every one of the 104 trust re-
ceipts was paid and collected in full? 
Mr. Limburg: I cannot make that state-
ment except with the qualification that part 
of it we had to pay back. 
The Court: That I do not think is ma-
terial at this point. 
Mr. Limburg: This statement will show 
just what we received. 
The Court: That is what we are inter-
ested in; not what you have to pay back. 
Can we get that? 
Mr. Marshall: But it does not show there 
were 104 trust receipts paid, your Honor. 
That is what I want to show. 
Mr. Limburg: Correct. 
The Court: That is stipulated, that there 
were 104 trust receipts in this particular 
transaction. 
Mr. Limburg: That these collections that 
we made 
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The Court: That is not the point. I see 
what counsel wants, and that is a direct 
question; or do we have to prove it; he has 
demanded it be proved and I think he is en-
titled to it, whether or not in the transaction 
that occurred between this plaintiff and 
Stern, whether there had been in the course 
of that transaction 104 trust receipts upon 
which advances had been made, all of which 
had been paid for in full? 
Mr. Limburg: Yes. 
The Court: Subject to the exception, 
which I am not going to discuss now. 
Mr. Podell: So long as your Honor does 
not close the door on us. 
The Court: I say, subject to the excep-
tion. 
Mr. Podell; All right; that is stipulated. 
The Court : That is clear, Mr. Marshall. 
Mr. Marshall: That is fine, your Honor, 
but I think the account is going to be put in. 
The Court: No, it is not, except as you 
get the conclusion and figures, that is all. 
They are in the bill of particulars. I would 
rather not have the account because that 
shows the other thing. 
Mr. Marshall: I mean the account in the 
bill of particulars. 
The Court: I do not think so. I have no 
objection, however, to it, if you have not. 
Mr. Marshall: I will bring out what I 
want on that later. 
Mr. Podell: I want to say in connection 
with any of these stipulations that I think 
almost every document that passed in con-
nection with this, counsel" is cordially wel-
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come to look at and offer them in evidence, 
and I will have no objection, and that state-
ment applies to what I have to say now. I 
have here a tabulation of our dealings. Here 
is a copy (handing to Mr. Marshall) of our 
dealings from April 5th, 1924, to January 
31st, 1925. In other words, the first and the 
last transaction practically here between the 
parties. I give the account number, the ad-
vances made by Ultramares, the interest and 
commission charges, the collections from the 
accounts assigned to us. I give them both 
separately for each specified period; that is, 
I have had it divided here in periods because 
that is how these transactions shaped them-
selves. One of them begins there on April 
4th and would end by April 22nd, so we will 
take the period 
Mr. Limburg: Statements rendered by us 
to Fred Stern and acknowledged by him. 
Mr. Podell: As I understand, periodically 
a statement would be rendered by us to Fred 
Stern, and those are the periods we took, but 
the totals would naturally be the same re-
gardless of the periods. 
I have the total of advances totalled up, 
the total of commissions, the total of collec-
tions. Now, if counsel will permit me to 
offer that in evidence, I will be very pleased 
at his request personally to mark any docu-
ments in evidence that he wishes me to, or 
I will waive any possible objection to any of 
the documents involved in these specified 
transactions. 
In computing the amount that we ad-
vanced to Stern on these transactions, which 
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he failed to repay, we did not include either 
interest or commission charges. We de-
ducted those, as to those that he did not 
pay. 
Mr. Marshall: Not in your statement to 
Stern, however. 
Mr. Podell: Certainly not. If we could 
have collected from Stern interest and com-
mission charges, there is no reason on earth 
why we should not collect it, but we did not; 
that is the trouble. 
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, I 
welcome such a summary a little later, but 
I think that we ought to have proof of the 
advances that they claim were not repaid 
and all of the circumstances of those ad-
vances separately. We have only covered 
trust receipts 1 to 104. Now, we have got 
105,106 and 107, 108, 109, 110 and 111. All 
but 106 they claim have not been paid. 
The Court: You mean the history of those 
as to that? 
Mr. Marshall: Yes, because that is the im-
portant part of their case. 
The Court: Was there any difference in 
the method or anything of that kind? 
Mr. Marshall: I think the circumstances 
are very important, 
The Court: All right, if you do. 
Mr. Marshall: These were made in No-
vember and December, a year after our bal-
ance sheet. 
The Court: And on the question of con-
tributory negligence? 
Mr. Marshall: It is very important. 
The Court: I see what you mean, yes. 
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Exhibits—Extracts from Testimony in Bankruptcy. 
Mr. Podell: I have not any objection to 
that, I thought Mr. Marshall was the one 
who made the suggestion. 
The Court: No. He said all of those up 
to the point of 104; yes, let us have them, 
because it becomes material in the history. 
Mr. Podell: Even at the expense of that 
time. I thought I was waiving some things 
I did want to point out with regard to some 
of these last transactions. May this state-
ment go in and we will supplement it with 
these specific proofs 
The Court: That includes these payments 
that were made by Ultramares since the 
Mr. Podell: I think so. 
Then we will mark that for identification 
for the present? 
The Court: Yes. 
(Marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 60 for Identi-
fication. ) 
(Whereupon, at 4 o'clock P. M., adjourn-
ment was taken until to-morrow, April 3, 
1929, at 10 o'clock A. M.) 
Exhibit referred to on page 166 is as follows, be-
ing pages 1759, 1760 and 1761 of the bankruptcy 
proceeding: 
"Romberg. 
"Q. Now, will you tell us what happened? A. 
Mr. Rea came to my desk and presented to me a 
letter and asked me to sign it. 
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"Q. Who had prepared it? A. Mr. Rea himself. 
"Q. Yes? A. I refused to sign it. 
"Q. What did you tell him? A. I didn't give him 
any reason. I just refused. Just refused. He 
asked me for an explanation. I says, 'I cannot. 
There is no explanation. I just do not want to 
sign it.' 
"Q. Is that the letter (handing paper to wit-
ness) ? A. That is it, Wasn't there one more? 
"Q. How about this one, too (handing paper to 
witness) ? A. Both of these. 
"Q. They are Trustee's Exhibits 1 and 2 of June 
29th, 1926; photostatic copies. Now, will you tell 
us what happened then? A. Mr. Rea presented 
these two letters to me at my outside desk, and 
asked me to sign them, and I emphatically refused. 
"Q. Did you tell him why? A. No, I didn't tell 
him the reason why; and he did not press me for 
the reason. 
"Q. What did he ask you? Did he tell you the 
purpose that he wanted to use those letters for? 
A. No, I don't think he did, because the purpose 
he wants to use the letters for is explained in the 
contents. 
"Q. Who prepared those letters? A. Mr. Rea 
himself. 
"Q. And did he dictate them right in the office 
there? A. Dictated them right in the office there. 
"Q. Himself? A. Himself. 
"Q. But he did not explain to you the purpose, 
other than what appears in the body of the letter? 
A. The body of the letter. 
"Q. And you refused point-blank to sign? A. I 
refused point-blank to sign. 
"Q. What did he say? A. He says, 'Well, I can-
not—unless this letter is signed I won't be able to 
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give you a financial statement.' I says, 'You will 
have to see Mr. Stern about that.' 
"Q. What happened then? A. Then he went in 
to Mr. Stern and came out again. 
"Q. Who did? A. Rea did. And Mr. Stern 
called me in. 
"Q. You mean that Mr. Rea said to you that Mr. 
Stern wants you? A. 'Mr. Stern wants you'—Mr. 
Stern called me in. 
"Q. And did you go in with Mr. Rea? A. No; I 
went in alone first. 
"Q. Was Mr. Rea there at the time? A. Mr. Rea 
was not there. 
"Q. But Mr. Stern was there. A. But Mr. Stern 
was there. 
"Q. Yes. A. And Mr. Stern told me that he ex-
pected to obtain a loan of $500,000 from a private 
individual, and that everything will be straightened 
out, and that it will be all right for me to sign the 
letter, and so I went out and got Mr. Rea, and 
Mr. Rea came in and I signed in his presence his 
letter. 
"Q. And you gave it to Mr. Rea? A. And I gave 
it to Mr. Rea. 
"Q. And that was given in connection with the 
preparation of the audits as of December 31st, 
1923? A. The audit as of December 31st, 1923, 
correct. 
"Q. Upon which Touche, Niven & Co. was at 
that time working? A. Correct. 
"Q. Was Mr. Rea insistent that unless you signed 
those two letters he could not prepare a financial 
statement for the banks? A. Correct. 
"Q. Did he mention the banks in that connec-
tion? A. No. 
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Q. All he said was that the financial statement 
could not be prepared? A. Could not be prepared. 
"Q. Did he refer at that time to the fact that he 
was working on the audit? A. No. I saw them; 
they were there quite some time working on the 
audit right along." 
New York, April 3, 1929, 10 o'clock A. M. 
TRIAL CONTINUED. 
(Same appearances.) 
THIRD DAY. 
(Adjourned until to-morrow, Thursday, April 4, 
1929, at 10 o'clock A. M.) 
New York, April 4, 1929, at 10 o'clock A. M. 
TRIAL CONTINUED. 
(Same appearances.) 
FOURTH DAY. 
Mr. Podell (at bench) : The plaintiff moves for 
the amendment of the complaint to include a sec-
ond cause of action as per verified copy filed here-
with. It is stipulated that the allegations may be 
deemed to be denied without filing a formal answer 
or denial. 
Mr. Marshall: And it is further stipulated, as 
I understand it, Mr. Podell, that the representa-
tions referred to in the second cause of action 
added by this amendment to the complaint are those 
made by Exhibits A and B annexed to the com-
plaint. 
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Mr. Podell: The latter in the nature of a bill of 
particulars. The motion to amend, I assume, is 
granted? 
The Court: Is granted. 
Mr. Marshall: I assume, your Honor, I will have 
the right at the end of the case to move to dismiss 
this part of the complaint? 
Mr. Podell: You can move to dismiss any part. 
Mr. Marshall: On the ground it does not state 
a cause of action and that the cause of action has 
not been proven. 
The Court: Right. 
(Amendment received in evidence and marked 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 61. It is printed on pp. 
12-14 as part of the complaint.) 
PLAINTIFF 'S PROOFS (continued). 
HERBERT SCHLUBACH , witness on behalf of the 
plaintiff, resumed, further testified as follows: 
Mr. Limburg: Mr. Marshall, we had in-
cluded in Mr. Schlubach's testimony up to 
and including 104. 
Mr. Marshall: Trust receipt 104. 
Mr. Limburg: Now, 105 was fully paid 
-—not fully paid by January 31st, 1925, but 
shortly thereafter; and 106 has been fully 
paid. The papers are all here, but I thought 
in the interest of the saving of time we 
would go on then with 107. 
Mr. Marshall: You now state that this 
item of $7,922.58 which your bill of particu-
lars shows unpaid under loan 105 has been 
paid? 
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Mr. Limburg: That is one of the amounts 
that we subsequently collected, as set forth 
in our bill of particulars. 
The Court: 106 too? 
Mr. Limburg: 106 we had stated in the 
bill of particulars as having already been 
paid. 
Mr. Marshall: I think that will save time 
if they go through with that because I am 
going to prove 105 and 106 on cross-exam-
ination anyway, and I think it would be 
much more convenient if we had it in the 
regular way. 
The Court: He said he would have to go 
into it on cross-examination anyhow. 
Mr. Podell: We have not the slightest ob-
jection. 
Mr. Marshall: I think it would make it 
clearer if he started on the 105. 
Mr. Podell: Just a question or two. 
When we covered this 104 there was one 
stipulation or statement, there was some 
things that occurred with respect to almost 
each one of that 104 which I think your 
Honor and a jury should know, so it becomes 
necessary for me to ask general questions 
about that practice on 104. 
The Court: Up to 104? 
Mr. Podell: Up to 104, just one or two, 
and subsequent, and I want to show the 
practice with respect to those 104 was prac-
tically carried on with the rest. 
Mr. Marshall: May we have first some 
questions to show what this witness' connec-
tion was with these transactions? 
The Court: That is what he is getting at 
now, I think. 
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Mr. Marshall: I thought he was going to 
ask some general questions as to what the 
procedure was; and I want to know this 
witness' relations to these transactions. 
Direct examination (continued) by Mr. Podell. 
Q. Did you have occasion to look into each one 
of these transactions at the time they were pre-
sented to the office? A. Not each one. 
Q. Not each one; but did you know of them as 
they came along? A. Yes. 
Q. Who took them up with you, Mr. Schlubach? 
A. The president, Mr. Von Goeben. 
Q. Now, from your knowledge of these transac-
tions, do you recall that when an advance was 
made, there was this trust receipt and subsequently 
you received accounts receivable, assignments of 
accounts receivable? A. Yes. 
Q. Could you say from your knowledge of the 
situation how much later as a rule, from what 
period to what period, these accounts receivable, 
these assignments of accounts receivable would 
come in? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as being a 
conclusion. 
The Court: I will allow it. 
Mr. Marshall: He can make a table from 
.those papers. I am perfectly willing to have 
that. 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, the original 
papers are here and are subject to counsel's 
examination any time he wants them. 
The Court: I will allow it. 
Q. T am speaking now of these 104; about what 
period of time would elapse before, on the average 
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—you can give a minimum and maximum—before 
you would get your assignments of accounts receiv-
able? A. Three weeks. 
Q. That would be the maximum, about three 
weeks? A. No, that would be an average. 
Q. It would be a little short of it or a little fur-
ther away, but the average would be about three 
weeks? 
Mr. Marshall: What is the question? 
Mr. Podell: After the advances were 
made. 
Mr. Marshall: Do you mean the accounts 
receivable, or collected them? 
The Witness: The accounts receivable. 
Q. I want to be sure you understand my ques-
tion, Mr. Schlubach; I am not asking you now how 
long after you would receive payment of the as-
signed accounts; you did not understand that to be 
the question? A. No. 
Q. The question is at the time—from the time 
that you advanced the money—at the time you 
usually got a trust receipt, you advanced the 
money, did you not? A. Yes. 
. Q. How long after that, on an average, would 
it be before you received the assignments of the 
accounts? A. About three weeks. 
Q. You say that is an average. Approximately 
how long after those three weeks would they be 
payable? A. Thirty days. 
Q. That was the average dating on these ac-
counts receivable? A. Yes. 
Q. I am told that would be the maximum. Some 
were less? A. Yes. 
Q. To your knowledge, some were ten days? A. 
Yes. 
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Q. The papers are all here? A. I don't know. 
Q. But thirty days you would say would be about 
the majority? A. Yes. 
Q. In all of these 104 was there a practice be-
tween you and Fred Stern & Company 
Mr. Marshall: I object to the form of the 
question. He has been leading his witness 
a good deal. 
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Podell: I will put it in this form: 
Q. Did you always receive an assignment of the 
accounts receivable which has been promised you 
at the time that the advance was made? A. No. 
Mr. Marshall: He said the practice was 
they never received it at the time the ad-
vance was made. 
Mr. Podell: My question is, did they 
always receive that identical account? I 
want to show there was a practice of switch-
ing accounts receivable and characteristic 
of the 104 instances. 
Mr. Marshall: The question was at the 
time. 
Mr. Podell: At what time? 
The Court: I see what Mr. Marshall 
means. 
Mr. Podell: I do not. I would like to see 
it, your Honor. 
The Court: In other words, we have the 
evidence here that no time when he paid out 
the drafts did he receive any accounts receiv-
able; that subsequent to that, making an 
average of some three weeks, he said. Now, 
the question would infer that at some time 
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he did receive accounts receivable when he 
gave the check. 
Mr. Podell: Maybe my question is faulty 
in that regard. 
Mr. Marshall: Let us strike out the ques-
tion and answer. 
The Court: Yes, strike out the question 
and answer. 
Mr. Marshall: I might be able to help by 
offering a stipulation here. I will stipulate 
that there were substitutions of accounts re-
ceivable. 
Mr. Podell: That is it. I think we ought 
to know this. 
Mr. Limburg: Let us get the facts. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. At the time when the advance was made there 
were certain accounts receivable promised but not 
actually assigned; is that right? A. Yes. 
Q. Then within three weeks or thereabouts on an 
average, you would receive actual assignments? A. 
Yes. 
Q. Your practice was not to send notice to the 
assigned accounts at the time when the advance 
was made, but at the time when you received the 
assignment? A. Yes. 
Q. That is the time you would send your notice 
out? A. Yes. 
The Court: That is notice to the parties 
to whom the goods were shipped and of which 
assignment had been made to them? 
Mr. Podell: That is right. 
Q. Now, in between the time when the loan was 
made and the promise that you would get certain 
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assigned accounts and the time when they actually 
delivered the assigned accounts, were there substi-
tutions of accounts? A. There were. 
Q. Tell us how that was done, and why? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to why it was 
done. 
Q. How did it come to be done? A. First Stern 
would call up and mention that he wanted to send 
off some lots first to some other client; that he had 
promised or offered first; and whether we were 
willing to accept that assignment ; and we didn't 
care as long as the receiving firm was good and 
the amount was sufficient to cover our advance. 
Mr. Marshall: To save time, Mr. Podell, 
do you think we could look at those 104 trust 
receipts and the letters covering them? 
Mr. Limburg: The five envelopes are here 
and you can have any one of them at any 
time you like as long as you keep them in 
the same order. 
Mr. Marshall: I ask you for them now. 
Mr. Limburg: All right. Give them to 
him, please. 
Mr. Podell: May I, with counsel's per-
mission in the interest of time saving, offer 
all the documents, including the request for 
a loan, the trust receipt and the assigned 
accounts, all relations to transaction No. 
105, advance 105? 
Mr. Marshall: In all of these, your Honor, 
they are subject to my general objection 
against any dealings between Stern and the 
plaintiff and any intra-office dealings be-
tween the plaintiff's various officers. 
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The Court: The general exception is taken 
to all of them. 
Mr. Marshall: Yes, and may I take that 
now to the balance, and this whole line? 
The Court: Yes, and that will save the 
objection being taken each time. 
(Received in evidence and marked respec-
tively Plaintiff's Exhibits 62, 62-A to 62-G, 
inclusive.) 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, I am offering 
here a number of copies instead of originals. 
There is no objection based on the ground 
those are copies? 
Mr. Marshall: None whatever. 
Mr. Podell: And the only objection as I 
understand it, is to preserve your general 
contention of law? 
Mr. Marshall: That is the only purpose. 
The Court: That is how I understand it, 
Mr. Podell. 
(Last exhibits read from by Mr. Podell 
to jury.) 
Foreman of Jury: Is this a new transac-
tion or is it from the beginning? 
Mr. Podell: I do not think, your Honor, 
that we made one thing clear. If I may be 
permitted to state—and if it is incorrect, you 
correct me—the last thing we took testi-
mony on, your Honor, related to the first 
$100,000; then the second $100,000. Now, 
then, there were after that second $100,000, 
to save time we just stated or the record 
shows that there were a series of 104 transac-
tions in which accounts were paid and more 
moneys advanced and repaid and advanced 
and repaid; regular course of conduct. 
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Mr. Marshall: There are 104 of these 
transactions, all of which were paid. 
Foreman of Jury: Each separate? 
Mr. Limburg: Each separate. 
Mr. Podell: And this is one dated Novem-
ber 25, 1924, and there are about five or six 
others that will be taken up separately; and 
may I state further that what we are taking 
up now will lead to those that we did not 
collect on and those that we lost on. 
Mr. Marshall: I do not know if your 
Honor caught part of this. On this loan 105 
of November 25th, 1924, these assigned in-
voices were not received until December 
15th, December 23rd, December 17th, an-
other one December 23rd, another one De-
cember 24th; two of them on January 1st, 
1925; another one on January 23rd, 1925. 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, if there is any 
question about what it usually took before 
we got these invoices, that this is any differ-
ent from previous transactions, I will have to 
offer the previous bills. Now, all this wit-
ness gave 
Mr. Marshall: The witness said three 
weeks, your Honor. 
Mr. Podell: Pardon me, that is just what 
I am going to tell you. All this witness gave 
was the average time. 
The Court : Yes. 
Mr. Podell: He said it was sometimes less 
and sometimes more. As long as there is 
going to be a question raised, in order not 
to take up the time and offer each item, I 
am going to try and have it tabulated as to 
each one of the 104 transactions, to show 
y o u — -
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The Court: What significance has that 
got, Mr. Marshall? 
Mr. Podell: I do not know, but counsel 
seems to make a point of it. 
The Court: I would like to know the sig-
nificance, so if it is material, we can have it. 
Mr. Podell: I assume he means we did 
something different in these accounts where 
we lost money on from what we had done 
in all other accounts; is not that your point? 
Mr. Marshall: My contention is, your 
Honor, that they were not as careful as they 
might have been and should have been in 
following up their security and getting it 
in in time. 
The Court: I see. 
Mr. Podell: My point is that we did 
nothing in those transactions different from 
what we had done in the one hundred in-
stances before, substitution of accounts at 
the time when the accounts were receivable. 
The Court: That will be up to him for 
cross-examination. 
Mr. Podell: Surely. 
Now, I want to offer in evidence the 
checks aggregating the $50,000 advance. 
(Received in evidence and marked, respec-
tively, Plaintiff's Exhibits 63, 63-A and 
63-B.) 
Mr. Marshall: I would welcome a tabula-
tion of the sort Mr. Podell suggested. In 
fact, I suggested it before; I suggested we 
tabulate these trust receipts. 
Mr. Podell: We will not quarrel about 
that. We will try and do it. It is a big 
job, too. 
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Mr. Marshall: I have a tabulation already 
on the first seven, Mr. Podell. 
Mr. Limburg: We will give you a tabula-
tion on the 111. 
Mr. Marshall: Fine. 
Mr. Podell: The exhibits are: $25,000 
check of November 26, 1924, $15,000 check 
of November 25, 1924, and $10,000 check of 
November 25, 1924, making a total of 
$50,000. 
Mr. Marshall: That is still under trans-
action 105? 
Mr. Podell: Yes, that is that transaction. 
The Court: What part of that $50,000, 
Mr. Podell, if I may ask to clarify my own 
mind, remained uncollected? 
Mr. Limburg: None. 
Mr. Marshall: That has all been paid. 
Mr. Podell: That has all been paid, your 
Honor; and I understood Mr. Limburg to 
say that both 105 and 106 were all paid; is 
that right, Mr. Limburg? 
Mr. Limburg: That is correct. 
Mr. Podell: This one also has all been 
paid. Now, I offer in evidence the letter of 
November 29th, together with the invoices 
relating to trust receipt No. 106. 
(Received in evidence and marked, respec-
tively, Plaintiff's Exhibits 64, 64-A, 64-B 
and 64-C.) 
Mr. Podell: And I will offer this check 
in evidence. 
(Received in evidence and marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibit 65.) 
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(Mr. Podell reads from last exhibits to 
jury.) 
Mr. Marshall: May I read one of these 
documents to the jury at this time, your 
Honor? (Reading.) I think that is a little 
different letter than accompanied some of 
them. 
Mr. Podell: I do not think counsel should 
make those remarks. The letter speaks for 
itself. The transaction is here. 
Mr. Marshall: Pardon me, Mr. Podell. I 
was explaining to the Court why I thought 
it was necessary to read this transaction, in 
view of the fact that the others had been 
read. 
Mr. Podell: I think after we get through, 
your Honor, we will have to offer in evi-
dence all the 104. I think we will have to 
do it. 
Mr. Marshall: Can we not tabulate it? 
Mr. Podell: We cannot take the position 
that this is the same, as long as counsel 
makes the point to pick little differences. I 
will show him where this same form of let-
ter happened not once but a dozen times in 
the previous 104 transactions. 
Mr. Marshall: I am not pointing that out 
as being a difference in this transaction, but 
a very important item, that they went and 
asked Ultramares frequently, if not always 
—they may have- done it always—whether 
they would be ready to finance them, and 
that it was not under any general under-
standing that they were going to finance 
Stern, and that each transaction was specifi-
cally taken up and a specific request made 
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each time whether there would be a financ-
i n g . 
Mr. Podell: Has anybody claimed any-
thing different, your Honor? We made a 
first arrangement for $100,000. Then when 
that was consummated, each transaction was 
taken up and there were 104 transactions. 
Each was paid. They requested whether we 
would finance them in the same form you 
saw that letter. We financed them and got 
the invoices, and there was not anything dif-
ferent and there was not any other arrange-
ment made. 
There is one thing certain, your Honor, 
so long as counsel has made that statement, 
that had we known that this concern was 
either dishonest or bankrupt, we would have 
had no transactions with them, either se-
cured or unsecured. That is our position. 
The Court: The witness has so testified. 
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, it 
might save a lot of time if Mr. Podell will 
stipulate in each instance there was a spe-
cific request made for a loan and that the 
loans were not advanced under any general 
understanding; not that upon application 
were they bound to grant any loans that 
were asked. 
Mr. Podell: Counsel is confusing what 
he claims to be a general understanding with 
a reliance and credit that we extended these 
people on reliance and faith on their finan-
cial statement furnished to us through these 
defendants, prepared by these defendants. 
He is confusing the two. 
Mr. Marshall: I am not confusing the 
two. 
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Mr. Podell: There is not any doubt that 
our contention at least is that in making 
every transaction, that we made with Fred 
Stern & Company, we relied on the financial 
statement of these people, whether it was a 
separate transaction in each case, or whether 
it was all the result of one transaction, or 
whether it was several transactions. 
The Court: So the witness said. But that 
is entirely a matter for the jury. 
Mr. Podell: That is what we claim. I do 
not really know the occasion for this dis-
cussion. 
Mr. Marshall: I think your Honor under-
stands what my contention is. 
The Court: I do, very clearly, sir. 
Mr. Marshall: That is all I asked for. I 
am sorry if Mr. Podell does not. 
Mr. Podell: I will offer in evidence the 
papers relating to transaction No. 107. I 
think this is the first transaction, your 
Honor, where there has not been payment; 
107, I am advised, we partially collected on. 
108 and 109, no part was collected. 
(Received in evidence and marked, respec-
tively, Plaintiff's Exhibits 66, 66-A and 66-B, 
and Plaintiff's Exhibits 67, 67-A and 67-B.) 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, to clarify the 
situation, will you permit me to state with 
regard to these transactions, I think it will 
be helpful to know 
Mr. Marshall: This is in the form of a 
stipulation, I understand. 
Mr. Podell: This is in the form of a stipu-
lation to be supplemented by proof, which 
we are going to offer now, just so that the 
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proof will be entirely clear; when we col-
lected on all accounts receivable that were 
actually assigned to us, our loss, in other 
words, did not arise in full; we collected in 
full on all accounts receivable that were 
actually assigned to us, subject to that one 
thing that your Honor has already in mind, 
where we had to pay back. 
The Court: Yes, sir. 
Mr. Podell: Now, the loss that we in-
curred was the result of two things 
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, I 
am not consenting to any stipulation that 
they had any loss or that it was the result 
of any two things. 
Mr. Podell: I explained that to Mr. Mar-
shall first, and I understood him to say he 
had no objection. 
Mr. Marshall: I want the facts and not 
the conclusions that the loss was caused by 
anything. 
Mr. Podell: I do not say it caused the 
loss, that is not part of any stipulation; that 
is for the jury, of course; but I just want to 
point out so that the proof that I offer will 
be more readily understood. The loss was 
occasioned rather by two things; we did not 
get any rubber on the trust receipt, as it was 
promised. 
Mr. Marshall: There is, your Honor 
Mr. Podell: I said on the trust receipt. 
The Court: In other words, a trust re-
ceipt came and no rubber or bills paid? 
Mr. Podell: No rubber, and 
Mr. Marshall: The rubber described in 
these trust receipts, as I understand it, was 
non-existent. 
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Mr. Podell: We could not find it was 
non-existent and your Honor has in mind 
with regard to the second one, although he 
promised us accounts at the time he got our 
money, it would take three or four weeks be-
fore those accounts would be assigned. He 
did not fulfill that promise before he died, 
as to certain of those promises of assign-
ments. 
The Court: Is not that stretching it a 
little further than three or five weeks? 
Mr. Podell: The 104 transactions will 
show you, your Honor, that there were in-
stances of three, four and five weeks before 
he assigned accounts. 
Mr. Marshall: He is describing his wit-
ness' action. 
Mr. Podell: I am talking of the average. 
I am not attempting in this statement to give 
you any more than an idea, so that you can 
follow the proof, and whatever I say will be 
proved. 
The Court: You never got any, so that 
there would be no attempt at all. 
Mr. Limburg: We did not get any until 
108 and 111. 
The Court: We have understood those 
assignments for 108 and 111. Now, in 107, 
what about that? 
Mr. Marshall: Some of the accounts that' 
were supposed to be assigned are in evidence, 
and as to the others that should have been as-
signed, there were none received. 
Mr. Podell: No assignments received. 
Mr. Marshall: What is the statement? 
Mr. Podell: There is no stipulation. I 
am merely making an explanation. 
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Mr. Marshall: If this is just a speech, I 
object. 
The Court: He is lining out what the 
testimony will be. 
Mr. Podell: Just to make it clear. 
The Court: In other words, it is not any-
thing except what he hopes to present as a 
matter of evidence. We will see whether the 
evidence is forthcoming and it just clarifies 
the situation, if the evidence is forthcoming; 
if not, there is 110 clarity to it. 
Mr. Marshall: I had hoped that his open-
ing remark would be a stipulation that 
would be carried out. 
Mr. Podell: If you do not take care, I 
will give you one. I want to offer in evi-
dence first checks dated December 9, 1924, 
which I am advised covered those for 107, 
108 and 109, aggregating in the sum of 
$100,000. 
(Checks received in evidence and marked 
Plaintiff's Exhibits Nos. 68 and 68-A.) 
Q. Before reading this, may I ask you, Mr. 
Schlubach, at the time you received the letter of 
December 8, 1924, whether you had any informa-
tion that there had been any difference in the finan-
cial condition of Stern & Company from that set 
forth in the statement, that he was worth not less 
than the statement showed; did you receive any 
inkling or suggestion from anybody? 
Mr. Marshall: May I ask if that be put in 
different form, whether he received any in-
formation with respect to Stern's finances, 
or were they better or worse. 
7 8 8 
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Q'. Did you receive any information as to Stern's 
condition? A. I did, through our president, Mr. 
Von Goeben, heard that Stern had been earning 
well and that up to August of that year. 
Q. August of what year? A. 1924. 
Q. The statement was given you in the latter part 
of March or April? A. Yes. 
Q. And August following that, in 1924? A. 
1924. 
Mr. Marshall: May we have what Mr. 
Von Goeben said on that point? I think you 
interrupted. 
Q. You can tell in August, 1924, finish your 
answer. A. Until then he had earned and added 
some $150,000 of profits to his capital, and shown 
as of the statement of Touche, Niven & Co. of the 
31st of December, 1923. 
Q. In other words, he had bettered his condition 
by $150,000? A. Yes. 
Q. Over and above? A. The capital as shown by 
that statement. 
Q. By the statement shown? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you say you heard that in August? A. 
No, I heard it later. 
Q. How much later? A. In about October; end 
of October. 
Q. And certainly by December, had you any 
inkling or had you heard anything to the effect that 
Stern was financially embarrassed or anything of 
that character? A. No. Nothing. 
Q. And did you continue to rely upon the infor-
mation that you had received from the statement 
von had received? A. Yes. 
265 
Herbert Schlubach—For Plaintiff—Direct. 793 
Q. In your transactions 
Mr. Marshall: When you say "informa-
tion that you had received," did you mean 
the information that Von Goeben had given 
you here? 
The Witness: Yes, because I asked Mr. 
Von Goeben, due to some other reasons, in 
October or beginning of November, expressly 
about the conditions and the financial situa-
tion of Stern. 
Q. And the information was that it was $150,000 
better than the statement? A. At least $150,000. 
Q. He made a profit of $150,000 above? A. Over 
and above what had been shown by the statement of 
31st December, 1923. 
Q. Now, then, on December 8, 1924 
Mr. Podell: I will now read Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 66 (reading same to jury). And 
may I along the lines of the questions that I 
asked before ask you 
Q. You certainly had received no word from 
Stern or Von Goeben that any part of that financial 
statement was withdrawn? A. No. 
Q. You received no other financial statement by 
any accountants? 
Mr. Marshall: Just a minute; you mean 
you personally received no other? Let us get 
this straight. 
Q. So that you claim Touche, Niven & Co. or any 
other accountant did not furnish any other? 
Mr. Marshall: No, I claim the statement 
that Romberg prepared in the summer was 
delivered to Mr. Von Goeben. 
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Mr. Podell: Read Von Goeben's testi-
mony. 
Mr. Marshall: I shall in due time. 
Q. Did you ever see any other statement at any 
time prepared by them? A. I did not. 
Mr. Podell: Please mark these papers for 
identification. 
(Four sheets received and marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 69 for Identification.) 
Q. Did you ever see this paper in your life be-
fore? Just answer yes or no. A. I did not. 
Q. And you are the gentleman that had to pass 
on credits? A. Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: May I see those. 
Mr. Podell: The witness refers to Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 69 for Identification. 
Mr. Marshall: That consists of four 
sheets, may the record show that. 
Mr. Podell: That comes from the files of 
the trustee, your Honor. We do not want 
the claim made that we had them in our 
possession. 
The Court: Yes. 
Q. Now, this letter was received from Stern on 
December 8, 1924 (reading exhibit to jury). 
Mr. Podell: Then comes the trust receipt 
dated December 8, 1924, the same date; that 
is, the trust receipt for $29,700, specifying 
rubber marks E. A. C. No. M. S. of forty 
tons. I have missing trust receipts 108 and 
109. That is marked. The trust receipt 107 
is the one I referred to for $29,700, trust re-
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ceipt same date of December 8,1924, No. 108, 
for $24,000. Trust receipt on the same date 
No. 109, $38,700. The three of them were 
$102,400, the amount in the record. We have 
invoices one of December 30, the letter is 
dated December 8th. The receipt is assigned 
with this, dated September 30th, for $7,224, 
for the Hood Rubber Company. On Decem-
ber 30th, again Hood Rubber Company $7,-
171, and we immediately sent out notice to 
the Hood Rubber Company on December 31. 
On December 30 we received assigned ac-
count of the Garlock Packing Company for 
$13,064, and I assume we sent out notice of 
that, although I have not got that notice, 
that is in evidence. We sent out notice on 
December 31 to the Garlock Packing Com-
pany of the assignment to that company. 
Q. Now, can you state, Mr. Schlubach, whether 
other than these assigned accounts—and Mr. Lim-
burg, I will trouble you to follow this and make any 
correction in the figures—other than these assigned 
accounts or invoices of this request for $102,400 
Mr. Marshall: Transaction 107. 
Q. (Continuing) —107 and 108 and 109, did you 
receive any other assigned accounts, do you know, 
without looking at the papers? A. No. 
Q. You could not tell? 
Mr. Limburg: There were none. 
The Court: Can you tell or don't you 
recollect? 
The Witness : Not that I know of. 
The Court: He means that he can tell not 
that lie knows if there were no others. 
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Mr. Marshall: Can or cannot tell? 
The Court: Cannot tell. 
The Witness : Cannot tell. 
Mr. Marshall: It was not part of your 
duties to receive these assigned accounts? 
The Witness: Not my duties. 
Q. The amount advanced on this request of De-
cember 8, 1924, for a total of $102,400, the request 
was stated in Mr. Stern's letter: "We would ap-
preciate if you would put us in funds, i. e., $100,000 
even to advance the above lots." And the checks 
dated December 9, just one day after the request, 
one of them is for $75,000 and the other for $25,000. 
That is $100,000. The total amount of invoices 
that he has listed with this letter aggregate 
$382,400, but his request is only for $100,000, that 
was what he requested. 
The Court: And what was the total 
amount of the bills assigned? 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, we cannot prove 
it by this witness, but of course we will prove 
it by the records. 
The Court: As far as we have gone, I 
mean? 
Mr. Podell: By the records of the defend-
ant. 
Mr. Marshall: I am willing to stipulate. 
The Court : That is what I want. 
Mr. Podell: If you will stipulate it, that 
will simplify it. Let us get the records 
exact. 
Mr. Marshall: Perhaps during the recess 
—what do you want? 
The Court: Stipulate those were all the 
bills they got. 
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Mr. Podell: Those bills are three in num-
ber. They aggregate $13,864.48 on one, $7,-
224.47 on the other; $7,171.01 on the third. 
Mr. Marshall: I am a little confused in 
this. 
Mr. Podell: There is nothing confusing. 
Mr. Marshall: May I ask a question, your 
Honor, from Mr. Podell, for the record? I 
want to get my record in shape. 
The Court: I would like to follow this, 
and I cannot, because I want to know. 
Mr. Podell: I will tell you in a minute if 
you will be patient. I will tell it to you 
right now if you will be patient, Mr. Mar-
shall. 
Mr. Marshall: May I ask a question? 
The Court: See whether you get what you 
want; if not, we will give you a chance. 
Mr. Podell: I do not want to give a wrong 
impression, that is why I am so eager to 
have your Honor know this. Your Honor 
will gather the impression that we collected 
on all of those assigned accounts from what 
I have previously said, all of those three. 
The Court: No, I did not get that impres-
sion. 
Mr. Podell: That is what is puzzling me. 
I did make the statement that all accounts, 
assigned accounts, had been collected. 
The Court : Yes. 
Mr. Podell: I did not state to your Honor 
that as to some of them, and this presents 
one of the series 
Mr. Limburg: That is all. 
Mr. Podell: This is all there is of them— 
those were accounts that had also been as-
signed to someone else and they are differ-
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ent; there are other items, because in the 
other items we collected and had to pay back, 
and here we did not collect any more than 
a certain amount as a result of an agree-
ment. 
Mr. Marshall: Your Honor, I move to 
strike out his remarks about what he had 
to pay back, or ask for an instruction to the 
jury to disregard that as not being proof. 
The Court: Yes, that is not proof, gentle-
men. 
Mr. Podell: I do not want the jury to take 
my statement as proof. 
The Court: It is explanation. I have told 
you before that no statement made by coun-
sel is proof. 
Mr. Podell: Of course not. 
Mr. Marshall: In fact, sometimes it is 
just the opposite. 
Mr. Podell: Unless in the form of stipu-
lation. 
The Court: Or a question that is an-
swered. 
Mr. Limburg: The amount is in our bill of 
particulars. 
Mr. Podell: What is that? I just want 
to get that distinction in your mind, about 
collecting the bill in full and then paying 
back and the general loss. 
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: I call your Honor's atten-
tion again to the fact that I am not bound 
by any of their losses to third parties. 
The Court: That is right. 
Mr. Podell: I do not want to miss a word 
you say, and I cannot hear you, Mr. Mar-
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shall, and if I go forward the jurors cannot 
hear me. 
Mr. Limburg: We collected on those 
accounts. 
Mr. Podell: When you are speaking of 
those accounts 
Mr. Limburg: Those are the ones we had 
to sue on to collect, on the Hood Rubber 
account, October 11, 1927, $6,523.26. We 
collected on the Firestone Tire & Rubber ac-
count of January 13, 1928, the amount of 
$5,543.05. We collected on the account of 
the Garlock Packing Company on January 
14, 1928, the amount of $7,177.42. 
Mr. Marshall: Your Honor, I will not ac-
cept those figures because I understand that 
at least as to the Garlock Packing Company, 
that was the result of a settlement which 
they made in a litigation. 
The Court: I see. 
Mr. Marshall: And I think we should 
take those invoices on their full value until 
it is a matter of proof. 
The Court: Yes, they will be taken at full 
value until proof is submitted, Mr. Marshall. 
Mr. Podell: May I suggest this: This is 
in the nature of an admission as to the 
amount we received; in other words, when 
we received this assigned account, it was 
not really payment to us. Payment to us 
was what we received in the way of money 
either by check or otherwise, and the order 
of the proof now is simply to show what we 
actually received as against what was ad-
vanced, and I think on that point 
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The Court: Let me get an addition here, 
and I will make a ruling. 
Mr. Podell: Yes. 
The Court: Do my figures add properly? 
The total amount of the invoices was $38,-
859.95? 
Mr. Limburg: Your figures must be 
wrong, your Honor. 
Mr. Podell: I gave the Judge the net 
figures after deduction. 
The Court: I want the gross figures first. 
Mr. Limburg: I think your Honor's addi-
tion must he erroneous. 
The Court: Have you it there? I was 
trying to catch the figures. 
Mr. Limburg: You mean the aggregate? 
The Court: The aggregate amount, that is 
what I asked before, I have now $13,064. 
Mr. Podell: That is my mistake. I read 
it eight. 
Mr. Limburg: $13,064.48; $7,224.47; $7,-
171.01. About $27,000 or $28,000. 
Mr. Podell: $27,459.96. 
The Court: $27,000 odd. 
Mr. Marshall: That is right—$27,459.96. 
The Court: That is right. Is the other 
right, $19,263.47, the amount received? 
Mr. Podell: Mr. Limburg is adding it up. 
Mr. Limburg: $19,243.73. 
The Court: Is that $19,243? 
Mr. Podell: That is the sum we collected. 
The Court: What is your difference? 
Mr. Podell: The loss on those assigned 
accounts that we lost as the result of litiga-
tion was $8,263.23. The point that I am 
making, your Honor 
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The Court: I understand you, Mr. Mar-
shall. The Court has admitted in evidence 
at this time, as a matter of proof, that there 
were on these transactions, irrespective of 
how it was done, a loss of $8,263.23 to them. 
Having admitted that in evidence as a total 
of $27,459.96, I am giving you your excep-
tion in relation to the admission of that 
amount, based on the understanding that we 
had this morning. 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, I want to be 
sure that the record is clear about that, when 
you say a loss of $8,263.23, you mean on 
these three invoices ? 
The Court: That is right. 
Mr. Podell: On the whole transaction 107, 
108 and 109? 
The Court: No, on the result of these 
three transactions which you say went into 
litigation and which were fixed in some way, 
I am taking the difference of $8,263.23, up-
on which I have made the reservation, as I 
have described to you this morning. 
"Mr. Marshall: And which I understand 
is, unless they prove 
Mr. Podell: Would not you be safer to 
have the record show, rather than saying it 
is a loss, in just having the record show that 
on this advance of $100,000 we received 
those sums of money? 
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Podell: I mean we received the sum 
of $19,243.73, so far as the proof at this 
point shows. In other words, I am proving 
that I advanced $100,000, and I am going 
to prove whatever I collected, and thus far 
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I will admit on the record that I received 
out of these three invoices $19,243.73. 
The Court: That is one way of doing it. 
Mr. Podell: That does not involve a con-
clusion. That states a fact. 
Mr. Marshall: I am not quite clear where 
that leaves me on the record. 
The Court: I will tell you where it leaves 
you, that I am leaving a difference of $8,-
263.23 which I am admitting in proof over 
your exception. The other is admitted with-
out that exception. That is the only differ-
ence. 
Mr. Marshall: And that your Honor re-
serves the legal question? 
The Court: Yes, the legal question for 
future determination, after the determina-
tion of this case. 
Mr. Marshall: On the question of the 
settlement? 
The Court: Yes, sir. Are you clear on 
that? 
Mr. Marshall: I think so; your Honor 
said pursuant to our agreement this morn-
ing, and I want to make sure that agreement 
or understanding was on the record. 
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Podell: I want to offer in evidence 
the papers relating to trust receipt No. 110, 
and the papers relating to trust receipt 111. 
Mr. Limburg: That is all. 
(Received in evidence and marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibits No. 70 and 70-A.) 
Mr. Podell: I offer in evidence the check 
for $25,000., dated December 13, 1924. 
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(Received in evidence and marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 71.) 
Mr. Podell: I offer in evidence check for 
$40,000., dated December 23, 1924. 
(Received in evidence and marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 72.) 
Mr. Podell: I offer in evidence also a 
letter written by Fred Stern & Company to 
the Ultramares Corporation of December 9, 
1924. 
(Received in evidence and marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 73.) 
Mr. Podell: And the letter written by 
us to Frederick Stern under date of Decem-
ber 18, 1924. 
(Received in evidence and marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 74.) 
Mr. Marshall: May I see Exhibit No. 72 
a minute. That is the check, was it not? 
Mr. Podell: Exhibit No. 72 is the check 
for $40,000. Now, on December 13th, there 
is a check for $25,000, that is Exhibit No. 
71. On December 12 there is a request for 
that $25,000, which I shall read: "Attached 
herewith you will find assigned trust re-
ceipts as follows"— (reading to jury). That 
is dated December 12. The check is Decem-
ber 13. Attached is a trust receipt for $25,-
000, trust receipt 110, marked A. F. E.; 
R. S. S. 45 tons is the amount in the letter. 
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On December 9th there is a letter to the 
Ultramares Corporation, saying: 
"Dear Sirs: 
Confirming our telephone conversation re-
garding our loan of $100,000., kindly be 
advised that we will make arrangements to 
liquidate this loan within a week's time. 
Thanking you for your efforts in this 
matter we remain 
Yours very truly, 
FRED STERN & C o . , INC. 
P e r FREDERICK S T E R N . " 
Q. Do you know how that letter came to be 
written, Mr. Schlubach? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Mr. Podell: In any event, he promises 
to liquidate this loan of $100,000., that is 
the previous advance. 
Mr. Marshall: In one week. 
Mr. Podell: Now, on December 18th, this 
was after the $25,000. had been advanced, 
that was dated December 13th, and before 
the $40,000. was advanced the date of the 
$40,000. is December 23rd. 
Mr. Marshall: Advance on 111 was the 
$40,000. 
Mr. Podell: You mean trust receipt 111? 
Mr. Marshall: Yes. 
Mr. Podell: But the date is what I wanted 
to call attention to. This letter I am going 
to read now was written by us to Fred Stern 
& Company, between those two checks. They 
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had already advanced the check of Decem-
ber 13 for $25,000., but had not yet ad-
vanced the check for December 23, for $40,-
000. ( Reading letter to Fred Stern of 11th 
of December to the jury.) 
Now then, the extension of time was from 
December 18th until December 24. Then 
on December 23rd, Stern wrote this letter. 
(Reading.) The trust receipt is the same 
as the others dated December 23, 1924 for 
rubber marks, amount 70 tons sold to Fire-
stone Tire & Rubber Company, 70 tons, total 
amount $40,000., and on the same paper, 
trust receipt, the check is dated December 
23, 1924, for that $40,000. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Was that the last advance that was made to 
Stern? A. Which one? 
Q. December 23 for $40,000.; if you are not cer-
tain, say you are not certain. We will have it 
checked up. 
Mr. Marshall: That is the last one. 
A. I am not quite certain. 
Mr. Podell: It is stipulated that is the 
last one we advanced. Now, had you ever 
received or will you stipulate that we have 
never received invoices of the $100,000., the 
$25,000, and the $40,000, making a total of 
$165,000., except the item of $19,243.73, am 
I right in that? Mr. Limburg adds to that 
except in so far as our collections on pre-
vious loan might give a credit. There might 
have been something remaining from some 
previous assigned accounts. 
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Mr. Marshall: It is in the bill of particu-
lars. I think they had better prove that, 
your Honor. 
Mr. Podell: I thought we would simplify 
i t . 
Mr. Marshall: I will stipulate there was 
no rubber representing merchandise de-
scribed in these trust receipts and that there 
were no a c c o u n t s assigned to you on the 
trust receipts Nos. 107, 108, 109, 110 and 
111, if that will help you. 
Mr. Podell: I think in substance I will 
take that stipulation; but the fact of the 
matter is, your Honor, there is the account. 
We do not know whether he had rubber or 
not. We were unable to locate any such 
rubber. The fact that we will prove is 
that our investigation disclosed that the 
money which he took from us with which 
to purchase this rubber—that was the es-
sence of the transaction, he was to receive 
money and pay for certain rubber—but he 
never used it for that purpose and diverted 
it. There was some rubber, but we could 
not identify it as ours, and somebody else 
had a lien on it, so that the only thing I can 
say is that we never got any rubber. 
The Court. I SEE. 
Mr. Podell: I will put Mr. Manning on 
to prove exactly what he did in that con-
nection, and that we never got any rubber 
pursuant to the trust receipt, and never got 
any asigned accounts only those which were 
proved. 
The Court: I do not think counsel has 
any objection to that stipulation. 
8 3 3 
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Mr. Marshall: I did not know that was a 
stipulation. I thought that was an ex-
planation. 
The Court: I am asking you whether you 
have any objection to so stipulating. 
Mr. Podell: We never received any rub-
ber on the trust receipts and never received 
any assigned accounts other than those. 
Mr. Marshall: I will stipulate that if 
they say they will put Manning on the stand. 
Mr. Podell: Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: Fine. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. So that the record will show, did you see 
anything of Stern in the latter part of December? 
A. I myself, no. I have never seen him. 
Q. Did he call on the premises at all? Did he 
ever call at your offices? A. He did. 
Q. I mean in the latter part of December, did 
he ever call at your office? A. I do not know. 
Q. You do not recall seeing him there? A. No. 
Q. What I am driving at is, do you know what 
happened to Stern in the early part of January? 
A. I was told that he had died on the 2nd of 
January. 
Q. 2nd day of January? A. 2nd day of January. 
Q. So long as you are telling what you were 
told, were you told that he died by suicide; is 
that the report that was carried about? A. No, 
it was not the report. 
Q. You were not told of that? A. No, I was 
not told of that. 
Q. Did you personally go over his books or re-
cords after that time? A. I did not. 
Q. You say that Mr. Stern did visit on your 
premises; you saw him there? A. I did not see 
him. 
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Q. But you knew of his visit, you, personally? 
A. Because I was told by our president, Mr. Von 
Goeben, that Mr. Stern had been there. 
Q. Did you personally, in passing upon the credit 
to be extended, did you ever have occasion to ex-
amine any of his books or records; I mean during 
the year 1923? A. No. 
Mr. Marshall: That means you person-
ally, that question. 
Q. Either you personally, or did you ever send 
or cause any one to make any such examination? 
839 A. During which time? 
Q. During 1924. A. Mr. Von Goeben did, and 
reported that he saw 
Mr. Marshall: I ask that we have the 
rest of that answer, your Honor. 
The Court: Let us have the answer. 
(Question repeated as recorded.) 
The Court: That he saw what? 
The Witness: That he saw sales contracts, 
and contracts of purchases of rubber, and 
that he convinced himself that the prices 
paid were correct, according to the situa-
tion of the market, and that prices obtained 
in the sales were netting him a profit. 
840 
Q. Well now, I am not talking about Von Goeb-
en's examination of the contracts of sale to find out 
whether there was a profit; did he ever tell you 
in words or substance that he examined any or all 
of the books of account? A. No. 
Q. Did you personally cause anyone to go over 
there at any time to examine the books of account; 
I mean in 1924? A. No. 
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Q. And did you at all times rely upon the finan-
cial statement that was furnished you, Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1, as to the worth of Frederick Stern & 
Company? 
Mr. Marshall: He answered that ques-
tion several times, I think the last time 
Mr. Podell: I have asked with regard to 
specific instances and want to now cover it 
generally. 
Mr. Marshall: I think he also relied on 
the same information which Von Goeben 
had given him, which had been given him 
by Stern, as to the profit Stern was making. 
Mr. Podell: The statement was the basis 
that he had made $150,000. and over. There 
was no other financial statement. 
The Court: Don't say those things, Mr. 
Podell. 
Mr. Podell: Counsel provokes them. 
The Court: There is no necessity for it 
at all. The objection is sustained, as being 
already answered a number of times. 
Mr. Podell: If your Honor considers it 
has been answered, I won't press it any 
further. 
Q. Did you ever receive any dividend or payment 
from the Bankruptcy Court? A. No. 
Mr. Podell: Will it be stipulated that 
Frederick Stern was petitioned into bank-
ruptcy. 
Mr. Marshall: That is admitted by the 
answer. 
Q. Did you ever receive any dividends from the 
bankruptcy? A. No. 
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Cross-examination by Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Of course, I cannot finish in fifteen minutes, 
your Honor 
The Court: I did not imagine you would. 
Mr. Podell: If I may presume to suggest, 
we would all probably welcome two minutes 
recess. 
The Court: You may have it, certainly. 
Q. Now, Mr. Schlubach, how long have you been 
engaged in business? A. Over thirty years. 
Q. And what kind of business have you been en-
gaged in in that time? A. Always in import, ex-
port and factoring. 
Q. And what business were you in just prior to 
the time that you joined the Ultramares Corpora-
tion in 1923? A. In my firm at Guatemala, Central 
America. 
Q. And you have been associated in your busi-
ness with banking firms and done business with 
banks to a considerable extent? A. Not as a part-
ner. 
Q. No. I mean in the course of your business— 
The Court : Business experience, he is 
driving at now. 
Q. You have had a good deal to do with banks, 
have you not? A. Yes. 
Q. In connection with the Ultramares and other 
business, you have been associated, for example, 
with J. Henry Schroder Company of London, a 
banking firm, have you not? A. Yes, 
Mr. Podell: I object, that they are a 
bank. 
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Q. They are a banking firm. So that you have 
at all times expert banking advice if you should 
think that you needed it? A. Yes. 
Q. You could have gone to them at any time 
for banking advice, if you had needed it? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, I suppose you know as a result of your 
experience what a bill of lading is? A. Yes. 
Q. And would you describe in a few words to the 
jury what you understand by a bill of lading? A. 
A bill of lading covers the receipt of goods which 
are shipped. 
Q. It is a representation by the carrier or shipper 
on the railroad that the goods have been delivered 
to him and that he will deliver them to the bearer 
of that certificate? A. Yes, 
Q. And you know from your business experience 
that these bills of lading are used to convey title 
or give title to the merchandise described in them, 
don't you? A. Yes. 
Mr. Podell: I do not think that is a sound 
statement of the law with regard to bills of 
lading. He is asking the witness a question 
of law. 
Q. Frequently it conveys title? 
Mr. Podell: Sometimes. 
Q. You understand, do you not, that bills of 
lading are very often bought and sold instead of 
the merchandise itself? A. No. 
Q. And you can buy a bill of lading and never 
get delivery of the merchandise, cannot you? A. 
You buy the goods which are represented by the 
bill of lading, but not the bill of lading. 
Q. Put it that way, if you want. Now, do you 
know what a letter of credit is? A. Yes. 
8 4 8 
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Q. Now, will you tell the jury what a letter of 
credit is, as you understand it? A. A letter of 
credit is a confirmation by a banker or banking 
house 
Q. A little louder, please. A. A letter of credit 
is a confirmation by a banker or banking house that 
a certain credit is at the disposal of the beneficiary. 
Q. And do you know that in most instances a 
letter of credit used in the foreign trade provides 
for payment or acceptance of a draft against de-
livery or documents of bills of lading, don't you? 
That is customary? A. Not always. 
Q. But it is very customary, is it not? A. I do 
not understand exactly your question. 
Q. Is it customary that the bank does not accept 
a draft under a letter of credit unless it receives 
with the draft, bills of lading or other documents 
covering merchandise? A. A bank may accept 
without a bill of lading. 
Q. It may; but the custom in foreign trade is 
usually to have the documents accompany the draft, 
is it not? A. No. Not customary. 
Q. You say it is not? A. It is not customary. 
Q. Did you ever hear of the documents of bills 
of lading accompanying drafts drawn under letter 
of credit? A. Yes, but it is not always the case. 
Q. But it is the usual case, is it not? A. I do 
not know about that. 
Q. You could not say? A. I could not say that. 
Q. After all your years of foreign trade? A. I 
would add that there are just as many drafts drawn 
without attached bills of lading. 
Q. What is a trust receipt, as you understand 
it? A. It is a receipt of goods which are in trust, 
Q. In other words, the man who gives the re-
ceipt says that he holds the goods in trust for the 
man to whom he gives the receipt? A. Yes. 
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Q. And he holds the goods for that man? A. 
That he received. 
Q. That he received the goods, or holds them for 
that other man? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, you understood, didn't you, when you 
got these first 104 trust receipts from Stern, that 
you were getting some kind of security under those 
trust receipts? A. (No reply.) 
Q. Did not you believe you were getting some se-
curity under these trust receipts? A. Not the mo-
ment we received those trust receipts from Stern. 
Q. You thought you were just getting a piece of 
paper? A. It was almost a piece of paper, just 
advising what he promised to assign. 
Q. Didn't you say a moment ago, Mr. Schlubach, 
that you understood a trust receipt to be a docu-
ment by which a man declared he held in trust 
certain merchandise for the benefit of another man? 
A. Yes, 
Q. Did not you understand then Stern's repre-
senting and saying that he was holding certain mer-
chandise in trust for you? A. After he had paid 
for them. 
Q. But immediately upon payment he would 
have held that merchandise? A. He would have 
held that merchandise for us. 
Q. Did you ever inquire from Mr. Stern whether 
there were any shipping documents, any of these 
bills of lading covering this merchandise? A. I 
personally did not, 
Q. Whose duty would it have been to have made 
that inquiry? A. The president's duty. 
Q. Mr. Von Goeben? A. Yes. 
Q. His sole duty, no one else's duty? A. I could 
not say—or the other gentlemen attending and 
helping me and assisting me. 
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Q. I will ask you whether you know who would 
be the man? A. I do not know. 
Q. You could not say who handled that of your 
concern? A. Mr. Von Goeben handled it. 
Q. Now, you have in the course of your long busi-
ness experience had occasion to see a great many 
balance sheets, have you not? A. I have seen some. 
Q. Well, one hundred, a thousand, or what would 
you say? A. Certainly not thousands, but probably 
a hundred. 
Q. In thirty years you have only seen one hun-
dred? A. (No reply.) 
Q. In thirty years you have only seen a hundred? 
A. Yes, because I have been an executive only 
lately, and during the past ten years, and not be-
fore then. 
Q. Will you look at Exhibit 1, please. Now, were 
you acquainted at all with the rubber market dur-
ing the year 1924? A. May I ask—acquainted—I 
do not understand. 
Q. Did you watch the rubber market and see 
what the prices of rubber were during the year 
1924? A. Not very closely. 
Q. Have you any recollection about whether that 
was a steady market or a fluctuating market? A. 
It was a fluctuating market so far as I can remem-
ber. 
Q. Is it not a fact that there were considerable 
fluctuations—there were considerable fluctuations, 
were there not ? A. I do not recollect, 
Q. Whose duty besides your own would it have 
been to keep track for the Ultramares Corporation 
of the market in rubber; who would have watched 
that market for you? A. The manager of our im-
port department, especially our salesmen of rubber. 
Q. Who was that? A. I do not recall who it was 
at that time. 
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Q. When you were lending money to Stern, 
didn't you think it was important to keep advised, 
to keep yourself informed as to the rubber market; 
will you answer so that the stenographer can take 
it down? 
Mr. Podell: You will have to say yes or 
no. 
A. I have not spoken yet. I am thinking. It was 
not my duty, so I did not do it. 
Q. Whose duty was it in your concern, just the 
export manager? A. Or the president's duty. 
Q. That is Mr. Von Goeben's? A. Yes. 
Q. Now I ask you again didn't you think that it 
was important when you were financing a rubber 
concern such as Stern, to keep yourself or your 
company informed as to the prices of rubber? You 
may answer that yes or no, I think. Do you want 
the question read again? 
Mr. Podell: Let him think first. If he 
does not understand, he will tell us. 
Mr. Marshall: I am sorry. 
A. May I just ask again—you say whether it was 
"important" ? 
Mr. Marshall: Will you read the ques-
tion. 
Q. (Question repeated as recorded.) A. Yes, 
Q. You were in charge of credits for Ultramares, 
I think you have testified? A. Yes. 
Q. And now I understand you also to say that 
you did not consider yourself as the credit man of 
Ultramares to keep yourself informed of the rub-
ber prices during that year? A. Not regularly. 
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Q. Now, you noticed, didn't you, on this balance 
sheet, Exhibit 1, which is before you, an item at 
the bottom of the liabilities, "Sterling contracts 
£165,000 covering purchase commitments," and 
carried over to the right-hand side—$737,300? A. 
Yes, 
Q. Carried as a contingent liability, you see that, 
don't you? A. Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: I think I had better point 
out to the jury the item that I am referring 
to. This is the last item here (indicating). 
Q. Now, what did you understand by "sterling 
contracts covering purchase commitments"? A. 
They were contracts of purchases in pounds sterl-
ing, English pounds sterling. 
Q. In other words, they were open contracts 
which Stern had which had not yet been closed by 
the delivery of merchandise? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, fluctuations in the rubber market might 
have caused either a considerable profit or a con-
siderable loss on this item of purchase commit-
ments of $737,000, might it not? A. If he had not 
sold the goods at the same time and covered him-
self. 
Q. Did you ever inquire of Stern the nature of 
these commitments? A. No. 
Q. Did you ever inquire of him whether he had 
sold at the same time? A. I didn't. 
Q. Do you know whether anybody of your con-
cern did? A. Mr. Von Goeben. 
Q. Do you know that he inquired? A. Yes. 
Q. He made a personal inquiry of Stern in re-
spect to his sterling contracts covering purchase 
commitments? A. I couldn't say whether he made 
a personal inquiry about these sterling contracts, 
but he did ask about the contracts. 
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Q. He did ask about them? A. About contracts 
in general. 
Q. And what did Mr. Von Goeben report to you 
that Stern said about those contracts? A. May I 
ask which contracts? 
Q. The contracts you say that Von Goeben dis-
cussed with Stern? A. Purchase contracts. 
Q. What did he say about them? A. That he was 
buying at prices which were in accordance with the 
market. 
Q. Did you ask the prices? A. I think the prices 
were told me at the time. 
Q. Now, let me get this clear: Are you talking 
about these contracts referred to in this balance 
sheet? A. No. 
Q. I was afraid that you were not. You are talk-
ing about contracts— A. In general. 
Mr. Podell: Ask him, Mr. Marshall. I 
asked you specifically what contracts you 
were talking about? 
Mr. Marshall: May I not be interrupted? 
Q. You are talking about contracts that Stern 
made after this balance sheet was presented to you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, did you make any inquiry with respect 
to these contracts referred to in the balance sheet? 
A. No. 
Q. Which were reported to be open in Decem-
ber, 1923? A. They were reported as contingent 
liability. 
Q. But you made no inquiry as to this item of 
contingent liability? A. No. 
Q. And yet on that item there might have been, 
as you said before, great loss if the rubber market 
fluctuated down? A. Yet the amount was well 
within the assets on the other side. 
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Q. But there might have been a considerable 
loss on that item? A. I don't know. 
Q. Well, now, Mr. Schlubach, let us get this 
straight. You say you know that there were con-
siderable fluctuations in the rubber market during 
the year 1924. There is carried on the books as a 
contingent liability as of December 31st, 1923, an 
item on unfilled contracts of over $700,000. If the 
market in its fluctuations dropped, would there not 
be a considerable loss to Stern on that item? A. 
May I come to figures? As a business man, I 
figured 
Q. No. 
Mr. Podell: If your Honor please, the an-
swer to that has been, that if they did not 
resell; if they did not resell. 
Mr. Marshall: And he said he did not 
know whether they had. 
Mr. Podell: I beg your pardon; he said 
he did know that they had resold. 
Q. Did you say that? A. I said that Mr. Von 
Goeben had ascertained that he had sold, bought 
and resold. 
Q. On this same— A. Not on the sterling con-
tracts exactly, but as a general rule. 
Q. That is what I am trying to find out, whether 
he ascertained it on these sterling contracts? A. 
I don't know. 
Q. As far as you know, no inquiry was made 
with respect to whether he resold to protect him-
self on those sterling contracts? A. I don't know 
whether Mr. Von Goeben did or not. 
Q. And he did inquire whether that was the 
usual practice of Stern, and Stern said it was the 
usual practice for him to resell; is that what you 
mean to say? 
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Mr. Podell: What is that question? 
(Question repeated as recorded.) 
A. I don't know. 
Q. I am sorry, Mr. Schlubach, to have to go over 
this again. Did you not say just a minute ago, 
after Mr. Podell's remarks, that Stern had told 
Von Goeben that it was his practice to resell to 
protect himself on purchase commitments of rub-
ber? Did you not say that? A. Mr. Von Goeben 
told me that he had. 
Q. That Stern had told him that? A. That he 
had seen the purchase contracts and the sales con-
tracts. 
The Court: Let us confine ourselves to 
this 735,000 or whatever it is, 
Mr. Marshall: That is what I am trying 
to do, Judge. 
Mr. Podell: That has been asked and an-
swered. He asked him specifically about 
that, your Honor. At least he gave it and 
he only knows from Von Goeben, what Von 
Goeben told him. 
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor pleases, 
may we not have the witness' testimony and 
not Mr. Podell's? 
Mr. Podell: I am not seeking to give tes-
timony. 
Q. Now, I ask you once more to look at this last 
item of liabilities, and to say whether you know or 
whether any investigation was made by your con-
cern as to the cost of this rubber covered by these 
purchase commitments or whether Stern had pro-
tected himself, had hedged on this contract by re-
selling this rubber, this very rubber discussed 
there, mentioned there? A. I say no. 
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Q. So far as you know, no such inquiry was made 
as to these particular contracts? A. As to this 
particular contingent liability. 
Q. Mentioned on this balance sheet, Exhibit 1? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, will you turn, Mr. Schlubach, to the 
item of inventory of crude rubber pledged under 
trust receipts in the assets column? A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know whether anybody of your con-
cern at any time made any inquiry as to the cost 
of that inventory? A. No. 
Q. Do you mean that you do not know or you do 
know that they did not do it? A. I do not know. 
Q. Whether it was done or not? A. Whether it 
was done or not. 
Q. But you were the credit man? A. I was the 
credit man. 
Q. You did know though, as I understand from 
what Mr. Von Goeben told you, that Stern made 
further purchases of rubber during the year 1924? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And as I understand, Stern went over with 
Von Goeben the purchases of rubber and showed 
him his purchase bills, or invoices or what? A. 
Purchase contracts. 
Q. Purchase contracts? A. Yes. 
Q. And he told him, kept informing him of the 
value of these contracts from time to time during 
1924? A. Yes. 
Q. Did he ever report to you whether Stern was 
making a profit or loss on these contracts? A. Yes, 
he reported that he was making profits. 
Q. That is Von Goeben reported to you? A. Yes. 
Q. And did Von Goeben tell you where he got the 
information from about this profit? A. From the 
contracts of sale that Stern showed him. 
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Q. Now, did he not also give figures at one time 
as to how much profit Stern was making during 
that year? A. In some instances, he may have. 
Q. Well, do you not remember one instance in 
which Von Goeben said that Stern had made a 
profit of a hundred and fifty thousand dollars dur-
ing the year 1924; I think it was up to about 
August, you said? A. Yes. 
Q. And Von Goeben said he got that information 
direct from Stern, did he not? A. Yes. 
Q. Did he tell you whether Stern had presented 
him with a trial balance to show that? A. No. 
Q. You mean he said he did not, or you do not 
know whether he presented it or not? A. He did 
not say. 
Q. But he may have seen the statement ? 
Mr. Podell: I object to what he may have. 
Q. As far as you know. 
Mr. Podell: I object to that. 
The Court: Sustained. 
A. I don't know. 
Mr. Marshall: All right. I won't press 
that. 
Q. Now, will you turn to the balance sheet again, 
Mr. Schlubach. You notice 
Mr. Marshall: I wonder whether there is 
another copy of this balance sheet we can 
give to the jury, and they can follow it and 
save time (handing to jury). 
Q. You notice the first item of assets is "cash"? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And I suppose you noticed when you looked 
at this balance sheet, that out of $206,000 odd of 
cash, there was held by the banks in anticipation 
of maturity of acceptances under letters of credit, 
185,000 odd dollars, did you not? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, the next item of "notes and trade ac-
ceptances receivable"; did you notice that out of 
$208,000 of notes, trade acceptances, there was 
pledged as collateral to acceptances approximately 
$156,000? A. Yes. 
Q. And did you notice that under trade accounts 
receivable, that out of approximately two and a 
half million dollars, there was over $900,000 pledged 
as collateral to trade acceptances? A. And out of 
$2,461,000 there were $903,000 pledged as col-
lateral. 
Q. You noticed that, too? A. Yes. 
Q. And you noticed that the inventory of crude 
rubber pledged under trust receipts, under that 
item the entire inventory was pledged, did you not ? 
A. The entire inventory here of $131,000, yes. 
Q. And you noticed, did you not, that under the 
investments there was pledged two small items as 
collateral to acceptances, 7 per cent, preferred stock 
of Ames Holden, Tire & Rubber Co., Ltd., and Howe 
Rubber Corporation preferred stock; you noticed 
that, did you? A. The $7,800 and $6,200? 
Q. That is right. You noticed that? A. Yes. A 
total of $14,000. 
Q. Now, will you turn to the liabilities again. 
Did you notice the first statement there, "Secured 
by assets pledged per contra and by borrowed 
securities aggregating $1,402,278.03," out of a total 
of $1,479,000—that is wrong. This item secured 
by assets pledged per contra and by borrowed 
securities aggregating 1,402,000 odd dollars ; lia-
bilities of 1,362,000 odd dollars; you noticed that? 
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A. May I repeat, against the current assets of $2,-
371,000 there were current liabilities of $1,479,000. 
Q. Will you please answer my question? A. I 
want to be sure that I understood. 
Q. My question is whether you noticed that there 
was a liability of 1,362,000 odd dollars shown on 
this balance sheet to be secured by assets pledged 
of 1,402,000 odd dollars? A. Yes. 
Q. And you noticed that of the accounts 
Mr. Podell: Where do you get the $1,-
402,000? 
Mr. Marshall: Right here (indicating). 
Mr. Podell: The difficulty arises from the 
fact that I understood counsel to say that 
out of 1,349,000 odd of accounts receivable 
there was $903,000 pledged. That is not cor-
rect. 
Mr. Marshall: Payable, accounts pay-
able. 
Mr. Podell: I am talking now as to ac-
counts receivable as assets, total accounts 
receivable, according to his statement, was 
2,461,000 
Mr. Marshall: That is not right, 
Mr. Podell: That is what is confusing. 
Mr. Marshall: I think not. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Were you confused by that last question? A. 
I feel confused. 
Q. I will ask it again. Strike out the answer, 
if your Honor will permit. 
Mr. Podell: Mr. Marshall, I am sure you 
do not want to mislead anybody as to the 
figures. 
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Mr. Marshall: I am going to repeat the 
question so there will be no question about 
it. 
Mr. Podell: Let us get one thing clear— 
Mr. Marshall: May I continue my cross-
examination? 
The Court: Yes. Let him continue his 
cross-examination. 
Mr. Podell: May I call to your Honors 
attention, in connection with this balance 
sheet, I do not want anybody to be misled 
about it. I understand counsel to state, 
and if I am in error I will stand corrected, 
that out of the $1,349,000 on the left side 
here, $1,349,280.43 accounts receivable, there 
was $903,000 paid? 
Mr. Marshall: You understood wrong. 
Mr. Podell: Then the proper figure is 
that it was $1,400,000 of accounts receivable, 
and out of that $900,000 was paid? 
Mr. Marshall: We have already passed 
that, and now Ave are on the liability side. 
Q. And I am asking you whether you noticed 
that against 1,362,000 odd dollars of current lia-
bilities there had been pledged $1,400,000 assets? 
A. Yes. 
Q. As security? A. Yes. 
Q. And that of the liabilities of 1,479,900 odd 
dollars, the unsecured accounts payable amounted 
to only 117,600 odd dollars, approximately; you 
noticed that? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, did not that impress upon you the fact 
that Stern was doing a business of borrowing 
against security, that that was his method of doing 
business? A. He was borrowing against pledged 
collateral. 
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Q:. Yes; and you understood that as soon as you 
saw this balance sheet? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, you were making short loans to Stern, 
were you not? A. Stern was making short loans? 
Q. You were making short loans, short time loans 
to Stern? A. Yes. 
Q. And you were naturally interested therefore 
in the cash position of Stern, were you not? A. 
Yes. 
Q. Now, did you make any inquiry at about this 
time, April, 1924, as to the due dates of the ac-
counts receivable which Stern had as assets? A. 
No. 
Q. Of course, that would have had some bearing 
upon his cash position, would it not, when his ac-
counts receivable became due? A. Yes. 
Q. But you made no inquiry? A. No. 
Q. So as far as you know, no inquiry was made? 
A. No. 
Q. Now, these being short loans, it was also 
rather important for you to know at that time, was 
it not, in April, 1923, whether Stern's business was 
making money or losing money? A, 1924? 
Q. 1924, yes; pardon me. A. Yes. 
Q. That was an important thing for you to know? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You noticed, did you not, that there was no 
profit and loss statement accompanying this balance 
sheet? A. Yes. 
Q:. Did you ever inquire for one, from Stern? A. 
I didn't. 
Q. Did anybody from your concern that you know 
of inquire? A. Mr. Von Goeben inquired how 
much he was making. 
Q. That was in about April, 1924? A. March, 
April—the end of March, 1924. 
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Q. Now, let me get this straight. You did not 
have any profit and loss statement from Stern? A. 
No. 
Q. But you wanted to know whether his concern 
was making money or losing money in March and 
April, at about March and April, 1924? A. Or be-
fore that. 
Q. Yes. You wanted to know whether he was 
making or losing money? A. Yes. 
Q. Before you advanced any money to Stern, 
you wanted to know whether he was making or los-
ing money before you made any advances, did you 
not? A. Naturally. 
Q. Certainly. And so Mr. Von Goeben inquired 
of Stern whether he was making or losing money 
at that time, did he not? A. Yes. 
Q. The stenographer cannot get your nods. A. 
I cannot say with clear certainty he did right at 
that moment. 
Q. He reported to you that he had so inquired? 
A. That he had inquired. 
Q. And what was the result of his inquiry, did 
he say to you? A. That he was making money. 
Q. That Stern was making money? A. Yes. 
Q. And did he give you any figures at that time? 
A. Not that I recall. 
Q. And that was part of the information that 
you had when you made these first loans? A. When 
I went over this statement. 
Q. When you went over this statement for the 
purpose of determining whether to advance credit 
to Stern? A. Yes. 
Q. So that this statement was used by you as 
collateral information to Stern's own statements 
about his business position at that time, is not that 
correct? A. As principal information. 
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Q. Do you object to the use of the word "col-
lateral"? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. But it was used together with this other in-
formation, was it not? A. The only information 
that I could really see from a reliable source. 
Mr. Marshall: I ask to have that stricken 
out as not responsive to my question. 
Mr. Podell: I submit that is a fair an-
swer. 
The Court: I will allow it. 
Mr. Podell: Was what? 
Mr. Marshall: Was this statement. 
The Court: Indicating Plaintiff's Exhibit 
No. 1. 
Q. That statement was the only information 
which you had from a reliable source, is that right, 
Exhibit 1? A. No, not the only one. 
Q. Did you not just say that it was the only 
one? A. Mr. Von Goeben had given me also in-
formation. 
Q. And you regarded him as a reliable source? 
A. I regarded him, too, yes. 
Q. And his information came from Stern, did it 
not? A. I don't know. He said so. 
Q. Well, did you not regard Stern as a reliable 
source? A. I didn't inquire. 
Q. Would you say that you did not regard Stern 
as a reliable source? A. I considered Mr. Von Goe-
ben's information as reliable. 
Q. And Mr. Von Goeben said that he got his in-
formation from Stern? A. Or perhaps from other 
sources. 
Q. Did he not give you information about the 
profit that Stern was making, and he got that in-
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formation from Stern, did he not? A. Generally, 
yes. 
Q. Your answer is he got that from Stern? A. 
Yes. 
Q. Did you not consider Stern a reliable source? 
A. Which is the same question which I just couldn't 
answer. 
Q. You mean that you did not consider him a 
reliable source? A. It wasn't put up to me to con-
sider that, 
Q. Now, Mr. Schlubach, you were the credit man 
of Ultramares; you were the chairman of its board 
of directors; you say that you passed upon the ques-
tion of whether advances should be made to Stern? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Will you tell this jury that you do not know 
now whether you regarded Stern as a reliable 
source of information in March or April, 1924? 
A. When we consider credits, then we do not go 
after the information that we got from the one 
soliciting credits. 
Q. May I have an answer to my question? 
Mr. Podell: You have got the answer. 
Q. I asked whether you regarded Stern as a re-
liable source of information? A. That question did 
not come up. 
Mr. Podell: He does not claim to have 
spoken to Stern or claim to have gotten any 
such information. 
The Court: That is not the point and 
that is not the question, Mr. Podell. We 
want to get his attitude at the time advances 
were made, and what his thoughts were at 
that time. 
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Q. Did you trust Stern in April and March, of 
1924? Now, you can answer that yes or no, I 
think. A. How far trust? 
Q. Did you trust him; did you believe him? A. 
I never was in a position to consider that, whether 
I trusted him or not, 
Q. You won't tell me whether you trusted him or 
not, whether you believed him or not? 
Mr. Podell: I object to counsel lecturing 
the witness. 
Mr. Marshall: I was not lecturing him. 
I was just asking whether he won't tell me 
that. 
Q. You cannot answer that? A. As a general an-
swer I would say that we do not trust creditors 
asking credit unless we convince ourselves from 
statements and everything how their position is, 
and they must be offered through neutral sources. 
Q. You got this from Stern himself, did you not, 
this balance sheet? A. From Stern himself, 
through Mr. Von Goeben. 
Mr. Podell: Got which from Stern him-
self? 
Mr. Marshall: Exhibit 1. 
Mr. Podell: Which? 
Mr. Marshall: Exhibit 1. 
Mr. Podell: But it is a statement by 
Touche-Niven. 
Mr. Marshall: We know that, 
Q. Will you say that you did not trust Stern 
at that time? A. I didn't know anything of Stern 
until that time. 
Q. Mr. Von Goeben did, did he not? A. Yes. 
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Q. He had known him a number of years? A. 
Apparently. 
Q. Had he not? A. He told me so. 
Q. And he told you that Stern was a reliable 
man, did he not? A. That he considered him a 
reliable man. 
Q. Yes, that in his opinion Stern was a reliable 
man? A. Yes. 
Q. That in his opinion was an honest man? A. 
I don't know about that. 
Q. Well, he did not suggest that he was a dis-
honest man, did he? A. He did not. 
Q. And you believed, as far as you knew, that 
Stern was an honest man? A. I did. 
Q. Now, was there ever a time prior to January, 
1925, that you did not trust Stern? A. No. 
Q. You trusted him throughout that period? A. 
Yes. 
Q. If you had not trusted him, you would not 
have made any advances to him, would you? A. 
No. 
Q. You believed him to be honest during all that 
period? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, Stern used to come into your office, the 
office of Ultramares, during the year, did he not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did he talk to you? A. No. 
Q. Whom did he talk to? A. To Mr. Von Goe-
ben. 
Q. Anybody else? A. I don't know. 
Q. How many times did you meet Stern? A. 
I never met him. 
Q. You never met him? A. No. 
Q. So you relied largely on the judgment of Von 
Goeben? A. On what? 
9 0 5 
9 0 6 
303 
Herbert Schlubach—For Plaintiff—Cross. 907 
Q. On Stern's personal honesty and his personal 
character? 
Mr. Podell: He was trying to make an 
answer and you stopped him. On what? 
The Witness: I relied upon the informa-
tions that were submitted to me through Mr. 
Von Goeben. 
Q. And that information included something 
about the character of Mr. Stern, too, did it not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Von Goeben's opinion of his character? A. 
From remarks. 
Q. As a matter of fact, is not a good character 
just as important as a good balance sheet when 
you are making loans? A. Sometimes one dispenses 
with a good character but never with a good bal-
ance sheet, 
Q. You do not mean that, do you? A. I do. 
Q. You mean if Stern had a fine balance sheet 
and you believed him to be crooked, you would 
have advanced him money anyway? A. If I be-
lieved the balance sheet was crooked or the state-
ment put before me, no. 
Q. If you believed the balance sheet was good 
but you believed Stern to be crooked, would you 
have advanced money to him anyway? A. I would 
have hesitated. 
Q. I do not suppose you handled these individ-
ual, these 111 individual transactions at all? A. I 
did not. 
Q. But as each obligation of Stern, each one of 
these 104 obligations was met, your faith in Stern 
grew, did it not? A. It was not disturbed. 
Q. After you do business with a man for a while 
and lend him large sums of money, as you loaned 
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to Stern, and he keeps paying them and paying 
them promptly, does not that improve your opinion 
of the man, as to his financial condition? A. Of 
his financial condition, the way it had been. 
Q. It does improve it? A. It does. 
Q. So that as he kept paying the sums of money, 
these 104 different loans, you began to place some 
reliance on his prompt payments, as a sign of his 
good financial condition, did you not? A. Yes. 
Q. Certainly. 
Mr. Marshall: Now, if your Honor please, 
I think if we adjourn now I could go on a 
little faster after lunch, because I want to 
start a new line of examination, and I think 
it would be a little more convenient not to be 
interrupted, as we would have to repeat. 
The Court: All right. Recess until 2 
o'clock, gentlemen. 
AFTER RECESS. 
HERBERT SCHLUBACH resumed. 
Cross-examination (continued) by Mr. Marshall. 
Q. May we have the last question read? 
(Last question and answer repeated as 
recorded.) 
Q. Will you look at the certificates annexed to 
Exhibit 1; did you read that certificate in March 
or April, 1924? A. I did, yes. 
Q. Did you look at it before money was ad-
vanced to Stern? A. Yes. 
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Q. Did you notice that that certificate stated 
that the annexed balance sheet was in accordance 
with the accounts of Fred Stern for the year ended 
December 31, 1923, and with the information and 
explanations given to Touche, Niven & Co.; did 
you notice that? A. Yes. 
Q. Did you at any time personally make any in-
quiry as to what information and explanations had 
been given to Touche, Niven & Co.? A. No. 
Q. Did you ask anybody else ever to? A. No. 
Q. Did you ever discuss this balance sheet with 
Touche, Niven & Co.? A. No. 
Q. Did you ever ask anybody connected with 
your company to do so? A. No. 
Q. Now, you noticed further down, didn't you, in 
that same certificate that the accountants certified 
that the statement presented a true and correct 
view of the financial condition of Fred Stern as at 
December 31, 1923, in their opinion? A. Yes. 
Q. Did you notice that? A. Yes. 
Q. They did not say outright that it represented 
a true and correct view of the financial condition 
of Stern as at December 31, 1923, but they ex-
pressed their opinion on that? 
Mr. Podell: I object, as an attempt to 
summarize the contents of a paper which is 
in evidence. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Mr. Marshall: I asked whether he noticed 
that. 
Mr. Podell: He noticed every part of it. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Q. What was the capital of Ultramares Corpora-
tion in 1924? A. $1,060,000; 
Q. $1,060,000? A. Yes. 
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Q. Now, will you say to this jury that you 
placed no reliance upon trust receipts which you 
received, when you made these advances to Ultra-
mares? A. I did not make any advances to Ultra-
mares. 
Q. I beg your pardon—to Stern; will you say 
that you placed no reliance on these trust receipts 
when you made your advances to Stern? A. May 
I ask—on which behalf? 
The Court: I did not catch that. 
The Witness: I did not catch what re-
liance 
The Court: I did not hear what the wit-
ness said. 
Mr. Podell: He wanted to ask a question 
—on which behalf. He does not understand 
the question. 
The Witness: I do not understand the 
question. 
Q. Each time money was advanced by Ultra-
mares to Stern, Stern sent with his application one 
of these trust receipts that is in evidence? A. 
Yes. 
Q. Will you say now that when you advanced 
this money to Stern which Stern requested, you 
placed no reliance upon these trust receipts as se-
curity? A. Yes. 
Q. You say now 
Mr. Podell: I do not know what the an-
swer means. 
Mr. Marshall: I will try and find out. 
Q. You say now that you did not rely upon those 
trust receipts? A. No. 
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Q. Will you say, Mr. Schlubach, that you placed 
no reliance upon the accounts receivable that 
Stern was to assign to you as security when you 
made advances? A. I placed reliance on the ac-
counts receivable. 
Q. Did you place reliance on the accounts re-
ceivable? A. Yes. 
Q. You thought those trust receipts were just a 
scrap of paper? A. Like a letter. 
Q. You thought they amounted to nothing? A. 
Just as much as a letter. 
Mr. Marshall: May I have one of those 
trust receipts, please? 
Mr. Limburg: Take the file. 
Q. Where did Stern get this form of trust re-
ceipt, do you know? A. I do not know. 
Q. Don't you know that Ultramares supplied 
Stern with these forms of trust receipts? A. I do 
not know. 
Q. Now, I hand you Exhibit No. 32, and ask 
you to look at it. Read the last line. A. "We 
would appreciate if you would hand bearer some 
trust receipt forms." 
Q. Now, don't you know that Ultramares sup-
plied the form of trust receipt to Stern? A. I do 
not know. It was not my duty. 
Q. Whose duty was it? A. The president's duty. 
Q. Mr. Von Goeben? A. Mr. Von Goeben. 
Q. You would not say that Ultramares did not 
supply the forms? A. I would not say. 
Mr. Marshall: This is Exhibit No. 32, 
I was asking the witness to look at, Gentle-
men of the Jury. (Reading) "We would ap-
preciate if you would hand bearer some 
trust receipt forms." 
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Q. Now, there is no, question in your mind, how-
ever, that you did rely upon the accounts receiv-
able that were to be assigned? A. Yes. 
Q. And you were very insistent that those ac-
counts receivable should be promptly assigned to 
you, were you not? A. Yes. 
Q. When Stern was a few days' late in the month 
of May, 1924, in delivering these assigned invoices, 
Ultramares wrote to him demanding those invoices, 
didn't they? 
Mr. Podell: I object. I think we are en-
titled to have the letters, as he is referring 
to the contents of the letter, I think he 
ought to have the letter. 
Mr. Marshall: Strike that out. I will 
ask him. 
Q. Do you know whether your company did de-
mand invoices from Stern in approximately May, 
1924, when they were a few days behind? A. Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: Now, will you produce the 
letter, May 5, 1924, Ultramares to Stern, 
please? 
Mr. Podell: It is in evidence. 
Mr. Limburg: Have you a copy? 
Mr. Marshall: My copy is all marked up. 
Mr. Limburg: Perhaps I can identify it. 
What is the date? 
Mr. Marshall: May 5, 1924, and at the 
same time, the trust receipts. 
Q. While we are waiting for that, will you look 
over this file of trust receipts and tell me the 
dates of trust receipts 17 to 21 (handing)? A. 
17 to 21? 
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Q. Yes. A. No, 17, April 30th. No. 18, April 
30th. No. 18, April 30th. 
Q. They are original and duplicate? A. They 
are just the same, yes, sir. No. 19, April 30th. 
No. 20, April 30th. No. 21, also April 30th. 
Mr. Marshall: Have you found that let-
ter yet? 
Mr. Limburg: Yes, here it is (handing). 
Mr. Marshall: This letter is produced by 
Mr. Podell from the files of the Ultramares 
Corporation, and I offer it in evidence. 
Mr. Podell: No objection. 
(Received in evidence and marked Defend-
ants' Exhibit A.) 
Mr. Marshall: This is a letter dated May 
5, 1924, addressed to Fred Stern & Co., 
Inc. (reading Defendants' Exhibit A to the 
jury) : "We presume that we will receive 
from you to-day invoice from the Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Company, and would ap-
preciate your advising us when we may ex-
pect the invoices covering the advance made 
on merchandise represented by Trust Re-
ceipts, Nos. 17 to 21 inclusive." Those were 
the trust receipts that Mr. Schlubach just 
identified as having the date of April 30— 
"Thanking you for your kind attention to 
this matter, we are, Very truly yours— 
Cashier." 
Q. That is the cashier of Ultramares? A. Yes. 
Q. His initials are H. M. ? A. Yes. 
Q. Will you now say, Mr. Schlubach, that you 
did not advance money against merchandise rep-
resented by trust receipts? A. We did advance 
money against merchandise. 
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Q. And that merchandise was represented by 
trust receipts, was it not? A. Not at the moment 
that we advanced the money. 
Q. Mr. Schlubach, will you read this letter 
again at the bottom, and see whether Mr. Manning 
did not state that he wanted the invoices covering 
merchandise represented by Trust Receipts 17 to 
21 inclusive? A. Yes, they were contained and 
indicated in the trust receipts. 
Q. Precisely; and the trust receipts represented 
merchandise, didn't they? A. They indicated cer-
tain merchandise. 
Q. You make a difference between the use of the 
words "indicated" and "represented"? A. Yes, be-
cause I considered the trust receipts in this case 
as indicative 
Mr. Marshall: May I ask you not to 
volunteer. I asked you a question, and I 
think you have answered it. 
Q. Have you been told anything by any lawyers 
about these trust receipts, and what they repre-
sent as a matter of law; have you discussed that 
with your lawyers at all? A. No. 
Q. You have not discussed these trust receipts 
at all with your lawyers at any time? A. Yes, I 
have, but not with regard to fraud. 
Mr. Podell: What? 
The Stenographer: Fraud. 
Q. Have I said anything about fraud, Mr. 
Schlubach? A. I do not hear very well. 
Q. Have I said anything about fraud? A. I 
thoroughly understood so. 
Q. I do not think I have mentioned the word to 
you to-day, sir. A. I am sorry. 
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The Court: Keep your voice up, please. 
Mr. Podell: When you do not hear, let 
Mr. Marshall know, and he will repeat the 
question. 
Mr. Marshall: Very glad to repeat it if 
you do not understand or do not hear it. 
Q. Now, you say these trust receipts "indicated" 
merchandise? A. Yes. 
Q. And you were particular that these trust re-
ceipts should indicate specific definite merchan-
dise, were you not? A. No. 
Q. You did not care whether or what merchan-
dise they represented? A. As long as the value and 
amount seemed sufficient to cover advances. 
Q. As long as the value and amounts were suffi-
cient to cover your advances you did not care what 
the merchandise was? A. Not exactly. 
Q. You noticed, didn't you, Mr. Schlubach, that 
every one of those trust receipts described definite 
shipments of merchandise, didn't you? A. Yes. 
Q. Giving the marks? A. Yes. 
Q. The ship from which they were to be deliv-
ered? A. Yes. 
Q. And the number of tons? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, you were interested, were you not, in 
the fact that these trust receipts covered the mer-
chandise described in them, were you not? A. Not 
specially. 
Q. In other words, you did not care if the trust 
receipt described merchandise marked A. F. T.; 
R. S.; Ex. SS. City of Yokohama, forty-five tons, 
you did not care whether you got forty-five tons 
marked M. S. 1, 84, from the SS. Madion? A. Not 
especially. 
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Q. It did not make any difference to you what 
the merchandise was? A. As long as we got suffi-
cient amount assigned afterwards to cover our ad-
vances. 
Q. Yes; but you wanted to be sure that this suffi-
cient amount was the same amount mentioned in 
this trust receipt, didn't you? A. Or a similar 
amount. 
Q. In other words, if they said to you—we are 
giving you merchandise marked so and so from the 
SS. City of Yokahama, forty-five tons, you did not 
care whether they gave you entirely different mer-
chandise under that trust receipt? A. We did not. 
Q. Were you not interested in the description of 
the rubber? A. No. 
Q. You did not care what kind of rubber you 
got? A. No. Not especially. 
Q. Did you care about the prices at which the 
rubber was purchased? A. Yes. 
Q. Did you care about the prices at which the 
rubber was sold? A. Yes. 
Q. Did you want to know that before you ad-
vanced any money? A. I personally did not in-
quire, but I considered it the duty of the president 
to find out. 
Q. What the prices were of the merchandise? A. 
Yes. 
Q. And the sales price of the merchandise? A. 
Yes. 
Q. Before you advanced any money? A. Not 
before we advanced the money. 
Q. I mean each time that you advanced money 
on a definite shipment, you did not care? A. Not 
necessarily so. 
Q. It was not necessary to know the prices then? 
A. No. 
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Q. Or the sales price; it was not necessary to 
know the kind of rubber? A. It was not necessary. 
Q. Or the description of rubber? A. It was not 
necessary. 
Q. Do you know the signature of Mr. Manning? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the letterhead of the Ultramares Cor-
poration? A. Yes. 
Q. I hand you a letter dated May 1st, 1924, pro-
duced by the trustee in bankruptcy of Stern & Com-
pany, and ask you whether that is on the letterhead 
of your company and whether the signature is Mr. 
Manning's signature? A. Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: I ask to have it marked 
in evidence. 
Mr. Podell: May I see it—no objection. 
(Received in evidence and marked Defend-
ants' Exhibit B.) 
Mr. Marshall: This is on the letterhead 
of Ultramares Corporation, Gentlemen of 
the Jury (reading Defendants' Exhibit B.). 
It is to Messrs. Fred Stern & Co. on May 1, 
1924, from H. Manning, Cashier. 
Q. Now, didn't you know as a matter of fact, 
that these applications of Stern's did not include 
the prices at which the merchandise had been sold? 
A. It did not include them. 
Q. And they did not include 
Mr. Podell: Are you sure you are talk-
ing about the same thing? I do not want 
any confusion. What applications are you 
referring to? 
Mr. Marshall: Certain applications. 
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Mr. Podell: The figure there, I would 
like to know what it is, whether it is the 
price or sale or what it is. There is always 
the risk, your Honor, of asking the witness 
as to the contents of documents which are 
in evidence and I think these applications 
did state the price at which they were sold 
to various people, namely, the people and 
the price. 
Mr. Marshall: I think I am entitled to 
test this witness' knowledge of what this 
business was. 
Mr. Podell: He is testifying of his recol-
lection. I do not want to interfere with 
that, but I do not want any misinformation. 
Mr. Marshall: I think I know what I 
am doing, Mr. Podell. 
Q. Will you look at this letter. Now this is 
one of the applications, and tell us whether or not 
you were correct in saying that the price was not 
on the applications that Stern sent you, the sales 
price? A. It was not. 
Q. It was not? A. No. 
Mr. Podell: That depends upon what you 
mean by price. Repeat the question. (Ques-
tion repeated as recorded.) 
A. The sales price was not. The amount sold, 
yes. 
Mr. Podell: You mean the dollars and 
cents? 
The Witness: The sales price, I was asked 
whether the price was on. 
The Court: What he means by the sales 
price, let us get the distinction there; what 
940 
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do you mean, the total amount, or the 
amount, which would indicate what it was 
per pound for rubber? 
The Witness: The total amount was 
noted, but not the sales price. 
Mr. Podell: If you sold $20,000. worth, 
it was put in there, but it did not state the 
price per pound at which it was sold. 
Q. The sales prices is not in there; it is the total, 
that is the only thing that is in there? A. The total, 
yes. 
Q. There is no description of the rubber, how-
ever, in this application, is there? A. Not that I 
recall. 
Q. Do you recall any application in which there 
was a description of the rubber? A. I do not. 
Q. As far as you know, Ultramares made no 
other attempt to get a description of the rubber 
covered by the trust receipts at the time that the 
loan was made? A. It was not my duty, so I do 
not know. 
Q. But as far as you know, you know nothing? 
A. I do not know. 
Q. Whose duty would that have been? A. The 
president and his assistants. 
Q. And who was his assistant? A. The cashier 
in this case. 
Q. Mr. Manning? A. Yes, 
Mr. Podell: I may state if you wish me 
to that Mr. Manning is here, and he wrote 
most of those letters, and I intend to call 
him as soon as you get through with this 
witness. 
Q. Now, even after April and May, when the de-
livery of the assigned accounts was delayed, you 
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would ask Stern to deliver them to you, would you 
not? A. Yes. 
Q. Those were your instructions to Manning 
and Von Goeben, were they not? A. I did not 
give any special instructions about the details. 
Q. Did you expect them to follow up the de-
livery of these accounts receivable? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, is it not true that it was just the mer-
chandise and these accounts receivable especially 
to which you were looking in the first place for the 
return of your money ; you expected to collect these 
accounts receivable and get repaid that way, didn't 
you? A. Yes. 
Q. And Stern, you only looked to Stern to pay 
if the accounts receivable which you received were 
not paid promptly? A. Yes. 
Q. That is true, is it not? A. Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: May I have the letters of 
November 3 and November 5 referred to in 
the bill of particulars? 
Q. And there is no question in your mind now, 
is there, that the money was lent against security? 
A. Was advanced. 
Mr. Podell: I object to that as calling 
for a question of law, from the facts adduced. 
The Court: Yes, I think that is true, Mr. 
Marshall. 
Mr. Marshall: All right; I won't press 
the question. 
Q. Do you recognize this letter which I hand you 
dated November 3, as being written on the letter-
head of Ultramares Corporation, signed by Von 
Goeben; you do not have to read it. A. Yes. 
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Mr. Marshall: I offer that in evidence. 
Mr. Podell: May I see it—no objection. 
You want the answer, I suppose. 
(Letter received in evidence and marked 
Defendants' Exhibit C.) 
Q. And do you know the signature of Stern? 
A. I think I recognized it from the letters. 
Q. Does this letter dated November 5 on the 
letterhead of Stern & Company bear the signature 
of Stern? A. It seems to me right. 
Mr. Marshall: It was produced by your 
counsel so that there is no question. 
Mr. Podell: Yes, there is no objection. 
Mr. Marshall: I offer that in evidence. 
(Received in evidence and marked Defend-
ants' Exhibit D.) 
Mr. Marshall: Gentlemen of the jury, I 
will read that; that is the first one, is a letter 
on the letterhead of Ultramares, signed by 
its president, Von Goeben, to Stern, dated 
November 3, 1924. (Reading.) 
I will give your Honor the letters. 
The Court: Just a little louder, please. 
Mr. Marshall: I am sorry; I will face 
this way. (Reading Defendants' Exhibit E 
to the Court and jury.) 
That is signed by Ultramares Corporation, 
Von Goeben, president. 
The next exhibit is a letter signed by Fred 
Stern as president of Fred Stern & Com-
pany, addressed to the Ultramares Corpora-
tion, dated November 5, 1924, two days after 
the letter from Ultramares, reciting in pre-
cisely the same language this understanding. 
I would like your Honor to look at this. 
The Court: I follow this. 
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Q. Now, as a matter of fact, Mr. Schlubach, you 
could have obtained, if you had wanted to, delivery 
orders for merchandise at the time you advanced 
the money, could you not? A. Those were not the 
terms that Fred Stern had offered us. 
Q. He had never offered you those terms? A. 
I do not recall. 
Q. I hand you a letter dated March 31, 1924, and 
ask you whether you ever saw that letter? A. I 
did not see this letter. 
Q. Is there anything to indicate to you who 
would have seen it? A. I cannot say. 
Q. There are no initials on there that you recog-
nize? A. I do not. 
Mr. Marshall: Let us just mark it for 
identification at this time. 
(Letter received and marked Defendants' 
Exhibit E for Identification.) 
Mr. Podell: I do not know how counsel 
comes to be in possession of the original let-
ter. 
Mr. Marshall: It comes from the trustee's 
file. 
Mr. Podell: It is not ours. 
Q. So that you did not have to lend money to 
Stern unless you were satisfied with the security 
that he gave; is not that so? A. It depended on us, 
yes. 
Q. You had the say at any time a loan was asked 
for, whether you would grant it or whether you 
would not? A. Yes. May I add—you refer to the 
Ultramares Corporation and not to me personally? 
Q. Yes, to the Ultramares Corporation, and your 
answer is the same as you made before? A. Yes. 
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Q. Now, you considered very carefully, didn't 
you, the credit standing of the various accounts 
which Stern offered to assign? A. Yes. 
Q. And he offered to assign to you accounts that 
you considered good? A. Yes. 
Q. In each instance? A. Yes. 
Q. And those accounts included such companies 
as Firestone Tire & Rubber Company? A. Yes. 
Q. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company? A. Yes, 
Q. Michelin Tire Company? A. Yes. 
Q. Detroit Insulating Wire Company? A. I do 
not recall all the names, but they were among them, 
I think. 
Q. Do you recall the General Electric Company? 
A. Yes; the Ford Motor Company. 
Q. Johns-Manville Company? A. Yes. 
Q. Endicott-Johnson? A. Yes. 
Q. Lovell Manufacturing Company? A. I do not 
recall. 
Q. Brunswick-Balke-Collender? A. Yes. 
Q. The DuPont Company? A. I do not recall 
all the names. 
Q. The Ford Motor Company? A. Yes. 
Q. The Hood Rubber Company? A. Yes. 
Q. The Garlock Packing Company? A. Yes. 
Q. And you considered all of those accounts as 
good also? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, on November 25, 1924, that is the time 
when loan 105 was made, do you know whether 
your company was fully covered on all previous 
advances? A. I do not know. 
Q. Who would know that? A. To-day? 
Q. Yes; whose business then was it to know 
about that? A. Mr. Von Goeben. 
Mr. Podell: Who would know that to-day, 
Mr. Schlubach? 
The Witness: Mr. Manning. 
9 5 6 
9 5 7 
958 
320 
Herbert Schlubach—For Plaintiff—Cross. 
Q. Mr. Manning? A. Yes. 
Q. Well, if you did not know that at that time, 
how could you pass upon the application for loan 
105? A. I inquired from Mr. Von Goeben how it 
was, and he told me. 
Q. You relied on him? A. Yes. 
Q. And did Mr. Von Goeben come to you each 
time a loan was made? A. Not each time, because 
I was sometimes away. 
Q. But when you were there, did he come to you 
every time? A. Yes. 
Q. And you then relied upon him for certain in-
formation before passing upon the loan? A. Yes. 
Q. When you were not there, Von Goeben had 
the full authority to pass upon the loans, didn't he? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know whether you passed on loan 111, 
the last loan? A. How much was it? 
Q. $40,000 on December 23, I think? A. Yes. 
Q. You personally passed upon that? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, did you know at that time that invoices 
had not yet been received in full on loan 105 of 
November 25th? A. Yes. 
Q. You knew that at that time? A. Yes. 
Q. Did you know at that time that Stern had 
defaulted on the payment of $125,000 in loans 107 
to 110, made on the 9th and 10th of December? 
Mr. Podell: I object to that. 
A. Yes, but he had not defaulted. 
Mr. Podell: That is just it. You answered 
so quickly. I object to it on the ground 
that it assumes facts that are not proven. 
There is no proof that he had defaulted on 
any loan. 
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Mr. Marshall: We will just see. I would 
like Exhibit No. 74. 
Mr. Podell: I wish to say 
Mr. Marshall: Mr. Podell, do not testify 
or guide this witness. 
Mr. Podell: I am asking the Court for his 
ruling. 
The Court: That has been ruled on. I 
am striking out that answer until such time 
as it is shown that is a fact upon which the 
hypothesis is based. 
Q. Now, you know that loans 107 to 110, inclu-
sive, made on the 9th and 10th of December, 1924, 
were supposed to be paid one week after that date? 
A. We wanted him to pay that. 
Q. Well, did not he agree to pay them then? 
Mr. Podell: I object to that, your Honor; 
that is an assumption of fact; it is not 
proved in the record. 
Mr. Marshall: I am asking him whether 
he agreed to it. 
The Court: He can ask whether he did or 
not agree to pay. 
Mr. Podell: The transactions are in writ-
ing, the same accounts in previous transac-
tions. 
A. He agreed. 
Mr. Podell: Assigned accounts. 
Mr. Marshall: I think Mr. Podell is in 
error and I will show your Honor that. 
The Court: All right. 
Mr. Marshall: From their own letter. 
Mr. Podell: Let me finish my statement. 
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Mr. Marshall: Won't you stand up so 
that I know when you are talking. 
Mr. Podell: The transaction is identical 
for the reason that counsel would not permit 
me to ask. An arrangement was made 
whereby Mr. Stern was requested to antici-
pate the payment and pay it within a week, 
and he agreed to do that. 
Mr. Marshall: That is just what I am 
getting at. 
Mr. Podell: And wrote subsequently, and 
I asked how that letter came to be written 
and counsel objected and I could not get 
that, that the time was extended. 
Mr. Marshall: Now, then, as Mr. Podell 
has coached his witness, may I proceed? 
Mr. Podell: Do you think that is a proper 
remark? 
Mr. Marshall: I do. 
Mr. Podell: Is there anything I have said 
that is not already before this jury? 
Q. Mr. Schlubach, was not there an arrangement 
by which Stern was to pay within one week those 
loans made on the 9th and 10th of December? 
Mr. Podell: I object, as that is not prov-
ing the entire arrangement, and, further-
more, the arrangement is evidenced in writ-
ing by the documents which are already in 
evidence, and it calls for this witness' con-
clusion of what that whole arrangement 
was. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Q. Read the question back. (Question repeated 
as recorded.) A. I did not know that there was an 
arrangement. 
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Q. You did not know that? A. No. 
Q. You did not know that at the time, or you do 
not remember it now? A. I do not remember it 
now. 
Q. You do not remember that Stern was to pay 
back $125,000 to you, one week after the 9th or 
10th of December, 1924? A. Whether it was ex-
actly one week, I do not recall. I do recall that it 
should have been paid back before the 31st of De-
cember. 
Q. Do you not know that it was on the 16th of 
December, 1924, that this sum was to be repaid? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. Will you read this letter, Exhibit 74, please 
(handing to witness). Now, I ask you to read Ex-
hibit 73 (handing to witness). Now, is your recol-
lection refreshed at all on the question of when this 
$125,000 loaned on the 9th and 10th of December, 
1923, was to have been paid? A. Yes. 
Q. When was it to have been paid? A. Before 
the 23rd of December. 
Q. On December 16th? A. It was afterwards 
agreed that it would be paid between 
Q. I know that. But it was first agreed that it 
should have been paid on December 16th? A. Ac-
cording to this paper, yes. 
Q. Well, does not that refresh your recollection 
as to it? A. I didn't go through the details so I 
cannot just answer every detail. 
Q. Who did go through the details of this? A. 
The president of the company. 
Q. That was Mr. Von Goeben? A. Mr. Von 
Goeben. 
Q. And when you passed upon this loan of De-
cember 23rd, you did not go into this detail? A. 
I did not go into this detail. 
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Q. Mr. Von Goeben went into this detail for 
you? A. Into this detail of writing the letter? 
Q. As to when this loan ought to be paid then? 
A. He submitted this paper and then we agreed 
what should be written, and he wrote the letter. 
Q. Then, do you not remember that on December 
16th, 1924, Stern was supposed to have paid 
$125,000? A. According to this letter, yes. 
Q. You do not remember of your recollection? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you know it at the time; did you know 
at the time about this arrangement on this $125,000 
loaned on the 9th and 10th of December? A. I re-
member I had given instructions that I wanted to 
have the money back until Christmas. 
Q. That you wanted it back on the 16th? A. I 
didn't state that fixed date. 
Q. You remember that? A. That fixed date, I 
don't remember. 
Q. But you remember that you wanted it back 
in a short time? A. I wanted to have the accounts 
cleaned up before Mr. Von Goeben left. 
Q. When did you first know that Mr. Von Goeben 
was going to leave? A. That he was going to 
leave? 
Q. Yes. A. The beginning of November. 
Q. And when did he leave? A. On the 31st of 
December. 
Q. And do you know where he went when he left 
your concern? A. That day, yes. 
Q. Where did he go? A. To Fred Stern & Com-
pany. 
Q. Into their employ? A. Into their employ. It 
may have been on the 30th. 
Q. Now, when you made this loan on December 
23rd, loan 111, the last one, and you passed upon 
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that, had you caused any investigation to be made 
as to where the merchandise was that was de-
scribed in trust receipts 107 to 110? A. No. 
Q. Whose duty would it have been to make that 
investigation, if anyone's? A. If there was any, 
our president's duty. 
Q. Well, can you say whether it was his duty or 
not; did you expect it of him? A. I didn't spe-
cifically expect him to check up just this one. In a 
general way, yes. 
Q. Did you expect him to check up the exist-
ence of the merchandise covered by the trust re-
ceipts described in the trust receipts? A. No. 
Q. You did not expect him to? A. No. 
Q. To find out whether there was any merchan-
dise covered in the trust receipts? A. No. 
Q. You just took Stern's word for the fact that 
there was that merchandise? A. Yes. 
Q. Did you ask him whether he checked up to 
see whether there were any sales contracts with 
the people named in the trust receipts? A. I don't 
recall that I asked him. 
Q. Did you expect it of him? A. Not neces-
sarily. 
Q. You were just willing to take Stern's word 
for the fact that he had resale contracts with these 
people? A. Yes. 
Q. Mentioned in the trust receipts? A. Yes. 
Mr. Podell: I do not know that counsel 
wants to leave that impression, your Honor. 
We sent copies of the assignment of each ac-
count. 
Mr. Marshall: That was later. I under-
stand that. This was upon the receipt of 
the trust receipt I am talking about. 
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Q. At the time you made the advances against 
the trust receipts, you made no investigation? A. 
No. 
Q. You trusted to Stern's word that the sales 
had been made? A. We trusted also to the state-
ment that he was worth a million. 
Q. Mr. Schlubach, did I ask you anything about 
that statement? A. No. 
Mr. Podell: I submit, your Honor, coun-
sel ought not to quarrel with the witness, be-
cause 
Mr. Marshall: For volunteering. 
Mr. Podell: It is a perfectly fair answer. 
Mr. Marshall: May I continue, your 
Honor. 
The Court: Yes, sir. 
Q. Did I ask you anything about that statement? 
A. No. 
Q. Was there anything in the statement re-
ferring to these resale contracts that were described 
in trust receipt 111? A. May I ask in which state-
ment? 
Q. In the statement you referred to, pointing to 
the one before you. A. The financial statement? 
Q. Yes. Is there anything? A. No. 
Q. Why do you always tell me that you relied 
on that statement also? 
Mr. Podell: I object to that. He does not 
always tell him that, your Honor. He has 
mentioned it for the first time this after-
noon, and he may have mentioned it a dozen 
times. 
Mr. Marshall: I will withdraw that ques-
tion. 
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Q. Have you been told by anybody that it is im-
portant for von to show that you relied upon this 
statement? A. No. 
Q. Did not discuss it with anybody? A. I did 
it on my own accord. 
Q. You did not discuss that with your counsel? 
A. I did discuss all—many questions with my coun-
sel. 
Q. Did you not discuss this with your counsel, 
on the reliance? A. I pointed out myself that I 
completely relied upon this. 
Q. Did you discuss with counsel whether it was 
important to your case whether you relied on that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Yes. Now, Mr. Schlubach, you did rely on 
Stern's statement on December 23rd, 1924, that he 
had made these sales referred to in the application 
for loan 111? A. Will you kindly read the ques-
tion? 
(Question repeated as recorded.) 
The Witness: Yes. 
Q. And you did rely on the statement contained 
in the trust receipt, that there was merchandise de-
scribed in that trust receipt? A. Yes, 
Q. And you knew on December 23rd, that the in-
voices due on the loan made November 25th, had 
not all been delivered to your company? A. Yes. 
Q. And you knew also that Stern had not paid 
back the money on loans 107 to 110 on the day that 
he had agreed to pay them back? A. Yes. 
Q. And, in spite of that, you went on and loaned 
$40,000 on December 23rd? A. Yes, 
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Redirect examination by Mr. Podell. 
Q. Now, you said something here, when you were 
asked about relying on Stern's statements and look-
ing to Stern to pay, if there was no collection of 
accounts receivable. I want to ask you 
Mr. Marshall: I omitted one question. 
Mr. Podell: Go ahead. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Now, I remember you saying—let us see if I 
get this right—on direct examination, that due to 
some other reasons you asked Von Goeben especial-
ly about the financial condition of Stern in Octo-
ber, 1924. 
Mr. Podell: He did not say that. 
The Witness: Mr. Von Goeben tendered 
his resignation. 
Mr. Podell: I object to an improper sum-
mary. He said on another occasion, as I 
understand it. You asked him about March, 
and he is telling about some other time. 
Mr. Marshall: May I ask him whether he 
said for some other reason he asked 
The Witness: Reasons in that respect, 
that Mr. Von Goeben had tendered his resig-
nation, and that is why I wanted to be quite 
sure that everything was in good order. 
Q. And as Von Goeben had resigned from your 
firm at about that time you wanted to make a spe-
cial inquiry as to what his opinion was of Stern's 
financial condition? A. Yes. 
Q. And it was in connection with that that he 
told you that Stern had told him that he had made 
so much money during the year 1924? A. Yes. 
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Mr. Podell: And when was that? 
The Witness: That must have been the 
beginning of November or the end of October. 
Foreman of Jury: Your Honor, I do not 
know whether I am allowed to ask a ques-
tion. 
The Court: I will tell you when I hear it 
whether it can be answered or not. 
Foreman of Jury; Had all the prior bills 
been paid until the date? 
The Court: Yes, you can ask that. 
Mr. Podell: All the bills prior to what? 
The Court: Had all the bills prior to 
these unpaid loans which they had received 
been promptly paid? 
The Juror: This particular three items, 
When they advanced the $40,000 there was 
a question the man has not paid his bills 
promptly, because it was supposed to be paid 
on the 16th, I understand, and he didn't pay 
that. Did he pay prior to that, the bills? 
The Court: All other bills prior to that? 
The Juror: Yes. 
The Court: Had they been promptly 
paid? 
The Juror: Yes. 
The Court: All of the bills? 
The Juror: I don't say that. 
The Court: The general run, had they 
been promptly paid? 
The Juror: On the date. 
The Witness: They were assigned on 
those dates. In some cases these did not 
come in as promptly as we expected them to 
come in; there was sometimes a delay, a 
little small delay or a larger delay, but they 
were always paid. 
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The Juror: You mean from the cus-
tomers? 
The Witness : Yes. There was, for in-
stance, accounts receivable of goods sent in-
to the interior, further away from New 
York, and the amounts, they wouldn't come 
in very often right the very day that they 
were due; there was a delay sometimes. 
The Juror: This particular bill—were 
they supposed to be paid from Stern? 
The Court: These three? 
Mr. Podell: I think I can clear that up 
with a series of questions I intend to ask. I 
have it on my list. I will get the exact facts 
and then if the juror would like to ask an-
other question, he may. See if I can bring 
out the facts and then if you have any other 
questions, you can ask them. 
The Juror: All right. 
Redirect examination by Mr. Podell. 
Q. There has been reference made here to the 
loan of $100,000 and then $25,000 in December, I 
think it was? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, was there any difference in the way that 
loan was made, that is, trust receipt, accounts re-
ceivable, and so forth? A. No. 
Q. As compared with all previous loans? A. No. 
Q. Done exactly the same. And did you expect 
to receive that money from the assigned accounts? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Just as you had done in the past? A. Yes. 
Only we wanted assigned accounts which were due 
shortly. 
Q. And you did collect some of that money from 
assigned accounts? A. We did. 
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Q. Now, before those assigned accounts were 
due, was Mr. Stern personally asked—you said, I 
think, before Christmas or before December 31st, 
he should clean up that account personally, that 
very money that was due on assigned accounts? 
A. Whether he was asked personally to clean up? 
Q. Yes. A. Yes. 
Q. And did he say that he would try to do that 
by the 16th of December? A. Well, I don't recall 
the date exactly, but 
Q. Well, that is in a letter? A. Yes. 
Q. Then, did he ask for a week's extension of 
time in order to pay that, and that was granted? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Well, in any event, at that time, by the 16th 
of December, the $100,000 and the $25,000 had al-
ready been advanced, had it not? A. Yes, 
Q. And the advance had been made on trust re-
ceipts and on accounts that he was supposed to 
assign? A. Indeed. 
Q. And some of them he did assign? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, what the juror, I think, would like to 
know is whether before that transaction where he 
was advanced $100,000, on the previous transac-
tions, had all of the assigned accounts been paid? 
A. To my knowledge, yes. 
Q. Now, were they always paid promptly as 
promised? A. As promptly as we could expect. 
Q. As promptly as you could reasonably expect ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you had occasions when you had to wait 
a week or ten days? A. Yes. 
Q. Was it anything unusual for either Stern or 
the account to be delayed a week or ten days? A. 
No. 
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Q. That had happened before? A. Yes, that had 
happened before. 
The Court: Does that clarify what you 
wanted, sir? 
The Juror: Yes. 
Mr. Podell: There is only one thing I 
want to ask—you say all the previous ac-
counts had been paid. And, your Honor, I 
cannot help referring to this. 
Q. I suppose that includes some of the accounts 
where you had collected money and afterwards 
had to pay back some of it? A. Oh, yes. 
Q. And did you have to pay back 
Mr. Marshall: There is nothing in the 
evidence, I understand, about paying back. 
The Court: Not yet. It is just a matter 
that will come out, 
Mr. Podell: I do not think it would be a 
correct statement unless I had that in, that 
is all. 
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: May I have that question? 
(Question repeated as recorded.) 
Q. Now, Mr. Schlubach, of course, you have 
stated that you did rely upon the accounts receiv-
able? A. Yes. 
Q. That you relied in a measure on this paper 
which you called this trust receipt? A. Yes. 
Q. And that you relied on statements that Von 
Goeben made and on some statements that Stern 
made? A. Yes. 
Q. Now I ask you whether in spite of the fact 
that you relied on all these things if at any one 
of these transactions that have been spoken of you 
9 9 5 
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had been informed that Stern was bankrupt 
whether you would have done any business with 
him? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that. 
The Court: I will allow it. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
Q. What is your answer? A. No. 
Q. If you had been informed that Stern had on 
his records accounts that had been assigned to dif-
ferent people, the same account, would you have 
done business with him? 
Mr. Marshall: Same objection. 
The Court: Same ruling. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
A. No. 
Q. If you had been informed that a suspicious 
entry for $706,000 was on his books, unsupported 
by supporting books, would you have done busi-
ness with a man of that kind? 
Mr. Marshall: Same objection. 
The Court: Same ruling. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
A. Certainly not. 
Q. If you had been informed that accounts re-
ceivable of his were long overdue, in the hundreds 
of thousands of dollars, and had been included in 
the financial statement, would you have done busi-
ness with a man like that? 
Mr. Marshall: Same objection. 
The Court: Same ruling. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
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Mr. Marshall: I assume that your 
* 
Honor understands that the record does not 
show that these matters have been brought 
out yet. 
Mr. Podell: Of course, we intend to sup-
ply the proof. 
The Court: General objection has been 
taken, subject to connection. In other 
words, all these facts must be established 
by the accountants. We have not had them 
yet at all. If they are to be established at 
all. And taken subject to such evidence. 
Mr. Marshall: And I move to strike out 
this evidence because in any event there is 
no duty upon the accountants after the bal-
ance sheet to do anything. 
The Court: I do not hear you, Mr. Mar-
shall. 
Mr. Marshall: I say, there is no duty 
upon the accountants after they have sub-
mitted and finished the balance sheet to do 
anything. 
The Court: Objection overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
Q. Now, had you been informed even of this, 
Mr. Schlubach, that when these accountants first 
looked at the books they found that the inventory 
of $131,000 had been padded to $370,000, would 
you have done business with a man who did that 
sort of thing? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to the word 
"padded." 
The Court: Sustained. 
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Q. Had been exaggerated. 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that. 
The Court: That is a question that I 
will take subject to connection. 
Mr. Podell: Subject to the proof. I will 
show that. 
Mr. Marshall: To say that it was padded 
or exaggerated is to characterize it. 
The Court: I think it would be better if 
you say the inventory had been reduced. 
Q. If you had been informed that the man's 
original inventory to the accountants as given was 
for three hundred and seventy odd thousand, and 
that the accountants after looking into those rec-
ords reduced it to $131,000, by over a quarter of a 
million dollars, or thereabouts, would you have 
done business with a merchant who does that sort 
of thing? A. I guess not. 
Mr. Marshall: That sentence is not very 
good—that question. 
The Court: You guess not. Which is it? 
The Witness: I would not. 
Q. Would you have done business with a man 
who did that sort of thing? A. I would not. 
Q. You have made some reference here to the fact 
that Mr. Von Goeben was going with Fred Stern 
& Company. When did you first hear of that? 
A. If I remember right, the very last days of De-
cember. 
Q. When had Von Goeben given you his resig-
nation? A. The first days of November. 
Foreman of Jury : 1924? 
The Witness: 1924. 
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Mr. Marshall: And continued with the 
company still? 
Q. When was Von Goeben's resignation to take 
effect? A. It was of the 12th of November, to take 
effect as of the 31st of December, 1924. 
Q. And to your knowledge did Von Goeben 
think or believe that he was going to have a real 
opportunity with Stern & Company? A. No. He 
only mentioned that he might have a chance to 
improve his salary and position. 
Q. His present salaried position? A. Yes. 
Q. Did he make, to your knowledge, as a condi-
tion of his going with Fred Stern & Company— 
did he say to Fred Stern that he would have to 
have an additional statement from Touche, Niven 
& Co. before he would accept any connection with 
them? A. Yes. 
Q. And was such a statement sent up by Touche, 
Niven & Co.? A. That is what Von Goeben told me. 
Mr. Marshall: Did he tell you, he, Mr. 
Von Goeben, was promised by Touche, Niven 
& Co., or by Stern? 
The Witness: By Stern. 
Mr. Podell: Let us see. My impression 
was it was by Touche, Niven & Co. 
Q. Now, at that time was there any question 
in your mind but what Von Goeben believed that 
this statement that had been furnished repre-
sented the true and honest condition of Fred Stern 
& Company? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Mr. Podell: If your Honor will just in-
dulge me one second, I want to find that 
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part. Now, to avoid any possible confu-
sion—I was in error about that, your Honor. 
I was in error about it. If counsel wishes, 
I will read Von Goeben's statement to him, 
what that was. 
Mr. Marshall: No objection. 
The Court: The witness answered it. 
Mr. Podell: Von Goeben was asked 
Mr. Marshall: I would welcome his read-
ing it, What page is that? 
Mr. Podell: Page 238. 
Now, Von Goeben was asked: 
"Q. Was any other statement given to 
you by Mr. Stern as to the financial condi-
tion of the Stern Corporation? A. No. 
When I spoke to Mr. Stern, or rather when 
he had a conference, I told him I would re-
quest a statement for the year of 1924." 
That is about the matter of his employ-
ment. 
"And he then proposed to close the books 
November 30th, so that Touche-Niven would 
have the month of December in making up 
their report." 
That is 1924. "And it was agreed that 
after the receipt of that statement I should 
join the firm. He told me he had made 
in 1924, up to November, approximately 
$240,000, bringing the capital up to $1,-
300,000." 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Now, as a matter of fact, you have been 
asked some questions here about this trust receipt. 
Quite regardless of what name you give that pa-
per, was it your understanding or arrangement or 
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practice with Mr. Stern that this money that you 
were advancing was to he used in paying for this 
merchandise? A. Was to be used to pay for such 
merchandise, yes. 
Q. So that he certainly did not have any mer-
chandise on hand at the time you advanced the 
money to him? A. No. 
Q. Could he very well give you any assigned ac-
counts until he had made shipments of that mer-
chandise? A. He could not. 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as calling 
for the witness' conclusions. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, he has been 
asked considerable about the practice in the 
business. 
The Court: I understand that. 
Mr. Podell: The jury should understand. 
At least probably most of them do, but we 
are not all engaged in that business. 
The Court : I appreciate it. I am not 
myself. 
Mr. Podell: They should understand the 
reason for the delay of three or four weeks 
before the assigned account would be sent 
over to him, and that is all I am inquiring 
about. I have no other purpose. 
The Court: I think we have it pretty 
clear and I think the jury has it pretty 
clear. 
Mr. Podell: If your Honor thinks it is 
clear, I shall not ask another question 
about it. 
Q. You have been asked a series of questions 
here about the pledged assets, pledged accounts. 
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As a matter of fact, can anyone get a letter of 
credit, or is it not customary when you do get 
letters of credit, that you must pledge something 
or have the cash on hand at the bank for the let-
ter of credit; is not that right? I mean, when 
you go to a hank for a letter of credit, does not 
the bank have to get the credit before it issues the 
letter? A. Give the credit, of course, before you 
get the letter, yes. 
Q. So that that ties up a certain sum of money, 
does it not, when the bank issues a letter, that 
there is a credit in its account? A. Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that. That is 
not accurate. 
The Court: That does not mean that the 
money would have to be put up, however. 
Q. Well, does it not? A. No. 
Q. What does it mean? A. The credit would 
have been put up. 
Q. Of what nature? 
The Court: The bank may give it to you 
just on your good name? 
Mr. Podell: That is right. 
Q. But if the bank does not give it to you on 
your good name, you have to put up the collateral? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, what is the customary and usual prac-
tice with regard to importers and exporters? Do 
they not, as a rule, have to pledge a great deal in 
that business all of the time? A. They have. 
Mr. Marshall: Certainly. 
Mr. Podell: I am glad we agree. That 
does not often happen. 
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Q. Now, have you observed also in your dealings 
with Mr. Stern, that a number of these so-called 
contracts for the purchase of rubber from abroad, 
that his practice was to make contracts of resale 
just as soon as he could? A. Yes. 
Q. In fact, is not that the principal business of 
importers and exporters? A. It is. 
Q. And when they do not do that, they are taking 
what they call a position in the market, are they 
not? A. Yes. 
Q. That is in the nature of a gamble, is it not? 
A. Or speculation. 
Q. Or speculation. You do not like the word 
"gamble"? A. No. 
Q. And then that will be subject to possible 
chance of loss in fluctuation? A. Yes. 
Q. Where a careful importer who sells at a profit 
and buys thereafter is on reasonably safe ground? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If he sells to good houses? A. Yes. 
Q. And these certainly were all good houses, 
were they not? A. Yes. 
Mr. Podell: I am omitting a good deal 
here, your Honor, so we can save time. 
Q. What are the usual datings and terms in the 
rubber business; do you know? A. Of sales? 
Q. Yes. A. Cash against delivery, or terms. 
Q. What are they? A. Manufacturers, up to 
thirty days. 
Q. About thirty days? A. Yes. 
Mr. Podell: Will you let me have Touche-
Niven's statement for 1922? 
Q. You were asked some questions about the 
operating profit of Stern. I mean, you were asked 
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on examination of that statement whether Stern 
had shown operating profit for the year 1923. Was 
there on your files, to your knowledge, a copy of 
the 1922 statement? A. No. 
Mr. Marshall: You could not compare it 
because you did not have it? 
The Witness: No. 
Mr. Podell: Now, has the 1922 statement 
prepared by Touche, Niven & Co. been 
marked in evidence? 
Mr. Marshall: Statement of Stern? 
Mr. Podell: Statement of Fred Stern & 
Company. 
Mr. Marshall: It has not been put in 
evidence. I will be glad to have it. 
(Received in evidence and marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 75.) 
Mr. Podell: I think—see if I am correct 
in my statement—capital and surplus ac-
count, as shown in the statement prepared 
for the year 1922 by Touche, Niven & Co., of 
Fred Stern & Company, shows $974,304; 
am I right? Capital and surplus. Net 
worth increased, according to these two 
statements, increased over $100,000 during 
1923. 
Mr. Marshall: Only $100,000? 
Mr. Podell: Only $100,000. That is all. 
Mr. Marshall: I would like to ask a 
couple of questions. 
Recross-examination by Mr. Marshall. 
Q. You would not say, would you, Mr. Schlu-
bach, that the mere fact that there was a large re-
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duction in the inventory of a concern, would make 
you think that that 'concern was carrying on a 
fraudulent business? A. No. 
Q. You did not mean to give the jury that im-
pression? A. No. 
Q. Or that the mere fact that inventory adjust-
ments were made so as to reduce the inventory 
considerably, would make you refuse to give credit 
to a concern? A. No. 
Q. Now, you said, I believe, you knew that most 
merchandise shipped from abroad is covered by 
bills of lading, did you not? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And after the merchandise gets off the ship 
and is on the dock, there is either a warehouse re-
ceipt or a dock delivery order given for it, is there 
not? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, when you advanced this money for the 
purchase of this merchandise, did you ever ask for 
either a bill of lading covering the merchandise or 
a dock delivery order? A. No. 
Q. Or a warehouse receipt? A. No. 
Redirect examination by Mr. Podell. 
Q. As a matter of fact, was not the very essence 
of your arrangement that he was to take this very 
merchandise and ship it to his customers? A. Yes. 
Q. And give you the accounts receivable? A. 
Yes. 
Q. And most of this merchandise had already 
been sold? A. Yes. 
Q. So that he could not very well give it to you, 
could he? A. No. 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as calling 
for a conclusion, and move to strike it out. 
The Court : Strike it out. 
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Q. Does not this matter of the reduction of the 
inventory, is not that a matter of degree, Mr. 
Schlubach? Did it make a difference to you if a 
man had an inventory of $10,000 and reported it 
to be $100,000? A. It would, yes. 
Q. Or if a man has an inventory of $131,000? A. 
Yes. 
Q. And his accountants found he reported it to 
them at $340,000, would that make any difference? 
A. Yes, it would make a difference. 
Q. Would you consider that in connection with 
the reliability of a man, such a thing? A. I would 
ask for an explanation. 
Q. If you knew about it, I say, if you were told 
about it? A. If I knew about it. 
Q. This statement does not tell you anything 
about it, does it? A. No. It does not explain any-
thing. 
Recross-examination by Mr. Marshall. 
Q. You have seen a great many balance sheets, I 
think you said? A. Yes. 
Q. At least a hundred? A. I would not account 
exactly for the one hundred. 
Q. And you have seen a considerable number of 
balance sheets connected with your own concerns, 
have you not? A. Yes. 
Q. Concerns with whom you have been con-
nected? A. Yes. 
Q. Did they show the reductions in inventory 
that the accountants may have made? A. Yes. 
Q. Did the balance sheets themselves show the re-
ductions of inventory? A. Balance sheet reduc-
tions of inventories against former balance sheets, 
yes. 
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Q. No. 
The Court: After reduction of inventory, 
did the balance sheet show? 
Q. When you see an inventory item in the bal-
ance sheet, does it ever show the amount that the 
accountants always reduced the inventory from the 
inventory carried on the books? A. No. 
Q. So that you would not expect to see on a bal-
ance sheet the amount the inventory may have been 
reduced by the accountants, would you? A. No. 
On the balance sheet itself, no. 
Q. If you were interested in the fact that the in-
ventory had been reduced, you would have had to 
ask someone else, the accountants or Stern, in this 
case? A. Yes. 
Q. And you never did that, did you? A. No. 
Redirect examination by Mr. Podell. 
Q. Have you not very often seen financial state-
ments, Mr. Schlubach—with a lot of footnotes? A. 
Yes. 
Q. A lot of explanations? A. Yes. 
Q. Of just such items? A. Yes. 
Q. Items of inventory? A. Balance sheets, yes. 
Q. Do you know of a single case that has come 
within your experience among those one hundred 
of statements, where they have shown, where the in-
ventory had been reduced by a quarter of a million 
dollars on an actual inventory of $100,000? A. No, 
I do not know of any. 
Q. And if some note—do you find any notes or 
explanations of any kind in that statement? A. 
No. 
Q. Is it not very frequently that accountants in 
furnishing a financial statement, make notes and 
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give explanations? A. They would indicate some-
thing in the accompanying 
Mr. Marshall: Please, I am making an 
objection. I object to that, unless he shows 
some statement to which he refers. 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, Mr. Marshall 
asked this witness about the one hundred 
statements. I did not. 
The Court: I will allow it. 
Q. Do you find any qualifications or explana-
tions or notes or addenda? 
The Court: There are none on this state-
ment. 
Mr. Podell: There are none. I just want 
to ask one other question. You go ahead, 
Mr. Marshall. 
Mr. Marshall: No, I will wait for you. 
Mr. Podell: I think that is all. 
Recross-examination by Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Would you think that it was anything 
astonishing or unusual or suspicious, that an in-
ventory had been reduced 50 per cent.? A. If I 
was told, I would say yes. 
Q. You would say yes? A. Yes. 
Q. Something that should be inquired into? A. 
Yes. 
Q. Would you think that it might be dishonest? 
A. Not necessarily. 
Q. It would not be dishonest? 
Mr. Podell: He said not necessarily. 
Mr. Marshall: I understand. That is all 
at this time. 
Mr. Podell: That is all, sir. 
(Witness excused.) 
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Mr. Marshall: I will offer in evidence an 
exhibit in connection with this witness' tes-
timony. Mr. Podell said he would have no 
objection to it. 
Mr. Podell: Let me see it. 
(Handed to counsel.) 
Mr. Marshall: It is a statement of the 
high and low market prices of rubber be-
tween December, 1923, and January, 1925, 
and I would like to offer it in evidence. We 
have got it from a source which I think Mr. 
Podell will recognize. 
The Court: All right. 
Mr. Podell: We will concede, your 
Honor, if a witness were called, he would 
testify to these figures and that the witness 
would be qualified to testify to them. It 
will not necessitate Mr. Marshall calling 
anybody for this. If your Honor thinks it 
admissible at the proper time. This is part 
of his case. 
The Court: He is offering it now. 
Mr. Podell: I object to that at this time. 
Mr. Marshall: It is in connection with 
the testimony of this witness in which he 
said he did know to some extent the value 
in the rubber market, but could not quite re-
member. 
The Court: I think that would be your 
case. I will admit it now. 
Mr. Podell: I object to it. 
The Court: I do not mean as a matter of 
admission now. I am taking it as subject 
to Mr. Marshall's case when it comes; or 
mark it for identification, which would be 
better. You mean in relation to what the 
existing market was at that time? 
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Mr. Marshall: Yes. 
The Court: That is a matter which you 
may need to dispute the examination of this 
last witness. 
Mr. Marshall: I am not offering it for 
that purpose, but the witness said he did not 
have a clear recollection of the market, and 
in order to have it on the record 
Mr. Podell: The market went up, your 
Honor. I might just as well admit it. 
Mr. Marshall: It went down in the middle 
of the year. 
Mr. Podell: A little in the middle of the 
year, but away up at the end of the year. 
If Stern had been honest, he would have 
made a lot of money. 
The Court: Why not mark it in evidence 
then? 
Mr. Podell: We might just as well. 
The Court: You will note, Mr. Stenogra-
pher, that there is no objection now to the 
admission of that particular exhibit on the 
part of counsel for the plaintiff. 
(Received in evidence and marked De-
fendants' Exhibit F.) 
Mr. Marshall: I think it shows a fluctua-
tion between 20 cents a pound—between 
somewheres around 18 and 40 cents, in those 
fourteen months. 
Mr. Podell: Whatever that paper shows. 
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HORATIO W. MANNING , a witness called on behalf 
of the plaintiff, being first duly sworn, and stat-
ing that his address is 37 Bellville Turnpike, North 
Arlington, New Jersey, testified as follows: 
Direct examination by Mr. Podell. 
Q. Now, Mr. Manning, what was your connec-
tion with Ultramares Corporation? A. I was 
cashier. 
Q. And I think I stated here—you were present 
when I stated you wrote most of these letters and 
documents relating to these transactions with 
Stern; is that correct? A. Yes, that is correct. 
Q. You did; who are you with to-day? A. Harri-
son National Bank. 
Q. And in what capacity are you with them? A. 
Cashier of the bank. 
Q. You left Ultramares Corporation? A. I did. 
Q. Were you there throughout the year 1924? 
A. I was. 
Q. And at that time you were the cashier? A. 
I was. 
Q. With reference to these last trust receipts 
and accounts receivable, after Stern's death were 
you the one that made the investigation to find the 
rubber, if there was any rubber there with regard 
to those trust receipts? A. I did. 
Q. First, what did you find that he did with the 
money that Ultramares had given Stern? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to it as immate-
rial. 
Q. Did he use it to buy up rubber? 
Mr. Marshall: I think that is immaterial. 
The Court: Sustained. You mean what 
Stern did with it? 
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Mr. Podell: Yes. 
The Court: You did not get it back. 
Mr. Podell: Don't you think, your Honor, 
we would have the right to show he did not 
use that money to buy rubber with? 
The Court: I do not think it makes a 
particle of difference. It may inject some-
thing else in it, too. 
Mr. Podell: If they do not make a point 
of this thing, I have no purpose in it, but I 
do believe that if they do, we ought to be 
permitted to show that. 
The Court: Yes, I will permit you to 
show it if such a thing arises. 
Mr. Marshall: I don't exactly know what 
thing he is talking about. 
The Court: What Stern did with the 
money which he got from this plaintiff. 
Mr. Marshall: I do not know and do not 
care. 
The Court: Neither do I. 
Mr. Marshall: I have made the conten-
tion there was no rubber covering these 
trust receipts. 
Mr. Podell: The evidence thus far is that 
when he got this money, one of the last 
things brought out, that he got it on the 
understanding that he was going to go and 
pay for a certain quantity of rubber. 
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Podell: Now, if he never paid for that 
rubber, we could not very well be expected 
to get it. 
Mr. Marshall: I will withdraw my objec-
tion, your Honor. I have no objection to 
his asking the question. 
The Court: All right, go ahead. 
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By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Now, I am speaking now of the month of 
December, 1924. There were at least three ad-
vances—one for $100,000, one for $25,000, and then, 
toward the end of the month, one for $40,000. Did 
you inquire or examine from the records of Stern 
& Company, after his death, as to what he had done 
with those sums of money? A. I did. 
Mr. Marshall: This covers what trust 
receipt, please? 
Mr. Podell: Covering the last trust re-
ceipts. 
Mr. Limburg: 108 to 111. 
Q. What did you find he had done with those 
moneys? A. He used that money to pay bank obli-
gations. 
Q. Bank obligations? A. Yes. 
Q. Did he use any of it, from your investigations, 
to pay for any rubber? A. He did not. 
Q. Did you find any rubber—were you able to 
find any rubber applicable to those trust receipts? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Now, with regard to the accounts receivable, 
did you handle all the details of these transactions? 
A. I did. 
Q. Have you been advised that Mr. Marshall re-
quested you to be present in court? That is so, 
is it not, Mr. Marshall? I just want to bring out 
the fact. I have him primarily at your request 
and you may ask him any questions. 
Mr. Marshall: I do not know whether he 
is primarily at my request. I asked that he 
be here, yes, but you called him as your 
witness. 
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Mr. Podell: I called him as my witness 
and I assume full responsibility for what-
ever he tells you. 
Mr. Marshall: That is fine. Go ahead. 
The Court: Are there any questions of 
this gentleman, Mr. Marshall? 
Mr. Marshall: Yes, your Honor. 
Mr. Podell: Just a question. 
Q. You live in Jersey now? A. I do. 
Q. Is your bank in Jersey? A. The bank is in 
Jersey. 
Q. So that you were not subject to any subpoena? 
A. I was not. 
Cross-examination by Mr. Marshall. 
Q. You came at the request of your old friend, 
Mr. Deetjen? A. You always do things for your 
friends. 
Q. Now you say that 
Mr. Podell: Just one question, if you do 
not mind. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Did you personally have anything to do with 
the passing of credit? A. I had not. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. It was part of your duty, however, to keep 
track of the security that was received on the 
Ultramares Company's loans, was it not? A. It 
was. 
Q. Under whose direction did you attend to 
that? A. Mr. Von Goeben. 
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Q. Now, do you recollect whether Stern was a 
frequent visitor at Ultramares during the year 
1924? A. By "frequent," what would you mean? 
Q. Well, I will withdraw the question. About 
how often, would you say, Stern did come into 
Ultramares during 1924? A. I would say three or 
four times a month, to my knowledge. 
Q. And whom would he talk to when he was 
there? A. Principally Mr. Von Goeben. 
Q. Anybody else? A. He might talk to Mr. Van 
Duren, our import man. 
Q. Did he talk to you? A. Occasionally. 
Q. What did he talk about? A. Usually about 
his accounts. I would ask him whether or not this 
was due or that was due, or he would probably be 
inquiring. Just general questions. 
Q. The only thing he talked about? A. That was 
all to my knowledge. 
Q. Do you know what he talked about to Von 
Goeben? Were you ever present? A. Two or three 
times in Von Goeben's presence. 
Q. Did he talk about anything else to Von 
Goeben? A. He did not. 
Q. Did he ever talk about his business? A. 
Stern's personal business? 
Q. Yes. A. Positively. 
Q. Positively yes or no? A. Yes. We were 
engaged. 
Q. Do you remember what he said about his 
business? A. He said that he was doing a good 
business. 
Q. And he said that frequently during the year 
1924? A. That is a foolish question. 
Mr. Marshall: Well, now, if your Honor 
please 
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The Witness : I beg your pardon, but I 
could not recall every time what he would 
ask about his business, or something of that 
nature. 
Q. I did not ask you that, Mr. Manning. A. I 
will answer that with I do not recall. 
Q. Do you know whether he frequently discussed 
his business? You can answer that yes or no. 
Mr. Podell: Did he not answer that al-
ready by saying three or four times a month? 
Mr. Marshall: No. He said he came up 
there three or four times a month. 
The Witness: I would say yes, because 
his calls were not social. 
Q. You yourself were pretty friendly with Mr. 
Stern, were you not? A. Not friendly. I never 
knew him before we commenced business. 
Q. But after that you became pretty friendly? 
A. We did not, except in a business capacity. 
Q. That is the only relationship you had with 
him? A. That is the only relationship I had with 
him. 
Q. Did not ever ask him for favors? A. The only 
favor I ever received from him was to have him 
get me a tire from the General Rubber. 
Mr. Podell: He gave you a tire? 
The Witness: He got one for me at a 
reduced price. 
Q. He got two for you, did he not? A. Two 
tires. 
Q. He got two for Mr. Stempf, was it? A. I 
believe he did. 
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Q. You were not on bad terms, at any rate? A. 
Pardon me? 
Q. You were not on bad terms, at any rate? A. 
No. I would do the same for any other friend, 
a business acquaintance. 
Q. Anything to help a friend? A. Well, you 
would go and get a discount yourself, if you can. 
Q. I say, you would do anything to help a friend? 
Mr. Podell: Get a discount, yes, 
A. I would, yes, if it is within reason. 
Mr. Marshall: Your Honor, I think we 
can make progress if we go on to-morrow. 
The Court: This man is in a bank and 
he wants to get away and does not want 
to come back. 
Mr. Marshall: There are some papers I 
wanted I have to subpoena. I did not know 
Mr. Manning would be on to-day. 
Mr. Podell: What papers are those, Mr. 
Marshall? 
Q. Now, Mr. Manning, do you recall stating at 
any time, at any place, that these advances to 
Stern & Company were made upon security? A. 
I don't recall it, but perhaps in my remarks at 
various times I have stated that we had obtained 
trust receipts as security for our loan until the 
accounts receivable were obtained. 
Q. And that would be a true statement, would 
it? A. That would be a true statement. 
Q. And you still maintain that the loans were 
made upon the security of the trust receipts until 
the accounts receivable were assigned? A. That 
is true. 
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Q. And after that the accounts receivable stood 
as security? A. That is correct. 
Mr. Marshall: I am trying to eliminate 
things I covered with Mr. Schlubach that I 
thought I would have to take up with this 
witness, so I won't go as fast as I had hoped. 
Q. Do you know who prepared the form of trust 
receipt which is in evidence here? A. I do not. 
Q. Do you know whether you did or Stern did? 
A. We did not. It came from Stern's office. 
Q. But it was satisfactory to you? A. It was 
satisfactory to us. 
Q. Did you pass upon that alone or did Mr. Von 
Goeben pass upon it? A. Mr. Von Goeben also. 
Q. Do you know whether Mr. Schlubach passed 
upon it? A. I presume that he saw them. I 
couldn't say as a fact. 
Q. But you do not know whether he specifically 
passed upon the form? A. No. They were in the 
private office safe. 
Q. While we are waiting for that, do you re-
member whether Stern used to show you or Mr. 
Von Goeben the purchase contracts which he had 
and the sales contracts when you advanced the 
money? A. He did at times. 
Q. He did to begin with, did he not? A. Yes. 
Q. And about how long after the beginning of 
these loans did that practice discontinue? A. I 
should say that continued for several months. 
Q. But by October and November and December 
he was not any longer submitting his purchase and 
sales contracts? A. Not to my knowledge. 
Q. You would have been the man to see them, 
would you not? A. I didn't examine the purchase 
and sales contracts. 
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Q. But they would come through your hands? 
A. Ocassionally. 
Q. Well, you were the man who passed upon the 
security? A. No. I knew nothing concerning the 
rubber market. That was out of my jurisdiction 
and Mr. Von Goeben would pass upon the prices 
and the contracts. I was interested in the trust 
receipts and the accounts receivable. 
Q. I see. Now, did you ever investigate prior 
to Stern's bankruptcy whether there was any mer-
chandise which these trust receipts purported to 
represent? A. I did not. 
Q. At no time prior to his bankruptcy? A. At 
no time. 
Q. Did you ever investigate prior to the bank-
ruptcy whether there was rubber of any given de-
scription before you got the trust receipts or did 
you just take the trust receipts, stating so many 
tons of rubber, without description? A. I did not 
examine them. 
Q. You did not investigate the kind of rubber 
you were getting? A. I did not. 
Mr. Podell: Is it fair to suggest, your 
Honor, that most of this rubber was bought 
on the high seas? 
Mr. Marshall: I do not think it is fair 
to suggest that. 
Mr. Podell: All right, 
The Court: I do not know whether it 
was or not. It may have been on the dock. 
Q. Did you ever ask Stern for documents such 
as bills of lading or dock receipts covering this 
rubber? A. We did not. 
Q. Did you ever investigate whether this rubber 
had been pledged to anyone else? A. It could not 
1 0 6 7 
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have been pledged to anybody else because we re-
ceived the accounts receivable. 
Q. Did you ever investigate at the time you re-
ceived the trust receipts whether this rubber was 
pledged to anyone else? A. No. 
Q. Now, you trusted Stern's word for the fact 
that there was rubber covering this merchandise? 
A. We did. 
Q. And you assumed that this rubber was not 
pledged? A. We assumed that because he was to 
use our money to pay for the rubber. 
Q. That is, he said he was to use that money to 
pay for the rubber? A. That is correct. 
Q. You did not go out and watch Stern pay over 
any money for any rubber at any time, did you? 
A. We did not, 
Q. Now, when you got these trust receipts— 
may I have a form of trust receipt (handed to 
counsel). You notice, and you recall maybe, that 
at the bottom it says "Sold to So-and-so and So-
and-so" (handing to witness)? A. That is correct. 
Q. Did you ever communicate with those pur-
chasers before you sent them the assigned invoice? 
A. Only after the death of Stern. 
Q. But during the year 1924, did you ever com-
municate with these people to whom the rubber 
was supposed to have been sold, before you sent 
on assigned accounts? A. We did not, 
Mr. Podell: When? 
Q. Or the assigned invoices. You understood 
my question? A. I understood the question. We 
would have no occassion to. 
Mr. Podell: Immediately we received it, 
we sent it to the people who owed the money. 
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The Court: What he is asking is, in be-
tween—on a certain question of law that is 
involved here—whether in between the re-
ceipt of the trust receipts they ever made 
any inquiry if there was a delay in the de-
livery of the assigned bills, whether such a 
sale had been made to the Goodyear Rubber 
Company or the Ford Company. 
Mr. Podell: There was not one such in-
stance. There is not one dollar of loss we 
suffered by reason of that. 
The Court: I understand that. 
Mr. Podell: Every account that was re-
ceived—— 
The Court: That is on a point that Mr. 
Marshall is making, as to contributory neg-
ligence. 
Mr. Podell: I know. That is what he is 
trying to show. 
Q. You never found out, did you, at the time that 
you advanced the money, whether the accounts 
that he promised to assign in those trust receipts 
were good and genuine accounts? A. The accounts 
did not exist before the delivery of the rubber. 
Q. Mr. Manning, is it not a fact that you under-
stood at that time that this rubber was sold, that 
he had contracts to sell this rubber at the time you 
got the trust receipts? A. Sold under contract. 
Q. Yes, sold to the persons whose names appear 
on this trust receipt? A. That is true. 
Q. Did you ever communicate with the persons 
whose names appear on this trust receipt, at or 
before the time you advanced the money on it? 
A. We did not. 
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Q. That is all I want. Did you ever see a bal-
ance sheet of Stern's prepared as of sometime in 
the summer of 1924? A. I did not. 
Q. Or trial balance? A. I did not. 
Q. Statement of any kind? A. No. 
Q. Do you know whether Mr. Von Goeben had 
such a statement? A. At that time, no. 
Q. At any time after that? A. The only state-
ment I saw after Stern's death was the certified 
statement of Touche, Niven & Co. 
Q. Do you know whether Von Goeben at any 
time received a statement subsequent? 
The Court: In between, around August? 
The Witness: I do not. I do not know. 
Q. You knew in November, 1924, that Von 
Goeben had resigned? A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And you knew shortly after his resignation 
that he and his son were to go with Stern, did you 
not? A. I wouldn't say shortly after the resigna-
tion. It was unknown where they were going. 
That is, to the general office. 
Q. His son was also employed at Ultramares? 
A. He was. 
Q. You yourself did not pass upon the credit, 
as I understand it? A. I did not. 
Mr. Podell: Will it be stipulated, Mr. 
Marshall, that Touche, Niven & Co. audited 
the accounts of Stern & Company just once 
a year? That will save the necessity of ask-
ing any questions or calling any witnesses. 
Mr. Marshall: Once a year. I am per-
fectly willing that there should go in evi-
dence the four balance sheets that Touche, 
Niven & Co. prepared. 
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Mr. Podell: Touche, Niven & Co. pre-
pared four balance sheets and they were 
annual balance sheets as of December 31st. 
We have two in evidence. 
The Court: 1922 and 1923. 
Mr. Podell: Now, they prepared two 
others. 
Mr. Marshall: Yes. And I want to offer 
them. 
The Court: You said four balance sheets? 
Mr. Podell: Yes. 
The Court: As of 1923? 
Mr. Podell: I am wrong. I did not mean 
as of 1923. 
The Court: You mean for 1920, 1921, 
1922 and 1923? 
Mr. Podell: Yes, sir. 
The Court: But that they prepared no 
balance sheets in the interim between one 
and the other; just the annual one as of 
December 31st of each year? 
Mr. Podell: Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: I would like the other two 
to be admitted in evidence. 
Mr. Podell: I would like to see them be-
fore they are marked; subject to my exami-
nation, before they are marked. 
The Court: Subject to your examination. 
(Whereupon, at 4.10 o'clock P. M. ad-
journment was taken until to-morrow, Fri-
day, April 5, 1929, at 10 o'clock A. M.) 
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New York, April 5, 1929, 
10 o'clock, A. M. 
TRIAL CONTINUED. 
Same Appearances. 
HORATIO W . MANNING , witness on behalf of the 
plaintiff, resumed, further testified as follows: 
Cross-examination (continued) by Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Now, Mr. Manning, when we closed yesterday, 
I think you had testified that it was not your duty 
to pass upon credits; is that correct? A. That is 
true, yes. 
Q. That it was your duty, however, to check up 
and see that the security came in; that you handled 
the various documents that were supposed to be 
the security? A. That is correct. 
Q. Mr. Von Goeben did not attend to details 
such as that, did he? A. No. Matters that were 
under question we brought up to him. 
Q. Yes. But the general run of matters you 
would take care of? A. I would. 
Q. If there was any delay in the sending of se-
curities at any time, it would be you who would 
take up the matter, and not Mr. Von Goeben, in 
the first instance? A. I would call it to Mr. Von 
Goeben's attention and he would tell me to take 
it up with the office. 
Q. Yes. Now, did you at any time see or ask 
to see any bills of lading covering any of the mer-
chandise described in the trust receipts? A. I 
did not. 
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Q. Do you know whether Mr. Von Goeben did? 
A. I couldn't answer. 
Q. Did you at any time see or procure warehouse 
receipts covering any of the merchandise described 
in the trust receipts? A. None of this rubber was 
warehouse. 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, I object to that. 
The Court: I will allow the question. 
Q. So that you did not see any such warehouse 
receipts? A. I did not. 
Q. Did you at any time procure or see any dock 
delivery orders for any of this merchandise? A. 
We did not. 
Q. Now, in the beginning, you were pretty 
prompt, were you not, in calling to the attention 
of Stern any delay in the sending of these accounts 
receivable? A. We were prompt all through the 
entire course of procedure. 
Q. You remember that in one of the earliest in-
stances, five days after a loan you called his atten-
tion to the fact that the invoices had not yet been 
received? 
Mr. Podell: I object to that as not a cor-
rect summary of the contents of that letter. 
The letter was merely an inquiry as to when 
the invoices would be furnished. 
The Court: I think that is right. 
Mr. Marshall: Your Honor, it is an in-
quiry just the same as when they were 
Mr. Podell: Ask him for a date. 
Mr. Marshall: As to when it would be 
furnished, and it is five days after the loan 
they make that inquiry already. 
The Court: I understand. 
Mr. Marshall: I take an exception. 
1 0 8 5 
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By Mr. Marshall. 
Q;. Now, Mr. Manning, you wrote this letter, 
Exhibit B, did you not (handing to witness)? A. 
I did. 
Q. Did you ever make any attempt to follow that 
up and see that the description of the rubber was 
put in the applications for loans made by Stern? 
Mr. Podell: Is that letter in evidence? 
Mr. Marshall: That is Exhibit B. 
A. The descriptions were usually described— 
that is, the rubber was usually described in the 
sales contracts, which were shown to Mr. Von 
Goeben at the time. 
Q. So that you never insisted that it be described 
in the— A. Not in the trust receipt. 
Q. In the trust receipt? A. No. 
Q. Because Mr. Von Goeben saw the sales con-
tracts? A. Saw the sales contracts. 
Q. He did not, however, see all of the sales con-
tracts at the end, I understood you said yesterday? 
A. I don't believe all to the end. 
Q. So that at the end he would not, therefore, 
have any information as to the description of the 
rubber covered by all of these trust receipts? A. 
That I couldn't answer definitely. 
Q. Now, who was Mr. Stempf, who I think you 
mentioned yesterday had received two tires at a 
discount from Stern at the same time you did? A. 
Mr. Stempf was one of our men in Uutramares, 
employed in the import department. 
Q. Were you acquainted with the account of 
Fred Stern with Ultramares—were you at the 
time? A. The actual account I did not keep, but 
I saw the regular accounts current that were sent 
out. 
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Q. Do you recollect what the total interest 
charges were that were made? A. I do not. 
Q. IS there any way that you can refresh your 
recollection? 
Mr. Podell: The interest charges were 
never in excess of 6 per cent. per annum. 
The factor's commission was charged in ad-
dition. If counsel wants a stipulation as 
to that, I will be glad to give him exactly 
what it is. 
Mr. Marshall: I would be perfectly will-
ing to put it in the record just what the 
commission was. 
Mr. Podell: Now, your Honor, I have no 
objection to this detailed account being 
marked in evidence. These are marked in 
evidence, your Honor, with the bill of par-
ticulars, and we stipulate that the total ad-
vances, in the aggregate, of course, were 
$2,343,818.59; commission charge in the 
aggregate was $40,144.05. Now, I should 
like to couple that with the statement that 
that total of advances includes the equity, 
and that, I believe, we can show that at no 
time did our extension of credit to Fred 
Stern & Company exceed the sum of approxi-
mately $300,000. It was a revolving credit 
which in the end aggregated that total 
amount. That is correct, is it not? 
Mr. Marshall: I do not understand the 
last part. 
Mr. Podell: There was no one point 
where there was an advance of more than 
$300,000, and most of it was less. 
Mr. Marshall: I do not know anything 
about that. 
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The Court: It does not make very much 
difference one way or the other. 
Mr. Marshall: I offer this in evidence, 
then, as a summary of the previous exhibit, 
Mr. Podell: I am told by Mr. Limburg 
there was one occasion when they slightly 
exceeded $300,000, but in the main they were 
below that. 
(Received in evidence and respectively 
marked Defendants' Exhibits G and G-1.) 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Now, Mr. Manning, I understand that you at 
no time charged more than 6 per cent, interest. 
Is that correct, that that was your usual charge 
to Stern? A. That is correct. 
Q. Will you tell us from that sheet in front of 
you, Exhibit G-1, what 6 per cent. interest was on 
the moneys loaned? A. Aggregate amount? 
Q. Yes. A. $12,657.59. 
Q. And now will you tell us what 1 per cent. 
of that would be? 
The Court: 1 per cent. of what? 
Q. If 6 per cent. is that figure of $12,657.59, what 
would 1 per cent. be? A. One-sixth of that. 
Q. If that is interest at the rate of 6 per cent., 
what would interest at the rate of 1 per cent. be? 
Mr. Podell: I object to that, your Honor. 
The Court: One-sixth of that, I should 
think. 
Mr. Marshall: I should think so, your 
Honor, too. 
The Court: I will allow it. 
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Q. Will you calculate that, please? A. $2,109.59. 
Q. Now, if $2,109.59 is interest at the rate of 
1 per cent. per annum on the sums advanced, how 
many per cent. per annum would $40,144.05 be? 
Mr. Podell: Now, your Honor, is there 
any question that a factor has a right to 
charge a commission? If so, then there are 
about 100 factor concerns in this country 
that ought to go out of business as illegal. 
Every one of them charges a normal com-
mission, and there is no proof nor any claim 
in the defense or in the answer that we 
charged any excess commission, that we 
charged any more than the usual charge. 
Now, why inject an issue that has no basis, 
no foundation and no plea of any kind? The 
figures are here. Counsel can make any 
argument he chooses based upon the figures 
that are here. 
The Court: I think that is right. 
Mr. Marshall: This is just a graphic way 
of putting that fact before the jury. I think 
we are entitled to put it in to show that there 
was a great interest on the part of this com-
pany to maintain this account, as it was a 
good account and paying them well, and that 
is the purpose of this inquiry. 
The Court: Those are the figures, but I 
do not see the application of comparisons 
of interest. Objection sustained. 
Mr. Marshall: I am just showing the rate 
of the commission, that is all, your Honor. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. Will your 
Honor permit me to prepare a table to show 
this thing I am trying to show now? 
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The Court: Yes, you may prepare any 
table you like. 
Mr. Marshall: Is the Clerk of the United 
States District Court here? 
(No response.) 
Mr. Marshall: Have you got the plead-
ings in the case of Equitable Trust Company 
of Baltimore against Ultramares? 
Mr. Limburg: Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: May I have them? 
Mr. Limburg: Here is the complaint 
(handing). 
Mr. Marshall: And the answer? 
Mr. Limburg: Here is a copy (handing). 
The original is probably on file. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. I hand you copy of the answer Mr. Limburg 
assures me is a copy of the answer in the action 
in the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York entitled, "Equitable 
Trust Company of Baltimore against Ultramares 
Corporation," and I ask you whether you remember 
verifying that answer? A. I do. 
Mr. Marshall: I offer in evidence the 
complaint and answer in that action. 
Mr. Podell: May I see them? 
(Handed to counsel.) 
Mr. Podell: I object to it, your Honor, 
as having no materiality. I do not want to 
take the time to read it now. 
The Court: I do not hear you, Mr. Podell. 
Mr. Podell: I beg your pardon. I object 
to it as incompetent, irrelevant and immate-
rial to these issues; no bearing. 
The Court: What is the materiality? 
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Mr. Marshall: The materiality is, your 
Honor, that in this action the Equitable 
Trust Company of Baltimore claimed that 
certain accounts receivable 
Mr. Podell: I certainly object to a state-
ment in the presence of the jury what he 
claims. I have never seen those papers in 
my life, and they are very bulky, your Honor. 
The Court: Come up here. 
(Counsel confer with Court at Bench.) 
The Court: Mark them for identification 
now. 
(Marked Defendants' Exhibits H and I 
for Identification.) 
The Court: Is that all of this witness? 
Mr. Marshall: Just one moment, your 
Honor. I think that is all, your Honor. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Did you inquire, Mr. Manning, when the ad-
vances were made whether the ship which was 
named in the trust receipt as having the merchan-
dise or bringing the merchandise described in the 
trust receipt had arrived in New York or not? A. 
I did not. 
Q. In no instance? A. In no instance. 
Mr. Marshall: That is all. 
Redirect examination by Mr. Podell. 
Q. Mr. Manning, was there a single account re-
ceivable that had been assigned to your concern 
that was actually assigned that was not a correct 
and bona fide account ? A. There was not. 
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Q. All of them were collected? A. All were col-
lected. 
Q. Were there any accounts receivable that had 
been assigned to Ultramares—we are talking now 
of accounts receivable that had been assigned to 
anybody else. Do you know that? If you do not 
know, say so. 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as calling 
for a conclusion of the witness. 
The Court: I allow it. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
Q. Do you not? A. I do not. 
Q. You do not? A. No. 
Q. Mr. Manning, are you familiar with the usual 
factor's commissions? A. I am not. 
Q. Are you familiar with the charges made here 
by way of commissions? A. I am familiar with 
them only as they appear in the accounts current. 
Q. At the beginning your charge, as I have stated 
it, was one-half cent per pound of rubber for com-
mission? A. That is correct, 
Q. Was that subsequently modified? A. It was 
later reduced. 
Q. Reduced? A. Yes. 
Q. Now, in what way was it reduced? A. If I 
recall correctly, it was 1 per cent. of the total 
advance. 
Q. 1 per cent. of the advance? A. That is cor-
rect. 
Q. As the commission? A. As the commission. 
Q. That was figured on the amount of money 
actually advanced? A. That is correct. 
Q. Without regard to time limit? A. Without 
regard to time. 
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Q. So that it was 1 per cent. whether they kept 
the money three months or one month? A. Re-
gardless of the time outstanding. 
Q. It was based and figured on the amount ad-
vanced? A. That is correct. 
Q. And that proved to be less than a half cent 
per pound? A. It was. 
Recross-examination by Mr. Marshall. 
Q. And this 1 per cent. commission was charged 
even where the loan was to be outstanding for only 
a week, is that true? A. The same as if it was 
outstanding thirty days; the same commission, 
regardless of time. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. That included a service charge, did it not, for 
whatever services was rendered? A. That included 
all service charges. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. What services did you render Stern in this 
connection? A. The handling of the papers that we 
were sending out, the insuring of them, registra-
tion, and so on. 
Mr. Podell: Tell everything. You can-
not be heard. 
Mr. Marshall: May I conduct this exami-
nation? 
The Court: I cannot hear you. Won't 
you talk up? 
Mr. Marshall: Read the answer, please. 
(Answer repeated as recorded.) 
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By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. In other words, the mailing of these invoices 
to Stern's customers? A. That was correct. 
Q. That was your service? A. That was our 
service. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. You do not mean to say that was all your 
service. Didn't you have to keep books and ac-
counts of those items, this multitude of items? A. 
Naturally we had a lot of detail in connection with 
that. 
Q. That is what I want to know. Did you have 
to take out insurance? A. The insurance on the 
merchandise? 
Q. Yes. A. We did not. 
Q. What insurance did you have? A. The insur-
ance of registered letters where there were docu-
ments of importance. 
Q. How about your mailing of those invoices? 
Did you have to have clerical help for that? A. 
Yes. 
Q. What were the services that a factor usually 
renders? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that—what 
services a factor usually renders. We are 
discussing now what he claims $40,000 for 
doing. 
The Court: Tell us what you did. 
Mr. Podell: Nobody is making any point 
of that claim against Touche-Niven. Our 
statement has eliminated commission on 
amounts that were not paid. Since counsel 
injected the issue here of alleged claim of 
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excess charges, I think we have a right to 
show that he made no more than the usual 
factor's charges, whatever their services. 
Mr. Marshall: He said once before he 
did not know what the usual factor's charge 
was. Now he is asking him an entirely dif-
ferent question. He is asking him what the 
usual factor's services were. That is imma-
terial. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Tell us, please, what your concern had to do 
in the way of keeping records and taking care 
of this account in the office. 
The Court: I think we know that, Mr, 
Podell, the usual office things that take 
place, the entering and mailing out and the 
stamp they put on the envelope and the in-
surance for the security of the papers. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. You kept those records for your own benefit, 
didn't you? A. Yes. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Who forwarded the bills of lading to the cus-
tomers? A. We forwarded the railroad bills to 
the customers. 
Q. And who arranged for the weight certificates? 
A. The weight certificates were arranged by Stern. 
Q. And who arranged for the registration? A. 
We arranged for that. 
Q. And did you have a bookkeeping staff? A. 
Yes. 
1 1 1 5 
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Q. In connection with these multitudinous ac-
counts? A. We did. 
Mr. Podell: I want to offer in evidence 
a tabulated statement as .far as we have gone 
of the 104 items 
Mr. Limburg: It is complete—— 
Mr. Podell: The complete tabulation of 
the 111 accounts, showing the date of the 
loan, the date of the assignment of accounts 
and the date of payment. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. In addition to those things that you men-
tioned, were there any legal services connected with 
these matters? A. There were no legal services. 
Q. Who passed on the forms of document? 
Mr. Marshall: He already testified. 
A. Those were passed on 
Mr. Podell: We won't discuss that. I 
offer that in evidence. 
Mr. Marshall: Subject to confirmation, I 
have no objection. 
The Court: All right. 
(Received in evidence and marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 76.) 
Mr. Podell: Now, gentlemen of the jury, 
I do not know whether it is entirely clear 
to you 
Mr. Marshall: Do you think this is the 
time to read it? 
The Court: He is not going to read it, 
Mr. Podell: This gives the date of loan, 
April 5, 1924; the date of assignment, April 
1118 
1 1 1 9 
374 
1120 Horatio W. Manning—For Plaintiff—Recross. 
2, 1924. That is the assignment of account 
(referring to Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 76). 
The date of payment, April 27, is shown. 
Now, here you have one of April 7, and you 
have got the assignment 4, 19 and 17, and 
payments were made. You will see over 
here the different dates of assignment after 
the date of the loan and the accounts. They 
are all tabulated. I think that will give you 
the date that we discussed the other day, as 
to each one of the 111 loans, the same items. 
Mr. Marshall: May I ask another ques-
tion, your Honor? 
The Court: Yes. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. I understand you to say, Mr. Manning, that 
you did get some railway receipts for the merchan-
dise? A. Railroad bills of lading. 
Q. Railroad bills of lading? A. Yes. 
Q. That was after their being shipped to the 
customer? A. After the rubber had been prepared 
for shipment to the customer. 
Q. After they had been taken off the ship? A. 
Yes. 
Q. So that you did have these bills of lading? 
A. We did. 
Q. You were interested in keeping records of 
these payments for your own sake, were you not, 
to check up and see that your security was coming 
in? A. We were. 
Q. So that in any event, no matter what security 
you had received, you would have to keep books, 
would you not? A. We did. 
Q. You would have to do so no matter what they 
had given you for security? A. We would have 
had it. 
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Q. That was the way in which you got your pay-
ment, was it not, from these customers? A. From 
the accounts receivable. 
Mr. Marshall: Yes. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. That is the first time I ever heard of the 
questioning of the propriety of that. There is 
nothing in the answer whatever about it. These 
bills of lading that you sent to customers, of course, 
your accountant sent them only when the accounts 
had been actually assigned to you? A. Yes, they 
were attached to the accounts. 
Q. The attachments were? A. Attached to the 
assigned accounts. 
Q. And you got bills of lading after the accounts 
had been assigned? A. We did. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. You insisted upon sending those out your-
selves? A. We always did. 
Q. You wanted to make sure that you had these 
accounts receivable in your own hands and sent 
out by you and not by Stern? A. As the party 
who received the money. 
The Court: All right. 
(Witness excused.) 
Mr. Marshall: I do not know whether 
this is the time, your Honor, but I would 
like to put in evidence the date of arrival 
of the vessels named in these trust receipts 
107 to 111, the date of arrival in New York. 
Mr. Podell: I object. 
The Court: Sustained. 
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Mr. Marshall: May I understand your 
Honor's ruling. Your Honor's ruling is that 
it is irrelevant or immaterial? 
The Court: I am ruling that it is not 
proof of the arrival of this merchandise on 
those steamers. 
Mr. Marshall: Ishall not offer it for that, 
your Honor. That is what I wanted to make 
certain. I was offering it as proof of the 
fact that the vessel named in that trust re-
ceipt had in almost every instance here ar-
rived a few days before the date of the appli-
cation for a loan, and therefore they could 
have gone to that vessel or that dock and 
found out whether there was any merchan-
dise there. That is my point. 
Mr. Podell: After the arrival, how do you 
know that she had not sailed again? 
Mr. Marshall: The merchandise would 
have been on the dock. They could have 
found whether she arrived with the mer-
chandise. 
The Court: I do not know whether it was 
or not. 
Mr. Marshall: They could have inquired 
whether the merchandise was on the vessel 
after she had arrived. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Mr. Marshall: I take an exception. I 
understand, so that we may get this clear, 
this is not objected to on the ground that 
proof is incompetent? 
Mr. Podell: Oh, yes, objected to on all 
grounds. I will make no stipulation with 
regard to that. 
1 1 2 7 
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Mr. Marshall: All right, I will get some-
body to testify so as to remove the question 
of competency. 
The Court: All right, sir. 
Mr. Podell: I would like to read, your 
Honor, or rather offer in evidence, the tes-
timony of Mr. Alexander Von Goeben that 
was examined by and on behalf of the trus-
tee—it is Alexander Von Goeben that was 
examined on behalf of the trustee in bank-
ruptcy proceeding under 21-A. 
Mr. Marshall: I object to the admission 
of that, your Honor. 
The Court: Why? 
Mr. Marshall: Because we have absolutely 
no chance to cross-examine, your Honor. 
There are some things I might permit to be 
admitted. 
The Court: No opportunity to cross-
examine? 
Mr. Marshall: No. It was under 21-A. 
Mr. Podell: I understood counsel to 
state that we could stipulate what Von 
Goeben did; but if counsel presses the objec-
tion, there is no doubt he was right on his 
objection. There was no opportunity for me 
or him to cross-examine. 
The Court: I am not going to argue about 
that. Is it coming in or going out? Do you 
object to it? 
Mr. Marshall: I object. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Mr. Marshall: I am perfectly willing to 
meet with Mr. Podell afterwards and pos-
sibly we can agree on parts to go in. 
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The Court : Do that between yourselves. 
The Court cannot regulate your own rulings 
on these propositions. 
Mr. Podell: The man being dead, we ought 
to have everything that was said on the sub-
ject about it; but if counsel wants to try and 
edit it, I will consider that and see if we can 
get any part of it. Mark it for identifica-
tion. 
(Deposition of A. Von Goeben received 
and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 77 for 
Identification.) 
Mr. Podell: You say he was our man. He 
was not in our service on March, 1925, at 
the time of this. 
Mr. Marshall: No, but he was before. 
Mr. Podell: Now, Mr. Saul Levy, will you 
take the stand? 
S A U L LEVY resumes the stand: 
Direct examination (continued) by Mr. Podell. 
Q. Mr. Levy, I believe you have already stated 
that you are a certified public accountant and have 
been practicing for several years in the City of New 
York? A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Marshall: Ten years, he said. 
Q. Ten years. With offices at 475 Fifth Avenue? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you had occasion—or tell us in your 
own way just what you have done in connection 
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with going over the books and records of Fred 
Stern & Company and any other data that was 
furnished to you in relation to the certificate or 
statement Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. A. I examined 
certain records of Fred Stern & Company in con-
junction with certain photostatic copies of working 
papers of Touche, Niven & Co., which working pa-
pers were prepared or compiled in connection with 
their balance sheet as of December 31, 1923. 
Q. Have you got those photostats? A. I have 
them in my bag. 
Q. Just take your bag, so that you will have the 
papers and every one of those statements. A. Those 
are the working papers I had reference to—that is, 
the photostatic copies (indicating). 
Mr. Podell: Is there any dispute about 
their being true and correct photostatic 
copies? I would like to have a stipulation 
with regard to those. 
Q. Is that one of the photostatic papers? A. 
That was in the batch of papers. It is not the 
photostat. 
Q. While Mr. Marshall is looking those over, so 
that we will be clear, those photostats, just what 
are they composed of? Explain that in your own 
way. A. Well, they are copies of the papers, the 
schedules, the memoranda, certain correspondence 
that were in the files of Touche, Niven & Co., which 
were prepared or secured in connection with the 
audit of the books of account. 
Q. Which Touche, Niven & Co. made? A. Yes, 
sir. 
Q. Prior to the statement of December 31, 1923, 
is that right? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And that includes their working sheets they 
had prepared at that time? A. Yes, sir. 
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Mr. Marshall: Some of these are copies 
of the work papers and some of them are 
not. 
Mr. Podell: All I want from Mr. Mar-
shall now is the statement that in so far as 
we used photostatic copies, that they may be 
used in the place of originals, subject to such 
objection as counsel may have as to material-
ity and relevancy. 
Mr. Marshall: I suggest that he offer the 
original work sheets which are here. 
Mr. Podell: I think they have been 
offered. 
Mr. Marshall: Only part of them, some 
of them offered in evidence and some for 
identification, and then he can work from 
these photostatic copies as he goes along. 
Mr. Podell: I have no objection to that. 
Mr. Marshall: I have no objection. 
The Court: All right. What are the 
originals? 
Mr. Limburg: They are marked Exhibit 
No. 15 for Identification. 
The Court: It will be No. 15 in evidence 
now, formerly marked for identification. 
(Received in evidence and marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 15.) 
Q. We are going to take up for the first time 
the matter of inventory and the investigation 
thereof, and get your papers together so that you 
are in a position to have them available in that 
regard. From these records that you have ex-
amined, can you state, Mr. Levy, what was the 
amount of inventory as originally reported and 
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appearing on the books of Fred Stern & Company? 
I mean as originally reported to Touche, Niven & 
Co. 
Mr. Marshall: Are you testifying to what 
the work sheets show? That is your basis 
of your testimony? 
Mr. Podell: I ask "from the information 
and papers he had. 
Mr. Marshall: We want to find out 
whether this information is coming from the 
work sheets or from some outside source. 
The Witness : I will state in my answer 
in each instance what is the source of my 1142 
information. 
Mr. Marshall: Can you tell me now? 
The Witness: Among the work sheets of 
Touche, Niven & Co., I find a paper marked 
"Inventory, December 31, 1923," showing an 
amount of $347 
Mr. Marshall: Just a minute, so that I 
can follow you on that. 
The Witness: That is page 67. 
Mr. Marshall: That is what I want. 
Thank you. 
Q. Go ahead. A. Showing a total of $347,219.08. 
At the bottom of this page is a notation, "Summary 1143 
sheet as handed to me for audit," and it appears 
to be signed "S. Towell." 
Q. Towell? 
Mr. Podell: So that we will identify him, 
Mr. Marshall, he is the gentleman who has 
been a witness, and I think he said he was 
the senior accountant on the job. 
Mr. Marshall: That is right. 
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Q. All right. Go ahead, finish your answer, and 
cell in your own way what you found on the records 
with regard to that item of inventory, referring spe-
cifically to your source of information every time 
you make reference to anything. A. I also found 
in the Touche, Niven working papers, page 3, which 
is part of the trial balance as of December 31, 1923, 
in the columns marked "Balance before closing, 
December 31, 1923," the item "Merchandise in tran-
sit, $347,219.08," which is the same item, indicating 
that this item appeared in the ledger account at 
the beginning of the examination of Touche, Niven 
& Co. 
Q. Can you stop right here and show us that 
ledger account and where it did appear? Would 
that be feasible, or would it be breaking into the 
order of events? I want you to state those your-
self. A. I would like to cover the working papers 
first. 
Q. Then cover the working papers first. Then 
go ahead. A. Then, among the working papers, I 
find pages 160 to 168, which contain journal entries. 
Mr. Marshall : Just one second till I get 
that, Mr. Levy. Now, all right. 
Q. Go ahead. A. Journal entries apparently pre-
pared by Touche, Niven & Co. Many of those en-
tries affect the inventory account and other col-
lateral accounts. I have summarized those entries. 
I have traced them to Touche, Niven's general led-
ger trial balance working sheet, and from that to 
the balance sheet prepared by them. I have also 
traced those entries to the books of account, 
Q. You are speaking now of the entries relating 
to the inventory? A. To inventory, and to the 
merchandise account generally. 
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Q. Yes. A. And also to certain related asset and 
liability accounts. 
Q. But gravitating around the subject of inven-
tory? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, have you got that summary? A. I have 
that summary, yes, sir. 
Q. Now, will you go on and tell us what you 
found with respect to those items? 
Mr. Marshall: May I see the summary 
first? 
Q. This is a summary of what Touche, Niven & 
Co. did, is that it? A. Yes, sir. 
By the Court. 
Q. Prepared by you? A. Yes, sir. 
The Court: That is a matter of evidence. 
I do not see why you should have it, Mr. 
Marshall. 
Mr. Marshall: All right. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. First let me ask you, did Touche, Niven & 
Co. make any corrections or changes in that in-
ventory as a result of those entries? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I prefer you to state it in your own way. I 
do not want to break in. A. I will summarize it 
first and then discuss the entries themselves. 
Q. All right, go ahead. A. Touche, Niven & Co. 
made adjusting entries through which they reduced 
the inventory by the amount of $215,795.27. They 
reduced accounts receivable $20,465.03. 
Mr. Marshall: How much? 
The Witness: $20,465.03. They increased 
the acceptances payable, a liability account, 
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in the amount of $67,602.90. The sum of 
those items being $303,863.20, a reduction in 
the net assets of Stern in that amount. 
Q. Now, these that you are speaking of now— 
A. I was going on with the reduction of inventory. 
They reduced the inventory from the original 
amount submitted to them of $347,000 in round 
figures, to $131,000. 
Q. These three items that you have mentioned, 
which aggregate and bring a net reduction of as-
sets of $300,000, were they all in relation to the 
inventory items? Were they all necessary in rela-
tion to the inventory items? A. They all related 
to the inventory item or to merchandise purchases. 
Q. Now, just tell us what you found from their 
own work sheets necessitated those corrections or 
adjustments. A. The first entry, which they 
marked "Journal entry No. 5," charged—debited 
the purchase account 
Mr. Marshall: Will you tell me on what 
page this is on? 
The Witness: Page 161. Debited the pur-
chase account in the amount of $8,426.30 and 
debited inventory $87.45 and credited ac-
ceptances $8,513.75. 
Q. Now, just in simple language explain so that 
we will all understand, first, what they found 
Stern's books showed in regard to that item and 
what they did. A. Their entry contains a very 
concise explanation right on their working sheets. 
Q. Which is? A. They stated, "To record the 
following shipment," and then they give the details 
of that shipment—lot 7440, 195 cases. 
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Q. Just what does that mean? I do not think 
it is quite clear. A. It means then they say—— 
Q. What does it mean that Stern had done which 
they had to undo? That is what I want. A. This 
represented the cost of 193 cases sold to Dunlop 
Tire & Rubber in December, 1923. This was an 
instance of merchandise which had been sold by 
Stern and paid for before December 31, 1923, but 
for which no liability was as yet entered on the 
books, and so the accountants 
Mr. Marshall: I move to strike that out 
as a conclusion and not what this paper 
deals with at all, and he is going outside of 
this paper for information. 
Mr. Podell: He is not going outside of 
any of the work sheets of Touche, Niven & 
Co. He is using their own work sheets. He 
is talking of sheets, and they are bound to 
know. 
Mr. Marshall: That is a good speech. 
Mr. Podell: It is not a speech, but it is 
from their own facts and figures, as they 
have reported them. 
The Court: Well, you have it in your own 
mind that you do not grasp it. 
Mr. Podell: I want this witness to ex-
plain. 
The Court: Maybe you do, and I do not. 
Mr. Marshall: He is giving information. 
The Court: I believe that is a conclusion 
without knowing the basis upon which it is 
worked, because I do not understand what 
it is based on. 
Mr. Podell: I do not either, and I will 
ask the witness to make it clear. 
Mr. Marshall: Strike it out. 
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The Court: Strike it out at this point. 
Mr. Podell: I will have to go over it again 
and explain it. 
Q. Mr. Levy, what we would like to know in 
simple, clarified English is just what it is that 
Stern had done which Touche, Niven & Co. saw 
fit to adjust or correct. 
The Court: And upon what do you base 
that? 
Q. Show the figures as you have found them 
there. What did you base that on? 
Mr. Marshall: As I understand it, the 
witness is now interpreting the work sheets 
on page 161. 
The Witness: 161, yes. I have before me 
a journal entry and an explanation of that 
journal entry 
Q. Made by whom? A. Made by Touche, Niven 
& Co. 
Q. There is no question about that, they made 
that entry? 
The Court: In the journal. 
Mr. Podell: That they made that explana-
tion. He is speaking now from papers pre-
pared by Touche, Niven & Co. themselves. 
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: This is part of their work 
sheets. One of the journal entries they 
recommended and insisted be made to cor-
rect the books. There is no question about 
that. 
The Court: Yes. 
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Mr. Podell: Is counsel going to take the 
witness stand to testify? What is the occa-
sion for interruption? Is there an effort be-
ing made to confuse this witness? 
Mr.Marshall: Oh, Mr. Podell. I appeal 
to your Honor. 
Mr. Podell: If counsel interrupts we shall 
not get anywhere. 
Mr. Marshall: The Court asked a ques-
tion and I was explaining. 
The Court: I asked Mr. Podell. Go ahead. 
Q. Mr. Levy, go along and answer that question. 
A. The explanation contained on this working sheet 
reads as follows: "To record the following ship-
ment " 
The Court: Now, does that mean to record 
it in some book where it is not? 
The Witness: Precisely. 
The Court: Why did you not tell us that, 
because I did not know it. I am not a great 
accountant or bookkeeper, either. 
Mr. Marshall: That is why I tried to make 
that suggestion before. 
The Court: Do not interrupt, please. 
Q. Go ahead. A. And then it gives the details 
of that shipment; and then, at the bottom of the 
explanation, it states, "That this merchandise was 
sold to Dunlop Tire & Rubber Company and paid 
for by them December 18, 1923." 
Q. Paid for to whom? A. To Stern. 
Q. And was it still included in inventory? Had 
it been included by Stern in inventory? A. No, sir. 
This is an instance of a purchase by Stern which 
had been omitted from the books entirely, although 
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that very merchandise had in large part been sold 
by Stern to someone else and the money collected 
for that sale, and this is a correcting entry by the 
accountants. 
Q. And the situation, as I understand it, is this: 
Stern had bought a certain amount of merchandise 
from this Dunlop Tire & Rubber Company? 
Mr. Marshall: Stern had? 
A. Stern had sold that merchandise. 
Q. Who had he bought it from? Does it show? 
A. It merely indicates the lot number. 
Q. What is it Stern had omitted to do? A. They 
had omitted to place upon their books the liability 
to their creditor for the merchandise they had pur-
chased. 
Q. That was not on the books at all of Stern 
& Company? A. No, sir. 
The Court: Liability to the creditor? 
Mr. Podell: Stern had sold merchandise 
and collected $8200 from somebody. 
The Court: Yes, 
Mr. Podell: And put it in and kept it, 
but owed for that merchandise to someone 
whom he bought it from and never paid for 
it, and the books did not show he owed 
that money. 
The Court: Stern's books? 
Mr. Podell: Stern's books. 
The Court: This is a correcting entry to 
have it put in the books? 
Mr. Podell: That is right. 
The Court: Let us have it. 
Mr. Podell: I want to show your Honor 
that anyone examining those books was 
bound to come to the conclusion that they 
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were irregular, that they were dishonest. It 
was not one instance of a mistake, but a 
series. 
Mr. Marshall: I object to his summing 
up this way, your Honor. It does not show 
anything of the kind. It shows we did a 
good job. 
Mr. Podell: You will be very proud of 
that job before we are through. Before we 
are through with you, we will show you what 
a wonderful job you did. 
Mr. Marshall: I do not pose. 
Q. In the first place, all these corrections that 
were made, if you assume that Stern had made 
these errors, all those that we are going to talk 
about in the inventory, assume now that they were 
mistakes; assume, however, that Stern did not want 
to be dishonest, but what I want to ask you is, did 
you find all these mistakes were in Stern's favor, 
all these mistakes that we are going to take up 
now? A. No, sir, not all of them. 
Q. About how many of them? 
Mr. Marshall: I think he ought to give 
them, and not proportions. I think that is 
a guess. 
The Witness: I was going to embody that 
in my summary after I cover the specific 
items. 
Mr. Marshall: That would be a fairer 
way. 
The Court: I think so. 
Q. Do we understand that first item correctly, 
that Stern originally omitted from his books put-
ting down what he owed for merchandise, although 
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he had pocketed the money he had received from 
selling? Is that right? A. Yes. 
Q. From the original books, and Touche & Niven 
corrected that on that first item, is that right? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, the next item. A. The next item is 
journal entry No. 6. I am still on page 
First Juror: Where can we find the in-
formation about that he owed for that? 
Where was that? 
Mr. Marshall: I do not get that. 
Mr. Podell: Where and how did Touche 
& Niven find that he, Stern, owed for that 
merchandise? That is the juror's question 
The Witness: I cannot answer that on 
my personal knowledge, but they probably 
found this from the shipping records. 
The Court: The examination of the ship-
ping records disclosed that fact ? 
The Witness: This is contained right on 
Touche, Niven's working papers. I did not 
find that. I did not discover those. 
The Court: You see the difficulty. You 
see, Mr. Juryman, these papers from which 
this witness is reciting are the work sheets 
of the defendant. In other words, the photo-
static copy of this which counsel has in his 
hand, which was used by the accountants at 
the time that they were going over the books 
and papers of Stern & Company, and those 
are what counsel for plaintiff are attempt-
ing to show—these particular things which 
Stern & Company did, intending to indicate 
that there was knowledge upon the part of 
Touche, Niven & Co. that those things were 
bad, and, being bad, be careful how you go— 
in the vulgar vernacular. Is that the theory? 
1 1 6 9 
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Mr. Podell: That is the theory. 
The Court: I have cleaned up that much. 
Q. Now, Mr. Levy, taking each one of these 
items separately 
Mr. Marshall: Don't you think your 
Honor ought to say 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor has answered 
the juror's question. 
Mr. Marshall: Don't you think you ought 
to say you have formed no opinion on that? 
The Court: Not at all. I am describing 
what they might show as evidence. 
First Juror: I want to get it, and the 
others do not get it, so that I get it in my 
mind 
The Court: It makes no difference whether 
that gets on the record or not. 
Q. Mr. Levy, when you say that they had been 
paid for this merchandise and had not made an 
entry—that is, Stern, in his books, showing that 
he had paid for it, are you quoting what Touche 
& Niven themselves say in that work sheet? A. I 
am referring to what they did. They entered that 
bill and added that amount to the liabilities of 
Stern. 
Q. So that would show that that is what Touche, 
Niven did in connection with that account? A. 
Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, you have a number of such items there, 
aggregating a total, as I see it, of $312,550.70? A. 
A number of journal entries. 
Q. Can you deal with that as a whole, or must; 
you take up each item separately? A. Well, I can 
do either. 
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Q. Well, which is the simpler method? A. I 
think perhaps if I ran through these journal en-
tries I can do it rather briefly, and read from the 
working papers. 
Q. All right, go ahead. A. And then summarize. 
Journal entry No. 6, on Touche-Niven's working 
paper page 161, charges the purchase account and 
credits inventory with the amount of $19,031.65, 
and the explanation by Touche, Niven & Co. is as 
follows: "To charge the purchase account with the 
following lots which have been included in the in-
ventory twice"—and then they enumerate these 
items, which amount to, in terms of English cur-
rency, and then convert them at the rate of $4.343/8 
per pound, getting the amount of $19,301.65. 
Q. In simple language does that mean that they 
found that Stern had taken certain items and had 
duplicated them in making up his inventory? A. 
Precisely. 
Q. That is, he had $19,000 worth of merchandise 
which he entered up twice? A. Exactly. 
Q. Instead of it being just $19,000 worth of mer-
chandise which he had, when he got through adding 
it up, $38,000? A. Exactly. 
Q. And that is what the Touche-Niven papers 
show, is that right? A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Marshall: May I understand one 
thing: You do not mean, when you say that 
Stern put that in twice, that he did it per-
sonally, do you? 
The Witness: I am referring to the ac-
counts of Stern & Company. 
Mr. Marshall: And that one of the em-
ployees might have done it? 
Mr. Podell: I do not think, your Honor, 
with the greatest respect, that that inter-
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ruption is necessary. I do not think it is 
plain that Stern himself did the bookkeep-
ing. 
The Court: It is his servants. 
Mr. Marshall: He said Stern, and I want 
to know. 
The Court: Everything contained here is 
what Stern did through his representatives. 
Mr. Marshall: It may make it clear 
whether Stern himself made the mistake or 
whether one of his employees did it. 
Mr. Podell: I object to that discussion, 
which tends to confuse us. 
The Court: It does. You can ask when 
the times comes, Mr. Marshall. Let us get 
along on this or we will never get through. 
Make a reservation on your cross-examina-
tion and bring that out. 
The Witness: Journal entry No. 7 
charges the purchase account and credits 
acceptances in the amount of $5,473.12, and 
the explanation on Touche-Niven's working 
paper is as follows: "To record the follow-
ing shipment not entered in purchase ac-
count till January, 1924, but sold to Hood 
Rubber Company December 26, 1923, invoice 
17, 9, 78," and then it gives some details. 
Q. Does that in plain English mean the same as 
the first item? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That is to say, received certain merchandise 
for which he had been paid, he had sold it to some-
body. He had been paid and kept the money, but 
did not have on his books a record of the money 
that he owed to the man he bought it from. Is 
that correct? A. Yes. I may say that this entry 
does not refer to whether or not he had paid for 
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the merchandise, but that won't matter. He had 
not taken it upon his books. He had not shown 
that there was a liability for it. 
Q. If he had paid for that merchandise, he would 
have a liability for it, and then an item or entry 
showing he had paid for it? A. If he had paid for 
the merchandise, and if the corresponding liability 
had not been entered, then the payment would ap-
pear as an asset on his books instead of being offset 
by the liability. 
Q. Is that correct to say that there was neither 
a charge nor a credit? That is to say, neither a 
debit or credit in respect to that item as to pay-
ment for merchandise? A. This entry merely in-
dicates that the liability had not been taken on 
the books and Touche, Niven & Co. increased 
Stern's liabilities by that amount. 
Q. All right, of course, the three items you have 
spoken of thus far are $8,426.30, $19,031.65, $5,473.-
12. Those were mistakes made by Stern. Every one 
of those mistakes was in favor of Stern, was it not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And would increase his assets, would it not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now then, the next item. A. Journal entry 
No. 8 charges purchases and credits inventory 
$14,807.84, the explanation being "To eliminate 
from the inventory of December 31, 1923, lot 7586," 
with a lot of detail, "which was sold and charged 
to Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Company in De-
cember, 1923." 
Q. In other words, he had sold the merchandise 
and he claimed to still have it in the inventory, 
and at the same time he had entered in accounts 
receivable, showing that there was money due him 
from the person who had bought that merchandise, 
is that right? A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. So that instead of having his assets there 
$14,000, he doubled his assets and made it $28,000? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. He counted the same item of merchandise—I 
hope to make myself clear, your Honor—he counted 
the same item of merchandise both as having it in 
his premises and as having sold it to somebody who 
owed him money for it? 
The Court: Yes. 
A. Journal entry No. 9 appears to cover some 
similar items. 
Q. If the last item we spoke of was a mistake 
on Stern's part, it was also a mistake in his favor 
of fourteen thousand odd, was it not? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now then, item No. 9? A. Charges purchase 
and credits the inventory—that is, it reduces the 
inventory—in the amount of $18,728.20, and the 
explanation being "To eliminate the following lots 
from inventory, same having been sold in December, 
1923." And then the detail follows. 
Q. Well, he had doubled on that item, too, by 
counting it as merchandise in hand and part of 
the inventory and also counted it as an asset, being 
an account receivable, having sold it to somebody? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And that was a mistake in Stern's favor, if 
it was a mistake, of $18,000 worth? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, coming to item No. 10. A. Item No. 
10 charges purchases in the amount of $225,590.94. 
It credits—that is, it reduced the inventory $178,-
229 and it credits acceptances—that is, it increases 
liabilities in the amount of $47,361.94. 
Q. What note is there? A. The explanation is, 
"To eliminate items taken in inventory which were 
not received until January and drafts for which 
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are not reported by banks as having been accepted 
in December, 1923, and to set up as liability other 
items in the inventory which were not put through 
books till January, but drafts for which were ac-
cepted by Huth & Company in December." This 
is a little complicated, because it really consoli-
dates the two journal entries. First we have a 
reduction of the inventory of $178,229, and with 
regard to that reduction in inventory, the explana-
tion is "To eliminate items which were taken in 
inventory but were not received until January, and 
the liability for which was not incurred until Janu-
ary." The other part of the entry 
Q. Do you mean by that that the man had in-
cluded merchandise in inventory of $178,229 but 
had failed to charge up— A. No, sir. 
Q. —as an indebtedness the money that he owed 
for it? A. No, sir. Not as to that part. As to that 
part, he had merely included in his December 31 
inventory merchandise which he did not get until 
January. It simply was not there on December 
31, and he had not assumed the liability for it, 
and he was stating an inventory as of December 31. 
Q. Yes? A. In which were included items that 
did not come along until subsequently, January. 
Q. The subsequent year? 
The Court: There are two parts to it. 
Q. Yes. A. The other part of the entry relates 
to the items that you have just asked me about. 
There the accountants increased the liabilities to 
the extent of $47,361.94, and the explanation as to 
this increase of liabilities is "To set up as a lia-
bility for items in the inventory which were not 
put through the books until January, the drafts 
for which were accepted by Huth & Company in 
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December." In other words, there was $47,000 
worth of merchandise included in the inventory the 
drafts for which had been accepted but the lia-
bility was not taken on the books until January, 
so, of course, the accountants made it clear 
Mr. Marshall: Let us have the rest of 
that answer. 
Q. So, of course, the accountants made that ad-
justment? A. Made that adjustment, 
Q. If we assume that was all a mistake on the 
part of Stern, how much of a mistake was it in 
dollars and cents? A. $225,590.94. 
Q. He made one big mistake for $225,000? 
Mr. Marshall: Let him finish. 
The Witness: Yes. This embodies nu-
merous items which are summarized. 
Mr. Marshall: I think we ought to be fair 
there. It was not one mistake. 
The Witness: A great many mistakes. 
Q. But they were all in his favor, were they not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. All these mistakes were likewise in his favor, 
were they not? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And they aggregate a total of $225,590? A. 
Yes, sir. 
Q. And how much of that—did it all operate to 
reduce his assets or increase his assets by that 
amount? A. It operated to increase his net assets. 
Q. By how much? A. By $225,590. It decreased 
his inventory by $178,000 
Q. As a matter of fact, if we call it a mistake, 
it increased his assets by $225,000, and then the 
accountants corrected that alleged mistake and re-
duced his mistake on that? A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. If I understand you correctly, that all—as to 
that $178,000, all that Stern did was to include 
in the inventory as of December 31 $178,000 worth 
of merchandise which he never had in his place 
on December 31? A. Which he did not get until 
January. 
Q. Until some time in January? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, how would that affect his assets, assum-
ing that he included it and made a charge that he 
owed for that merchandise $178,000; would not 
that equalize his accounts? A. If he had done that, 
it would not have affected his net assets. 
Q. That is the— A. But he had omitted the 
liability. 
Q. In other words, he included that $178,000 
worth of merchandise but did not charge himself 
for that merchandise the price that he owed for that 
merchandise? A. Exactly. 
Q. So that it tended immediately to increase his 
assets by $178,000? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, Mr. Levy 
Mr. Marshall: I do not understand that, 
your Honor. Are you testifying from this 
paper or outside of it? 
The Witness: From this paper. 
Q. From the work sheets of Touche, Niven, is not 
that correct? A. Certainly. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Is this page 162? A. Page 162, yes, sir. 
Mr. Marshall: All right. 
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By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Now, Mr. Levy, what I am going to ask you 
now is—I wish you would clearly understand, and 
before you give me a correct answer 
Mr. Marshall: May I interrupt ? I think 
you made a mistake in the question. You 
did not mean $178,000 are liabilities? 
Mr. Podell: $178,229. I beg your pardon. 
That is another item. 
Q. Mr. Levy, Mr. Marshall says that the liability 
that was not set up was $47,000 and not $178,000. 
A. That is another item that he refers to. 
Q. You mean that is an additional item? A. 
Yes. 
Q. But the $178,000 was one item; there was no 
liability entered for that, although he included it 
in the inventory? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the $47,000 was an additional item where 
he had credited—you had better tell us in your 
own language what that $47,000 item is. A. The 
$47,000 represents merchandise that was included 
in inventory 
The Court: To be delivered in January? 
The Witness: No, we are on the second 
half of it now. 
The Court: I understand. 
The Witness: That merchandise was 
there, but the liability for it was not set up 
on the books. 
Q. In other words, the $47,000 he had received 
in time before December 31 and it should have been 
included in the inventory as it was? A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. He included the merchandise but he did not 
put down in his books that he owed for it, is that 
it? A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Marshall: All right, 
Q. Now, Mr. Levy, you have heard of inventories 
being padded. No, I am speaking seriously. I 
just want to make a certain distinction there that 
I want to make clear, and see if I am right. You 
have heard of that in the course of accounting? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. A merchant will very often place a higher 
value on certain merchandise than the market al-
lows, won't he? A. That is frequent, yes, sir. 
Q. Sometimes he will take it at cost and cost is 
higher than the prevailing market, is that right? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And sometimes he will take it at market 
value, and that is higher than cost, where he might 
have taken it at cost? A. Yes, sir, attempts to do 
that will often be made. 
Q. And sometimes he will take it at a higher 
value than cost or market, to show a large state-
ment and large assets—that sometimes happens? 
A. That sometimes does. 
Q. Now, you have made a certain allowance for 
inventory, a certain percentage sometimes. I mean, 
you either reduce it or increase it, according to 
what the particular client did, in the audit of ac-
counts, sometimes, don't you? That is normal, is 
it not? A. We correct all errors that we discover, 
yes, sir. 
Q. I am speaking now of the different types of 
errors, that is what I am driving at. A. None of 
these errors related to the price of merchandise. 
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Q. That is what I am driving at. Were those 
errors where a man attempted to increase the value 
of merchandise that he had, or were they exclusive 
of entries deliberately made in the exclusion of 
liabilities and the inclusion of assets? That is 
what I am driving at. 
Mr. Marshall: I object to the sugges-
tion—attempted and deliberately made. 
Mr. Podell: All right, I will reframe my 
question and bring out what I have in mind. 
Q. Mr. Levy, I want you to state in your own 
way, so far, at least, from these items alone that 
you have given, what would an ordinary, reason-
able, prudently careful accountant, having in mind 
a man who did nothing extraordinary—just exer-
cising prudent care—what would be the conclu-
sions that he would be justified in drawing if he 
found those errors or corrections or alleged errors 
in the books? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that. 
The Court : Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
A. I think it is quite obvious that here is an 
attempt to fraudulently pad an inventory. 
Q. Now, there is no doubt that these mistakes 
aggregating $225,000 were in Stern's favor, as were 
all the others, if they were mistakes? A. They 
were in Stern's favor; that is, they overstated his 
net assets. 
Q. Now, then, as to the mistakes which he made 
against himself, what were they? Were there any? 
A. Yes, sir. I think one comes up in the next 
entry. 
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Q. Yes, item No. 12? A. No. That was not a 
mistake against himself. 
Q. It was not, you say? A. No, sir. That was 
a different type of adjustment, This entry added 
to the inventory or charged the inventory with 
$6,254.09 and credited the Konig Company, who 
was a creditor, with the same amount. 
Q. That was another reduction from inventory, 
was it? A. No, sir. This was added to the inven-
tory and added to the liabilities. This did not 
affect the net worth of the concern one way or the 
other. 
Q. This was just an item where he had received 
merchandise and had sold it, is that right? A. No, 
sir. Shall I read Touche & Niven's explanation? 
Q. Yes. A. "Invoice drawn for"—and then it 
gives the detail—"in December, but not set up in 
F. S. & Company books till January." This was 
a December invoice and should properly have been 
entered in December so that the amount would be 
added to inventory and added to liabilities. Stern 
did not enter it. He omitted it entirely, and did 
not enter it until January, and so the adjustment 
was made by the accountants. 
Q. At least, if it was not a mistake against him-
self, it was not a mistake in his favor; that is what 
you mean. It did not affect— A. In view of the 
amount, I think we can say it was a mistake which 
was neither against nor in his favor. 
Q. Now, then, as to the next item. A. The next 
item, journal entry No. 16, was a mistake which 
Stern made against himself. 
Q. And how much was that? A. The accountants 
showed the inventory increased inventory $8,687.50 
and credited the purchase account, and their ex-
planation is "to correct error in original inventory 
figures," and they give the details of the correction. 
The amount there is $8,687.50. 
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Q. That was a mistake that Stern made, if that 
is a mistake, in his own favor? A. Yes. Appar-
ently an error in computation. 
Mr. Marshall: That was not a fraud. 
Mr. Podell: I beg your pardon? 
Mr. Marshall: That was not a fraud. It 
was a mistake. 
Q. Go ahead. 
Mr. Podell: Get all the comfort out of 
this you can. 
Mr. Marshall: I am just laughing at it. 
Q. Go ahead, sir. A. No. 17 is a very small item-
Q. Do not pay any attention to that. A. $27. 
Q. Leave that out. A. No. 29, on page 166 of 
the working sheets, charges the purchase account 
and credits accounts receivable in the amount of 
$6,439.64; the explanation being, "invoice 18,006, 
sold in December for purchase, not charged to the 
rubber purchases until January," and then there 
is further detail. 
Q. How does that affect the net result? A. And 
the note this was charged—there is a further note 
there, but it is immaterial. It relates to the wrong 
account being charged. 
Q. Yes, A. The effect of this was to reduce their 
assets $6,400. That is the effect of the account-
ant's entry, was to reduce Stern's assets. 
Q. It was a mistake that Stern had made, if we 
call it a mistake, in the sum of $6,439? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What he did there was to sell the merchan-
dise in December and collect or rather credit him-
self with that amount of money due from the per-
son to whom he had sold it, but it was not until 
January that he set up the entry in his books show-
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ing that he owed money for that same merchan-
dise, having bought it, is that it? A. Yes, sir. 
The Court: Let us take a few moments' 
recess. 
(After short recess.) 
Q. Just one more of these items, Mr. Levy, and 
that will conclude that branch of it, I think— A. 
Journal entry No. 30, page 167. 
Q. Can you not shorten it by just saying it was 
another mistake that he made in his favor, if it 
was a mistake, in the sum of $14,025? 
Mr. Marshall: What are you referring to 
now, please? 
Mr. Podell: Journal entry No. 30, page 
167. 
Mr. Marshall: You had better explain it. 
I object to the summary. 
Q. All right. You explain it in your own way. 
A. In this entry, Touche, Niven & Co. charged pur-
chases and credit accounts receivable; that is, they 
reduce accounts receivable in the amount of $14,-
025.39; and their explanation is as follows: "To 
adjust the following accounts for invoices at cost 
paid for in December and charged to accounts, but 
invoices not credited to creditor's accounts. All 
this merchandise was sold in December." And then 
it gives the details of the sales. 
Q. Well, to summarize it in popular language, 
what had Stern done and what had Touche-Niven 
done in regard to this 14,000? A. Well, they had 
sold this merchandise in December and had charged 
accounts receivable with that and 
Q. Called it an asset of $14,000? A. Yes, sir. 
And had omitted the liability to creditors for it. 
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And Touche-Niven made the adjustment by re-
ducing the customers' accounts for the cost of that 
merchandise. 
Q. $14,000? A. $14,000. 
Q. So that it was again an instance where Stern 
had increased his assets by $14,000 in that way? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The total? A. May I summarize these en-
tries? 
Q. Yes, summarize it. 
Mr. Marshall: May I have a copy of the 
witness' summary, if he is going to read from 
it? 
The Court: Yes, you will have it. 
Mr. Marshall: May I have one now? 
Mr. Podell: You may have a copy of any-
thing we have. 
The Court: Have you an extra copy of 
it? 
The Witness: Yes (handing to counsel). 
Mr. Marshall: Which schedule are you re-
ferring to now? 
The Witness: The one that is number 2. 
The net result of the journal entries which 
I have read are as follows: They debit the 
purchase account in the aggregate amount 
of $312,550.70. 
Q. In plain language, does that mean that 
Stern— A. I beg your pardon. I think if I may 
summarize it after giving the total debits-
Q. All right. A. They debit the purchase ac-
count $312,550.70. They debit the inventory $15,-
029.04. They credit acceptance account $67,602.90. 
They credit inventory $230,824.31. They credit ac-
counts receivable $20,465.03. They credit the pur-
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chase account $8,687.50. And after eliminating off-
setting entries, all of these journal entries boil 
down to this: They reduce the inventory $215,-
795.27. 
Mr. Marshall: Just a second. Where are 
you getting this from? 
The Witness: It is my summary. 
Mr. Marshall: Not on this table? 
Mr. Podell: It is not on any table. 
The Witness: But I can show you how 
it is made up from that table. 
Mr. Marshall: Have you got it before 
you there; might I follow? 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, that includes a 
number of comments. I am perfectly will-
ing to give counsel tabulations, but I do not 
think he ought to have our comments just 
now. 
The Court: No, he cannot give you that 
because he has just got that one comment 
for himself and him, I suppose, for the pur-
pose of the examination. 
Mr. Marshall: I would be interested in 
knowing what he is testifying to. 
Mr. Podell: I have no objection if coun-
sel will consent to have the accountant's 
complete report go in evidence. I am satis-
fied to have that go in. 
Mr. Marshall: Blind, without seeing it? 
Mr. Podell: You can read it. At the 
proper time I will offer it, very glad to offer 
it. 
Q. You say that the net result was what? A. 
The net result of all of these entries was as fol-
lows: The inventory was reduced $215,795.27. 
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Q. Let me interrupt to ask: Does that mean that 
Stern in the manner and method that you have 
described from Touche-Niven's own work sheets 
had increased his inventory originally by $215,-
795.27? A. Yes, sir. He had overstated his in-
ventory. 
Q. He had overstated his inventory in that 
amount? A. Yes. 
Q. Had he overstated his accounts receivable, 
and in what amount? A. He had overstated his 
accounts receivable in the amount of $20,465.03. 
Q. And then the accounts payable, had he under-
stated those? A. The accounts payable or the ac-
ceptances payable had been understated by the 
amount of $67,602.90. 
Q. Now then, so that there will be absolutely no 
confusion about it: He had in his records repre-
sented that he had $215,000 more merchandise than 
he actually had? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that correct? A. Than Touche-Niven 
found that he had. 
Q. He had represented 
Mr. Marshall: To Touche-Niven? 
Mr. Podell: Yes. 
Q. He represented that he had $20,000 more ac-
counts receivable than he really had? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And he had represented, rather his records 
as he kept them, showed that he had understated 
the moneys that he owed by $67,000? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that question 
in that form. If he wants to say that he rep-
resented to Touche-Niven, I think that is al-
lowable. 
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Q. Did his books show that in the keeping of 
his books—well, in what form did he represent; 
state in your own words? A. I will put it this 
way: That the working sheets which I have ex-
amined show that Touche-Niven discovered that he 
had oversated his net assets in the amount of 
$303,863.20, and that they had passed through cor-
recting entries for those. 
Q. And that overstatement was in the manner 
and method that you have described in detail? A. 
Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, I want to ask you this question: Mr. 
Levy, from your experience as an accountant, act-
ing just in a normal, prudently, reasonably care-
ful way, I mean without any extraordinary care, 
any accountant, acting with ordinary care, finding 
this condition, this overstatement of assets in the 
sum of $303,000, in the manner that is described 
in these very work sheets of Touche-Niven, what 
was he bound to do, in connection with any audit 
that he was making of those books? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as calling 
for a conclusion. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: This witness is not com-
petent. 
The Court: Overruled. You are not ob-
jecting on the grounds of qualifications or 
anything of that kind? 
Mr. Marshall: I do not regard him as 
qualified. 
Mr. Podell: If he objects to qualifica-
tions, go ahead and satisfy yourself. 
Mr. Marshall: You satisfy me. 
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Mr. Podell: If counsel wants to ask him 
any questions as to his qualifications, let 
him ask him. 
The Court: Did you qualify him at the 
start? 
Mr. Podell: I asked him whether he had 
ten years experience. 
The Witness: On certified public account-
ing. 
Q. State your experience, what you have done 
as a certified public accountant, so the jury will 
know some of your ability to pass on these things. 
The Court: Or to render this opinion. 
Q. Or to render this opinion? A. I have been 
in active practice in New York City as a certified 
public accountant for the past ten years, a little 
over that. 
Q. Tell us some of the organizations that you 
have audited books for? A. I prefer not to go into 
that. 
Q. Mention some of them? A. I have done 
Mr. Marshall: I would not ask that. Let 
us see the kind of audits he made. 
Mr. Podell: That might be disclosing 
confidential information? 
Mr. Marshall: Yes. I do not think he 
should be asked that. 
Q. Tell us anything that you are in a position 
to tell us, with regard to your qualifications? A. 
I have been in active practice for all of that period 
of time; and during that time I have personally 
conducted and have supervised my assistants in the 
conduct of perhaps hundreds of audits. I have 
1226 
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certified to balance sheets that have been relied 
upon by bankers and others granting credit. And 
I engaged generally in the practice of accountancy 
during all of that time. Prior to that time I had 
been doing public accounting work for a period 
of approximately three years, making my total ac-
counting experience total about thirteen years; and 
prior to that time for five years or more, I did 
bookkeeping work. 
Q. Generally, without mentioning names, you 
represented large organizations? A. Large, yes, sir, 
large and small. 
Q. You made audits of institutions whose worth 
is in excess, really in excess of a million dollars? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you have had occasion to check up the 
work of your subordinates on the job in connection 
with those matters? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, will you tell us any accountant that 
finds a condition like the one you have just des-
cribed 
Mr. Marshall: May I ask him some ques-
tions on accountancy? 
The Court: Yes. This is not in relation 
to the accounts. This is in relation to quali-
fications to render an expert opinion. 
By Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Have you ever audited the books of a rubber 
concern? A. No, sir. 
Q. Have you ever audited the books of a com-
pany in the kind of business that Stern was in? 
A. In the importing business, yes, sir. 
Q. Have you practiced for yourself ever since you 
have been an accountant? A. Yes, sir. And I have 
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conducted practice in my own name. Of course, 
I have a staff. 
Q. I understand that. Have you ever been con-
nected with any other firm of accountants? A. Yes, 
sir. 
Q. Whom? A. For a short, for a very short time, 
with Barrow, Wade, Guthrie & Company. 
Q. How long was that, and when? A. That was 
just a matter of a few months, in 1917, I believe; 
and prior to that time I was on the staff of Mr. 
Jacob Schapiro, for a period of over a year. 
Q. That is in this city? A. Yes, in this city. I 
think the firm name is now Schapiro & Schapiro. 
Q. What other firms have you been connected 
with? A. I was in the government service for a 
period of eighteen months; I was plant accounting 
officer at the Western Electric Company. 
Q. Where is that? A. For the government, rep-
resenting the government. 
Q. The government at the Western Electric Com-
pany? A. At the Western Electric plant. 
Q. When was that? A. That was in 1918, I be-
lieve. 
Q. Well now, you have brought us up to 1918, 
have you? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you go on and tell me A. I will have 
to go back to tell you whom I have been employed 
by. 
Q. That is what I am trying to find out. A. 
Because in 1919 I commenced practicing in my own 
office, at 120 Broadway, New York, and I have 
been engaged in practice by myself during all of 
that time. 
Q. By yourself? A. By myself during all of that 
time, yes, sir. 
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Q. There are no other firms you were with prior 
to the time you had started for yourself? A. Not 
as a public accountant. I have done bookkeeping 
work and other similar work for the United Press 
Associations, for Symons, Krausman Company, 
cigar manufacturing concern. 
The Court: Go back to the question, 
please. 
(Question repeated as recorded.) 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. What was he bound to do in approaching 
the balance sheet audit or an audit of the books 
for the purpose of issuing a statement, a certified 
statement? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as incom-
petent, irrelevant and immaterial. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
A. He was bound to regard the whole situation 
with very strong suspicion, and to look for similar 
irregularities, to make a very searching examina-
tion with respect to items, so as to guard against 
overstatements in other accounts. 
Q. Now, tell me, in discovering these things that 
they did discover, that you have described, did 
they have to go to the supporting books, the books 
supporting the ledger? A. Certainly. 
Q. They could not have discovered those things 
without going to the supporting books, is that 
right? A. I am sure they could not. 
Q. They could not. Now then, will you turn to 
the rubber sales account. You made an examina-
tion of that account? A. Yes, sir. 
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The Court: What part of the Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1 does this inventory account refer; 
where is it on that? 
The Witness: May I show your Honor? 
The Court: Yes. 
(Witness indicates.) 
Mr. Podell: I think, your Honor, if I 
may show it to the jury also 
The Court: Yes. I would like to have 
the jury see it. 
Mr. Podell: Is it the item "Inventory 
crude rubber"? 
The Witness: $131,000. 
Mr. Marshall: Pledged. 
(Shown to jury.) 
Q. That is the reduced inventory? A. Mr. 
Podell 
Q. May I ask you one question: This $131,000 
appears to have been pledged. Can you tell this 
jury whether this increase of $215,000, which Stern 
originally had, had that been pledged or was it un-
pledged; did you know? A. I don't know. 
Q. Their work sheets do not show that? 
Mr. Marshall: I think he described what 
happened to those items already. 
Mr. Podell: Will you permit me, please, 
to ask a question, Mr. Marshall? 
Mr. Marshall: I raise an objection to it. 
Q. Of course, not having had that merchandise, 
he could not have pledged it, could he? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as a state-
ment. It does not show that he did not have 
that merchandise. Some of it came in later. 
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Some of it had already been sold; but to say 
he did not have the merchandise 
Mr. Podell: That is not so at all, and I 
object to any such statement. This is a pure 
fraud and a falsification. That is what we 
claim. 
Mr. Marshall: May I finish something, 
your Honor? 
Mr. Podell: Counsel would like to smooth 
it over by saying some of it came in before 
and some of it came in after. That is all 
talk that tends to confuse. 
The Court: I apparently started some-
thing by asking a question, have I not? 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor cannot be blamed 
for his statements. 
Mr. Marshall: Let us have the question. 
Mr. Podell: I will withdraw that ques-
tion for the present and go along. 
The Witness: I meant to call your atten-
tion to another working sheet of Touche-
Niven. I have here the working sheets which 
cover all of the journal entries which I have 
read, and then 
Mr. Podell: I would like to mark them in 
evidence. They all relate to Schedule No. 2? 
Mr. Marshall: They are in evidence. 
The Witness: Yes, sir, they contain other 
entries as well, but these sheets contain those 
entries relating to inventory and purchases 
which I have testified about. 
Mr. Marshall: May we have the number 
of the page? 
The Witness: That was page 160. I be-
lieve the last entry was on page 167. Then, 
in addition to that is the summary sheet, 
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page 67, as handed to Mr. Towell for audit 
by Stern, which shows the entry of $347,000, 
and then another working sheet, page 65, 
which shows the inventory of $131,000 
which 
Mr. Podell: Where is the one that shows 
$347,000? 
(Handed to counsel.) 
Mr. Podell: This is one of the sheets, 
gentlemen, "summary sheet as handed to me 
for audit", signed by Towell. And you will 
notice it says, "inventory December 31st, 
1923, $347,219.08." Then, readjusting inven-
tory which shows the inventory to be $131,-
423.81. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. This is from Touche-Niven's working papers? 
A. Yes, sir. That is a photostat copy of them. 
Mr. Podell: Will it be stipulated as to 
whose handwriting appears on those two 
sheets, Mr. Marshall? 
Mr. Marshall: Page 65 is all in the hand-
writing of either Mr. Siess or Mr. Towell. 
Page 67 is in the handwriting of some em-
ployee of Stern, who gave that as the inven-
tory of Stern. Then, except at the bottom, 
"the summary sheet as handed to me for 
audit S. Towell," is in Mr. Towell's hand-
writing. 
Mr. Podell: I take it they concede it, 
that that inventory sheet was given to Mr. 
Towell when he came there to begin his 
audit, as a statement of inventory of that 
date by some one of Stern's employees? 
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Mr. Marshall: Sometime during the audit. 
I do not know just what date. 
Mr. Podell: Surely before he made the 
audit which resulted in these adjustments. 
Mr. Marshall : Before he went over the 
inventory. 
Mr. Podell: Yes. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Now, Mr. Levy, will you turn to rubber sales 
account. You say you have made an examination 
of that, and I would like you to tell what you 
found, using the papers of Touche-Niven, and such 
other papers as you will refer to in making that 
examination? 
Mr. Marshall: Is this the general led-
ger? 
The Witness: General ledger. 
Mr. Marshall: I object to the witness tes-
tifying from this book. There has been noth-
ing to identify the condition of the book 
at the time when 
The Court: I cannot hear you. 
Mr. Marshall: At the time the audit was 
made. I say, there has been no proof so 
far of the condition of the book at the time 
the audit was made. 
Mr. Podell: The condition of the book, 
there has been. Mr. Siess has testified. 
The Court: I will allow it. Objection 
overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: I respectfully take an ex-
ception, and may I note now an exception 
to any and all testimony of this witness re-
ferring to these books, to any of these books? 
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The Court: Of any of them? 
Mr. Marshall: I will take them one at a 
time then. Of this book. 
The Court: I cannot follow every one of 
them, but I believe this one has been con-
nected. 
Mr. Marshall: All right, Judge. Excep-
tion. 
The Witness: This is the rubber sales 
account in the general ledger, that covers 
the year 1922 and also the year 1923. It 
shows a balance for the year 1923 of $10,-
492,387.64, representing the total net sales 
for the year, and that same balance appears 
in the work sheets of Touche, Niven & Co., 
page 4. 
Mr. Marshall: Just a minute. 
The Witness: In the column marked 
"balance before closing December 31st", and 
alongside of the item "rubber sales". Ex-
amining this account, I find on its credit 
side each month a large amount appears, rep-
resenting the total sales for the month. 
Q. Does more than one such item appear for 
any month prior to December, 1923? 
Mr. Marshall: May I look over your 
shoulder? 
The Witness: Yes. During the year 1922, 
there are a total of twelve such items on the 
credit side, one for each month of the year. 
Mr. Marshall: I move to strike out 1922. 
The Court: No. I will allow it because 
it is in evidence that he made the examina-
tion of 1922. 
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Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
The Witness: And during 1923, I find 
one such credit item for each of the first 
eleven months of the year, but during De-
cember I find two such credit items in this 
rubber sales account. 
Q. Read the items, if you please? A. One for 
$644,758.17, and another credit item in December 
for $706,843.07. 
Mr. Marshall: I move to strike that out 
now, as the contents of a book not in evi-
dence. 
The Court: Denied. That is a general 
objection. You do not need to take any 
more exceptions. Put it on the record as a 
general objection and exception as to the 
admissibility of this particular testimony 
based on the figures in the books from which 
they are taken. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Mr. Levy, one of the jurors asked me—there 
are two columns appearing on that sheet. One is 
debit and the other is credit. When you speak of 
one item for each month, what are you referring 
to? A. I am referring to the credits only and the 
credits represent total sales made during the 
month. The debits would represent the offsets con-
sisting of any returns or allowances or other charge-
backs. 
Q. But credits, deducting the offset, you get the 
net assets, the net sales? A. You get the net vol-
ume of business, the net sales. 
Q. Go along in your own way and just explain 
that account ? A. Yes, sir. Each one of these credit 
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entries makes reference to a voucher number. For 
instance, these items of December, 1923, refer, in the 
first case, to 12-9, journal voucher for the twelfth 
month of the year, December voucher No. 9. The 
second credit, sales credit in December, of $706,000, 
refers to journal voucher No. 28, of December. 
Q. Are those customary references to supporting 
books? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Supporting records? A. Yes, sir. The led-
ger is always posted up from some underlying 
record. 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that statement 
and move to strike it out, because of the 
specific statement of Romberg here the other 
day, that this book was posted from invoices 
and not from these journal vouchers. 
The Court: I think that is so, Mr. Podell. 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, that is not the 
question now. The question is what is the 
usual customary thing with regard to ref-
erences. I am perfectly willing—— 
The Court: You mean Stern & Company 
should have had a book that they put them 
in first and then into this? 
Mr. Podell: Yes. And if it was irregular, 
they had notice of it. If there was anything 
irregular about it, different in Stern's case 
from any other case, they certainly had no-
tice of it and are chargeable with notice of 
it. 
Mr. Marshall: That is a conclusion and 
summary. 
The Court: I think it is, Mr. Podell. I 
will sustain the objection. 
Mr. Podell: You mean the witness is tes-
tifying to a conclusion? 
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The Court: No. I sustain the objection 
that counsel originally made, that it having 
been testified that these particular entries 
were made right from the sales bills them-
selves—— 
Mr. Podell: I think he is in error about 
that. 
Mr. Marshall: I will show it to you. 
Mr. Podell : Now, if your Honor please, 
I know what the witness said. The witness 
said that he referred to three items. He re-
ferred to the journal vouchers, the debit 
memo book—remember that black book—he 
referred to that too as one of the supporting 
books. He referred to the journal too. 
The Court: A journal? 
Mr. Podell: I think so. Shipment record. 
He referred to that, and specifically identi-
fied the volumes; but it is not material one 
way or the other. What we are driving at 
is something different. I want your Honor 
to know as we go along. 
Mr. Marshall: I will call your Honor's 
attention to page 190 of the record, where 
Mr. Romberg was asked: "Q. That could 
be posted directly from duplicate invoices, 
could it not?" 
The Court: Could be. 
Mr. Marshall: "A. Yes." 
"Q. And it frequently was so posted, was 
it not? A. Yes. 
"Q. Without reference to the journal 
vouchers? A. At no time is there a refer-
ence to the journal vouchers." 
Mr. Podell: What does that show? 
The Court: I will allow the question. 
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Mr. Marshall: He says that he did not 
enter it from the journal vouchers. 
Exception. 
The Witness: I may say this book is the 
general ledger, not the accounts payable 
ledger. The accounts payable ledger might 
have been posted up from the individual in-
voices, but this is a summary ledger. 
Mr. Marshall: Your Honor, is this wit-
ness going to be allowed to describe the prac-
tice of Stern? 
The Court: I think that is explanatory. 
I will allow it. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Now, we have been talking about the item 
of $706,000, which is one of the two that appear 
for December? A. Yes, sir. The fact that there 
are two such entries in December is unusual on 
the face of this ledger account, and because that 
second amount comes through at the very end of 
the year, it calls for further examination. 
Q. It is the very last item, is it not? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as a con-
clusion. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
Q. It is the very last item, is it not? A. It is 
the very last item in this account, yes, sir. 
Q. Now, assume further, Mr. Levy, as has been 
testified to by Mr. Siess, that he wrote up every 
item after May 7th, 1923, that it was in his hand-
writing, appearing on that account, every single 
one item below that, and that the last item that 
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he had entered was the one of $644,758, and that 
the item of seven hundred and six thousand and 
odd dollars was not in his handwriting and was 
entered by someone else, would you take that as 
an additional circumstance calling for a very close 
investigation? A. Certainly. 
Q. Now then, tell us what the normal ordinary 
reasonable investigation would have consisted of, 
and what it would have disclosed? I am not ask-
ing you for anything extraordinary, Mr. Levy. I 
just want ordinary reasonable care, the ordinary 
prudent examination. What would that have 
shown with regard to that last item? A. Well, I 
would take both items and examine them, of course. 
Q. Well, you mean now both items in December? 
A. Both items in December, yes. And that would 
call for journal vouchers 9 and 28, of the month 
of December. 
Q. Now, you dig them out just as though you 
were making your ordinary examination. Take 
them out. Let us have those vouchers? 
Mr. Podell: They are in evidence, your 
Honor. 
Mr. Marshall: Which are you referring 
to, first? 
The Witness: I am first referring to jour-
nal voucher marked 12-9. 
Mr. Marshall: I object to the use of that 
document on the ground that document has 
in no way been connected with the case. 
Mr. Podell: Specifically referred to in 
the ledger. 
Mr. Marshall: But it has not been con-
nected as having been in that condition at 
that time. 
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Mr. Podell: It is produced from the Trus-
tee's files and so identified by Mr. Romberg. 
Mr. Marshall: I think it was not identi-
fied. 
Mr. Limburg: It is part of Exhibit 21. 
Mr. Podell: It was marked in evidence; 
I am sure that I marked them, identified 
them and marked them in evidence at the 
time. 
Mr. Limburg: Exhibit 21 is the entire 
vouchers for December. 
Mr. Podell: Marked all the vouchers in 
evidence, Plaintiff's Exhibit 21. 
Mr. Marshall: They were marked in on 
the requirement of certain proof being nec-
essary to connect them up finally. 
The Court: Subject to connection. 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, Mr. Romberg 
identified them definitely; examined each one 
of them and identified them as journal 
vouchers that were on the files at the time, 
and continued on the file. There was not 
any doubt about it. The record will show 
it. I am positive. 
Mr. Marshall: He said, on cross-exami-
nation, he could not say whether any of those 
documents were in the condition they were 
in. 
Mr. Podell: He said what any man on 
this witness stand would be bound to say. 
How could any human being say any one of 
the books or vouchers or any documents 
were exactly as they were. That is for the 
jury to say after we get through here. You 
cannot expect a human being to come here 
and tell you a thousand or a million figures 
were exact. 
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Mr. Marshall: The man who wrote them, 
ought to know. 
The Court: Are those particular vouch-
ers identified, being part of the make-up of 
the record of Stern & Company at that time? 
Mr. Podell: Absolutely. January and 
February, 1924. They are marked in evi-
dence Plaintiff's Exhibit 21. 
The Court: I will allow it. 
Mr. Marshall: I respectfully except, on 
the ground that the record shows no such 
thing as Mr. Podell stated. 
The Court: You may have an exception. 
The Witness: Journal voucher 12-9 con-
tains five debit entries and eight credit en-
tries and among the credit entries is a credit 
to the rubber sales account, in the amount 
of $644,758.17, which is the amount which 
appears in this ledger account. This jour-
nal voucher appears to be a summary of a 
detailed sales record. And referring from 
this voucher to that, I understood referred— 
Q. What is this detailed sales record that you 
would refer to in order to check up and verify that 
item further? A. It is called the debit memo book. 
Q. Have you got it here, please? 
Mr. Limburg: It is Exhibit 5 (handing). 
Q. Plaintiff's Exhibit 5. Let us see what it is 
marked, to be sure. Plaintiff's Exhibit 5. 
Mr. Marshall: I have the same objection 
to this book, that it has not been tied up, 
and was only conditionally admitted. 
The Court: It is allowed. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
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By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Now, would your normal examination, the 
ordinary examination, would that take you on down 
to this debit sales book, to make certain of that 
six hundred and forty-four thousand odd item? A. 
Yes, sir. 
Q. And what would you find if you examined 
that debit sales book? A. Referring to page 33, 
which shows the totals for the month of December, 
1923, I might say that this book appears to be a 
sales journal. That is, it contains in numerical 
order the sales for the month of December. 
Q. Yes. What is the total of sales given there 
for the month of December? A. And comparing 
the totals for the month of December with the to-
tals which appear on this journal voucher 12-9, I 
find all of the details supported in this record. 
Q. In other words, this paper 12-9, is really al-
most a copy or summary of the details as they ap-
pear in this sales record, is that right? A. Yes, 
sir. It is a restatement of the details which ap-
pear in this sales record, so that my examination 
thus far would make it appear that this entry in 
the rubber sales account 
The Court: 644,000. 
The Witness: 644,000 is quite regular. 
Now following the same line of examination 
with the other entry, the credit for $706,-
843.07, I refer to journal voucher 12-28 
Q. That is the reference that is contained in 
this very ledger opposite that item, is it? A. Yes, 
sir. 
Q. 12-28? A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. What do you find on 12-28? A. But I do not 
find a credit of $706,000 to the rubber sales account. 
It is not there. 
Q. What would you conclude from that, and 
what would you do? A. Well, I would have to go 
further. 
Q. Then where would you go? A. I would refer 
to the debit memo book again to satisfy myself 
that all of the sales for December were contained 
on the prior voucher, that there were not any other 
sales. 
Q. Just to be absolutely certain, there are some 
loose leaf books. Is that debit memo book a, loose 
leaf book? A. No, that is a bound book. 
Q. A bound book. And are the pages all in con-
secutive order, in successive numbers? A. I have 
not gone through the entire book. 
The Court : Yes. 
Q. As far as you can see there? A. They are, 
in December. 
Q. Did you find support there for that item of 
$706,000? A. No, sir, no support there at all. 
Q. Now, to make absolutely certain, what would 
you have done then, go further; could you have 
gone any further? A. Well, examining the records, 
I would have gone to the invoice file. 
Q. Yes. A. Supporting this debit memo book. 
That is, to the record containing copies of original 
sales invoices sent to customers?. 
Q. Yes? A. To see if all of those invoices had 
been entered in this debit memo book, to see if 
there were any other invoices there, which were 
not entered in this debit memo book, which would 
help to explain the seven hundred and six thou-
sand dollar item. 
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Q. What other methods would you pursue? A. 
I would also have in mind going to shipping 
records, but that would come in at—probably as 
a later step. 
Q. The invoices are not in any bound book; they 
are usually loose documents, separate documents, 
are they not? A. Usually they are. 
Q. And they could be easily duplicated? A. Yes, 
sir. 
Q. Or fabricated, if we may use the term? A. 
Yes, sir. 
Q. To make certain they were not fabricated, 
in the ordinary course, where you find no support 
in the debit memo book, and no support in the 
journal voucher to which specific reference is made, 
would you have gone to the shipping records? A. 
Yes, sir. 
Q. Would that have given you a reasonable cer-
tainty that the goods had been shipped or had not 
been shipped? A. It would. I might have gone 
further than that, depending on the circumstances, 
because those shipping records might have been 
fabricated, too. 
Q. As a matter of fact, one of the safest methods, 
particularly where you find a suspiciously large 
item—is not that one of the safest methods, to 
communicate with the people who are supposed to 
owe this money and check up as to whether they 
really owed it? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And where you find these number of suspi-
cious circumstances, is not that what an account-
ant in the ordinary course of his duty, whether a 
client likes it or not, is bound to do? A. Well, 
the accountant is bound to insist upon doing it. 
He cannot 
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Q. Either that or refuse to certify to the state-
ment? A. Or he refuses to certify, yes, sir. 
Q. He always has that alternative? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I mean an accountant is free to certify or not 
certify unless certain things he asks are done? A. 
Yes, sir, or he can qualify his certificate, setting 
forth the circumstances. 
Q. In that event, would you not consider, if he 
qualified or explained his certificate, that in fair-
ness and honesty he would have to explain that 
seven hundred and six thousand dollar item? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that. 
A. Yes, sir. I base that answer upon my com-
plete examination. I haven't finished my testi-
mony. 
Q. You go along and finish your testimony now 
with regard to that item. A. Referring to the sales 
invoice records. 
Q. Yes, let us have those. 
Mr. Marshall: May it be noted I make 
my same objection to the use of this book, 
that it has not been identified as being in 
this condition at the time Touche, Niven & 
Co. audited the books? 
The Court: Yes. You may have an ob-
jection and exception. What is this entry 
we are getting at? Is this a new one? 
The Witness: I am still tracing the sales 
credit of $706,000. I find no trace of it in 
the journal voucher 12-28, and no trace of it 
in the debit memo book, so I am going back 
further into the records, into the sales in-
voices; examining this file of sales invoices 
I found seventeen invoices here. 
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Q. Yes. A. Which total the exact amount of 
$706,000. These seventeen invoices total exactly 
$706,843.07, which is the amount in the ledger, but 
none of these invoices appear in the debit memo 
book. 
Q. And none of them appear in the journal 
voucher? A. And none of them appear in journal 
voucher 12-28. 
Q. And the debit memo book is not a loose leaf 
book, and the invoices are loose leaf, are they not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where you find the condition like that, did 
you examine the invoices—I mean in the exercise 
of ordinary care, in the ordinary audit, would you 
have examined the invoices closely and suspi-
ciously? A. I certainly would. 
Q. Did you do that? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And what did you find? How would you con-
duct such an examination; would you compare 
them with all other previous invoices? A. I would 
first look at these invoices generally to see what 
they appear to be; and then I would trace them 
into the customer's ledger, and I would make com-
parisons with the usual invoices that they had. 
Q. Have you done that? A. Yes, sir, I have. 
Q. What did you find? A. I found on the face 
of these invoices, a number of unusual things. 
Q. In what respect are they different from the 
ordinary and regular invoice that the concern sent 
out, first, were they regular invoices consecutively 
numbered? A. They were consecutively numbered, 
but these numbers were entirely out of line. 
Q. You mean the numbers on these seventeen 
invoices? A. On these seventeen invoices; they run 
from 18235 to and including 18252, with one num-
ber omitted. 
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Q. Yes. A. And the debit memo book indicates 
that the last sales invoice entered in December is 
18010. That is, there appears to be a gap between 
18010 and 18235. That would indicate that there 
is some irregularity about these invoices; they were 
not prepared in the ordinary course of business, be-
cause in the ordinary course of things, the num-
bers would run consecutively. 
Q. You go along. A. And then, right alongside 
of the invoice number, glancing at other invoices, 
I find that in every instance practically there are 
two numbers appear. After the invoice number 
of 18,000 there is a number beginning ten thousand 
and something. Upon inquiry, I learned that that 
second number is the shipping record number. 
Q. You are speaking now of a regular invoice? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That contains a shipping record number? A. 
An invoice number, and alongside of it a shipping 
record number. 
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, I 
think that the record should show that there 
are two sets of numbers there on those other 
invoices. 
Mr. Podell: Wait until he finishes. He 
has not finished yet. 
Mr. Marshall: I thought he gave the im-
pression there was only one number on these 
invoices. 
Mr. Podell: Do not rest on impressions. 
The Court: I thought so, too, Mr. Podell. 
Mr. Podell: He has not finished his 
answer. 
The Witness: Let me explain. These are 
carbon copies and they are presumably car-
bon copies of an original invoice. The origi-
1289 
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nal invoice usually goes to the customer and 
on the other invoices, we have in carbon type-
written one number alongside of the other. 
We have two numbers. 
Q. Which other invoices? A. We have in type-
writing an invoice number, and alongside of it a 
second number. 
Q. Yes. A. On these invoices we have typewrit-
ten but one number. 
Q. You say about "these". We do not know 
what you are speaking of? A. The seventeen in-
voices. 
Q. You have what? A. We have only one type-
written number. 
Mr. Marshall: The other is a written num-
ber? 
The Witness: There is another number, 
which is a written number, but that is a 
totally different series. The other num-
bers run in the ten thousand series, and 
these written numbers run 2600. The writ-
ten number up there would appear to be 
some bookkeeping reference. That is, it does 
not appear from this that the written num-
ber was on the original invoice which went 
to the customer, whereas from all of the 
other invoices 
Mr. Marshall: I certainly object to that, 
as the wildest kind of a guess. 
Mr. Podell: He has a right to show dif-
ferences between the two sets of invoices. 
That is all he is doing. 
The Court: But he cannot say how it 
would compare; that the other number was 
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not on the invoice. He can show the dis-
tinction. 
Mr. Podell: The point I am making is 
that he is asked to tell what the ordinary ac-
countant would have done and would have 
concluded, and that involved an examina-
tion of the papers. 
The Court: I would be glad to have him 
do that, but I do not want him to render 
a mental conclusion which he does not know 
anything about unless he can show he does. 
Mr. Podell: He has a right under that 
question to state to your Honor what reac-
tions he would have had in the ordinary ex-
amination. 
The Court: Yes, and what he should have 
done. 
Mr. Podell: And he is entitled to say this 
is what he would have concluded, where two 
typewritten numbers or carbon copies of 
typewritten numbers were on the usual ordi-
nary invoice. On this invoice there appears 
to be one typewritten carbon copy number 
and one written in number. He would have 
concluded, as he examined it, that the writ-
ten number was not on the original sent to 
the customer, but was a mere bookkeeping 
item. That would have been his conclusion. 
What that might have led him to do, re-
mains to be seen. 
The Court: I see what you mean. 
Q. You go along. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
The Witness: As I say, the significance 
of that number to me was that, in the first 
1 2 9 5 
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place, there is a difference there that I asked 
about. In the second place, when I made 
the inquiry, I was told that that second num-
ber was a shipping record number. 
Mr. Marshall: I object to what he was 
told by somebody else, and I move to strike 
that out. 
The Court: Strike that out. Tell us any-
thing you found. 
The Witness: I found it was a shipping 
record number. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Now, you go along and tell us the differences 
between these two sets of invoices? 
The Court : Is this a summary of what 
you are going to describe now? A summary 
of your conclusion? 
The Witness: Yes, sir. 
The Court: Go right ahead. 
The Witness: Further making a compari-
son between these seventeen invoices and the 
invoices as they run in this file, I find that 
in the center of most invoices appears a 
number, a third number; and upon looking 
at a copy of the form used, the original in-
voice form, I see that has provision for the 
customer's order number, but on none of 
these seventeen invoices is there such a cus-
tomer's number. 
Looking through the regular flies, I find 
that practically all of these invoices refer 
to some steamship, or give weight slips or 
other data relating to the shipments, so you 
could identify the particular shipment, the 
1 2 9 8 
1 2 9 9 
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net weight; and none of these seventeen in-
voices have any reference of that character 
to the steamship carrying the rubber. None 
of them make a reference to a weight slip 
or to a bill of lading. 
Q. Have you got one of the seventeen; are they 
all in the file? A. They are all in this file. 
Q. Is it possible to take one of them out? A. 
It would make it much more convenient if we could 
take all seventeen out. 
Q. Go ahead. We will see if we cannot have 
a copy made for a comparison? A. In tabulating 
these seventeen invoices, to see what they totalled 
up to, I also observed that they were for large 
amounts. They ran $21,500 to $64,600; the seven-
teen of them averaged over $40,000; and looking 
at the—glancing through the invoice file, I find 
these are all unusually large items for Stern. Stern 
had made some large sales in the past, but the 
ordinary run of invoices would run—here I have 
a batch before me, which shows invoices $2900, 
$14,000, $2500, $9300, $1300, $5900, $2900. These 
are all very large amounts. 
Mr. Podell: May I hand to the jury, if 
you will pardon me, a regular invoice, and 
I have phtographs of these seventeen in-
voices, some of them. 
The Court: Just hand them, one of each, 
so there may be a comparison. The witness 
testifies and the Court can see with its own 
eyes that the seventeen run in about the 
same way as distinguished by what has al-
ready been testified to as to the old invoices. 
Mr. Podell: You mean, each one of the 
1 3 0 1 
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seventeen is pretty much the same as dis-
tinguished from all the others? 
The Court: Yes. 
(Recess until 2:05 o'clock P. M.) 
A F T E R RECESS. 
S A U L LEVY resumes the stand. 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, I have a few 
photographs of original invoices; I mean the 
regular invoices. 
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Podell: And photographs of these 
seventeen invoices. I would like to have 
them marked in evidence or marked for iden-
tification. I think better in evidence, and 
let the jury see them. 
Mr. Marshall: I make the same objec-
tion to their going in evidence as I did to 
the originals. 
The Court: Yes. Exception is granted. 
Mr. Podell: I think you can mark them 
as one exhibit and that will save time. 
Mr. Marshall: And having been in, it is 
stated that at the time we examined the 
books I have no objection. 
Mr. Podell: I show them to the jury as 
examples of what you have already in. 
The Court: Yes, they are in evidence. 
(The nine papers were received in evidence 
and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 78.) 
Mr. Podell: There are nine out of the 
seventeen and there are four regular in-
voices; some of them are duplicates, but 
1 3 0 4 
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there are nine physical exhibits. I think 
you have enough to pass around to the jury. 
Direct examination (continued) by Mr. Podell. 
Q. When you spoke of the second number at the 
top on the seventeen, in ink, you meant the figure 
appearing up above, a little above the typewritten 
figure to the right in handwriting? A. Will you 
tell me what invoice? 
Q. Take the invoice of November 17th to the 
Brunswick-Balke-Collender Company? A. What 
number is that? 
Q. 18,235, and the handwriting appearing in 
the upper corner of the right appears 6668. A. 
Yes, sir, that is the handwriting that I referred 
to as distinguished from the typewritten number. 
Q. There appears on this 18,235 a change which 
says "Due February 15", and that is crossed out 
and marked 1st? A. It is marked 3/1/—March 1st. 
Q. Does that appear on other invoices, or just 
on that one? I mean out of the seventeen, those 
are all the same? A. There are other changes of 
that sort. 
Mr. Marshall: May the record show, your 
Honor, that Mr. Podell is showing these ex-
hibits to the jury at this time? 
The Court: Oh, yes, 
Q. When you spoke of the absence of weights, 
what did you say about that? There appears to 
be on this one of the seventeen, there appears to 
be 139,339 pounds? A. I think you misunderstood 
me, Mr. Podell. I said that there is no notation 
on any of these invoices to the effect that a weight 
slip is enclosed or a bill of lading is enclosed; 
1307 
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whereas on other invoices that very frequently ap-
pears, "The weight slip herewith." "Bill of lading 
herewith." 
Q. What are the pencil 
Mr. Marshall: This number frequently 
appears. 
The Court: That is what he says. 
Q. What is the handwriting in the lower right-
hand corner of B-10? A. What invoice are you re-
ferring to? 
Q. The regular invoice of December 31, 1923, to 
the Rubber & Woolen Manufacturing Company, 1310 
that appears to be one of the regular invoices. Then 
this one of the seventeen invoices is the same one, 
18,235, and there is a B-10 in the lower right-hand 
corner? A. That would be a posting reference. 
That would indicate that the account had been 
posted to the customer's ledger, account 10 under 
the letter B. 
Q. This seventeen won't— A. They are all 
posted to the customer's ledger. 
Q. But in tracing whether or not sales have been 
made, you find the condition that you have des-
scribed, that there was no posting or record of a 
sale in the debit memo book or in the journal book, 
and this was the difference that you found in the 
appearances of the invoices? A. That is so, I have 
not fully completed that though. 
Q. And the seventeen, the last in the book, the 
last invoices for that year? A. They are the last 
in the book, yes, sir. 
Fifth Juror: There are dates on the ones 
previous to December 31, and the latter ones 
in are November 17th. 
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Q. A juror is asking the witness a question— 
did you find that to be the situation? A. That is 
the situation. 
Mr. Marshall: I think that to get this 
clear, certainly there is nothing to show the 
order in which these loose leaf things were 
in this book at that time. There has been 
no identification at all. They have been gone 
over in lots of hands since then. I do not 
think we should be bound by the present 
order of these documents in this book. 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, the testimony 
is that these books were in the premises on 
January and February at the time they ex-
amined them and in conjunction with all of 
the circumstances that we have here, all we 
want to show, and have a right to show, and 
I think the juror very properly asked the 
question, is that here is an entry of $700,000 
which is the last entry in the customer's 
ledger. 
The Court: I will let it stand as it is. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
The Court: Your accountants may show 
differently. I do not know whether they 
will or not. 
Mr. Marshall: I am not discussing the 
figures. 
The Court: I do not mean that, but their 
position. 
Mr. Marshall: But their position in the 
book, and the condition of this loose leaf 
book. 
The Court: Yes, that may be proven dif-
ferently. I do not know whether they can 
or not. 
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Mr. Podell: We will check up on that. 
We have another way. 
Mr. Marshall: I respectfully take an ex-
ception. 
The Court: All right, sir. 
The Eighth Juror: What is the difference 
in the terms of the two invoices? 
Q. The juror refers to the difference in the terms 
between the two invoices that you have spoken of 
here? A. Yes, sir, I have not spoken of it yet, but 
that is another matter that I came across in the 
course of my examination. 
Q. The comparison of these two? A. Yes, sir. 
Not only were those amounts unusually large but 
there was abnormal dating; that is, dating that 
was greater than the usual dating, as shown by 
the regular invoices in this file, and as shown by 
the customer's accounts of these very same custo-
mers. 
Q. Take the specific instance, if I may interrupt 
you. I hold invoice 18,235, dated November 17, 
which had at first the dating of February 15th, and 
that was changed to March 1st, and that would 
give it a dating of more than three months, would 
it not, from November 17, the date of the invoice, 
to the due date would be over three months, Novem-
ber 17, you see? A. November 17, yes, over three 
months, 
Q. Now, you have heard the testimony that the 
usual dating is 30 days maximum? A. That cus-
tomer's usual dating is thirty days, as shown by his 
ledger account. 
Q. And that was another point of difference? 
A. That was another suspicious circumstance. 
Q. Now then, there has been some question here 
as to the order in which these invoices were in 
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the book. You say that appears to be the last batch, 
as you have the book now? A. I understood the 
juror meant the order they were in here now. 
Q. That is all right. You stated that appeared 
to be the last invoices in there? A. Yes. 
Q. Now in the order I was numbering, are not 
the numbers appearing on those invoices—there is 
a gap; the numbers are subsequent to the numbers 
of the preceding invoices? A. Yes, sir, certainly. 
Q. So that you got that order as to numbers 
fixed. If those invoices were entered, as you see, 
in the accounts receivable ledger, reference to the 
accounts rceivable ledger would show the order in 
which they were made up, would it not; it would 
be apt to show it, would it not? A. It will show 
then that there are some invoices dated November. 
I have before me in this number 18,236, which is 
dated November 18th, the ledger would show that 
that was posted in December. 
Q. In December? A. In December, yes. 
Q. Would it show that it was posted after the 
posting of an earlier sale than that one? A. Well, 
if it were in the same account. 
Q. Yes, that is what I mean. It is entered up 
in the respective accounts; you could check that 
up, of course? A. There is a separate account for 
each customer in that ledger. 
Mr. Podell: You can check that up. We 
will go along with something else, because 
I do not want to take too long. 
Q. Now, seeing these various invoices, and the 
difference in appearances between the invoices, and 
seeing further the character of this last entry, and 
having in mind the irregularities as to inventory 
1319 
1320 
441 
Saul Levy—For Plaintiff—Direct. 1321 
that you have testified to—by these surrounding 
circumstances, would there have been any doubt in 
your mind that these invoices were fictitious? 
Mr. Marshall: Same objection. 
The Court: Same ruling and exception. 
A. I certainly would have strongly suspected it. 
It would have been at least one thing more to ques-
tion. 
Q. Before you ever allowed yourself to certify 
such a statement, what would you have done? A. 
I would have examined the shipping records, and 
I would have insisted upon communicating with 
those customers, particularly when I found, as I 
did, that there was no record in the shipping book 
that there had been shipments as indicated by 
these invoices. 
Q. You looked at the shipping book and you 
can testify now there is no record of any of those 
shipments? A. Not of those shipments, that is so. 
Mr. Marshall: The same objection as be-
fore. 
The Court: Yes. 
Q. I know no record of shipments 
Mr. Marshall: May I point out to your 
Honor, and I want your Honor to have a 
chance to rule on all the facts before you, 
that the witness Romberg said that was the 
shipping book, he specifically stated he could 
identify it in any event. 
The Court: That is true. It has been 
testified to here, I think, by one witness that 
that was the shipping book that was there, 
but he does not say it was in the condition, 
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or he could not swear it was in the condition 
it was now at the time they made their ex-
amination. 
Mr. Marshall: That is correct; or that 
it was in the condition it was at the time 
this witness made his examination? 
The Court: Yes, I will take all of that, 
and we will see what they have to say about 
it. 
Mr. Marshall: Your Honor understands 
I do not want to have any question that I 
did not bring up all the facts to your Honor 
at the time you made an important ruling. 
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Those are the shipping books, are they—let 
me have those? 
Mr. Marshall: What is the exhibit num-
ber? 
The Witness: Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 7 
and 8. 
Q. Those are the books that contain the record 
of shipments for the month of December 1923, 
don't they? A. Those books cover November and 
December 1923, and go back a little further than 
that. 
Q. And you can state you have examined those 
books and you have found no record of any of these 
shipments of these seventeen invoices? A. I beg 
your pardon 
Mr. Marshall: The same objection and 
exception. 
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Q. I mean as to the description of the books? 
A. Yes, sir, I was correct about that. 
Q. And you have found no record of any of those 
shipments? A. I found no record of any of those 
shipments. 
Q. In the shipping records? A. In the shipping 
records, yes, sir. 
Q. And your statement is that you never would 
have allowed yourself to certify an account with-
out communicating then with these alleged cus-
tomers and verifying whether or not these accounts 
receivable were really in existence or whether they 
were pure fraud? A. Certainly, I had to have 
further proof, because at this stage it would seem 
quite clear that there was something wrong about 
these accounts. 
Q. And you would want to be convinced? A. 
Certainly. 
Q. And you would not consider that you were 
doing anything extraordinary in that? A. Cer-
tainly not under those circumstances. 
Mr. Podell: Now, will it be stipulated 
that the $706,000 is fictitious or must we 
read these depositions? 
Mr. Marshall: It is stipulated as to some 
of them. 
Mr. Podell: As to those that we have 
depositions of? 
Mr. Marshall: No. Some of your deposi-
tions do not show. 
Mr. Podell: The records were destroyed. 
We have examined all these accounts com-
prising $706,000 by taking the depositions 
of the various customers that were supposed 
to be owing money to Stern to show that 
they did not owe it. 
1 3 2 8 
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The Court: Have you all of the accounts? 
Mr. Podell: All of them except some of 
them saying that their records were de-
stroyed by fire. 
Mr. Marshall: I am perfectly willing to 
stipulate that if somebody were called who 
was competent from those concerns, they 
would testify to this effect 
Mr. Podell: They have testified. 
Mr. Marshall: May I finish my remarks; 
so that he does not have to read these into 
the record. 
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: Or waste time. I do not 
want to concede the fact, but I will concede 
that they would so testify. 
The Court: That they will so testify— 
that is a summation, Mr. Podell, which will 
save a great deal of time, that counsel will 
concede that if each one of these respective 
parties named in these bills were called, that 
they would testify that they never had any 
such account with Stern & Company. 
Mr. Marshall: Not any such account— 
just as to these particular items. 
The Court: I mean these seventeen. I 
refer only to the ones in question, those 
seventeen alleged customers, these items. 
Mr. Podell: Will your Honor permit me 
to add to that statement that we have their 
depositions here? 
Mr. Marshall: Some of them. 
Mr. Podell: In substance they testify to 
that effect, with the exception of two, whose 
records were destroyed by fire, and that will 
be satisfactory. 
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Mr. Marshall: You have not got them 
all. I will give you a concession anyway. 
Mr. Podell: If you had given the con-
cession in time, we would not have to take 
the depositions. 
Mr. Marshall: I did not know about it, 
The Court: Are you going to read them 
anyhow? 
Mr. Podell: No. We served notice on 
your office, Mr. Marshall. 
Q. Now, Mr. Levy, does that about cover the 
situation with respect to these seventeen alleged 
invoices aggregating $706,000, or is there some-
thing else that occurs to you in connection with 
it which you would like us to know? Pardon me, 
but may I make just one thing a little clearer about 
that. You spoke of the second number on the top 
of the invoice; that usual second number in type-
writing is the very number that refers to the ship-
ping record, is it not? A. Yes, sir, and that is the 
very number that I find in the shipping record with 
respect to all other November—— 
Q. Regular invoices? A. November and Decem-
ber regular invoices. 
Q. And you could not find any other number 
except the ink number at the top and that was 
not a reference to the shipping record, was it? A. 
It was not. 
Q. And the other number that is missing, is 
the customer's order number; that is, in the other 
invoices, the regular invoices, there is always the 
customer's order number, is there not? A. There 
usually is. 
Q. They are not on these. Of course, these ac-
countants examining these books, and finding that 
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condition, could have asked for the original orders 
from customers, too, could not they? A. Yes, sir. 
The record that an accountant would ordinarily 
ask for would be the shipping record though; that 
is, there always is a shipping record. 
Q. Well, this time, the invoice is made out when 
there is a shipment made? A. Usually the invoice 
is made from the shipping record, after there has 
been a shipment, but other concerns keep its ship-
ping records, and it is always there on the premises. 
Q. You have spoken now of certain accounts in 
December. Have you likewise examined these ac-
counts for the month of November, 1923? A. Yes, 
sir. Having come across these irregular invoices 
in the month of December, I examined the records 
further back to see 
Mr. Marshall: Is this calling for a con-
clusion now? 
The Court: Yes, I think so—having 
found those irregular invoices. 
Mr. Podell: Those invoices that you speak 
of. 
The Court: It may be a question as to 
whether they are irregular or not. 
Q. Those irregular invoices in the form which 
you have described, did you check up? A. I went 
back further; I glanced through my debit memo 
book for the month of November, and also through 
the invoice file of November, looking for similar 
items. 
Q. And did you find some invoices had no sup-
port in this debit memo book? A. I might say that 
I also checked back the shipping records for the 
month of November as well as December, and in 
checking back these shipping records I found en-
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tered in the debit memo book in the month of 
November, four items on page 27, invoices Nos. 
17,790 to 17,793 inclusive, four invoices, which to-
talled $250,474.00, and referring to the invoice file, 
I found carbon copies of those invoices in here, 
and they appear to be similar. 
Q. The same as the seventeen invoices? A. As 
the seventeen. They had many of the same ear-
marks. 
Q. Yes? A. But there is no record of these 
items having been shipped. 
Q. In the shipping record? A. No, sir. Those 
items were in the debit memo book, and the num-
bers were in order. 
Q. In the debit memo book? A. In the debit 
memo book, but there is no record of their having 
been shipped, of any merchandise being shipped 
in support of these invoices, and the four invoices 
in this file had several of these other indications 
on them. 
Mr. Marshall: I move to strike out the 
word "indications". 
The Court: Yes. 
The Witness: I will describe what I 
mean. 
The Court: Yes, you have to; are they 
of the same dates? 
Q. Point to them and describe them? A. There 
are only four of them. They have not any ship-
ping number at the top, and they have not any 
customer's order number. There is no notation 
that the rubber was coming on any particular 
steamship. There is no notation that a weight slip 
or bill of lading is enclosed. They are all for very 
large amounts. They average over $60,000 each. 
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Q. And what is their dating? A. March 15, 
April 1st, March 1st; one of them May 1st, and 
those are all November invoices. 
Q. Now, would you insist before certifying to 
any statement, that you communicate with the peo-
ple mentioned in these accounts? A. I certainly 
would. 
Q. Would you have signed a statement if the 
client refused to allow you to communicate with 
them? A. I would not have given that certificate 
unless I stated in that certificate the circumstances 
I had found. 
Mr. Marshall: That is subject to my 
same objection and exception. 
Q. Is that something unusual or extraordinary 
that you would have done, or is that customary 
with accountants? A. All these circumstances are 
unusual and extraordinary. 
Q. I am not talking about unusnal circum-
stances. A. I should not do otherwise. 
Mr. Marshall: I think the question should 
be answered whether it was customary or 
usual to circularize customers. 
Mr. Podell: Where accountants find dis-
crepancies. 
Mr. Marshall: That was the question. I 
think the question should be answered as 
given originally. 
The Court: It is the same thing. 
Q. When you have found all these things that 
you have described, what is the thing an honest 
accountant would do? A. It would be to employ 
every means in his command to verify these items, 
and one of these means would be to communicate 
directly with the customer. 
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Mr. Podell: Will it be conceded if those 
communications had been sent, it would 
have been found that these invoices aggre-
gating $250,000 are fictitious? 
Mr. Marshall: I will not make that con-
cession. 
Mr. Podell: Then we will read the depo-
sitions. 
Mr. Marshall: I will make the same con-
cession as in the other case. 
Mr. Podell: That may leave some ques-
tion in the mind of the Court or jury that 
these were fictitious, and I will take time 
to read them at the proper time, to read 
those depositions. They are not very long. 
The Court: Very well. 
Mr. Marshall: I am perfectly willing to 
make the same concession as to the others, 
but he asked me a different thing. 
Mr. Podell: All right. May I offer in 
evidence the tabulation the witness has with 
regard to these accounts receivable. I have 
not offered the tabulation that he had with 
regard to the inventory, but I offer Schedule 
2 which relates to the inventory items he 
has testified to. 
Q. What schedule is that on; is that about ac-
counts receivable, Mr. Levy, Schedule 1? A. That 
is Schedule No. 1. 
Mr. Podell: Yes, I offer in evidence 
Schedules 1 and 2. 
Q. Have you this page? A. Mr. Podell, this 
schedule relates to certain examinations I have 
made concerning which I have not testified to. 
1346 
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Q. You mean Schedule 1? A. Schedule 1. 
Q. Or does that include besides these A. I 
examined the individual ledger accounts in the 
customer's ledger with respect to each one of these 
items. 
Q. Yes. A. And I found that these invoices had 
all been posted up. 
Q. Yes, you have said that. A. And I also traced 
these items in the Touche & Niven working pa-
pers, and through those working papers into the 
balance sheet which they prepared, and I found 
that these invoices, these seventeen invoices in De-
cember and four invoices in November, totalling 
$957,317.07 were included in the balance sheet. 
Q. In Plaintiff's Exhibit A? A. Yes, sir, in the 
item, I think "Trade accounts receivable". 
Q. And you got that from the working papers 
of Touche, Niven & Co.? A. Taken in conjunction 
with the customer's ledger. 
Q. So that there is no doubt that this $957,000 
of accounts receivable was part of the $2,400,000 
accounts receivable which appears in the statement 
annexed to Plaintiff's Exhibit A? A. That is so. 
Mr. Marshall: There is no question about 
that. 
Q. Is there anything else on this Schedule 1 
which you have not testified to? A. There are cer-
tain comments which appear. Those comments are 
all based upon my examination of the individual 
customer's accounts. That is, in some instances, 
I find transactions during the same month, with 
this customer on the regular terms, that is, on the 
usual terms as shown in the ledger account itself, 
and as shown by this schedule. 
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Mr. Podell: I offer Schedule No. 1 and 
Schedule No. 2 in evidence. 
Mr. Marshall: I object, your Honor. 
The Court: Why? 
Mr. Marshall: On the ground in the first 
place that I have not had a chance to check 
them up. 
Mr. Podell: Take them subject to any cor-
rection as to figures that counsel wishes to 
make. 
Mr. Marshall: And in the second place, 
I object to them because they are based upon 
books of Stern's which have not been identi-
fied as being in the condition that they were 
in at the time that we made the audit. 
The Court: Yes. I will take them sub-
ject to the first stipulation and subject to 
their correctness. 
Mr. Podell: The checking up as to the 
figures. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
The Court: Yes, and I overrule the ob-
jection. 
(Schedule No. 1 was received in evidence 
and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 79.) 
(Schedule No. 2 was received in evidence 
and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 80.) 
Q. Now, will you turn to the United Baltic 
Corporation account. In the statement that you 
made with respect to Schedule 2, correction of in-
ventory, you referred to instances where merchan-
dise had been bought by Stern, had been sold by 
him and he had credited himself with accounts re-
ceivable therefor, but had failed to make an entry 
of moneys that he owed for the purchase of that 
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merchandise. Do you recall those instances? A. 
There are certain technical things in your ques-
tion that are incorrect,—had not credited himself 
with accounts receivable—he had entered the ac-
count receivable on his book. 
Q. That is a credit to himself, it adds to his 
assets then? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. All right. My technical knowledge in ac-
counting is surely bad. Do you know what in-
stance I refer to? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, do you find—I say, first finding such 
a condition with regard to inventory; what would 
have been your attitude with respect to all pur-
chases and all sales and accounts receivable in 
connection with any audit? A. I would have been 
on the lookout for similar items, for suppressed pur-
chased invoices; that is, for invoices covering mer-
chandise that had been purchased, which were 
omitted from the records. I would have been on 
guard against that. 
Q. Now, have you made such an examination 
with regard to the accounts, the accounts payable 
particularly? A. I have examined the United 
Baltic account in the accounts payable ledger. 
Q. Now you tell us about that. A. I might say 
that prior to doing that I examined the Touche, 
Niven Co. working paper relating to accounts pay-
able. 
Q. All right. Let me ask you this question with 
regard to the Touche-Niven working paper relating 
to accounts payable on the United Baltic account. 
Did you find something in their own working pa-
pers that aroused your suspicion with regard to 
the account; just tell the jury what their own work-
ing papers show with regard to that account? 
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Mr. Marshall: What page? 
Mr. Podell: May I have that original, 
please. What one is that? 
The Court: He is trying to locate it, 
Mr. Marshall: We do not know the page. 
The Witness: Pages 108, 109 and 110. 
Mr. Podell: All right. Will you let me 
have the originals of those papers. Will it 
be stipulated as to whose handwriting they 
are in, Mr. Marshall? 
The Witness: And also page 171. 
Mr. Marshall: Either Towell's or Siess'. 
Mr. Podell: And the first being the senior 
and the second the junior accountant; is that 
right? 
Mr. Marshall: That is in the record. 
Mr. Podell: Next, what page? 
The Witness : Page 171. 
Mr. Podell: And may it appear, your 
Honor, that these originals are produced 
from the files of Touche, Niven & Co., the 
defendant; that is, not being in our posses-
sion at any time. 
The Court: Yes. 
Q. Will you talk about them and tell us what 
you found on your own working? A. Pages 109 
and 110 are headed "Accounts payable" and ap-
pear to be a schedule of the open balances in the 
accounts payable ledger, in the individual accounts 
in that subsidiary ledger, and included in that 
list—— 
Q. Have you another photostat of that by any 
chance? A. I have not. 
Mr. Podell: Have you another photostat ? 
There is no other photostat, your Honor. 
We will do the best we can to follow. 
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Q. Go ahead, Mr. Levy. A. Next to the last item 
in that alphabetically arranged list, is the United 
Baltic Corporation, a debit balance of $.113,199.60, 
and alongside of that amount, a notation "Sterling 
deposits for future purchases". 
Q. "Sterling deposits for future purchases"? A. 
Yes, sir, and on page 171, at the very bottom, which 
is headed "Notes", at the very bottom of that page 
is the notation "United Baltic debit balance in 
accounts payable". Then there is a question mark, 
and then alongside of it "O. K." 
Mr. Podell: This is the item he is refer-
ring to (indicating to the jury). 
Q. What was the other item on 171? A. The 
last item on this page. 
Mr. Podell: Have you seen this last item? 
(pointing out to the jury). 
Q. There is a debit balance? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In "accounts payable" a question mark? A. 
Yes, sir. 
Q. And then "O. K."? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Well, now, what did you make of that? A. 
I referred to the ledger account in the accounts 
payable ledger 
Q. Pardon me, what is generally and commonly 
understood by the words "debit balance"; what 
does it mean? A. The debit balance generally? 
Q. Yes. A. In a case of this sort, a debit bal-
ance would mean that account owes us money. A 
credit balance would mean that we owe them 
money. 
Q. These were the work sheets of the accounts 
payable? A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. They were the work sheets of accounts that 
Stern owed to other people? A. Apparently the 
accountants question that. 
Q. The accountants question the item which in-
dicated that some one of those buyers or sellers 
owed Stern money; is that it? A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Marshall: I object to "apparently 
the accountants questioned that". 
Mr. Podell: They did. 
The Court: In accordance with their in-
dication marked there. 
Mr. Marshall: He says there is "O. K." 
which shows that they investigated and sat-
isfied it. 
The Court: That is there too. 
Mr. Marshall: They should not leave the 
impression that they left the thing with a 
question in their mind, because there is the 
"O. K." following that question mark. 
Mr. Podell : I want to point out that O. 
K. following that. I pointed out the ques-
tion mark first and then the O. K. 
Mr. Marshall : It shows they questioned 
it. 
Mr. Podell: Not so much the question 
mark. 
The Court: What does the "O. K." dis-
close; that is what I am waiting to hear? 
Mr. Podell: The O. K. undoubtedly means 
that they passed the item as regular. 
The Witness: I think I can answer that 
from their working papers. From their 
working papers it would appear that they 
accepted that item as an asset, because they 
transferred that account from accounts pay-
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able and included it with their trade ac-
counts receivable and included it in their 
balance sheet as an asset. 
Mr. Marshall: All right. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. What did you find with respect to that? A. 
Referring to the ledger account— 
The Court: What is wrong about that, 
before you go any further? 
Mr. Podell: I do not know whether we 
have made it quite clear. These are the work 
sheets of accounts payable, am I right? 
The Court: That is right. 
The Witness: Yes, sir. 
Mr. Podell: In among them they found 
an account receivable from somebody. 
The Court: Right. 
Mr. Podell: From whom they would buy 
merchandise and their work sheet shows that 
they questioned that item, and then O. K.'d 
it; that is as far as we have gotten right now. 
The Court: He has gone further than 
that. 
Mr. Podell: What did your Honor under-
stand him to say after that. 
The Court: I know what I have got in 
my mind. 
Mr. Marshall: You are putting the Court 
on the witness stand. 
The Court: Up to that irregularity hav-
ing trouble by getting an account which 
made it practically an asset, there was some-
thing wrong in addition to that. 
Mr. Podell: We do not complain about 
that. What we complain about just now is, 
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if that item were a regular item, if the 
United Baltic really owed Stern $113,000., 
that they followed the proper procedure; 
that is to say, instead of having it as a Ster-
ling Deposit, they entered it as an account 
receivable due to Stern, and that is what we 
complain of, and the reasons for it I was 
about to tell you. 
The Court: Let us have the reason. 
Q. Am I right in my statement? A. I think 
so. 
Q. Go ahead. A. My next step was to examine 
that account in the accounts payable ledger. 
Q. First, is it an unusual thing to find among 
the accounts payable, an advance of $113,000 which 
that would seem to indicate by way of a deposit for 
future purchases? A. It is an item which always 
calls for explanation. Ordinarily the people we 
buy merchandise from do not ordinarily owe us 
money. Ordinarily the balance is the other way. 
Q. Yes. Now then, go ahead and tell us what 
you did. You examined the accounts of the United 
Baltic? A. And I found 
Mr. Marshall: Before you found it, may 
I see that account. 
The Witness: Yes. 
Mr. Marshall: What are the items of the 
United Baltic (referring to accounts with 
the witness)? 
The Witness: There (indicating). 
Mr. Podell: I think we would all like to 
be taken into this private conference. 
Mr. Marshall: I am just asking him to 
show me what it is. I make the same objec-
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tion, with regard to any reference to this 
book, your Honor. 
The Court: The same ruling. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
Q. You go on. A. These accounts with the United 
Baltic Corporation show that at the end of 1923, 
there was a debit balance in that account of 
$113,199.60 in this account. It also shows that the 
United Baltic Corporation were people from whom 
Stern bought merchandise, because the credits of 
this account relate to shipments of merchandise, in-
voice numbers and steamship references; where-
as, the debits relate to letters of credit and cash 
drafts and remittances, clearly indicating that they 
were an account from whom we bought merchan-
dise, and not an account to whom we sold merchan-
dise. 
Q. And do you know that it is not quite custom-
ary for people to pay in advance before merchan-
dise is delivered, is it? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that. 
Q. I think that is a fair question. 
The Court: I will allow that. 
Q. Particularly when the letters of credit ex-
plain it? A. I would say it is rather unusual. 
Q. You go ahead and explain it in your own 
way. A. That is the condition of affairs as shown 
by the ledger, and I would have investigated that 
item further, particularly in view of the fact that 
there were already other instances of items of pur-
chase invoices that had been omitted. This would 
suggest to me the possibility of cash having been 
paid to these people for merchandise which they 
had received and the invoices were omitted; that 
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is, there was the failure, the omission to credit this 
account with invoices; and I will say that in con-
nection with any audit or examination of accounts, 
any large debit balance in an accounts payable ac-
count especially if it results from cash payments, 
would be investigated by the accountant from that 
standpoint. He would want to make certain. 
Q. You mean it would be the normal thing to do, 
and that it should be done? A. Yes, sir, and in this 
instance of course it would have to be done without 
question because other instances of the omission of 
purchase invoices had already been discovered as 
disclosed in the working papers of Touche, Niven 
& Co. 
Q. Purchase invoices; by purchase invoices, the 
omission of purchase invoices, you mean the omis-
sion to enter it in the book what Stern owed for 
the merchandise which he had already purchased 
and sold? A. Exactly, failed to credit the shipper. 
Q. What would have been the most direct and 
effective way of finding out whether there were 
$113,000 due to the United Baltic, or whether Stern 
owed the United Baltic Corporation? A. To com-
municate directly with the United Baltic Corpora-
tion, to tell them that the book showed they owed 
this amount to Stern, and ask them to confirm it. 
Q. Is there the same delicacy with communicat-
ing with a concern that you buy from as with a 
similar concern to whom you sell? A. There is not, 
I might say I would also have asked for a statement 
from this creditor, but I doubt whether I would 
have accepted that statement as final, even if it 
had been submitted to me; I probably would have 
insisted upon the direct communication in any case, 
owing to the other circumstances and owing to the 
very large amount represented here $113,000. 
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Q. Now then, from these very books, have you 
been able to tell after investigation, what the real 
condition was as of December 31st? A. I did not 
investigate that one, Mr. Podell. 
Q. This investigation was made by Mr. Djorup 
from these books? A. So I have been told. 
Mr. Marshall: What investigation? I do 
not get the sense of that question. 
The Court: As to whether or not this was 
as indicated here, a fact, whether it was a 
credit or debit, whether it was really investi-
gated by somebody. 
Mr. Podell: Yes. Perhaps to save time, 
we are willing to stipulate not only such 
statement that Stern, or rather the United 
Baltic, owed Stern $113,000 odd—not only 
is that false, but that as a matter of fact, 
Stern owed to the United Baltic as of De-
cember 31, $258,288.20. 
Mr. Marshall: Did the books show it 
when you audited it? 
The Court: What is that? 
Mr. Marshall: Did the books show it 
when we audited it. 
Mr. Limburg: Yes. 
Mr. Podell: If you want me to answer 
that question, I will tell you just what Mr. 
Levy has just said, if you had done the 
proper thing under the circumstances and 
checked it up, it would undoubtedly have 
shown that was the case. Let us show it the 
regular way then. Let me have the invoices, 
Mr. Djorup. 
Mr. Marshall: I take it the witness's tes-
timony as to Mr. Djorup's investigation is 
not part of this record, you do not allow 
that? 
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The Court: No. 
Mr. Podell: Did your Honor strike out 
something? 
The Court: To the effect that Mr. Djorup 
has made an investigation, so he had been 
told. 
Q. Have you finished your statement as to the 
United Baltic? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I thought you wanted to add something. Now 
one more group of items— A. There was in connec-
tion with this account of the United Baltic, there 
is one other observation that I made in examining 
the account, and that is the balances during the 
year were small in amount, and not until Novem-
ber of 1923 did this large debit balance appear. 
That is, it developed in the accounts at the end of 
the year. Prior to that time, the account was 
almost in balance regularly. There was a small 
balance one way or the other. I had these figures 
before me. 
Q. If you have the items again, will you state 
them so that the jury will understand it accur-
ately? 
Mr. Marshall: Same objection and excep-
tion. 
The Court: Same ruling. 
A. These ledger accounts indicate that on De-
cember 31, 1922, there was a $27 debit balance. 
Then $27.61 January 31st. 
Q. You mean by that, that the United Baltic 
owed—I would rather you put it that way—owed 
Stern $27.64? A. Yes, that would mean that the 
account was substantially in balance. There may 
have been some little adjustment that was still 
open. 
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Q. And in January 1923? A. There was a credit 
balance. Stern owed United Baltic $68.48. At 
the end of February, Stern owed United Baltic, 
$68.48. March 31, a debit balance of $397.79. 
April 30, a debit balance of $67.27. May 31, a credit 
balance 
Q. $84.96? A. That April 30 was a debit balance. 
May 31 a credit balance of $84.96. June 30th 
Q. Pardon me a minute. Will you take the 
months of May, June, July, September and Oc-
tober. Were they all balances in favor of United 
Baltic, credit balances? A. Small balances in 
favor. 
Q. In favor of the United Baltic; that is, that 
Stern owed the United Baltic $84, $1,137, $21, $10, 
$276, for the month of October? A. Yes, sir, those 
are round figures. 
Q. Yes, I have not mentioned the pennies. But 
that has been the run of that account for that 
year? A. Yes, sir, but at the end of November, the 
ledger account shows a debit balance of $83,017.11, 
and at the end of December, as I have already 
stated, a debit balance of $113,000 odd. 
The Court: In favor of Stern? 
The Witness: A debit balance which 
would mean in favor of Stern. That is what 
it indicates to me. 
Mr. Marshall: The same objection as to 
what it indicates to him. 
The Court: I will allow it. This is ex-
pert testimony? 
Mr. Podell: Yes. 
The Witness: It indicates to me—this 
debit balance was a recent thing, something 
that came up right at the very end of the 
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year, something new, that it was not in ac-
cordance with 
The Court: The general run of business? 
A. (Continuing) The general run of business, 
not merely for the year, but with that concern for 
the year, so of course that would be an additional 
reason for inquiring into the thing. 
The Court: Now, have we finished with 
Baltic? 
Mr. Podell: I think we are, your Honor. 
I think I will have to continue with the 
balance of the Baltic with the other witness. 
Q. Now, did you make any further check up on 
these books, with regard to their condition? A. 
Yes, sir, I looked into the situation with reference 
to assigned accounts receivable. The balance sheet, 
the certified balance sheet, indicated that there was 
some $900,000 worth of assigned accounts. 
Q. That is Plaintiff's Exhiibt 1? A. Yes, sir. 
The Court: $900,000? 
The Witness: Nine hundred thousand 
and something. I have not that before me. 
May I have a copy of that? 
The Court: Pledged as collateral to ac-
ceptances; is that what you mean? 
The Witness: Yes, sir. 
The Court: All right. 
The Witness: Included among the assets. 
Q. Pardon me, before we come to that, if you do 
not mind; what did you find with regard to the— 
is it customary in making an audit of this character 
to look into overdue accounts and so forth? A. 
Yes, sir. 
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Q. Did Touche-Niven in their work sheets pay 
any attention to that, do you know? A. Oh, yes, 
they did. 
Q. And what did that show with regard to the 
general condition of the business, reliability of it? 
I mean, as far as these accounts that they had, ac-
counts receivable? A. It showed a vast amount of 
accounts that were past due, a large proportion. I 
have the exact figures. 
Q. Give us the figures. How long were they over-
due? A. Various periods. 
The Court: What do you want to say, 
Mr. Marshall? 
Mr. Marshall: I was going to suggest 
maybe if he went to the work sheets he would 
get it faster. 
The Witness: I have a summary of the 
work sheets. I was going to use that. 
Mr. Marshall: Will you tell us which 
work sheet you are referring to then, please? 
The Witness: Yes, sir. I have it. Pages 
59 to 64 inclusive? 
Q. Just tabulate, if you please, the total amount 
of accounts receivable and the total amounts that 
were overdue, and from what period to what period 
they were overdue? A. These working sheets of 
Touche-Niven indicate that there was on Decem-
ber 31st, 1923 overdue accounts aggregating 
$781,669.72. That of those accounts—those ac-
counts they classified, those overdue accounts they 
classified as follows: Under three months $173,-
558.23. Three to six months, $28,000 
Q. Overdue? A. These are all overdue accounts. 
Three to six months, $28,241.87. 
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Q. I did not get that figure? A. $28,241.87. Six 
to twelve months, $28,565.68. One year and over, 
$551,303.94, making the total of $781,000 approxi-
mately—$781,700. 
Q. What is the total that is overdue? A. That 
is the figure I have just read, $781,669.72. 
Mr. Marshall: Did I understand you to 
say overdue accounts? 
The Court: Yes. That is what he said, 
781,000 overdue. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Now, Mr. Levy, if you deduct that, plus the 
fictitious accounts receivable from the total ac-
counts receivable, how much in accounts receivable 
did he have that were not overdue nor fictitious? 
A. He would have $391,692.50. 
Q. What is the original figure that he had there? 
A. What original figure? 
Q. What figure did he have in this statement? 
You say he had about three hundred and odd thou-
sand? A. The balance sheet would show that, 
Q. I mean the statement shows that he figured 
$2,461,000? A. $2,461,000 against which they set 
up a reserve of $427,000. 
Q. The reserve is $427,000? A. So they showed 
a net balance in the accounts of over $2,000,000. 
The Court: And from that you are de-
ducting the $781,000 and the other accounts 
receivable, amounting to how much? 
Mr. Podell: The admittedly fictitious ac-
counts receivable 
Mr. Marshall: What do you mean, ad-
mittedly fictitious? 
Mr. Podell: I withdraw the word "ad-
mittedly". It is not quite admitted. 
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The Witness: These working sheets show 
that there were total accounts at that time 
which they analyzed, amounting to $2,130,-
679.35. Now, out of that total, if I do as 
you requested, if I deduct from that total the 
$957,317.07 
Q. Fictitious accounts? A. And the past due ac-
counts of $781,669.72, that would leave a balance 
of only $391,692.56. 
Mr. Marshall: If your Honor please, I do 
not think it is proper to make this tabula-
tion, to deduct the overdue accounts after 
deducting the reserve, the doubtful accounts. 
The Witness: No. I am making my cal-
culation on a basis of gross accounts. I am 
not referring to the balance sheet. I am re-
ferring to the work sheets. There were other 
adjustments. 
The Court: He said he was figuring on 
gross accounts. 
Mr. Marshall: There was a reserve set 
up in making his tabulation. 
Mr. Podell: The witness is doing that 
very thing. 
Mr. Marshall: I did not understand he 
was doing so. 
Mr. Podell: That is your misunderstand-
ing. He is just doing that very thing. 
Q. Now, Mr. Levy, when you find a situation 
such as you have described, fictitious accounts re-
ceivable, what would be your inference from your 
experience, as to the solvency or insolvency of the 
particular concern under investigation; aside from 
any figures, when people omit to enter bills that 
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are payable, in a number of instances? A. You 
always look for a reason. You always suspect 
things. You have to look for them. You have to 
look further into the situation. Where there is 
smoke, there is usually 
Q. Would you not at least have a real suspicion 
as to their solvency, as to their having any money 
at all? A. Oh, certainly. 
Q. Now, with that suspicion in your mind, in 
the normal course of things, looking at these as-
signed accounts, will you please explain to the jury 
what you find, and in this instance I want you to 
be particularly careful, particularly careful to 
point out to the jury what Touche-Niven did and 
what they knew; you understand what I mean? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. At the time when you made this same exam-
ination ; and so far as you can, point it out by the 
written instruments that you have, the originals? 
The Court: They are working sheets you 
are referring to? 
Mr. Podell: More than that. More than 
that, your Honor. I would rather have that 
come from the witness, with your Honor's 
permission. I do not mean to be abrupt, but 
I would rather get it from the witness. 
A. These working sheets, pages 61 to 64, indicate 
that Touche-Niven went through the customer's 
accounts and analyzed them as to due dates, and 
there is also a column which is marked "assigned", 
part of these work sheets; and that column totals 
up $903,285.83, which appears to be, which is ex-
actly the amount that they show in Exhibit 1, as 
accounts receivable pledged as collateral to accept-
ances. 
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Q. That is, it is included as accounts receivable 
pledged as collateral, in this statement signed and 
certified to by them? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. $903,285? A. So evidently, in connection with 
their audit, they—they, Touche-Niven, evidently 
sought to verify the fact that these accounts were 
assigned, and the amount of the assigned accounts. 
Q. What makes you say that? A. Because they 
stated in the balance sheet which they certified to 
and their working sheets show— 
Q. What do their working sheets show? A. 
Their working sheets show the individual accounts 
which were assigned, numerous items which total 
the exact amount which appears in the balance 
sheet. 
Q. So that they were working on the assigned 
accounts; there is no doubt about that? A. No 
question about that, from this work sheet, 
Mr. Marshall: Is there any objection to 
having the jury look at these working sheets? 
Mr. Podell: Certainly not. 
The Court: Not at all (showing to jury). 
The Witness: Now, in this column, which 
is headed "assigned", is included the amount, 
and alongside of it, to the right, is a num-
ber in parenthesis, the explanation 
Q. What page are you speaking of? A. I am re-
ferring to page 61, the first page of this detailed 
schedule. 
Mr. Marshall: The first broad page. 
Q. What item are you speaking of? A. I am 
referring to the column headed "Assigned"; it is 
the last column to the right. 
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Q. What appears there, do you say? A. The 
amount of the account assigned, and alongside of it 
to the right appears a number in parentheses. 
Q. Yes. A. The meaning of that number is in-
dicated in a little table which appears at the top of 
the working sheet. Each number indicates some 
bank or some creditor firm. 
Q. No. 7 is the Chemical National, No. 4 is the 
Huth & Company, No. 8 the Metropolitan Trust, 
No. 9 Central Trust, No. 14 J. B. Moors, 16 Bank 
of New York? A. Yes. That is a sort of key to 
these numbers, the number indicating the assignee, 
the person to whom the account was assigned. Look-
ing through the working sheets of Touche-Niven, 
I find that they wrote to various banks and wrote 
to various creditors, asking them whether they held 
any accounts. 
Mr. Podell: Will you produce the letters, 
please? 
Mr. Marshall: They are produced (hand-
ing to counsel). 
Q. I hand you certain letters which are pro-
duced. 
The Court: Are they in evidence? 
Mr. Marshall: They are part of the work-
ing papers, I believe. 
Mr. Podell: I offer them in evidence. 
Mr. Marshall: They are in evidence. 
Mr. Podell: Are they part of the working 
papers? 
Mr. Marshall: Yes. 
The Court: All right. 
Mr. Podell: I ask for the production of 
the replies to those letters. 
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Mr. Marshall: Are the replies there? 
The Witness: I do not think so. That is 
what I was looking for. 
Mr. Podell: I would like to have all the 
replies, if you please. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Now, these are letters checking up from these 
banks and creditors as to whether or not they are 
the holders of certain assignments of accounts, is 
that right? A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Marshall: Let us read the letters. 
They are in evidence. I think they ought to 
speak for themselves. 
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Podell: I will be glad to read one. 
Mr. Marshall: Read one form. You do 
not have to read them all. 
Q. I assume this was on the letterhead of Touche-
Niven, was it? 
Mr. Marshall: I think so. 
(Letter read to jury.) 
Mr. Podell: This particular one is Feb-
ruary 15th, 1924. It is signed by Touche-
Niven and then it is countersigned. Who 
countersigned, do you know, Mr. Marshall? 
Mr. Marshall: I do not know who coun-
tersigned it. I understand Stern did. 
Mr. Podell: Stern countersigned it. 
Signed by Touche-Niven. 
Now then, you have the answers received? 
Mr. Marshall: They are already in evi-
dence. 
Mr. Podell: Just pass them up to Mr. 
Levy, if you will, please. 
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Mr. Marshall: They are scattered through-
out these work sheets attached to various 
schedules, so you probably have to turn to 
several of them to find all the letters. 
Mr. Podell: Will you be good enough to 
pick out J. B. Moors' letter of December 
31st? 
Mr. Marshall: It is in those papers. 
Mr. Podell: Will you state on the record 
what answer you would like to see to those 
letters? 
The Witness: Well, I examined photo-
stat copies of the replies received from Huth 
& Company, and that from William Brandt's 
Sons, Bingham & Company, agents. 
Q. Have you got those replies? A. I think I can 
locate those. 
Q. You have these photostats, have you? A. Yes, 
sir. Shall I use the originals or the photostats? 
Q. Well, use the originals, if you have them there. 
Mr. Marshall: If he could use the photo-
stats, I could follow him. 
Mr. Podell: All right. Use whichever 
you prefer, whichever will help you most. 
Mr. Marshall: What page are you going 
to refer to? 
The Witness: I have a letter; it is page 
6, a letter dated January 18th, 1924. 
Mr. Podell: I would like to mark that 
separately in evidence. 
The Witness: From Huth & Company. 
Mr. Podell: May we mark that separately 
in evidence, your Honor? 
The Court: Yes. 
The Witness: That consists of two pages. 
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And another letter from Huth & Company, 
dated January 31st, 1924, consisting of four 
pages, marked pages 8 to 11, inclusive. 
Mr. Podell: Your Honor, may I read those 
letters? 
The Witness: And there is one more. 
Mr. Podell: And that is from Huth & 
Company? 
The Witness: Yes. 
By Mr. Podell. 
Q. Do those letters of January 18th, January 
31st, those letters, do they indicate the accounts 
that Huth & Company claimed to have had as-
signed to them from Fred Stern & Company? A. 
Yes, sir, they do. They give lists of those accounts. 
Q. They give long lists of those accounts? A. 
The accounts they claim to be assigned to them. 
Q. Have you got any letters from any other peo-
ple besides Huth & Company? A. I have a letter 
from Bingham & Company, letter dated January 
12th, 1924. 
Q. Tell us what page that is? A. That is page 
99 and 100. 
Mr. Podell: May I have that letter please, 
99 to 100 (handed). 
Q. And does that letter from Bingham & Com-
pany give lists of the accounts that Stern assigned 
to them? A. Yes, sir, it does. 
Q. And all those communications we have spoken 
of purport at least to be answers to this form letter 
of inquiry that I read to the jury? A. They appear 
to be, yes, sir. They are all in the working sheets. 
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Mr. Podell: Mark the two letters from 
Huth & Company separately, please. 
(Received in evidence and marked respec-
tively Plaintiff's Exhibits 81 and 82.) 
Mr. Podell: Now then, the letter from 
Bingham will be marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 
83. 
(Received in evidence and marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 83.) 
Q. Now, were there any other letters that you 
wanted to call attention to that came in in answer 
to this inquiry? A. No, sir. Those are the two 
letters that I worked on. 
Mr. Podell: Now, these letters, let the 
record show, are in the files which have been 
in the possession of Touche, Niven & Com-
pany and are produced now by them. The 
originals have never been in our possession; 
and addressed to Touche, Niven & Company. 
Mr. Marshall: Part of our work sheets. 
Mr. Podell: And embraced in part of 
your work sheets, so I take it it will be con-
ceded they were brought to the attention of 
Touche, Niven & Company? 
Mr. Marshall: Certainly was. 
Q. Will you be good enough to tell us what you 
find on a comparison of those letters from Huth 
and Bingham? A. I prepared a schedule of the ac-
counts which Huth & Company claim were assigned 
to them on December 31st, and the schedule of the 
accounts which Bingham claimed were assigned to 
them, and then I compared those accounts with the 
information contained on the work sheets of 
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Touche-Niven, to see what the record showed with 
respect to those accounts. I also examined the cus-
tomer's ledger, to see if there was any indication 
there, any record there of the assignee of the ac-
count. I found such a record in each customer's 
account. I have tabulated all of that information 
in comparative form. 
Q. Now, will you give us that tabulation, what 
you found? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to this again in so 
far as it is based on books not identified, on 
books of Stern unidentified any further than 
heretofore. 
The Court: You mean, on the original ob-
jection? 
Mr. Marshall: On the original objection, 
yes, sir. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Marshall: Exception. 
The Court: Not on the tabulation itself, 
but on the books? 
Mr. Marshall: The tabulation I am per-
fectly willing to take, subject to checking up. 
The Court: Yes. 
The Witness : I find 
Q. How many accounts were there altogether, 
first? A. These two letters of Huth & Company 
and Bingham & Company, related in all to forty-one 
invoices which either one or the other claimed had 
been assigned to them. 
Q. Yes. A. I compared this information, com-
pared Huth's list with Bingham's list, compared 
both lists with the information I found in the cus-
tomer's ledger, and also with the information found 
on Touche-Niven's working papers. 
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Q. Yes. A. And that information presented 
many conflicts. That is, it showed that out of the 
forty-one invoices, six invoices were assigned once, 
but twenty-seven invoices were assigned twice. By 
that, I mean there was a record of an assignment 
to two different parties in the case of twenty-seven 
invoices. 
Q. Of these forty-one accounts? A. Yes, sir. And 
seven of them appeared to be assigned three times, 
and one of them four times. 
Q. When you say appeared to be assigned three 
times, you mean to three different concerns, as col-
lateral? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The same account? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. No question about it being the identical ac-
count and assigned twice and three times and four 
times? A. Yes, sir. I can be more specific. 
Q. You must be, please. A. And indicate just 
what I mean. 
Q. Yes. A. There was the invoice of December 
1st, customer's name was Murray Rubber Com-
pany; the amount of that invoice was—— 
Q. Pardon me. What date did you say? A. De-
cember 1st, 1923. 
Q. To the Murray Rubber Company? A. To the 
Murray Rubber Company. 
Q. Does that appear on schedule 3 of your re-
port? A. Yes, sir. It is the seventh item down. 
Q. Yes. A. Murray Rubber Company, $12,821.30. 
Huth & Company claimed it was assigned to them. 
Bingham & Company claimed 
Q. I would like you to state again, December 1st, 
Murray Rubber Company, $12,821.30 is the amount 
of the account due from the Murray Rubber Com-
pany, presumably, is that right? A. Yes, sir. Huth 
& Company claimed it was assigned to them. Bing-
ham & Company claimed it was assigned to them. 
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Q. Now, wait a moment, Stop right there. You 
say Huth & Company claimed it was assigned to 
them. Did it make that claim in that very letter 
that has been marked in evidence? A. Yes, sir. 
That is the source of all my information. 
Q. Did it make any claim in that very letter ad-
dressed to Touche-Niven that that $12,821.30 had 
been assigned to them as collateral? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And did Bingham & Company make the same 
claim, that that same account had been assigned 
to them, and did it make it in that letter addressed 
to Touche-Niven? A. Yes, sir. 
A Juror: What were the dates of these 
two assignments? 
Q. Give the dates of those assignments as claimed 
by these people? A. I haven't the date of the as-
signment, I have just the information, the date of 
the invoice, and the fact they claimed they were 
still holding it as an assigned account on December 
31, 1923. 
Q. No question about that now. I would like to 
explain that to the juror. The inquiry that was 
sent out by Touche-Niven asked for the state of the 
assigned accounts as of December 31st, did it? A. 
Exactly. 
Q. And the answers that came in from these peo-
ple made the claim that that money shall belong to 
them as an assigned account, both Huth and Bing-
ham, made the same claim as of December 31st? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. No doubt about that? A. No, sir. 
Q. And both these letters were addressed to 
Touche-Niven, were they not? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, you go along and finish the rest of that. 
A. Both Touche-Niven working papers and the 
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ledger account in this instance, indicated that the 
account was assigned to the Central Trust & Sav-
ings Company. 
Q. In other words, Touche-Niven working pa-
pers showed an assignment to still a third party? 
A. Yes, sir. 
The Court: Of that December 1st ac-
count? 
The Witness: Of that same December 1st 
invoice. 
Q. And the ledger showed an assignment to 
whom? A. In this instance to the Central Trust & 
Savings Company, the same as Touche-Niven. 
Q. So that neither Huth & Company nor Bing-
ham were entered in the books as assignees of that 
account? A. Exactly. 
Mr. Marshall: I do not think he can say 
that. 
Q. As of December 31st anyway? A. Were en-
tered in the ledger. 
Q. In the ledger, I mean. 
Mr. Marshall: May I have my same gen-
eral objection and exception? 
The Court: Yes. 
Q. Go along and give us the other items referred 
to in those letters? A. I was in the midst of my 
summary, I merely gave this as a specific instance 
of what I meant. 
Q. I am sorry. A. So of these 41 invoices which 
are covered by the letters from Huth & Company 
and Bingham & Company 
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Q. Pardon me. Did I understand you correctly 
that besides this one of $12,821.30, there were other 
accounts which Huth & Bingham both claimed be-
longed to them on December 31, 1923; am I right 
in that? A. There was one other such account. 
Q. Which other was that? A. There was a two 
cents difference there in the papers, but the ledger 
would indicate that it was the same account. 
December 26, Hood Rubber Company, Huth & 
Company claimed an account assigned to them, 
$5,921.83. Bingham & Company claimed an ac-
count of the same date, from the Hood Rubber 
Company, of $5,921.85. 
Q. You have verified it, have you not? A. There 
was only one such invoice. 
Q. Of December 26th? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That was contained in both the letters, both 
in Huth & Company and Bingham & Company? 
A. That was contained in both the letters, yes, sir. 
Q. What did the books say about that? A. The 
Touche-Niven working papers showed that it was 
assigned to J. B. Moors & Company. 
Q. Do you happen to know where Touche-Niven 
working papers got that information from, that it 
had been assigned to J. B. Moors & Company? A. 
I cannot say. 
Q. What did the customer's ledger show it to be 
assigned? A. Assigned to the Chemical National 
Bank. 
Q. So that altogether between the two letters, 
the Touche-Niven working papers, and the cus-
tomer's ledger account, the same account of $5,900, 
on the same date, December 31st, appeared to be-
long to four different concerns as collateral? A. 
Four conflicting claims, yes, sir. 
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Mr. Marshall: I object to his saying four 
conflicting claims. I move to strike out the 
word "conflicting". 
The Court: Strike it out. Answer the 
question. 
Q. Four different concerns, is that right? A. 
There is a record of four different concerns as the 
assignee of this one invoice. 
The Court: That is the answer. 
Q. In coming to that conclusion, did you use one 
single bit of paper more than was used or must have 
been used by Touche, Niven & Company in this 
audit? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that. 
Mr. Podell: I will withdraw it and put 
it in this form. 
Q. Tell us, in arriving at the assignee, accord-
ing to the customer's ledger, did you look at the 
customer's ledger? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you looked at that account of the Hood 
Rubber Company for that date? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, there is no doubt in your mind, is there, 
from the working papers that Touche, Niven & Com-
pany in making the audit, looked at and used the 
customer's ledger? 
Mr. Marshall: I object to that as calling 
for a conclusion. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Q. Do the working papers of Touche, Niven & 
Co. show that they must have examined the cus-
tomer's ledger? 
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Mr. Marshall: I object to that. 
The Court: I still sustain the objection. 
Mr. Podell: I am going to ask your 
Honor's help to frame the appropriate ques-
tion. 
The Court: The papers speak for them-
selves as a comparison. In other words, if 
on the work sheets there is an indication 
which shows there was an extraction taken 
from the particular part of the book, of 
course that has got to be shown as a fact. It 
may be entirely different, another proposi-
tion. 
Q. Tell me, these are the work sheets of Touche-
Niven, are they not (handing to witness)? Are 
those the work sheets; are they? A. I am told that 
they are. 
Q. Mr. Marshall admits that. 
Mr. Marshall: We offered them in evi-
dence, or somebody offered them in evidence. 
The Witness: I used photostat copies. 
Q. At the head of that work sheet there I see key 
numbers 7, 8, 9, and so forth, giving the names of 
the banks? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was the book from which that informa-
tion was taken? A. I cannot say; I don't know. 
Q. Now, in any event, you can tell us what books 
or documents you used in order to arrive at the in-
formation you have just given us? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And those are what? A. I used the letter 
from Huth, the letter from Bingham. 
Q. The letter addressed to Touche, Niven & Co., 
of which you had a photostat? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The letter from Bingham & Company ad-
dressed to Touche, Niven & Co., of which you had a 
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photostat? A. Yes, sir. I used these working sheets 
of Touche-Niven. 
Q. Of Touche, Niven & Co. and— A. And the cus-
tomer's ledger. 
Mr. Marshall: I move to strike out that 
answer, referring to books which have not 
been identified. 
The Court: You do not need any more 
exceptions on that, Mr. Marshall. 
Mr. Marshall: All right. If your Honor 
says I am covered on that, I am perfectly 
satisfied. 
The Court: You have enough. We will 
not consider it waived hereafter. To any 
reference that is made to these books, you 
have a clear objection and exception. I give 
you a general objection and exception on 
those books which the Court has thus far 
permitted and as to all books which the 
Court permits reference to, as to extracts 
therefrom. That will cover it, 
Mr. Marshall: That will save me from 
doing this again. 
The Court: That saves you the trouble of 
making a specific objection and taking an 
exception each time. 
(Adjourned until Monday, April 8th, 
1929, at 10 o'clock A. M.) 
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